In re Matthew W.
The respondent mother appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor child. The mother claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that she had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of the statute (
The trial court‘s unchallenged factual findings, including its findings regarding the respondent mother‘s transience, mental health issues and substance abuse, were sufficient to support its determination that the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to
BRIGHT, C. J. The respondent mother, Johnna W., appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights to her minor child, Matthew W.1 On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly determined that she had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of
The following undisputed facts, either as found by the court or as appear in the record, are relevant to the respondent‘s apрeal. The respondent has struggled with her mental health since childhood. “[S]he was in and out of psychiatric hospitals from an early age. She is diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), bipolar disorder, and anxiety. [The respondent] has a history of substance abuse and has utilized both inpatient and outpatient treatments . . . to address the issue. She . . . continued to [abuse] substances up until the time of her incarceration in November, 2022.
“[The respondent] is the mother of five children, none of [whom has] been consistently in her care. Her oldest child, [D], was born [in December, 2004]. [D] was removed from [the respondent‘s] care and placed with her maternal aunt . . . in 2007. Her second child, [R], was born [in February, 2008]. Guardianship of [R] was
Matthew was born in February, 2023. The respondent “does not know the identity of Matthew‘s father. At the time of his birth, [the respondent] was incarcerated at York Correctional Institution and hospitalized at Yale New Haven Hospital.” On February 3, 2023, a hospital social wоrker reported to the department that the respondent was unable to care for Matthew, as she was “exhibiting some signs of paranoia,” including making “comments about her fear of staff raping the baby.” The petitioner invoked an administrative ninety-six hour hold on behalf of Matthew that same day. On February 6, 2023, the petitioner filed a neglect petition as to Matthew, and she sought and obtained an order of temporary custody, which the court, McLaughlin, J., later sustained on February 10, 2023.
“On March 23, 2023, the court ordered [the respondent] to attend inpatient substance abuse treatment at New Prospects in Bridgeport . . . . In May, 2023, [the respondent] was discharged from New Prospects. Thereafter, she moved to a shelter and was [required to wear] a [global positioning system] monitoring device. Due to concerns regarding her behavior, her
On June 21, 2023, the court, Maronich, J., adjudicated Matthew neglected, committed him to the care and custody of the petitioner, and ordered final specific steps for the respondent.3 Matthew was placed in a nonrelative foster home with the same foster parents who adopted Matthew‘s sibling, T, in November, 2022. “Matthew is well bonded with his foster parents and receives love and support from them. The foster parents are ready, willing, and able to adopt Matthew.”
The petitioner filed the underlying petition for termination of the respondent‘s parental rights on June 23, 2023, alleging that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of
The respondent “was referred to Connecticut Valley Hospital from July, 2023, to Septembеr, 2023, for competency restoration. Upon discharge from Connecticut Valley Hospital, she went back to York Correctional Institution. She was released from York [Correctional Institution] in September, [2023]. After her criminal charges were resolved, she was placed on probation for a period of two years.
“[The respondent] was referred to [Connecticut Renaissance (CT Renaissance)] for a mental health and substance abuse assessment. . . . [The respondent] completed the intake in October, 2023, but struggled with her attendance at the eight week program. She eventually completed the program [shortly before the trial in February, 2024]. . . . [The respondent] also was previously referred by the department to engage in mental health treatment, substance abuse counseling and resource management while her case was pending with [T].
“[The respondent‘s] first successful visit with Matthew was in November, 2023. She was referred to the Boys and Girls Village Quality Parenting Center [(parenting center)]. At the [parenting center] program, she would be able to have visitation [with Matthew] and parent coaching. [The respondent] had weekly visits at [the parenting center] with Matthew beginning in December, 2023.”
On December 7, 2023, the court approved a permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. On January 23, 2024, Robert Guerrera, a psychiatrist employed by CT Renaissance, conducted a psychological evaluation of the respondent and diagnosed her with bipolar disorder, cannabis use disorder, and stimulant use disorder. In his written evaluation, Guerrera noted that the respondent was three months
On February 21, 2024, the court, Skyers, J., held a trial on the terminаtion of parental rights petition. The court heard testimony from Karla Jimenez, an employee at the parenting center who observed the respondent‘s visits with Matthew; Nadia Mondestin, a licensed alcohol and substance abuse counselor employed by CT Renaissance; Denise Fuzie and Erica Laguerre, the department social workers assigned to Matthew‘s case; and the respondent. The court admitted ten exhibits into evidence, including records from CT Renaissance and the parenting center; Guerrera‘s psychological evaluation; the social study in support of termination of parental rights; the study in support of the permanency plan; court updates from the department; a copy of the court-ordered specific steps; and a copy of the respondent‘s criminal history establishing that the respondent had been convicted of larceny in 2012 and assault in 2017, and found in violation of probation in 2018 and 2022.
Jimenez testified that, when the respondent began the six month parenting center program in November, 2023, the respondent was homeless. Jimenez explained that the respondent‘s interactions with Matthew at the parenting center “were positive. But it did take some time for Matthew to adjust [to] having visits with his mother” because “[h]e was not familiar with [her].” Jimenez also noted that the respondent occasionally used profanity during the visits, although the respondent was “okay” with Jimenez’ attempts to redirect her.
Mondestin testified about the respondent‘s participation in the cognitive behavioral therapy group for her
Fuzie, who was assigned to Matthew‘s case in February, 2023, testified that the issues identified by the department in regard to the respondent‘s previous children were “her unstable mental heаlth, extensive substance [abuse] history, [intimate partner violence], parenting, as well as housing.” While Fuzie was assigned to Matthew‘s case, her communication with the respondent “was inconsistent due to [the respondent being] in and out of different programs.” Fuzie referred the
Laguerre, who previously had worked with the respondent in T‘s case in 2021, testified that the department had identified several issues for the respondent to address in T‘s case, including her mental health, substance abuse, intimate partner violence, employment, and resource management due to her lack of stable housing. She further testified that, although the department had recommended mental health services for the rеspondent in T‘s case, the respondent “was inconsistent with [that] treatment.” Laguerre also was assigned to Matthew‘s case in December, 2023, and she testified that she communicated with the respondent “pretty frequently, via text or phone calls” regarding visitation and monthly meetings at the parenting center. When asked about the respondent‘s progress with her substance abuse treatment through CT Renaissance, Laguerre noted that the respondent was not consistent with that program or her mental health treatment.
The respondent testified that she was residing with three other individuals in a three bedroom apartment in Bridgeport, that she continued to use marijuana, and that she wanted to “be a productive mother. A proactive mother. A determined mother. I have done so many things that I‘m not proud of in my past. You know . . . I felt like I haven‘t had a chance to be a mother, to step up to be a mother. I was kind of frightened. I was young. I had . . . like no stability at all. So, now that I‘m actually progressing in a lot of changes that I‘ve made I decided that I feel like I‘m suitable to making that [happen]. I know it doesn‘t justify what happened in the past, but I feel like I‘m ready to be a mother and stay for treatment and therapy with my child, not just alone.”
When asked how things are different with Matthew as opposed to her previous children, the respondent
During cross-examination, the respondent claimed to have been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and PTSD but denied being diagnosed with bipolar disorder. She explained that “[b]ipolar [disorder] could be [mistaken for] PTSD . . . .” When asked about her decision not to take medication due to her pregnancy, the respondent stated: “Well, [Guerrera] stated that my moods were not medication doable. So, like he‘s been putting me on medication. He told me if I get off the medication and I feel depressed or [something], which I most likely will because it‘s postpartum. I am looking . . . to [get] back on a different medication besides Latuda, I felt like Latuda wasn‘t helping me. And I told him that.”
As to her living arrangements, the respondent testified that her housing situation was temporary and that she would not want to bring Matthew to her apartment. On redirect examination, the respondent testified that her “ultimate plan for housing” was to find a studio apartment, though she also explained, “I‘ve seen a lot of loft studios, which were in my budget range. We‘re unable to still have money left if Matthew needs anything. So, that‘s . . . my living situation.”
As to the respondent‘s failure to rehabilitate, the court stated that the respondent‘s “parental rights were
In the dispositional phase, the court considered and made written findings regarding the seven best interest factors set forth in
On the basis of these subordinate findings, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the termination of the respondent‘s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The court stated that “Matthew is . . . a happy child. He is very bonded and attached to his foster parents. He looks to them for support and comfort. He is [neаrly eighteen months] old and has been with his current foster parents for all of his life. He needs a permanent home where he can continue to flourish and grow. His foster parents are committed to ensuring that he is in a safe, loving and stable home. The foster parents have expressed that they are willing
On appeal, the respondent does not challenge any of the court‘s subordinate findings as being clearly erroneous. Rather, her sole claim is that the court improperly determined that she had failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of
We begin our analysis with the applicable standard of review and relevant legal principles regarding a parent‘s failure to rehabilitate pursuant to
“An important corollary to these principles is that the mere existence in the record of evidence that would support a different conclusion, without more, is not sufficient to undermine the finding of the trial court. Our focus in conducting a review for evidentiary sufficiency is not on the question of whether there exists support for a different finding—the proper inquiry is whether there is enough evidence in the record tо support the finding that the trial court made.” (Emphasis in original.) In re Jayce O., 323 Conn. 690, 716, 150 A.3d 640 (2016).
“Personal rehabilitation as used in [
“During the adjudicatory phase of a termination proceeding, a court generally is limited to considering only evidence that occurred before the date of the filing of the petition or the latest amendment to the petition, often referred to as the adjudicatory date. . . . Nevertheless, it may rely on events occurring after the [adjudicatory] date . . . [in] considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child‘s life within a reasonable time. . . .
“Furthermore, [i]t is well established that a respondent‘s failure to acknowledge the underlying personal issues that form the basis for the department‘s concerns indicates a failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. . . . [A]s a general proposition, the failure to acknowledge and make progress in addressing the issues that led to a child‘s removal may be one of many contributing factors to a court‘s determination that a parent has failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re A. H., 226 Conn. App. 1, 17–18, 317 A.3d 197, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 918, 317 A.3d 784 (2024).
Construing the record in the manner most favorable to sustaining the judgment, as we must; see In re Niya B., supra, 223 Conn. App. 490; we conclude that the evidence reasonably supports the court‘s ultimate determination that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of
In the present case, the court considered events occurring after the adjudicatory date in June, 2023, in determining that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. As to the respondent‘s transiency issue, Laguerre testified that, in T‘s case, the department had identified the respondent‘s lack of stable housing and her mental health and substance abuse issues as the issues she needed to address and that the respondent had been inconsistent in the recommended treatments at that time. Both Laguerre and Jimenez testified that the respondent remained homeless in November, 2023, when the respondent began visitation at the parenting center. Mondestin likewise testified about the respondent‘s lack of stable housing during that time, explaining that her struggles with attendance at CT Renaissance were attributable to her lack of stable housing. The respondent herself testified that her living situation at the time of trial was temporary and unsuitable for Matthew, and she acknowledged that she was unable to afford a suitable dwelling while also providing for Matthew‘s needs. Consistent with this evidence, the court found that the respondent “ha[d] not demonstrated any period of stability that would demonstrate her ability to care for the needs of Matthew.” Accordingly, the court‘s finding that the respondent‘s history of transiency remained unresolved is supported by the evidence in the record. See, e.g., In re Lil‘Patrick T., 216 Conn. App. 240, 257, 284 A.3d 999 (record provided evidentiary basis for court‘s finding that “the respondent would likely not be able,
As to her mental health issues, the evidence established that, after successfully completing inpatient treatment for mental health and substance abuse issues at New Prospects in May, 2023, the respondent was unable to remain in New Prospects’ shelter due to issues with her behavior. Although the respondent testified that shе was “getting proper treatment, which [was] adjusting [her] mental status,” she also denied that she suffered from bipolar disorder and stated that she was not taking medication. In addition, the respondent testified that Guerrera had “stated that [her] moods were not medication doable,” whereas Guerrera specifically stated in his psychological evaluation that the respondent had stopped taking medication for her bipolar disorder because she was three months pregnant. The respondent thus denied her well documented diagnosis of bipolar disorder and was unable to treat her conditions with medication due to her pregnancy, which indicates a failure to acknowledge and an inability to address her underlying mental health issues. See, e.g., In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 589, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015) (parent‘s “failure to acknowledge the underlying pеrsonal issues that form the basis for the department‘s concerns indicates a failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re A. H., supra, 226 Conn. App. 17 (same).
The same is true as to the respondent‘s substance abuse issues. Guerrera noted that the respondent had last used ecstasy in April, 2023, which was during the time that she was receiving inpatient treatment at New Prospects. He also noted, however, that, despite being three months pregnant in January, 2024, the respondent “continue[d] to smoke marijuana daily.” Although Guer-
The respondent nevertheless argues that the record establishes that she had addressed her “transience and her mental health and substance abuse issues” in that she had (1) completed the CT Renaissance program, (2) “obtained housing and was willing to [allow] the department [to examine] the housing,” (3) participated “in weekly visitation with Matthew through” the parenting center, and (4) “cooperated with probation and avoided involvement with the criminal justice system . . . .” In short, although the respondent argues that some of the evidence in the record could have supported a different conclusion than the one reached by the court, that simply “is not relevant to our analysis . . . . [T]he mere fact that there was evidence in the record that would have supported a different finding is not enough to call into question the sufficiency of the evidence that does provide support for the court‘s finding.” In re Jayce O., supra, 323 Conn. 718. For this reason, the evidence identified by the respondent does not undermine our conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to support the court‘s finding that she failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of
Finally, the respondent argues that the court improperly based its decision on her history rather than on her abilities at the time of trial.9 In support of her argument, the respondent highlights the court‘s reference
As this court has explained, “the court in a termination of parental rights hearing should consider all potentially relevant evidence, no matter the time to which it relates. . . . In order for the court to make a determination as to the respondent‘s prospects for rehabilitation, the court was required to obtain a historical perspective of the respondent‘s child caring and parenting abilities. . . . Because the parent-child relationship is at issue, all relevant facts and family history should be considered by the trial court when deciding whether to terminate the respondent‘s parental rights. . . . The entire picture of that relationship must be considered whenever the termination of parental rights is under consideration by a judicial authority.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Gabriel C., 196 Conn. App. 333, 367, 229 A.3d 1073, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 938, 248 A.3d 708 (2020).
In the present case, the court properly considered the respondent‘s history with the department and her
In sum, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to suрport the court‘s determination that the petitioner had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief, that within a reasonable time, considering Matthew‘s age and needs, she could assume a responsible position in his life.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.