In re M.M.A.
{¶1} In this appeal from an adoption proceeding, the children‘s mother — Keyle A. — challenges the probate court‘s determination that both of the grounds set forth in
The Key Facts
{¶2} Keyle is the mother of M.M.A., J.A., A.A., and C.A. (the children), who currently range in age from 9 to 16. The children‘s father, Corey A., passed away in January 2021 from a drug overdose. Keyle was indicted in February 2024 for her alleged involvement in Corey‘s death, and she pled guilty to some felony charges and began serving a prison term for them starting in May 2024.
{¶3} The four children were first placed in the home of their paternal grandparents, John and Debra A., four years ago. John and Debra then received court-approved legal custody of the children in September 2023, and together those grandparents filed a petitiоn to adopt the children on March 3, 2025. Keyle did not consent to the proposed adoption of her children.
{¶4} The trial court held a hearing in August 2025 to determine whether Keyle‘s consent was required before John and Debra could adopt the children. Keyle, John, and Debra testified at that hearing, as did the children‘s paternal aunt and their maternal grandparents.
{¶5} Both John and Debra testified that Keyle had not provided any financial support for the children during the relevant one-year period before the March 2025 filing date
{¶6} After considering the testimony presentеd by all of the witnesses, the trial court found that Keyle‘s consent was not required for the adoption of the four children because both of the exceptions listed in
We Find No Error in the Trial Court‘s Conclusion That Keyle‘s Consent Was Not Required for the Children‘s Adoption
{¶7} In her one assignment of error, Keylе contends that the trial court wrongly determined that her consent was not required when the four children‘s paternal grandparents sought to adopt them. In her appeal, Keyle challenges both of the trial court‘s consent-exception findings under
{¶8} Adoption terminates a parent‘s fundаmental right to care for and to hold custody of a child. In re Adoption of B.T.R., 2020-Ohio-2685, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.). Under Ohio law, the consent of the parent of a minor must ordinarily be secured for an adoption of that minor to proceed unless one of the exceptions in
{¶9} The trial court in this case found that
{¶10} A petitioner seeking to adopt a child bears the clear-and-convincing burden of proof mentioned in thе statute. See In re Adoption of Z.A.-O.J., 2016-Ohio-3159, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.); In re Adoption of M.B., 2012-Ohio-236, ¶ 3. Once the petitioner establishes that the child‘s parent has fallen short in the parent‘s de-minimis-contact duty or the maintenance-and-support duty, the parent must identify “some facially justifiable cause” for the failure, though the burden of proving the absence of any justifiable cause remains with the petitioner. See In re Adoption of Bovett, 33 Ohio St.3d 102, 104 (1987) (“a natural parent may not simply remain mute while the petitioner is forced to demonstrate why the parent‘s failure to provide support is unjustifiable“).
{¶11} Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that “will produce in the mind of the trier of fаcts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. “‘Where the proof required must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether
{¶12} Although the trial court here found that both the failure-to-contact and the failure-to-provide-support prongs of
{¶13} We appreciate the trial court‘s analysis of both exceptions, but we focus today just on Keyle‘s alleged failure to provide for the maintenance and support of her four children.
Abuse of Discretion is our Standard of Review on the Alleged Lack of Support, Though We Examine the Manifest Weight of the Evidence When We Consider the Parent‘s Justification for Any Lack of Support
{¶14} We review for an abuse of discretion any trial-court determination that a parent has failed to provide for the maintenance and support of his or her child. See In re Adoption of M.B., 2012-Ohio-236, ¶ 21 (“A probate judgе has discretion to determine whether the biological parent provided support as contemplated by
{¶15} A trial court‘s finding that no justifiable cause exists to excuse a parent‘s failure to provide support will not be disturbed unless the trial court‘s determination runs counter to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163 (1986),
The Trial Court Did Not Err by Finding That Keyle Had Failed Without Justifiable Cause to Provide for the Maintenance and Support of the Children
{¶16} The Supreme Court has explained that a three-step analysis governs the maintenance-and-support inquiry in an аdoption case. See In re Adoption of B.I., 2019-Ohio-2450, ¶ 15 (“whether a parent has failed to provide child support as required by law or judicial decree involves a three-step analysis“).
{¶17} A court should first determine what the law or any judicial decree required of the parent during the year immediately preceding either the filing of the petition for adoption or the placement of the minor in the petitioner‘s home. Id. Because the adoption petition in this case was filed on March 3, 2025, the trial court rightly examined the one-year period between March 3, 2024 and March 3, 2025.
{¶18} Second, the trial court should determine whether the parent complied with his or her obligations under the law or that judicial decree. Id. Finally, if the parent failed during the relevant one-year period to comply with his or her obligation, the court should determine whether there was justifiable cause for that failure. Id.
{¶19} Regarding the first step, the parties agreed in the trial court that no court order had imposed a child-support obligation on Keyle for any of the four children. When we look, then, to Ohio law in general, we see that
{¶20} Regarding the second inquiry listed above, Keyle admitted during her testimony that she had not sent any money, necessities, or gifts for the maintenance and support of the four children during the one-year period. John and Debra also testified that they had not received аny money from Keyle during that time. We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Keyle had failed to provide for the maintenance and support of the children as required by
{¶21} In Keyle‘s challenge to the trial court‘s determination under the third step of the analysis that no justifiablе cause excused her failure to provide support for her children, Keyle explains that she needed to purchase hygiene products for herself with the entirety of the $22 that she earned each month through her work at the prison. She argues, too, that John and Debra never asked her for any monetary support for the children.
{¶22} As stated above, the text of
{¶24} Further, the trial court noted that no evidence presented at the adoption hearing indicated that Keyle was ever prohibited from sending money as support for the children. Keyle herself testified that she knew the address of the home whеre the children were staying, and she told the trial judge that she had on one occasion sent a letter to the children at that address. Those facts undercut her view that she was justified in failing to provide support. See In re M.T.R., 2022-Ohio-2473, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.) (“Biological Father knew where he could send maintenance and suрport for his child. He knew the addresses of Maternal Great-Grandmother and Maternal Grandmother“).
{¶25} Our court has explained that “‘[e]ven a meager contribution to the child‘s support could satisfy the maintenance and support requirement of
{¶27} On this record, then, we find that the trial court‘s conclusion that Keyle had failed without justifiable cause to provide for the maintenance and support of her four children was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶28} And because the trial court was required to find only that at least one of the two grounds listed in
{¶29} Finding no error in the trial court‘s conclusion that
{¶30} For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the Probate Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Keyle A.
By: Gormley, J.;
King, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur.