D.W., Pеtitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
B294110
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT
Filed 12/9/19
John C. Lawson II, Judge.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Nos. NJ29107 & NA105083)
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. John C. Lawson II, Judge. Petition granted and remanded.
No appearance for Respondent.
Jackie Lacey, District Attorney, Phyllis C. Asayama, June Chung and Matthew Brown, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner D.W. was found unfit for juvenile treatment based on the allegation that, at age 17, he committed second degree murder in violation of
D.W. alleges he is entitled to a new transfer hearing because the People (Real Party in Interest) have not established a prima facie case that he committed an offense that would now make him eligible for transfer to adult court. The People contend (1) they are no longer required to make a prima facie case in light of the statutory changes enacted by Proposition 57; (2) the facts presented to the juvenile court establish probable cause for the unalleged offense of assault with a deadly weapon under a natural and probable consequences theory; and (3) the nature of the specific offense alleged in the petition is irrelevant to the court‘s analysis of D.W.‘s fitness for juvenile treatment.
We agree with D.W. that he is entitled to a new transfer hearing and remand the case to the juvenile court to vacate its order transferring his case to adult court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 24, 2017, the People filed a petition in the Juvenile Court alleging D.W., at age 17, committed the offense of murder on October 3, 2016, in violation of
At the heаring on the transfer petition, the People presented evidence that D.W. was in a car with three adults at a gas station in Long Beach when an altercation began. The victim approached the car, after which D.W. and the adult men got out of the car, confronted the victim, and ultimately chased and beat him with hands and feet. One of the adults stabbed the victim, causing his death. When interviewed by police, D.W. admitted punching the victim multiple times, but denied knowledge of the stabbing. D.W. also stated the victim attacked him, and D.W.‘s father had taught D.W. to defend himself.
The People introduced no evidence that D.W. had the intent to kill the victim, or that he knew the victim would be stabbed. Instead, the People repeatedly invoked the natural and prоbable consequences doctrine of criminal liability for homicide. (Under that doctrine, D.W.‘s intent to commit murder was irrelevant. If murder was the natural and probable consequence of his participation in the assault of the victim, he could be found liable for
The juvenile court made three findings: the victim died of stab wounds inflicted by one of the adults; D.W. was one of the people who accosted the victim; and D.W. was over 16 years old at the time of the offense. Based on these facts, the court found probable cause that D.W. committed an offense within the meaning of
D.W. filed a petition for writ of mandate and petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging he was entitled to a new transfer hearing because: (1) the People failed to establish probable cause for murder as they relied sоlely on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which was eliminated by the Senate Bill No. 1437‘s amendments to
On February 28, 2019, wе denied the petitions. D.W. then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, at S254506, raising his right to a new transfer hearing based on the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, and arguing the lack of substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court‘s transfer order to adult court. D.W. also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus at S254508 alleging ineffective assistanсe of his juvenile court counsel.
On April 17, 2019, the California Supreme Court granted the petition for review and ordered us to vacate our order denying the petition for writ of mandate and to issue an order to show cause directing the juvenile court to show cause why relief should not be granted on D.W.‘s claim that the juvenile court‘s finding of a prima facie case is no longer valid following Senate Bill No. 1437‘s amendments to
On October 10, 2019, D.W. filed a letter pursuant to
DISCUSSION
The People concede D.W. may no longer be liable for murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and acknowledge People v. Lopez held that Senate Bill No. 1437 eliminated accomplice liability for murder under the same doctrine. Instead, the People argue they are no longer required tо prove a prima facie case of the alleged offense in light of Proposition 57, which amended
I. Relevant Law
Juvenile court jurisdiction attaches in cases in which the defendant is between 12 and 17 years of age when he or she violates any law of this state. (
borne by the People. (Edsel P. v. Superior Court (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 763, 773–774 (Edsel P.).)
Since 1975, the procedural requirements for fitness hearings (also called transfer hearings) have been established by
Since 1985, the People have been required to prove a prima facie case of the offense alleged before the transfer decision can be made. (Edsel P., supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at pp. 780, fn. 10, 784.) “When a minor charged with a crime triggering the presumption of unfitness challenges the sufficiency of thе evidence establishing that he committed the alleged offenses” the People must “make a prima facie showing that the minor committed the crimes before a fitness hearing may be held.” (Rene C. v. Superior Court (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1, 4 fn. 2.) “Prima facie” amounts to sufficient cause and is generally equivalent to “reasonable or probable cause.” (Id. at pp. 4–5, fn. 2.) These hearings are frequently referred to as Edsel P. hearings. (Id. at p. 4.)
Beginning with Proposition 21 in March 2000, and continuing until the adoрtion of Proposition 57 in November 2016, the People were authorized in specified circumstances to file a criminal action against a juvenile directly in adult court. (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 305 (Lara).)
In 2016 Proposition 57 eliminated direct filing for prosecutors, and amended
As it stands now, the People may move to transfer to adult court any minor 16 years of age or older alleged to have committed a felony criminal offense. (
II. Prima
The People contend Proposition 57, and its amendments to
We do not agree with the People‘s рremise for two reasons. Eliminating the requirement that the People prove a prima facie case leaves the minor with no opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of the offense alleged, which was a prominent due process concern considered by the court in Edsel P. Edsel P. was not concerned solely with how the alleged offense
operated as a mandatory presumption of unfitness. Edsel P. was concerned with how the charge itself оperated as a mandatory presumption of probable cause. The Edsel P. court made clear: “Because the issues of probable cause and fitness are discrete,”
Relieving the People of their burden to make a prima facie showing of the alleged offense would still operate as a presumption of probable cause, even in light of the statutory changes enacted in conjunction with Proposition 57. We therefore conclude Proposition 57 does not eviscerate the ratiоnale in Edsel P. for ensuring the minor has an opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and for requiring the People to produce such evidence to establish its prima facie case.
Second, and no less important, the Judicial Council amended certain rules of court in light of Proposition 57 to retain the requirement that the Peoplе establish a prima facie case of the alleged offense. The Family and Juvenile Law Advisory Committee (Committee) to the Judicial Council of California recommended the requirement “in order to protect the due process rights of the child to only be subject to a transfer motion if the prosecution makes a prima facie showing that the child has сommitted an eligible offense.”
Law: Implementation of Proposition 5, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (May 2017) p. 8.)2
The Judicial Council adopted this recommendation and enacted
III. The Court Must Consider D.W.‘s Fitness in Light of the Offense Alleged in the Petition
The People allege a transfer hearing is unnecessary because D.W. was eligible for transfer irrespective of his liability for murder and because the offense alleged is irrelevant to the court‘s consideration of D.W.‘s individual conduct. They contend that the same facts supporting the court‘s finding of probable cause for murder under a natural and probable consequence theory establish probable cause for anоther eligible offense: assault with a deadly weapon under a natural and probable consequences theory. Because D.W.‘s liability for the nontarget offense of murder was predicated on D.W.‘s conduct in the assault, they reason the same conduct supports probable cause for the nontarget and unalleged offense of assault with a deаdly weapon.3
We will assume but not decide that establishing probable cause for an unalleged offense satisfies the requirement that the People present a prima facie case. However, that assumption does not satisfy the requirements for the court‘s consideration of the five fitness criteria. The fitness determination is
So here, if we were to agree the facts the court relied upon in finding probable cause for murder also support a finding of probable cause for assault with a deadly weapon under the theory of natural and probable consequences, our analysis does not end because the court must consider the gravity of the offense in evaluating the fifth fitness factor. The fitness analysis is informed by the nature of the offense alleged. The court must cоnsider the “circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.” (
provoked, and that the provocative conduct is legally sufficient to cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation and reflection. (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 948–949.) The juvenile court made no such finding and we will not do so on appeal. As for direct aiding and abetting, the defendant must have acted with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose to commit, encourage, or facilitate the offense. (People v. Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 161.) The People did not presеnt any facts to show D.W. knew of the perpetrator‘s criminal purpose, the juvenile court made no such finding, and, again, we will not make any such factual findings on appeal.
second degree murder must be punished by a term of 15 years to life. (
Although the juvenile court does not actually “sentence” a minor, the sentence set by the Legislature is an indication of how it views the gravity of an offense. This overwhelming gap between how it judges culpability for assault versus murder cannot be divorced from the juvenile court‘s analysis of the gravity of the offense in determining a minor‘s fitness for treatment. The juvenile court is vested with the discretion to weigh all five factors, and we cannot presume the court would place as much weight on the fifth factor if it were tasked with considering the gravity of an assault with a deadly weapon under a natural and probable consequences theory instead of second degree murder.
“Our role is to interpret the statutes as they are written, not to establish policy.” (Juan G. v. Superior Court, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1495.) The fifth fitness factor directs the juvenile court to consider the gravity of the offense alleged in the petition. The statute сould not be more plain. For the reasons stated above, we conclude the gravity of the offense alleged in the petition is not irrelevant to the court‘s evaluation of a minor‘s fitness for juvenile treatment, and we will not presume that the juvenile court would find D.W. unfit if he were alleged to have committed an assault with a deadly weapon on a natural аnd probable consequences theory rather than second degree murder.
The petition is granted. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court, which is directed to vacate the order transferring Petitioner‘s case to adult court. If the People elect to proceed with a motion to transfer, they must refile a petition alleging offense(s) the juvenile court may consider at a transfer hearing if a prima facie case is established. At the transfer hearing, the People may introduce the transcript from the initial hearing and both parties may call and introduce additional witnesses and evidence.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
STRATTON, J.
We concur:
BIGELOW, P. J.
GRIMES, J.