In re Ja.O.
Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Groban, and Evans concurred.
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Kruger concurred.
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.
In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA;
This case involves a question about the scope of the initial inquiry duty, in particular, the county welfare department‘s duty to ask “extended family members” and others whether a child placed in its temporary custody “pursuant to Section 306” is or may be an Indian child (the extended-family inquiry duty).
(Former
After we granted review, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 81 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 81), and the Governor signed the bill as an urgency measure on September 27, 2024, effective immediately. (Stats. 2024, ch. 656.) Assembly Bill 81 amended former section 224.2 to add language specifying that the extended-family inquiry duty applies whenever a child is placed into a county welfare department‘s temporary custody, regardless of how the child is removed from the home. Assembly Bill 81 therefore
us for all cases in which a child was placed into temporary custody on or after the bill‘s effective date.
What remains to be decided is whether the extended-family inquiry duty applies in pre-Assembly Bill 81 cases where the child was placed into a county welfare department‘s temporary custody after being removed from the home pursuant to a warrant. We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties and amicus curiae on the significance, if any, of Assembly Bill 81 on this case. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the county welfare department has an extended-family inquiry duty in pre-Assembly Bill 81 cases.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2021, the five children of petitioner A.C. (Mother) were removed from their home pursuant to a protective custody warrant under
At the detention hearing, Mother denied the children had Indian ancestry,4 and she reiterated this in an ICWA form. R.O., the father of the two youngest children, Ja.O. and Je.O. (Father),5 also denied Indian ancestry at, and after, the detention hearing but checked a box on an ICWA form that states, “One or more of my parents, grandparents, or other lineal ancestors is or was a member of a federally recognized tribe.” At an August 2022 contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply, took jurisdiction over the children, removed them from parental custody, and ordered reunification services for Mother.
On appeal, Mother argued for reversal of the jurisdiction and disposition order based on the Department‘s failure to satisfy its extended-family inquiry
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (Italics added.)6
pursuant to
Mother asserts the Department knew the names of “numerous family members and close family friends” but did not fulfill its extended-family inquiry duty because it asked only one of them about the children‘s potential Indian ancestry. The Court of Appeal rejected Mother‘s argument, holding the extended-family inquiry duty did not apply because her children were placed into the Department‘s temporary custody after being removed from their home pursuant to a warrant under section 340 and were therefore not “placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to Section 306,” as specified in former section 224.2, subdivision (b). (See Ja.O., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 678–679.) In other words, the Court of Appeal interpreted the phrase “placed into ... temporary custody ...
Two months later, a majority of the Court of Appeal in Delila D. disagreed, interpreting the same statutory phrase in former section 224.2 — “placed into ... temporary custody ... pursuant to Section 306” — more broadly to hold the extended-family inquiry duty arises whenever a child is placed into temporary custody, “both when the child has been taken from home by a social worker or police officer under exigent circumstances without a warrant (§ 306, subd. (a)(1) & (2)) and when the child has been taken from home by means of a protective custody warrant issued under section 340 (§ 306, subd. (a)(1)).” (Delila D., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 971, review granted.) The Delila D. majority further held that to the
extent the phrase was ambiguous, the extended-family inquiry duty should be interpreted broadly to effectuate ICWA‘s purpose, reasoning: “Applying a narrower initial inquiry to the subset of dependencies that begin with a temporary removal by warrant frustrates the purpose of the initial inquiry.” (Delila D., at p. 962.) “The goal of the initial inquiry is to determine whether ICWA‘s protections may apply to the proceeding, and the way a child is initially removed from home has no bearing on the question of whether they may be an Indian child.” (Ibid.)
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Assembly Bill 81 was passed and took effect after we granted review.
As is evident, the language Assembly Bill 81 added to former section 224.2 (as italicized above) references the various ways in which a child may be placed into the county welfare department‘s temporary custody including, as relevant here, “pursuant to a warrant described in Section 340.” (
language, county welfare departments have “an obligation to make an extensive initial inquiry in all cases,” not “in warrantless cases only.”
The parties disagree, however, whether the extended-family inquiry duty also applies in cases like this one, where the child was placed into the county welfare department‘s temporary custody after being removed from the home pursuant to a section 340 warrant before Assembly Bill 81 took effect in 2024. Mother maintains the duty applies in such cases because Assembly Bill 81 merely clarified former section 224.2. In other words, her position is that even before Assembly Bill 81, county welfare departments had an extended-family inquiry duty in cases where a child was placed into temporary custody after being removed from the home pursuant to a section 340 warrant. Mother asserts this was the “general understanding” among courts and parties, “as evidenced by County Counsel‘s concession brief filed [below].” (Citing In re C.L. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 377, 385 [noting that “[e]arly decisions” of the Court of Appeal stated the extended-family inquiry duty “‘applies in every dependency proceeding‘“]; see also In re D.M. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1052 (dis. opn. of Raphael, J.) [applying the extended-family inquiry “‘in every case‘” “was not controversial“].)
cases unless the Legislature intended that they have retroactive effect, and the Legislature‘s “intent [was] for prospective application only.”
Assembly Bill 81 Clarified, Rather than Changed, Existing Law
Statutory Interpretation
As the parties agree, our precedents establish that when a statutory amendment clarifies, rather than changes, existing law, the amendment “is properly applied to transactions predating its enactment” (Carter v. California Department of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922 (Carter)) because “the true meaning of the statute remains the same” (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243 (Western Security Bank)).
Among the circumstances we may consider in evaluating whether an amendment clarified or changed existing law is whether the Legislature, in amending a statute, “promptly react[ed] to the emergence of a novel question of statutory interpretation.” (Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 243.) If so, “‘it is logical to regard the amendment‘” as clarifying — not changing — the law. (Ibid.) In addition, where “‘the courts have not yet finally and conclusively interpreted a statute and are in the process of doing so, a declaration of a later Legislature as to what an earlier Legislature intended is entitled to consideration.‘” (Carter, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 922, quoting McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 473; Western Security Bank, at pp. 244–245 [the Legislature‘s statement that an amendment clarifies existing law reflects its intent to apply the amendment to all existing cases including those that precede the amendment].)
Ultimately, however, “the interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power the Constitution assigns the courts.” (Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244.) Although “the Legislature‘s expressed views on the prior import of its statutes are entitled to due consideration,” “a legislative declaration of an existing statute‘s meaning is neither binding nor conclusive in construing the statute.” (Ibid.) “Indeed, there is little logic and some incongruity in the notion that one Legislature may speak authoritatively
Here, we will evaluate the scope of the extended-family inquiry duty under former section 224.2 by applying settled principles of statutory interpretation.8 “Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose.” (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737 (Coalition of Concerned Communities).) “We first consider the words of the statutes, as statutory language is generally the
most reliable indicator of legislation‘s intended purpose.” (McHugh v. Protective Life Ins. Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227.) “We consider the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.” (Ibid.) “The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) If the statutory “text is unambiguous and provides a clear answer, we need go no further.” (Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 750, 758.) It is only when the language supports more than one reasonable construction that we look to appropriate extrinsic sources, such as the statute‘s purpose, legislative history, and public policy. (Coalition of Concerned Communities, at p. 737.)
1. The Plain Meaning of Former Section 224.2
Subdivision (a) of former section 224.2 provided: “The court, county welfare department, and the probation department have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a [dependency] petition may be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child. The duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not limited to, asking the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether hе or she has any information that the child may be an Indian child.”
Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.”
A concurring opinion in In re Adrian L. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 342, 353 (Adrian L.) (conc. opn. of Kelley, J.) appears to be the first published appellate decision to view the statutory language in addressing the specific question before us: Whether former section 224.2‘s extended-family inquiry duty applied to cases in which a child was removed from their home pursuant to a warrant under section 340. Relying on the phrase “[i]f a child is placed into temporary custody ... pursuant to Section 306” (former § 224.2, subd. (b)), the concurring justice in Adrian L. concluded that county welfare departments had two types of initial inquiry duties: a duty that applied to warrantless removals, and a narrower duty that applied when the initial removal was pursuant to a warrant. The concurring justice reasoned that because the child in that case had been removed from his home pursuant to a warrant, the county welfare department had no duty to ask extended relatives about his Indian ancestry. (Adrian L., at p. 353 (conc. opn. of Kelley, J.).)
Like the concurring justice in Adrian L., the Department relies on the phrase “[i]f a child is placed into . . . temporary custody ... pursuant to Section 306” (former
any clearer statutory language” than that of former section 224.2, subdivision (b), which provided the extended-family inquiry duty arose when a child was placed into its temporary custody “pursuant to Section 306,” and not also “pursuant to section 340” relating to removals with a warrant.
The Court of Appeal in this case took a similar view, reasoning: “All of the children in this case were taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant under section 340 . . . [and] therefore were not taken into temporary custody pursuant to section 306 . . . . The expanded duty of initial inquiry under subdivision (b) of section 224.2 consequently does not apply.” (Ja.O., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 679.)
“[r]eceive and maintain, pending investigation, temporary custody of a child who is described in Section 300, and who has been delivered by a peace officer“;9 it does not limit the social worker‘s authority to “[r]eceive and maintain” a child to situations in which the child has been removed from the home without a warrant. (
As explained by the majority in Delila D., which read former section 224.2 as we do, when a child is removed from the home pursuant to a warrant, the removal is authorized by section 340, and the placement into temporary custody is authorized by section 306, subdivision (a)(1). (Delila D., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 971, review granted, citing
authorized by section 306, subdivision (a)(2), or sections 305 and 305.6 (which provide additional circumstances under which a child may be removed from the home without a warrant), and the placement into temporary custody is authorized by section 306,
In contrast, the interpretation of the Ja.O. court and the Department leaves the statute incomplete by creating two different types of inquiry duties — an extended-family inquiry duty for warrantless removals and a narrower inquiry duty for children removed from their homes pursuant to a warrant — without providing direction on the scope of the narrower inquiry duty. The Court of Appeal in this case, for example, concluded the Department had no duty to ask available extended family members and others about the children‘s Indian ancеstry, but it failed to address what kind of narrower duty applied instead, or identify where in former section 224.2 or in any other statute the scope of that narrower duty was defined. (Ja.O., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 677–681.)
The Department suggests the narrower duty was set forth in former
The flaw in this argument is that former section 224.2, subdivision (c), by its express terms, described the initial inquiry duty of ”the court,” not of the county welfare department. Under former section 224.2, subdivision (a), the “court, county welfare department, and the probation department” each had their own initial inquiry duty detailed in the subsequent subdivisions — subdivision (b) for the county welfare department and the probation department, and subdivision (c) for “the court.” Significantly, nothing in the language of former section 224.2 suggests the initial inquiry duty is satisfied for all three entities so long as any one of them conducts an inquiry.
abuse or neglect.” (Former
Although, for all the above reasons, we conclude the plain language of former section 224.2 reasonably required county welfare departments to conduct an extended-family inquiry in every case, we acknowledge that other Courts of Appeal have offered alternative interpretations of the former statute that were reasonable, even if ultimately less persuasive. In In re Andres R. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 828, 842–843 (Andres R.), for example, a majority of the court reasoned that section 306, subdivision (a)(1), which authоrizes a county welfare department to “[r]eceive and maintain” but not take “temporary custody of a child ... who has been delivered by a peace officer,” presumes the child has already been taken into “temporary custody” by a peace officer before being “[r]eceive[d] and maintain[ed]” by the county welfare department. And “[t]he only statutes that authorize peace officers to take children into ‘temporary custody’ relate to warrantless takings. (Andres R., at p. 843.) “In contrast, section 340 concerns the issuance of a ‘protective custody warrant,’ pursuant to which a child is taken into ‘protective custody.’ (§ 340, subds. (a)–(c).)” (Andres R., at p. 843, italics added.) The Andres R. majority concluded the Legislature‘s decision not to reference section 340 or “protective
custody” in the language of section 306, subdivision (a)(1), could not have been “arbitrary or meaningless.” (Andres R., at p. 843.)
Because we cannot conclusively say there is only one reasonable way to interpret the plain language of former section 224.2, we next consider extrinsic sources such as legislative materials and public policy considerations. (See Coalition of Concerned Communities, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 737 [we look to extrinsic sources when the statutory language supports more than one reasonable construction].)
“ICWA and [its state analogue] Cal-ICWA are unique statutory schemes that are intended to protect Native American heritage, cultural connections between tribes and children of Native American ancestry, the best interests of Indian children, and the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.) “[M]inimizing separation of Indian families and maximizing early plaсement of Indian children with extended family, other members of the child‘s Indian tribe, or other Indian families is the resounding preference of ICWA and of the ICWA regulations that the Bureau of Indian Affairs ... guidelines interpret. (In re C.L., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 388.) “This placement preference reflects ‘[f]ederal policy that, where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community.’ [Citation.] Thus, identification of a child‘s Indian community early on is paramount.” (Id. at p. 389.)
Former section 224.2 was enacted as part of Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) § 5 (Assembly Bill 3176), which made conforming amendments to ICWA-related statutes after the 2016 adoption of new federal regulations concerning ICWA
compliance (
Similarly, the legislative history of Assembly Bill 3176 shows that one of the bill‘s purposes was to “increase tribes’ opportunities to be involved in child custody cases involving Indian children.” (Cal. Health and Human Services Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3176 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 4, 2018, p. 1.) An Assembly Republican Bill Analysis for Assembly Bill 3176 stated, “The guidelines provided ... in [Assembly Bill] 3176 create standards that can help to increase the number of children kept within their respective tribes due to improved processes for determining a child‘s background.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Republican Analysis of Assem. Bill 3176 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 11, 2018,
forth specific steps a social worker, probation officer, or court is required to take to make that inquiry.” (Id. at p. 62.) The bill also “clarifie[d],” “consistent with California child welfare regulation, . . . when the duty to inquir[e] begins for the court and county agencies, which is at first contact.” (Enrolled Report, supra, at p. 3.)
Given ICWA‘s remedial goals and the importance of the initial inquiry as a way to ensure compliance with ICWA as early in the proceedings as possible, interpreting former section 224.2 narrowly to exclude situations in which a child was removed from the home pursuant to a warrant would be contrary to the letter and spirit of ICWA and Assembly Bill 3176. Instead, the statute is better read as requiring the county welfare department to conduct an extended-family initial inquiry whenever a child is placed into its temporary custody, regardless of how the child was removed from the home. (See Robinson v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 226, 233 [where remedial legislation is involved, we must interpret the statutory language broadly to promote its objective].)
As the majority in Delila D. said, “[t]here is no practical difference between children taken by warrant and those taken without a warrant, and . . . no reason to distinguish between them for ICWA inquiry purposes. . . . [I]t simply doesn‘t make sense to apply different initial inquiries depending on how the child was removed from the home, as that procedural happenstance has nothing to do with a child‘s ancestry.” (Delila D., supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 973, 975, review granted.)
Mother provides the following example to illustrate how the method of removal should have no bearing on the scope of
the initial inquiry duty: “Imagine a mother with two children whose home environment posed an immediate threat to a child. Further imagine one child was removed without a warrant from the mother as the child was home at the time of contact, but a warrant for the second child was issued as the second child had run away from home. Under these circumstances, the child welfare agency would only be rеquired to inquire of extended family members for the child found at the home, not the child who had run away. And if these children were half-siblings, as is often the case, the inquiry of the extended family members on the first child would not be fully relevant to the second child as there would be no inquiry as to the second child‘s paternal relatives at all.” In this type of scenario, it is unlikely the Legislature intended to require an extended-family inquiry for one child, but not the other.
types of initial inquiry duties depending on how a child was removed from the home.
Mother responds that the term “emergency removals” as used in the BIA Guidelines includes removals pursuant to a warrant, but we need not resolve that question because even if “emergency removals” rеfers only to warrantless removals, we do not read the BIA Guidelines as recommending an extended-family inquiry only when a child is removed from the home without a warrant. The next paragraph of the BIA Guidelines, which relates to active efforts, “recommend[s] that State agencies work with Tribes, parents, and other parties as soon as possible, even in an emergency situation, to begin active efforts to reunite the family,” which suggests this should be done as a matter of course in non-emergency situations. (BIA Guidelines, supra, at p. 29, italics added.) The BIA Guidelines also broadly state that the initial inquiry duty applies in every “emergency or voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding,” without restriction based on the way a child is placed into the county welfare department‘s temporary custody. (BIA Guidelines, supra, at p. 9.) Thus, the BIA Guidelines do not support thе Department‘s position.
Moreover, nothing in Assembly Bill 3176‘s legislative history suggests California‘s Legislature relied on the cited sentence from the BIA Guidelines to limit the county welfare department‘s extended-family inquiry duty. The various legislative committee reports and analyses contain comprehensive lists of the bill‘s intended changes and clarifications, but none of them contains any discussion about, or justification for, limiting the extended-family inquiry duty to situations in which removal from the home was without a warrant. (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 3176 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jun. 18, 2018; Assem. Rules Com., Off. of Assem. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3176 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 22, 2018; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3176 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 22, 2018.) Accordingly, extrinsic sources support interpreting the former statute broadly to require the county welfare department to conduct an extended-family inquiry in all cases
CONCLUSION
We conclude Assembly Bill 81 clarified, rather than changed, the law. Accordingly,
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to the juvenile court for compliance with the inquiry requirements of section 224.2, consistent with this opinion. If the juvenile court thereafter finds the inquiry duty has been satisfied and ICWA does not apply, the court shall reinstate the jurisdiction and disposition order. If the juvenile court concludes ICWA applies, it shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and Cаlifornia implementing provisions. (See In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
JENKINS, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu
I join the court‘s holding and the reasoning in today‘s opinion except for its dicta citing Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232 and Carter v. California Department of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10–12.) The court cites those cases for the proposition that the Legislature‘s amendment of a statute, purporting to clarify existing law, can aid judicial determination of the meaning of the original statute. But the discussion is dicta because today‘s opinion makes clear that “[w]e will not consider ... other circumstances — i.e., the Legislature‘s statements in amending former section 224.2 or the timing of the amendment [citation] — because our statutory interpretation answers the question before us.” (Id. at p. 11, fn. 8.)
I decline to join this dicta. “‘[P]ost-enactment legislative history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation’ because by definition [it] ‘could have had no effect on the [Legislature‘s] vote.‘” (Coker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 667, 690; see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. (1997) 520 U.S. 471, 484–485 [“‘the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.‘“].) As the court acknowledges, “‘there is little logic and some incongruity in the notion that one Legislature may speak authoritatively on the intent of an earlier Legislature‘s enactment when a gulf of
two bodies.‘” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.) And importantly, “‘it is the duty of this court, when ... a question of law is properly presented, to state the true meaning of the statute finally and conclusively.‘” (McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 472.) By contrast, “the Legislature has no authority to interpret a statute. . . . The Legislature may define the meaning of statutory language by a present legislative enactment which, subject to constitutional restraints, it may deem retroactive. But it has no authority simply to say what it did mean.” (Id. at p. 473; see id. at p. 470 [declining to credit legislative statements that amendments to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) were “‘declaratory of existing law‘” when the amendments had added language to impose liability that we said did not exist under the former version of FEHA].) This separation of powers principle is properly observed in today‘s opinion, minus the dicta.
LIU, J.
I Concur:
KRUGER, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion In re Ja.O.
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 91 Cal.App.5th 672
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S280572
Date Filed: August 4, 2025
Court: Superior
County: San Bernardino
Judge: Steven A. Mapes
Counsel:
Janelle B. Price, under appointment by the Supreme Court; and Donna Chirco for Defendant and Appellant.
Leslie A. Barry and Christopher Blake for California Appellate Defense Counsel and Children‘s Law Center of California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Dawn M. Martin, Svetlana Kauper and Landon Villavaso, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Donna Chirco
Appellate Defenders, Inc.
555 West Beech Street #300
San Deigo, CA 92101
(619) 696-0282
Landon Villavaso
Deputy County Counsel
385 North Arrowhead Avenue, 4th Floor
San Bernardino, CA 92415
(909) 387-0512