In re M.R.
M.R. timely appealed. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court‘s findings and ultimate ruling under
As discussed herein, we conclude that the juvenile court erred when it found all five statutory criteria weigh in favor of transferring M.R. to criminal court (
These errors require we vacate the juvenile court‘s order granting the prosecution‘s transfer motion, but we disagree that M.R. is entitled to entry of an order denying the motion at this juncture. While there may be cases where the record supports denial of the transfer motion as the appropriate rеmedy, this is not such a case. Where, as here, the juvenile court has abused its discretion in evaluating the evidence and applying the operative legal standards, it is appropriate to remand the matter so the court may reconsider the evidence and its ultimate determination “‘through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation . . .‘” (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 162, quoting In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288 (S.S.); see J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 714–715 (J.N.) [“‘exercises of discretion must be guided by applicable legal principles‘“].) Accordingly, we vacate the juvenile court‘s order granting the prosecution‘s motion to transfer M.R. to criminal court, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, to include an updated transfer report that comports with
I. Kidnapping and Sexual Assault of E.G.2
Between 2014 and 2016, M.R.‘s mother, Sandra Garcia, and J.G., a divorced father of two daughters, were in a romantic relationship. In early 2015, Garcia and her two younger sons, E.M. and Jo.G., moved into J.G.‘s house. Garcia‘s two older sons, M.R. and Brandon Roque, lived elsewhere. In the summer of 2015, in advance of the upcoming school year, J.G.‘s two daughters, K.G. and E.G., returned to the United States from Sweden, where they had been living with their mother.
Tensions developed in the household between J.G.‘s daughters and Garcia and her family. In Jаnuary 2016, after his daughters made the decision to stay in the United States, J.G. asked Garcia to move out. Garcia agreed but thereafter hatched a plan intended to scare J.G.‘s daughters badly enough to cause them to move back to Sweden. In February 2016, when J.G. was out of town for business, the plan was put into action.
Eleven-year-old K.G. did not feel well that day and stayed home from school. Garcia made K.G. go with her to a doctor‘s appointment she had scheduled for the afternoon. As a result, neither Garcia nor K.G. was home when 13-year-old E.G. arrived after school. That morning, E.G.‘s cell phone had disappeared from the counter where she left it, forcing her to leave for school without it, which concerned her. When she arrived home from school that day, she tried to enter the house through the garage but her key did not work in the lock so she went around to the front door.
Four males wearing black clothing and masks came up behind her, put tape over her eyes and mouth, tied her arms behind her back with a rope, and shoved her into a car trunk. E.G. recognized M.R.‘s voice but initially thought he and Roque were playing a
Throughout the ordeal, the males threatened to shoot her if she screamed and told her not to tell her father or the police. Before leaving her tied to the tree, they also said they knew her father was on a business trip and her mother was in Sweden, information which not many people knew. After waiting a few minutes to make sure her attackers were not coming back, E.G. freed herself, put on her pants and shirt, and made her way to the nearby road. She saw a couple outside a house and sought help from them, at which point law enforcement became involved.
II. Arrest, Complaint, and First Transfer Hearing
M.R., Garcia, and Garcia‘s cousin, Miguel Carriedo, were initially arrested in connection with the crimes committed against E.G. approximately one week later.3 The prosecution proceeded against M.R., who was only days shy of turning 18 at the time of the crimes, by complаint directly filed in criminal court.4 (
In August 2022, Roque was arrested, and M.R., Garcia, Carriedo, and Roque were subsequently indicted by a grand jury on charges of conspiracy to commit kidnapping, sexual penetration by force, kidnapping a victim under the age of 14 with multiple special circumstance allegations under the One Strike law,6 torture, and dissuading a witness by force or threat.7 (
In September 2023, jury trial commenced, and in October 2023, the jury convicted M.R. and Garcia as charged and found the One Strike law allegations true.
IV. Second Transfer Hearing
In December 2023, subsequent to the enactment of Assembly Bill 2361, the prosecution filed a second motion seeking to transfer M.R. from juvenile court to criminal court.
In March 2024, M.R. opposed the motion solely on procedural grounds, as follows. In 2022, after M.R. was indicted on charges by the grand jury, he filed a demurrer. (
In November 2024, M.R. filed motions in limine, in which he objected to another transfer hearing that late in the proceeding after he had “‘aged out‘” of the juvenile system. He also argued his entitlement to consideration of the five statutory criteria under a clear and convincing evidence standard, and to immediate appeal if the juvenile court ordered his transfer to criminal court.
The juvenile court hеld the second transfer hearing in November 2024. The prosecution called four correctional officers to testify at the hearing. M.R. did not put on any evidence. The juvenile court took the matter under submission and in January 2025, the court granted the prosecution‘s transfer motion.
M.R. filed the instant appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
A. Section 707
“When a minor age 16 or older is alleged to have committed a felony, the prosecution may move to transfer the minor to criminal court. (
“In determining whether to transfer a minor to criminal court, the juvenile court ‘shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E)’ of
“Section 707 also sets forth a nonexhaustive list of ‘factor[s]’ relevant to each of the five criteria. For the first criterion (criminal sophistication)[,] the relevant factors include ‘the minor‘s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor‘s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor‘s actions; the effect of the minor‘s family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor‘s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor‘s criminal sophistication.’ (
As amended by Assembly Bill 2361,
“[California Rules of Court, r]ule 5.770 was amended, effective September 1, 2023, to comport with these changes. It provides in relevant part: ‘Following receipt of the probation officer‘s report and any other relevant evidence, the court may order that the youth be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence each of the following: (1) The youth was 16 years or older at the time of any alleged felony offense . . .; and [¶] (2) The youth should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court based on an evaluation of all the criteria in
“[T]he ultimate finding that the juvenile court must make under
B. Standard of Review
“We review the juvenile court‘s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “‘The court‘s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. [Citation.] A decision based on insufficient evidence or the court‘s “‘erroneous understanding of applicable law‘” is subject to reversal. [Citation.]’ (Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187.) But . . . we do not reweigh the evidence and wе do not substitute our discretion for the discretion exercised by the trial court.” (J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 211.) “[W]e draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court‘s findings, not against them.” (Miguel R., supra, at p. 169.) “We . . . are concerned only with whether ‘“‘the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact‘s findings.‘“’ [Citation.] When evidence reasonably justifies the trier of fact‘s findings, ‘“the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.“‘” (Ibid.)
II. Summary of Transfer Hearing
A. Prosecution Witnesses
The prosecutor called four correctional officers employed at the jail to testify about four incidents involving M.R. Officer Molinar testified that on January 22, 2017, inmate-manufactured alcohol, or pruno, was discovered in a drawer during a security check of M.R.‘s triple-bunk area. M.R. admitted the pruno was his and he received a rules violation.
Officer Prieto testified that on November 26, 2017, he smelled smoke and located a box of chess pieces that had been set on fire in the shower. The inmates used staples and electrical cords to create the spark that started the fire, and Officer Prieto explained that inmates use melted plаstic to create tattoo ink. M.R. was in the area of the fire and
Officer Ataide testified that on September 4, 2019, staff discovered pruno in a drawer during a pod search. M.R. had some personal belongings in the same drawer and he received a rules violation, but he made no admissions and declined a disciplinary hearing.
Officer Garcia testified that on May 23, 2023, there was a fight in the common area of the pod involving three inmates, including M.R. M.R. had red hands and one of the other inmates also had physical signs of involvement on his hands and arms. Officer Garcia did not have any information concerning who started the fight or what caused it, but he testified that fights usually occur because of issues over disrespect.
B. Additional Evidence
In addition to the four witnesses, the prosecutor submitted M.R.‘s high school records, requested the juvenile court consider the jury trial evidence and noted a probation report had been prepared. (
C. Ruling
After taking the matter under submission, the juvenile court annоunced its ruling at a hearing and issued an 11-page written ruling. In the written ruling, the court stated it had considered the testimony of the four correctional officers, found them credible, and found M.R. engaged in fighting, possession of contraband, and arson while in jail custody. The court also stated it had presided over the jury trial and had considered the
III. Analysis
A. M.R.‘s Reliance on Dr. Blak‘s 2018 Testimony
Before turning to whether the juvenile court‘s findings are supported by substantial evidence, we address M.R.‘s reliance in his briefing on Dr. Blak‘s testimony from his first transfer hearing, held in 2018 before the Honorable Gary L. Hoff. In response to the People‘s contention that the juvenile court did not consider this testimony in ruling on the second transfer motion, M.R. argues the court necessarily considered it because a transcript of Dr. Blak‘s testimony was attached to the transfer motion and the сourt stated it had considered the motion. We disagree with this characterization of the record.
Dr. Blak evaluated M.R. and prepared a report, and he testified at the first retrospective transfer hearing in 2018. When M.R. moved for a second transfer hearing in 2022 following his indictment by the grand jury, the prosecution opposed the motion and attached a transcript of Dr. Blak‘s testimony as exhibit No. A. Neither party asked the juvenile court to consider Dr. Blak‘s report or his testimony at the second transfer hearing held in 2024, and the record reflects that the court considered the prosecution‘s second transfer motion brought in 2023, not the prosecution‘s 2022 opposition to M.R.‘s motion. There is no indication in the record that the court considered any of the evidence from the first transfer hearing and, therefore, in resolving this appeal, we do not consider
B. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Criteria Findings
1. Degree of Criminal Sophistication
The first criterion is “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.” (
The court found no mitigating factors applied and concluded that M.R. “was well aware of the diabolical nature of this horrendous crime.” The court observed M.R. “installed an application on his phone to provide for alternative, temporary phone numbers to secure telecommunications bеtween the coconspirators,” and “exchanged text messages with . . . Garcia about having to be picked up while they were both in the same car at or near the . . . [m]all.” The court also observed that M.R. laid in wait for the 13-year-old victim until she returned home from school, and he and the other coconspirators forced her into the trunk of the car, took her to an isolated location, tied her to a tree, and sexually assaulted her.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court‘s finding that this criterion weighs in favor of transferring M.R. to criminal court. M.R. relies heavily on Dr. Blak‘s testimony to support his argument, but, as discussed, Dr. Blak testified at the first transfer hearing in 2018, neither party requested the court consider that evidence at the second transfer hearing, and nothing in the record indicates the court considered that evidence. (See, e.g., J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 716 [extensive evidence of the minor‘s upbringing presented].) Further, although M.R. reported he was taking a medication for sleep when he was interviewed by probation in 2023, he reported no mental health issues, and he denied any suicide attempts, mental health hospitalization, or childhood abuse. Finally, although the juvenile court must consider any relevant factors and the prosecution bears the burden of proving this criterion weighs in favor of transfer,
Notes
M.R. was three days shy of his 18th birthday when E.G. was kidnapped and sexually assaulted. M.R. did not mastermind the plot, but there is no indication he was coerced, he was a major participant in the crimes, and his conduct was not rash or impulsive. To the contrary, Carriedo testified that when the group talked about the plan to scare J.G. and his daughters the night before the crimes occurred, Garcia, M.R., and Kahlid were the three interested in participating; and M.R., along with Kahlid and Carriedo, downloaded the Burner app to their phones and tested it that evening, evidencing M.R.‘s active and willing participation in the plot.12 M.R. was also present for and directly involved in kidnapping E.G., which then devolved into torture, sexual assault with a foreign object, and threats to kill her. (Compare J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 214 [escalating robbery spree culminating in a stabbing death deliberative rather than spontaneous or impulsive] & Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 162 [preplanned robbery where the minor shot victim and then fled, changed appearance, and lied to police] with S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1290 [the minor who stabbed victim to death at a party was drunk and court disregarded evidence of
2. Ability to Rehabilitate M.R. Prior to Expiration of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
The second criterion is “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction.” (
The court found the opportunity to rehabilitate M.R. prior to the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction, if at all, was very limited given that he was 26 years old, he committed the crime just three days shy of his 18th birthday, and the nature of the offense was very violent.
M.R. concedes committing numerous rules violations while in custody, but he argues there was no evidence presented that he could not be rehabilitated within the two-year period the juvenile court would retain jurisdiction over him. (
The juvenile court erred in finding that this criterion weighs in favor of transfer to criminal court. “[T]he focus of the second criterion is whether there is enough time to rehabilitate the minor while the minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile court jurisdiction.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166–167, citing J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 721 & Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 200, fn. 13; accord, O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.) “[T]he prosecution accordingly ‘bears the burden of producing evidence of insufficient time to rehabilitate the minor‘” (Miguel R., supra, at
The probation officer who prepared the transfer report did not testify, but she opined in the report that two years was not enough time to rehabilitate M.R. and his level of maturity exceeded that of the juvenile system. The juvenile court concluded, based on M.R.‘s age and the violent nature of the crime, that the opportunity to rehabilitate M.R., if at all, is very limited. However, the court‘s finding that M.R. is incapable of rehabilitation before the expiration of jurisdiction must be supported by substantial evidence. (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 163, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(b)(2).) Courts have recognized that “proper analysis of this criterion generally requires ‘expert testimony concerning the programs available, the duration of any of the programs, or whether attendance would rehabilitate [the minor] before termination of the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction.‘” (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1291, quoting J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 722; accord, O.F., supra, at p. 164; compare S.S., supra, at p. 1287 [declining to accept probation officer‘s opinion in report as an expert opinion] with C.S., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1018, 1019 [probation officer who prepared transfer report and testified at hearing “deemed an expert in the evaluation of juvenile offenders and their fitness to remain in the juvenile justice system“].)
The prosecutor in this case “presented no evidence to demonstrate what [M.R.‘s] rehabilitative needs were, much less why they could not be met within the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction.” (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1291, italics added; accord, J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 722.) Further, the probation officer‘s conclusory opinion does not constitute substantial evidence because it was not supported by substantial evidence. (J.N., supra, at p. 722; accord, S.S., supra, at p. 1287.) In addition to the dearth of facts in the report, in stating that M.R. had matured out of the juvenile system, the probation officer failed to acknowledge
The People contend that M.R. has overlooked “overwhelming evidence” supporting the juvenile court‘s implied finding that two years was insufficient to rehabilitate him, and they point to his history of disciplinary violations while in custody. As an initial matter, the juvenile court was required to recite the basis for its decision, including its reasons, and it did not cite M.R.‘s disciplinary conduct in custody in support of its finding on this criterion. (
In sum, the transfer report in this case contained no infоrmation specific to rehabilitation and the prosecutor did not introduce any such evidence at the hearing. Thus, given the absence of any evidence on the nature of M.R.‘s rehabilitative needs, what rehabilitative programs were available to him, and whether he would be amenable to rehabilitation through those programs within two years’ jurisdictional timeframe, the prosecutor failed to meet his burden of proving this criterion and the juvenile court‘s finding that this criterion weighs in favor of transfer to criminal court is not supported by substantial evidence.
3. Previous Delinquent History
The third criterion is “[t]he minor‘s previous delinquent history.” (
The court found that although M.R. did not have any known juvenile record, he had a lengthy, exhaustive history of defiance, disruption, and disrespectful behavior at school. The court found his behavior resulted in 60 disciplinary reports involving warnings, parental notifications, detentions, and summer school. Hе also accrued 88 unexcused absences and 23 suspensions. The court included a summary of 20 incidents.
M.R. argues that he had no delinquent history prior to the offenses committed against E.G. and the juvenile court abused its discretion by considering his school records
The minor in D.C. claimed that because “the ‘previous delinquent history’ criterion is limited to (1) conduct taking place before the alleged offense and (2) conduct resulting in a delinquency petition” (D.C., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 451), “the juvenile court‘s consideration of [his] 2017 burglary and the conduct documented in his school records was improper” (ibid.). The appellate court analyzed
M.R. did not have any known history of delinquency within the juvenile court system, but his records evidence a history of delinquent behavior in school and he engaged in multiple incidents of rule-breaking while in custody following his arrest in this case. This information is relevant to the inquiry and may be considered by the court. (D.C., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 456; accord, J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 214-215.)
M.R.‘s school records were admitted into evidence and the court found he had “a long and exhaustive history ... of defiance, disruption and being disrespectful during his academic career .... In total, [M.R.] generated [60] discipline reports, resulting in numerous warnings, parental notifications, detentions, and summer school assignments. During his high school tenure, alone, [M.R.] accumulated [88] unexcused absences and [23] suspensions.” The court then listed the following specific incidents that occurred between 2011 and 2015:
”September 30, 2011: [M.R.] took another student‘s worksheet, erased the student‘s name and replaced it with his own.
”March 16, [2012]: [M.R. disrupted the class by making inappropriate comments.
”May 3, 2012: [M.R.] was defiant and disrespectful to two teachers and walked out of class.
”August 20, [2012]: [M.R.] used his cell phone to take pictures of a math aide.
”December 11, 2012: [M.R.] made disrespectful comments about the color of an instructional aide‘s skin.
”February 4, 2013: [M.R.] confronted another student. ”February 15, 2013: [M.R.] disrupted multiple classes. Staff removed [M.R.] from class. In another class, [M.R.] chewed gum and slept during instruction. In yet another class, [M.R.] directed profanity at a teacher and then walked out of class.
”March 7, 2013: [M.R.] was defiant and used inappropriate language. He also left class without permission.
”May 21, 2013: [M.R.] was suspended for repeatedly using a racial slur around staff and students.
”October 1, 2013: [M.R.] repeatedly made noise during class and refused to comply with instructions.
”October 15, 2013: [M.R.] talked during instruction, threatened to sue the teacher, and was continuously disruptive and incited other students to disobey.
”November 14, 2013: [M.R.] disrupted the class and interrupted the teacher by moaning.
”November 19, 2013: [M.R.] yelled during the administration of a test.
”November 21, 2013: [M.R.] refused to complete his school work, used profanity towards a teacher, incited other students to disobey, and then left the classroom without permission.
”March 4, 2014: [M.R.] shoved and elbowed another student.
”March 27, 2014: [M.R. shoved] and elbowed a female student out of her seat.
”April 2, 2014: [M.R.] threatened his teacher and pushed and harassed another student.
”April 30, 2014: [M.R.] was suspended for fighting.
”October 27, 2014: [M.R.] asked his teacher three separate times if she was on her period. When told to put away his cell phone, [M.R.] replied ‘I don‘t give a fuck’ and left class without permission.
”February 3, 2015: [M.R.] cussed his teacher, took items off the teacher‘s desk without permission, and incited other students to disobey.”
M.R.‘s school records reflect 69 documented disciplinary incidents between 2011 and 2015, which resulted in verbal counseling; phone calls to Garcia and her mother, with
M.R. does not challenge this evidence except on the ground that it should not have been considered because it related to school. We have rejected that claim and conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court‘s finding that M.R. has a prior history of delinquency that weighs in favor of transfer to criminal court.
4. Previous Attempts to Rehabilitate M.R.
The fourth criterion is the “[s]uccess of рrevious attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor.” (
The court found that given the absence of any juvenile record, there were no previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate him. However, because the school district made numerous, comprehensive attempts to rehabilitate him without success, the court found it “dubious, at best, that” rehabilitation attempts by a juvenile court would have been successful.
M.R. argues that given his lack of any prior history with the juvenile system, there is no evidence of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate him. The probation officer‘s report is consistent with this information and he faults the juvenile court for considering the school district‘s efforts to correct his misbehavior. The People agree there is no evidence of prior attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate M.R., but they contend the court had the discretion to consider M.R.‘s school disciplinary records in making a finding on this criterion. Alternatively, the People contend that even if the
As the juvenile court, the probation officer, and the parties recognized, there were no previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate M.R. However, the statute provides that the court shall give weight to any relevant factor and, as previously stated, the appellate court in D.C. found the legislative history of
The finding that this criterion weighs in favor of transfer to criminal court must be supported by substantial evidence and, here, there is no evidence of prior efforts to rehabilitate M.R. Speculation based on M.R.‘s history of disruptive and defiant behavior does not suffice. Therefore, the court erred in finding this criterion weighs in favor of transfer to criminal court.
5. Circumstances and Gravity of Offense
Finally, the fifth criterion is “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.” (
This case does not involve any evidence that the victim trafficked, abused, or battered M.R., and the court found there was “a plethora of evidence that the [crime] was extremely violent [and] well planned,” and that M.R. was an active participant in both “the planning and execution of the crime.” The court noted that M.R. “and his coconspirators planned [and] executed the kidnapping of a thirteen-year-old [girl],” and the crime involved lying in wait outside her home. When she arrived home from school, one of the individuals, who was masked, covered her eyes and mouth with his hands and walked her to the side of the house where another masked individual, whom she recognized as M.R. by his voice, told her to get into the trunk. The victim was then driven to an isolated location approximately 45 minutes away, tied to a tree with rope, stripped of her clothing, and assaulted with the handle of a toilet plunger until she vomited. The victim was threatened she would be shot if she did not stop screaming and she was threatened with death if she told anyone what happened. She was then left tied to the tree without any clothing.
M.R. concedes the crime caused the victim severe harm, but he argues the juvenile court failed to either consider or appreciate the existence of mitigating evidence. M.R. again relies on Dr. Blak‘s testimony for support, but, as we have explained, that evidence was not before the court during the second transfer hearing. Moreover, “the existence of contrary evidence does not show that the trial court‘s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. In conducting substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court‘s findings, not against them. [Citation.] We consequently are concerned only with whether ‘“‘the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact‘s findings.‘“’ [Citation.] When evidence reasonably justifies the trier of
The circumstances and gravity of the offense committed against 13-year old E.G. are shocking. M.R. was an active participant in the crime. He engaged with his coconspirators in planning the crime, and he downloaded the Burner app to mask his messages. He also prepared for the crime in advance by dressing in black and masking himself, and, along with three other coconspirators, he was directly involved in kidnapping E.G., transporting her into the mountains in the trunk of a car, tying her to a tree, stripping her naked, repeatedly sexually assaulting her with the handle of a toilet plunger, and threatening to kill her. The crime was heinous, and the juvenile court‘s finding that the circumstances and gravity of the offenses weigh in favor of transferring M.R. to criminal court is, without question, supported by substantial evidence.
C. Ultimate Finding M.R. Not Amenable to Rehabilitation
“The amended version of section 707 requires the juvenile court to consider each of the five statutory criteria and how those criteria affect [the] minor‘s amenability to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (
As stated, “the ultimate finding that the juvenile court must make under section 707[, subdivision ](a)(3) concerns a global assessment of the minor‘s suitability to rehabilitation within the juvenile court system” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 167), and “[t]he prosecution bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is ‘not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court‘” (ibid., quoting
First, while “[t]he weight to be given each of the five criteria is within the juvenile court‘s discretion” (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 159, citing D.C., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 445), the weight the court afforded each criteria is not apparent from the record. Further, the record does not indicate that the court viewed each criterion, and its global assessment, through the lens of rehabilitation, as is required under the law. Indeed, the evidence in this case does not speak, at all, to several of the issues critical to a determination that a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation. This precludes a finding of
The crime committed against E.G. was vicious and resulted from a cold, calculated plan hatched in advance and in which M.R. actively participated. Assuming a spectrum on which a drunken knife fight at a party or a shooting that resulted from a struggle over a weapon, initiated by the victim, fall at one end (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1290; J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 711-712), this crime falls on the other. However, neither the horrifying nature of the crime nor its sophistication suffices to support a transfer order where, as here, the inquiry and findings were not
However, we disagree with M.R. that he is entitled to remand with directions to enter an order denying the prosecution‘s transfer motion. “‘All exercises of discretion must be guided by applicable legal principles .... [Citations.] If the court‘s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.] Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal. [Citation.]’ (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 106.) The ‘discretion must be exercised in accordance and within the framework prescribed by the Legislature.‘” (Bruce M. v. Superior Court (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 566, 573.)” (J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 714-715.)
This case does not involve a retroactive change in the law that occurred after the transfer hearing, and the juvenile court spoke to the applicable legal standard when it ruled. Nevertheless, the court‘s ruling expressly reflects a misaрprehension of the scope of its discretion under
Given the need for further proceedings on remand, we emphasize that when a transfer motion is filed, “the juvenile court shall order the probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the minor.” (
There are difficulties inherent in providing an adult with a retrospective juvenile transfer hearing (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 313), but it is a matter that must be approached with the utmost seriousness (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1294). We need not and do not endeavor to define the universe of evidence a prosecutor may or must rely on to support a transfer motion, but numerous appellate
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court‘s order granting the prosecution‘s motion to transfer M.R. to criminal court is vacated. This matter is remanded to the juvenile court for proceedings consistent with this opinion, to include an updated transfer report that comports with
MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
DETJEN, J.