In re ALEXEI KAVANAUGH on Habeas Corpus; In re ALBERTO J. MORENO on Habeas Corpus; In re LARRY SMITH on Habeas Corpus
D076500 (Super. Ct. No. HC23654; SCD238494; SCD239633; SCD240841); D076821 (Super. Ct. No. HCN1586; SCN367442); D077003 (Super. Ct. No. HC19685; SCD208823)
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
February 25, 2021
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
CONSOLIDATED APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Howard H. Shore and Harry M. Elias, Judges. Reversed.
Angela Bartosik, Chief Public Defender, and Euketa Oliver, Public Defender, for Respondents Alexei Kavanaugh, Alberto J. Moreno, and Larry Smith.
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, voters approved Proposition 57, the “Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016.” Proposition 57 amended the California Constitution to grant early parole consideration to persons convicted of a nonviolent felony offense. (
Petitioners Alexei Kavanaugh, Alberto Moreno, and Larry Smith (hereafter, the petitioners) were denied parole release under the procedures established by the parole regulations. In separate habeas corpus proceedings challenging the parole denials, the trial courts invalidated the parole regulations and ordered new parole consideration proceedings for the petitioners. The courts found the parole regulations are unconstitutional because they do not guarantee the assistance of legal counsel for potential parolees, they do not require in-person parole hearings, and they permit individual hearing officers—rather than multi-member panels—to make parole release decisions. According to the courts, the parole regulations conflict with section 32‘s guarantee of parole consideration and violate prisoners’ procedural due process rights.
Because we conclude the parole regulations are consistent with section 32‘s guarantee of parole consideration and do not violate prisoners’ procedural due process rights, we reverse the orders granting the petitioners’ habeas corpus petitions.
II
BACKGROUND
A
Legal Background
1
In the November 2016 general election, California voters approved Proposition 57. Proposition 57 added section 32 to the California Constitution. (Prop. 57, § 3.) Section 32, subdivision (a)(1) states in pertinent part as follows: “Parole Consideration: Any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term for his or her primary offense.” (§ 32, subd. (a)(1).) The expressed goals of the early parole consideration provision are “to enhance public safety, improve rehabilitation, and avoid the release of prisoners by federal court order ....” (Id., subd. (a).)
Section 32, subdivision (b) instructs CDCR to adopt implementing regulations for the early parole consideration provision set forth in
2
CDCR promulgated the parole regulations pursuant to section 32, subdivision (b).3 Under the parole regulations, a person sentenced to a determinate term for a nonviolent felony is generally eligible for early parole consideration when he or she has served the full term of his or her primary offense.4 (
If a prisoner is found eligible for parole consideration and referred to the Board, the Board must provide notification about the pending parole review to the prisoner, the prosecuting agency, and the victim(s) who were harmed by the prisoner‘s crime(s). (
A hearing officer—defined by regulation as a Board commissioner, a deputy commissioner, an associate chief deputy commissioner, or the Chief Hearing Officer (
The hearing officer must then issue a written decision, supported by a statement of reasons, determining whether the prisoner poses a current, unreasonable risk of violence or a current, unreasonable risk of significant criminal activity. (
Within 30 days of being served with the hearing officer‘s parole release decision, the prisoner may request review of the decision. (
B
Lower Court Proceedings
This appeal arises from three separate habeas corpus proceedings in which the trial courts found the parole regulations are unconstitutional.
Petitioners’ Parole Denials
In 2013, Kavanaugh pleaded guilty to three counts of obtaining and using personal identifying information of another person (
In 2017, Moreno pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful taking of personal property (
In 2010, a jury convicted Smith of 18 counts of grand theft (
2
The Habeas Corpus Proceedings
Each petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court challenging his parole denial(s). Kavanaugh alleged: (1) the Board “used erroneous facts ... to deny [him] early release” in violation of his due
The trial courts issued virtually identical orders to show cause in each proceeding. The orders to show cause stated as follows: “Petitioner claims the parole process promulgated by CDCR‘s adoption of regulations for determinately sentenced non-violent offenders violates his due process rights for early parole consideration provided under the California Constitution. [The] court finds that Petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief and hereby issues an Order to Show Cause as to why relief should not be granted. [The] court requests that the Return focus on the following issue[] ... [|] Do California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Division 2, Chapter 3, sections 2449.1, 2449.2, 2449.4, 2449.5, and 2449.7 satisfy an inmate‘s due process right to receive ‘due consideration’ for parole?”5
The People filed a return to each order to show cause and the petitioners each filed a denial.
The trial courts granted all three petitions for writs of habeas corpus on grounds that the parole regulations are unconstitutional. The courts found the parole regulations are unconstitutional because they do not guarantee the assistance of legal counsel for potential parolees, permit in-person parole hearings, or mandate that parole decisions be made by multi-member parole panels. The courts found these alleged deficiencies failed to ensure parole consideration under section 32 and violated prisoners’ procedural due process rights under the California Constitution.6 Based on these findings, the courts ordered new parole proceedings for the petitioners and ordered CDCR to repeal and amend the parole regulations.
The People appeal the orders granting the habeas corpus petitions, which were stayed pending appeal.8
III
DISCUSSION
A
Summary of the Habeas Corpus Procedure
“Our state Constitution guarantees that a person improperly deprived of his or her liberty has the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (Duvall).) “[T]he petitioner bears a heavy burden initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then later to prove them.” (Ibid.) “The petition ‘must allege unlawful restraint, name the person by whom the petitioner is so restrained, and specify the facts on which [the petitioner] bases his [or her] claim that the restraint is unlawful.‘” (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 737 (Romero).)
A court presented with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “must first determine whether the petition states a prima facie case for relief—that is, whether it states facts that, if true, entitle the petitioner to relief—and also whether the stated claims are for any reason procedurally barred.” (Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 737.) “The court determines ‘on the basis of the allegations of the original petition ..., as well as the supporting documentary evidence and/or affidavits, which should be attached if available, whether
“If no prima facie case for relief is stated, the court will summarily deny the petition.” (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 475.) “When, on the other hand, a habeas corpus petition is sufficient on its face (that is, the petition states a prima facie case on a claim that is not procedurally barred), the court is obligated by statute to issue a writ of habeas corpus,” i.e., a command to “the person having custody of the petitioner to bring the petitioner ‘before the court or judge before whom the writ is returnable’ ... and to submit a written return justifying the petitioner‘s imprisonment or other restraint on the petitioner‘s liberty [citation].” (Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 737-738.)
“Because ‘appellate courts are not equipped to have prisoners brought before them ... [they] developed the practice of ordering the custodian to show cause why the relief sought should not be granted.‘” (Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 738.) “Many superior courts have likewise adopted the practice of issuing an order to show cause in place of the writ of habeas corpus when a habeas corpus petition states a prima facie case for relief.” (Ibid.) The order to show cause directs the custodian to file a pleading called a return, which “‘becomes the principal pleading’ [citation] and is ‘analogous to the complaint in a civil proceeding’ [citations].” (Ibid.) The return must allege facts establishing the legality of the petitioner‘s detention. (Id. at pp. 738–739.)
Upon the filing of the return, the petitioner may file a response, known as a traverse (or a denial in the trial court), in which the petitioner “may deny or controvert any of the material facts or matters set forth in the return, or except to the sufficiency thereof, or allege any fact to show either that his imprisonment or detention is unlawful, or that he is entitled to his discharge.” (
“Once the issues have been joined in this way, the court must determine whether an evidentiary hearing is needed. If the written return admits allegations in the petition that, if true, justify the relief sought, the court may grant relief without an evidentiary hearing. [Citations.] Conversely, consideration of the written return and matters of record may persuade the court that the contentions advanced in the petition lack merit, in which event
B
The Petitioners Challenged the Parole Regulations in Their Habeas Corpus Petitions
Before we address the merits of the trial courts’ constitutional rulings, we consider a predicate procedural question—whether the trial courts impermissibly expanded the scope of the habeas corpus proceedings beyond the claims that were presented in the petitioners’ habeas corpus petitions.
The People contend the petitioners challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their parole denials and, in Kavanaugh‘s case, the validity of the parole regulation setting forth the parole criteria. However, the trial courts issued orders to show cause, and subsequently granted habeas relief, on grounds that the parole regulations are inconsistent with section 32 and violative of prisoners’ due process rights. According to the People, the courts exceeded their authority in addressing and granting relief based on claims that were not raised in the habeas corpus petitions.
The issues in a habeas corpus proceeding are defined by the pleadings and “may not extend beyond the claims alleged in the habeas corpus petition.” (Board of Prison Terms v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1235 (Ngo).) Thus, a court exceeds its authority when it “issue[s] an order to show cause that requires the respondent to address new claims not expressly or implicitly raised in the original habeas corpus petition or supported by the factual allegations in the original habeas corpus petition, unless those claims were raised ... in a supplemental or amended habeas corpus petition filed with the permission of the court.” (Id. at p. 1237.)
On the other hand, “[t]he goal ... of the procedures that govern habeas corpus is to provide a framework in which a court can discover the truth and do justice in timely fashion.” (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 482.) Therefore, courts “should not construe the pleadings in ... a parsimonious fashion.” (Ibid.) Further, a court “crafting [an] order to show cause has the power to explain its preliminary assessment of the petitioner‘s claims,
It is a fairly close call whether the trial courts’ orders to show cause and orders granting habeas relief addressed claims that were presented in the habeas corpus petitions. As the People note, the petitions focused largely on the alleged insufficiency of the evidence supporting the petitioners’ parole denials and, to a lesser extent, the criteria governing parole release decisions. Those issues appear to be distinct from the matters discussed in the orders to show cause and the orders granting habeas relief. Nevertheless, upon close examination, it is apparent to us that each petition also alleged a due process violation or an arbitrary and capricious parole release decision, as well as an irreconcilable conflict between the Board‘s parole consideration procedures and section 32 (referred to as Proposition 57 in the habeas corpus petitions).
For instance, Kavanaugh alleged the parole regulations violated his “right to due process” and the Board “implemented policies (under Proposition 57) that the voters never intended ....” Moreno alleged that his parole denial was “arbitrary and procedurally flawed,” and that CDCR “systematically deni[ed] him and other inmates ... the full benefit‘s [sic] of Proposition 57, by adopting regulation[s] ... which do not conform with the actual intent of the California voter‘s [sic] who approved Proposition 57 ....” Similarly, Smith alleged the Board deprived him of “earned liberty interests without due process of enacted laws,” and “failed and/or refused to exercise sound discretion governed by legal rules, valid, enacted laws[] [and] to do justice according to such laws in conducting hearings, receiving and reviewing evidence, and ... issu[ing] rulings ....” (Quotation marks and underline omitted.)
Based on these allegations, as well as the policies underpinning the procedures governing habeas corpus proceedings, we conclude the petitioners’ pro se habeas corpus petitions sufficiently alleged the claims upon which habeas corpus relief was granted. (See In re Lewis (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 13, 27 [habeas corpus petition raised constitutional vagueness challenge to parole regulations by alleging the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner].) It follows that the trial courts did not impermissibly expand the scope of the habeas corpus proceedings.9 Therefore, we proceed to the merits of the trial courts’ orders granting habeas
C
The Parole Regulations Ensure Parole Consideration
As previously noted, section 32, subdivision (a)(1) states as follows: “Any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term for his or her primary offense.” The petitioners contend section 32‘s guarantee of parole consideration for eligible felons includes an implicit promise that such felons will receive the assistance of legal counsel during the parole process, as well as in-person parole hearings and multi-member parole panels. They claim the parole regulations conflict with section 32 because the parole regulations do not fulfill this alleged promise.
The People argue there is no conflict between section 32‘s guarantee of parole consideration and the parole regulations. They emphasize that section 32 does not impose express procedural requirements applicable to the parole consideration process. They also contend that section 32, subdivision (b) commands CDCR to adopt regulations in furtherance of the new parole consideration requirement. According to the People, CDCR acted in accordance with this directive when it issued the parole regulations.
For the following reasons, we agree with the People.
1
Legal Standards
“A regulation adopted by a state agency, like any agency action, comes to the court with a presumption of validity.” (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1047–1048.) “In determining the proper interpretation of a statute [or constitutional provision such as section 32] and the validity of an administrative regulation, the administrative agency‘s construction is entitled to great weight, and if there appears to be a reasonable basis for it, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body.” (Ontario Community Foundations, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1984) 35 Cal.3d 811, 816.) “‘“Our function is to inquire into the legality of ... regulations, not their wisdom.” ’ ” (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 926.)
On the other hand, an agency has no authority to adopt a regulation unless it is “‘[1] consistent and not in conflict with the [enabling] statute [or
“In construing ... section 32, subdivision (a)(1), we apply normal standards governing the interpretation of constitutional provisions. ‘[O]ur primary concern is giving effect to the intended purpose of the provisions at issue. [Citation.] In doing so, we first analyze provisions’ text in their relevant context, which is typically the best and most reliable indicator of purpose. [Citations.] We start by ascribing to words their ordinary meaning, while taking account of related provisions and the structure of the relevant statutory and constitutional scheme. [Citations.] If the provisions’ intended purpose nonetheless remains opaque, we may consider extrinsic sources, such as an initiative‘s ballot materials. [Citation.] Moreover, when construing initiatives, we generally presume electors are aware of existing law. [Citation.] Finally, we apply independent judgment when construing constitutional ... provisions.’ ” (McGhee, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 909.)
2
There is no Conflict Between the Parole Regulations and Section 32‘s Guarantee of Parole Consideration
To assess whether a conflict exists between section 32 and the parole regulations, we begin by examining the language of section 32. (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 926; McGhee, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 909.) Section 32 broadly states in pertinent part that certain qualifying felons “shall be eligible for parole consideration ....” (§ 32, subd. (a)(1).)
The parties have not directed us to any constitutional or statutory definitions for the term “parole consideration,” and we are aware of none based on our own research. In the absence of such definitions, we presume the words were intended to be understood “‘in [their] ordinary sense and, consequently, we may refer to [those words‘] dictionary definition[s] to ascertain [their] ordinary, usual meaning.‘” (Russell City Energy Co., LLC v. City of Hayward (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 54, 64; see Cacho v. Boudreau (2007) 40 Cal.4th 341, 349 [“In the absence of a statutory definition, we assume that the Legislature intended that ‘rent’ would have its ordinary meaning ....“]; accord Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 933 [relying on dictionary definition to interpret the meaning of language contained within section 32].)
Webster‘s dictionary defines the term “consideration,” as relevant here, to mean “the act of regarding or weighing carefully.” (Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 484, col. 1.) Similarly, the online Oxford English Dictionary defines “consideration” to mean “[t]he keeping of a subject before the mind; attentive thought, reflection, meditation.” (<https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39602?redirectedFrom=consideration#eid> [as of Feb. 24, 2021], archived at <https://perma.cc/2RL4-ADT7>.) The American Heritage Dictionary gives “consideration” an analogous meaning, defining it as “[c]areful thought; deliberation.” (American Heritage Dict. (5th ed. 2011) p. 392.) Collectively, these definitions indicate that “parole consideration” refers to the giving of careful thought and deliberation to a person‘s parole suitability.
When the term “parole consideration” is given this common and ordinary meaning, it is apparent the parole regulations are in harmony with section 32. The parole regulations require the referral of each eligible prisoner to the Board for a parole assessment whereby a hearing officer reviews all relevant information and applies criteria to determine whether the prisoner poses a risk of violence or significant criminal activity. (
Our interpretation is bolstered by the fact that section 32 does not expressly mandate any procedures for the parole consideration it guarantees, let alone the features emphasized by the petitioners. The measure‘s drafters could have defined “parole consideration” to incorporate such procedural requirements.10 Or they could have imposed the procedural requirements in other provisions of the measure. It is not our role to insert this language—language the voters never considered or approved—into section 32. (People v. Roach (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 178, 183 [“Our job is to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained in the provision, not to insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted.“]; Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109, 114 [“In the case of a voters’ initiative ... we may not properly interpret the measure in a way that the electorate did not
In sum, section 32 does not specify any procedural requirements for the parole consideration to which nonviolent felons are entitled. Rather, it charges CDCR to issue regulations implementing its guarantee of parole consideration. (§ 32, subd. (b).) As the Supreme Court has explained, this charge of authority confers on CDCR “meaningful power to promulgate regulations” in furtherance of section 32. (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 934.) In particular, it affords CDCR “ample room to protect public safety by crafting the specific processes under which parole suitability is determined on a case-by-case basis. And [CDCR] has done so; the regulations direct the Board of Parole Hearings to consider ‘all relevant and reliable information’ ([Regs., tit. 15,] § 2449.4, subd. (b)) to determine whether the inmate poses a ‘current, unreasonable risk of violence or a current, unreasonable risk of significant criminal activity’ (id., subd. (c)), including an inmate‘s ‘documented criminal history’ (id., subd. (b)(1)).” (Ibid.) We discern no tension between section 32, subdivision (a)‘s broad promise of parole consideration and the parole regulations CDCR has adopted.
3
The Petitioners’ Interpretive Arguments Are Unavailing
In finding a conflict between section 32‘s guarantee of parole consideration and the parole regulations, the trial courts relied on statutes and regulations governing the parole consideration process for indeterminately-sentenced persons. Those statutes and regulations require the appointment of legal counsel for potential parolees (e.g.,
4
Conclusion
Section 32 guarantees parole consideration for eligible persons who have been sentenced to prison for a nonviolent felony offense. But it does not mandate any specific parole consideration procedures. Rather, it vests authority with CDCR to craft the specific processes under whichD
The Parole Regulations Do Not Violate the Due Process Clause
The trial courts found the parole regulations are unconstitutional, in the alternative, on grounds that the parole regulations deprive prospective parolees of their rights to procedural due process. The courts found the parole regulations run afoul of the California Constitution‘s due process clause for the reasons previously discussed—i.e., because they do not guarantee the appointment of legal counsel for prisoners undergoing parole consideration, in-person parole hearings, or multi-member parole panels. On appeal, the petitioners contend the parole regulations violate their due process rights for these same reasons. They also assert the parole regulation setting forth the criteria for parole release decisions is void-for-vagueness. The People assert the parole regulations afford prisoners the procedural due process to which they are entitled. The People claim the parole regulations ensure that eligible prisoners receive reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard, both before the parole release decision is made and prior to any subsequent review of an adverse decision. Further, the People claim the additional safeguards promoted by the petitioners would impose undue fiscal and administrative burdens on the state that are not commensurate with the limited liberty interests at stake in a parole release decision. In response to the petitioners’ void-for-vagueness challenge, the People assert the parole criteria regulation is sufficiently definite to guide the Board‘s exercise of discretion when making parole release determinations. Once again, we agree with the People.1
Legal Standards
Parole release proceedings are “informal, in contrast to judicial or formal administrative proceedings.” ( In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 654-655 (Rosenkrantz).) “[P]arole release decisions concern an inmate‘s anticipation or hope of freedom, and entail the Board‘s attempt to predict by subjective analysis whether the inmate will be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts.” (Id. at p. 655.) The Board must consider criteria set forth in regulations established by CDCR. (Id. at pp. 653-654; In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1256 (Shaputis) [regulations “guide the Board‘s assessment of whether [an] inmate ... is suitable for parole“].) However, the Board has broad discretion in making parole release decisions. (Rosenkrantz, at p. 655.) “‘The [Board‘s] discretion in parole matters has been described as “great” [citation] and “almost unlimited” [citation].‘” (Ibid., quoting In re Powell (1988) 45 Cal.3d 894, 902 (Powell).) “Although broad, the [B]oard‘s discretion is not absolute. That discretion ... is subject to the prisoner‘s right to procedural due process.” (Powell, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 902.) A prisoner “is not entitled to ... receive parole, [but] he is entitled to have his application for the[] benefit[] ‘duly considered.‘” (In re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639, 646 (Minnis).) By way of example, the Board may not categorically deny parole to all persons who have been imprisoned for committing a particular offense. (Id. at pp. 642-648.) Because “a right to due consideration of parole applications necessarily gives rise to a concomitant right to an available remedy.... [¶] ... [¶] due process requires that the [Board] support its determinations with a statement of its reasons therefor.” (In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 268-270.) Further, courts may conduct limited judicial review of parole denials to determine whether the denials are supported by “some evidence,” given that a denial without “some evidence” would be “arbitrary and capricious, thereby depriving the prisoner of due process of law.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 657-658; see Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1254-1255 [clarifying scope of judicial review].) In assessing a due process claim, we conduct a “case by case determination of whether a particular incident of due process is required for parole decisions ....” (Sturm, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 266.) We apply the balancing test announced in People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.) (Ramirez), to assess the amount of process that is required under the circumstances.15 Under the Ramirez test, we consider the following factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation2
Prisoners Do Not Have a Due Process Right to Legal Counsel for Parole Proceedings
At the outset, we will address the question of whether due process mandates the assistance of legal counsel for prospective parolees in parole release proceedings. We need not conduct a full-blown Ramirez analysis or engage in an extended discussion on this question because our Supreme Court has already answered this question in the negative. In In re Schoengarth (1967) 66 Cal.2d 295, a prisoner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the denial of his request for appointment of legal counsel during parole proceedings. The Supreme Court denied the petition and ruled the prisoner had no constitutional right to legal counsel. (Id. at pp. 304, 306.) As the Court explained, “[t]he proceedings of the [Board] are wholly administrative in nature, and that agency‘s determination of [the] conditions of parole is not a judicial act.” (Id. at p. 304.) Therefore, a prisoner has “no right to the3
Prisoners Do Not Have a Due Process Right to In-Person Parole Hearings or Multi-Member Parole Panels
We turn now to the more difficult question of whether determinately-sentenced nonviolent prisoners have due process rights to in-person parole hearings and/or parole panels consisting of at least two or more panelists. Under the first factor of the Ramirez test, we begin by identifying the private interest at stake in a parole release proceeding. “‘The essence of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence.‘” (Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 850, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 477.) The parolee “is not free from legal restraint, but is constructively a prisoner in the legal custody of state prison authorities until officially discharged from parole.” (In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1037Morrissey, at p. 480; see Taylor, at p. 1037.) “An incarcerated individual for whom a parole date has not been set possesses less of an expectation of4
The Parole Criteria Regulation Does Not Offend Due Process
In their appellate brief, the petitioners claim the regulation setting forth the criteria for parole suitability determinations (
DISPOSITION
The orders granting the petitions for writs of habeas corpus are reversed.McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, J.
O‘ROURKE, J.