In re MIGUEL R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MIGUEL R., Defendant and Appellant.
E082250 (Super.Ct.No. J279577)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Filed 3/1/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This is Miguel R.‘s second appeal from an order transferring him from the juvenile court to criminal court under
Effective January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2361) amended
We affirm. We publish this opinion to clarify certain points about application of the recent amendments to
BACKGROUND
A. The Alleged Offenses1
One night in January 2019, Steve N. and his wife, Keren N., were walking near their home when they saw three male teenagers dressed in black pants and hoodies approaching. Steve told Keren to get behind him and placed himself between her and the teenagers. The teens stopped in front of Steve and Keren and blocked their path. One teenager, later identified as Miguel, pointed a gun at Steve‘s head. Keren heard the gunman and one of the other two say, “Hey, motherfucker, what you got?” Steve lunged toward the gunman, and a struggle ensued. Keren saw a flash, heard Steve yell, and realized that Steve had been shot. Steve was taken to the hospital, where he died during surgery.
An officer searching the area shortly after the shooting stopped three teenagers matching the suspects’ description, two of whom were detained, while the third fled on foot. Other officers searching in the area where the third suspect had fled found a black backpack that contained a loaded .38-caliber revolver with one spent casing under the hammer, a black T-shirt, a black sweatshirt, a cell phone, and other items. In a nearby parking lot, officers found a wallet containing Miguel‘s California identification card, and a few feet away they found six additional bullets matching the rounds in the revolver.
After initially providing officers with false information, both of the two detained coparticipants made statements incriminating Miguel, identified the backpack containing the gun as Miguel‘s, and identified Miguel as the shooter in photo lineups. Miguel was arrested at school the following morning. A search of Miguel‘s home revealed shoes and other clothing matching those worn by the shooter, as well as a box of .38-caliber ammunition matching that found in the revolver.
Text messages found on Miguel‘s cell phone and statements by his mother revealed that Miguel had texted his mother shortly after the shooting, saying
Surveillance video obtained by police showed Miguel, wearing a backpack matching that found by police, boarding a bus heading towards Ontario with his two coparticipants a few hours before the shooting. All three were wearing black hooded sweatshirts, dark jeans, and black shoes. They can be seen sitting together and talking before exiting the bus together. Other surveillance videos show the three youths at various locations in the vicinity before and after the shooting.
B. The Petition and the Initial Transfer Proceeding
In January 2019, a juvenile wardship petition (
The prosecution immediately moved to transfer Miguel to criminal court. In April 2019, the probation department submitted a report pursuant to
The transfer hearing began in April 2021. The sole prosecution witness was Cynthia Diaz, the probation officer who prepared the report. Diaz explained her methodology, the interviews that she conducted, and the records that she reviewed in preparing the report. The report described Miguel‘s personal history and included statements from Miguel and his mother. Miguel‘s parents had been together for 30 years and had six children. Miguel lived with his parents and two younger siblings, aged 10 and 11. Miguel said that he got along well with everyone, including his parents and siblings, and his mother agreed. Before he was arrested, Miguel was a senior in high school with grades ranging from several A‘s to one D. Miguel was not involved in a gang. Miguel denied using drugs and said that he did not like alcohol, which he tried when he was 14 years old. Miguel had not been a victim of sexual or physical abuse.
The report recommended transfer to criminal court on the basis of four of the five statutory criteria: the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
Diaz reviewed a number of the detention behavior summaries documenting Miguel‘s conduct in juvenile hall over the two years since she had prepared her report. Miguel was involved in eight incidents described as “code reds,” all but one of which involved assaultive behavior on other minors. Although Miguel had obtained his high school diploma and enrolled in online community college courses, Diaz testified that Miguel was currently “suspended until further notice” from participating in the college program for having accessed unauthorized websites, and he had previously been suspended for a semester because of a plagiarism incident. On the basis of her review of Miguel‘s detention behavior summaries, Diaz continued to believe that Miguel was not amenable to treatment by juvenile services and should be transferred to adult court.
In December 2021, Shannon Johnson, Psy.D., a staff psychologist at Patton State Hospital, testified on Miguel‘s behalf. Johnson met with Miguel in July and August for a total of about three and one-half hours and submitted a psychological evaluation report and a risk assessment report.
Johnson testified that Miguel had demonstrated insight and expressed regret and remorse for the impact of his behavior on his family and on the victim‘s family, and Johnson believed that Miguel‘s contrition was honest and genuine. She testified that Miguel had made progress in his rehabilitation, as evidenced by his ability to view his detention as an opportunity to recreate himself and to consider how he would like his life to be in the future. Regarding her risk assessment evaluation, Johnson opined that Miguel was unlikely to seek out violence and that his strong family support mitigated his risk of reoffending, although if Miguel were subjected to violent conduct by someone, he was likely to defend himself. She believed that transferring Miguel to an adult incarceration setting would be destabilizing and have a negative impact on his functioning and eventual reintegration into the community. When asked if Miguel would present a low risk of reoffending or engaging in violence if he were treated in a juvenile facility, Johnson assessed Miguel‘s risk as “moderate” rather than “low.”
On cross-examination, Johnson acknowledged that Miguel had continued to engage in violent behavior during his detention, but she described that behavior as largely “situational” and related to his incarceration. Johnson
Johnson was also asked during cross-examination about an incident that occurred in October 2021. A staff member had redirected Miguel to take it easy on the other team during a soccer tournament, and Miguel responded: “You are telling me to chill out[?] You know I‘m a murderer on the set.” When questioned about his response, Miguel said, “I‘m a murderer. I kill people. So what?” Johnson acknowledged that the statement was not something that Miguel would have said during their meetings, and she stated that if he had said that to her, it would have changed her opinion.2 When asked if the statement demonstrated that Miguel lacked remorse and empathy, Johnson said that she could not tell without knowing more about the “situational factors” and circumstances in which the incident occurred. She described ways in which the remark may have been mere “posturing” or an expression of “hopelessness.”
After Johnson‘s testimony, the prosecution offered to recall Diaz as a rebuttal witness to testify regarding the detention behavior summary that reported Miguel‘s October 2021 statements and also to establish that Miguel was again not enrolled in college classes that semester. Both counsel agreed to submit on the document containing the October 2021 statements and stipulated to the fact that Miguel was not attending online college classes that semester, so Diaz was not recalled. Miguel submitted 10 character reference letters, including one written in Spanish and not translated. Some of the letters’ authors had known Miguel since he was a young child. The letters described Miguel as smart, good, respectful, well-behaved, and polite.
C. The First Ruling and Appeal
In 2022, the juvenile court granted the People‘s motion to transfer Miguel to criminal court. Miguel appealed from the order, arguing that it should be reversed because the juvenile court improperly relied on the evidence concerning the October 2021 incident. (In re Miguel R., supra, E078528.) He argued that “absent any evidence as to the ‘tone’ or ‘context’ of the remarks, they are ‘worthless as an indication of [Miguel‘s] purported state of mind.‘” (In re Miguel R., supra, E078528.) We rejected the arguments and affirmed in an unpublished opinion. (In re Miguel R., supra, E078528.)
D. The Second Transfer Proceeding
The second transfer hearing was held in August 2023, when Miguel was 21 years old. The parties stipulated that the court could take judicial notice of all of the evidence from the initial proceeding. The prosecution introduced two documents prepared by the probation department in April 2023: (1) a court memo prepared by probation officer Miguel Ramirez-Gamboa addressing Miguel‘s conduct while housed in county jail, and (2) an Assembly Bill 2361 transfer memo prepared by probation officer Paul Vargas.
Three probation officers testified for the prosecution: Diaz, Vargas, and Shannon Kim. No witnesses testified on behalf of Miguel.
In preparation for the hearing, Diaz reviewed the 2019 probation report that she had authored and the 2023 transfer memo prepared by Vargas. Diaz understood the new standard for transferring minors to criminal court. Diaz‘s opinion about whether Miguel could be rehabilitated by the juvenile justice system remained unchanged: She did not “believe he‘d be appropriate to remain in juvenile hall.” Diaz based her opinion on the fact that Miguel was almost 22 years old and juvenile jurisdiction would end when he turned 25. She explained that given the severity of the offenses and the sophistication involved, Miguel “would not have enough time remaining to be rehabilitated in the juvenile system.”
Vargas testified that he never directly supervised Miguel. In preparing the April 2023 transfer memo, Vargas reviewed Diaz‘s 2019 probation report, the police report concerning the alleged offenses, and Miguel‘s juvenile delinquency history. Vargas also spoke with Kim about the ARISE program, which is the secure youth treatment facility in San Bernardino County.
Vargas opined that Miguel could not be rehabilitated by the juvenile justice system. Vargas based his opinion on the “severity of the crime, [Miguel‘s] active role in it, the sophistication, as well as the limited time that he has under the juvenile jurisdiction.” Vargas explained that Miguel would age out of the juvenile system at 25 and thus would have about three and one-half years remaining in juvenile jurisdiction, which was not sufficient time to rehabilitate. Vargas‘s supervisor agreed with Vargas‘s analysis.
Kim worked in the field supervision unit of the ARISE program. She reviewed the reports prepared by Diaz and Vargas and likewise opined that
E. The Ruling
In August 2023, the juvenile court issued a detailed ruling and found “by clear and convincing evidence that the youth is not amenable to the care, treatment and training programs available through the juvenile court system under the statutory criteria,” and the court accordingly ordered Miguel transferred to criminal court. The court adopted its description of the offenses and various findings from its initial ruling in January 2022, as modified by the new clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, and it addressed each of the five statutory criteria in
The court found that the following factors weighed in favor of transferring Miguel to criminal court: the degree of criminal sophistication, the success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor, and the circumstances and gravity of the offenses. The court found that the prosecution had not carried its burden of proving that Miguel‘s delinquency history weighed in favor of transferring him or that he could not “be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction.”
With respect to the degree of criminal sophistication, the court adopted its initial ruling, as modified by the clear and convincing evidence standard, and found that Miguel “possesse[d] a higher level of criminal sophistication” because Miguel armed himself, participated in a preplanned armed robbery that was inherently dangerous and showed indifference to human life, and “willfully [shot] the victim for his failure to comply.” The court also found that Miguel‘s conduct after the shooting exhibited “a higher level of criminal sophistication” in that he fled, attempted to conceal his involvement by changing his clothing and appearance, and then lied to police about his involvement.
As for whether Miguel “can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction” (
With respect to Miguel‘s “previous delinquent history” (
Regarding the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate” Miguel (
With respect to “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged” (
DISCUSSION
Miguel argues that we should reverse the most recent transfer order because (1) the juvenile court misapplied recent amendments to
The Legislature amended
The five statutory criteria listed in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of
Effective January 1, 2024, Senate Bill 545 amended
We review the juvenile court‘s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 680.) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court‘s ruling under review. The trial court‘s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.) The juvenile court‘s findings with respect to each of
Likewise, we review for substantial evidence the juvenile court‘s ultimate finding “that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (
B. Assembly Bill 2361
Miguel argues that the juvenile court‘s ultimate determination that Miguel is “not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” (
“In interpreting a statute, our primary goal ‘is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose.‘” [Citation.] “‘Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.‘” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 294.) “‘If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls.’ [Citation.] We ‘avoid “interpretations that render any language surplusage.“‘” (Ibid.)
Moreover, the ultimate determination of whether “the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” (
In contrast, the ultimate finding that the juvenile court must make under
Time is only one of the five statutory criteria that the court must consider in making the determination. (
We accordingly conclude that the express terms of
In support of his contrary interpretation, Miguel relies on E.P. He claims that E.P. reversed the juvenile court‘s transfer order because the juvenile court‘s “‘totality of the circumstances’ approach, and its reliance on the other factors under [section 707(a)(3)], failed to properly consider the effect of” Assembly Bill 2361‘s amendments. (Underlining omitted.) Miguel‘s reliance on E.P. is misplaced. In E.P., the transfer hearing was held before Assembly Bill 2361 took effect. (E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 411.)
E.P. does not support Miguel‘s interpretation of
Because the juvenile court is not required to give greater weight to the second criterion or to deny the transfer motion if that criterion does not weigh in favor of transfer, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err by not according the second criterion greater weight than the other criteria. We further conclude that the juvenile court‘s finding that Miguel was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction (
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Miguel concedes that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court‘s findings under the previous preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. But he argues that the evidence is insufficient under the new clear and convincing evidence standard of proof because (1) the juvenile court relied on Miguel‘s statements in October 2021 about being a murderer, and (2) there was new evidence of his progress toward rehabilitation. We disagree.
Miguel argues that the court “excessive[ly]” relied on the statements Miguel made in October 2021, “despite the continued lack of evidence of the tone and context of the alleged comments” and “despite [purported] criticism of the relevance of those comments by not only the defense but also this
Second, Miguel‘s argument that the juvenile court unduly emphasized the October 2021 statements is not supported by the record, just as it was not supported by the record in the prior appeal. (In re Miguel R., supra, E078528.) The court‘s consideration of the October 2021 statements was limited to its analysis of the second criterion, namely, whether Miguel could “be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction.” (
Miguel‘s only other argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence is that the record contains evidence that Miguel did not have any recent disciplinary issues, completed a substance abuse program, and obtained his GED, all of which tends to show his “progress toward rehabilitation.” The argument fails because the existence of contrary evidence does not show that the trial court‘s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. In conducting substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court‘s findings, not against them. (Cardenas, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 119, fn. 11.) We consequently are concerned only with whether “‘“the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact‘s findings.“‘” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1054.) When evidence reasonably justifies the trier of fact‘s findings, “‘the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.‘” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514.)
For these reasons, we conclude that Miguel has failed to demonstrate that the juvenile court‘s finding is not supported by substantial evidence.
D. Senate Bill 545
Senate Bill 545 became effective while this appeal was pending, so we asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the effect of the new legislation on this appeal. The parties assume and we agree that the amendments are ameliorative and accordingly apply retroactively to Miguel‘s case
With respect to the new factors that must be considered in connection with the first criterion (i.e., the degree of criminal sophistication), Miguel acknowledges that the record “does not disclose any indication that [he] was involved in the child welfare or foster care system, or was a victim of violence, trafficking, or abuse[], and [he] specifically denied being sexually abused.” (
Before Senate Bill 545, “the effect of the minor‘s family and community environment” and “childhood trauma” were among the listed factors for the court to consider in analyzing the minor‘s “degree of criminal sophistication.” (Former
Accordingly, the 2019 probation report includes sections about Miguel‘s family background, personal history, and statements from both Miguel and his mother about his family life. No one reported that Miguel was ever involved in the child welfare or foster care system. The report affirmatively states that Miguel was not a victim of sexual or physical abuse. Likewise, none of the reference letters submitted on Miguel‘s behalf states that Miguel had any child welfare history, had been sexually abused, or was a human trafficking victim. Thus, even though Miguel had an incentive before Senate Bill 545 to introduce evidence concerning child welfare history and any history of sexual abuse or human trafficking, the record contains none and actually contains contrary evidence.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that it is not reasonably probable that the juvenile court would have reached a result more favorable to Miguel if it had applied the current version of
DISPOSITION
The order transferring Miguel to criminal court is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.