IN RE J.U.
No. 2 CA-JV 2016-0064
Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2.
Filed November 2, 2016
384 P.3d 839
CONCLUSION, REMAND, AND COSTS ON APPEAL
¶ 34 The New York court entered the adoption order in violation of
If the test results confirm Ramirez‘s paternity, the family court may, in the proper exercise of its discretion, initiate a conference with the New York court to consider whether to continue exercising jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. See generally
Emily Danies, Tucson, Counsel for Minor
Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Brammer1 concurred.
OPINION
ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge:
¶ 1 J.U. and two other juveniles telephoned two schools and threatened them with a “terrorist attack,” resulting in the evacuation and closure of the schools. After an adjudication hearing on a forty-eight count, amended delinquency petition, the juvenile court found J.U. had committed all but eight of the charges. On appeal, J.U. challenges the court‘s restitution order, entered after a combined restitution and disposition hearing. We vacate a portion of the restitution order and affirm the remainder for the reasons that follow.
¶ 2 We view the evidence presented at the adjudication and restitution hearings in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court‘s rulings. See In re Andrew C., 215 Ariz. 366, ¶ 6, 160 P.3d 687, 688 (App. 2007); In re James P., 214 Ariz. 420, ¶ 2, 153 P.3d 1049, 1051 (App. 2007). On August 26, 2015, J.U. and two other high school students called two Douglas schools using a cell phone in Mexico. In both instances, the caller left a recorded message that school personnel received the next day, stating he would “be doing [a] terrorist attack” and that the school must be closed for seventy-two hours. On August 27, the students called the schools a second time, pointing out one of the schools had not closed as directed and stating, “I am not playing games, with you, do not play games with me, please I do not want to harm the children or the teachers.” The Douglas Police Department (DPD) responded to the initial calls, evacuated and searched the schools for firearms or explosive devices, and investigated the threats. As a result of the investigation, J.U. was charged with multiple offenses.
¶ 3 After an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found J.U. delinquent and that the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt multiple counts of the following offenses: threatening or intimidating; conspiracy to commit threatening or intimidating; use of an electronic communication to terrify, intimidate, or harass; conspiracy to commit use of an electronic communication to terrify, intimidate, or harass; false reporting by initiating a report of a bombing, fire, offense, or other emergency; interference with or disruption of an educational institution; and conspiracy to commit interference with or disruption of an educational institution. Relevant to this case, the court found J.U. responsible on eight сounts of false reporting under
¶ 4 At a subsequent restitution hearing, the state presented general claims for restitution on behalf of the schools and DPD and requested restitution pursuant to
¶ 5 Kraig Fullen, DPD‘s chief of police, testified at the restitution hearing that his agency was requesting $5,957.21 for emergency response to and investigation of the offense, explaining the supporting documentation admitted as an exhibit.2 The exhibit shows both regular hours and overtime paid for officers related to those efforts. He also testified the officers had been required to travel to attend court hearings in Sierra Vista and requested reimbursement for mileage DPD paid for those trips.
¶ 6 J.U. concеdes that after reducing portions of the amounts the schools requested, the juvenile court entered appropriate restitution awards to each. He contends the court erred, however, when it awarded DPD the full $5,957.21 requested pursuant to
and thus, unrecoverablе.” He insists the order must be reduced by $5,061.63, which is the total amount for time DPD officers expended on the case during their regular working hours, overtime hours, and mileage DPD paid for its officers’ travel to and from the court for court hearings.
¶ 7 J.U. asserts he “timely objected to expenses incurred after the emergency response had ended.” The portion of the transcript he cites, however, does not suрport this contention. It shows he objected during the state‘s direct examination of Fullen about reimbursement of DPD for the cost of having officers attend hearings, which, as discussed below, was part of the general restitution claimed by DPD as a victim. J.U.‘s counsel stated, “I think the statute says that the Court may impose for costs of the emergency response, but that‘s all the statute says.” When the court responded that it did not understand the objection, counsel stated, “The objection would be relevance” because the police chief intended to request reimbursement for the cost of gas to travel to and from court hearings in Sierra Vista. The court overruled the objection.
¶ 8 During closing arguments, the prosecutor appeared to respond to J.U.‘s earlier objection by asserting
¶ 9 A restitution order that is not supported by statutory authority is fundamental, prejudicial error. See State v. Whitney, 151 Ariz. 113, 115, 726 P.2d 210, 212 (App. 1985).
¶ 10 Section
¶ 11 The statute defines “[e]xpenses” as “any reasonable costs that are directly incurred by a public agency... that makes an appropriate emergency response to an incident or an investigation of the commission of false reрorting.”
¶ 12 The plain language of
¶ 13 Moreover, although J.U. asserts Fullen testified the emergency had ended by August 31, that was not the testimony. Fullen was asked whether there was an emergency on August 31, and he responded, “A direct emergency, no.” Upon further questioning by the court, Fullen clarified sweeps of the school were conducted on that date and that the investigation continued on September 2 and 3.
¶ 14 J.U. suggests that case law interpreting the general restitution statute,
¶ 16 Finally, J.U. contends the juvenile court erred by including in the restitution award to DPD the $570 in mileage it paid for twelve officers to travel to and from court to testify in three hearings in this matter. Arguing the award was improper under
¶ 17 In his reply brief, J.U. counters that the mileage award was not appropriate under those statutes either. He asserts the officers did not appear in court in their individual capacity, they are not individual victims, and law enforcement agencies are not, in any event, victims “within the meaning of”
¶ 18 We generally decline to address issues that are not argued adequately, with appropriate citation to supporting authority. See
¶ 19 “Restitution is appropriate for those losses that (1) are economic, (2) would not have occurred but for the juvenile‘s delinquent conduct, and (3) are directly caused by the delinquent conduct (e.g. not consequential damages).” Andrew C., 215 Ariz. 366, ¶ 9, 160 P.3d at 689; cf. State v. Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. 27, ¶ 7, 39 P.3d 1131, 1133 (2002) (stating criteria for restitution payment by adult upon conviction). At the restitution hearing and in its order, the juvenile court articulated these factors in determining whether claimed losses were economic losses and therefore compensable under
¶ 20 We first reject J.U.‘s contention in his reply brief that DPD is not a victim for purposes of restitution. In Guilliams, we rejected the defendant‘s argument that ADOC was not a victim of the offense of escape for purposes of
¶ 21 Expenses incurred by a victim to attend trial generally are considered an economic loss for purposes of general restitution statutes. See State v. Madrid, 207 Ariz. 296, ¶ 10, 85 P.3d 1054, 1058 (App. 2004) (finding travel expenses incurred by murder victim‘s children tо attend trial “constitute an economic loss for which they are entitled to restitution“). Nevertheless, the juvenile court erred in ordering J.U. to pay DPD for the officers’ mileage.5
¶ 22 In Guilliams, we adopted the “modified but for” standard utilized by the First Circuit Court of Appeals for determining whether losses are direct or consequential, an inquiry to be made on a case-by-case basis considering the reasonablenеss of the expenses. Guilliams, 208 Ariz. 48, ¶ 18, 90 P.3d at 790-91, quoting United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.3d 579, 589-90 (1st Cir. 1997). Addressing the issue of what constitutes an economic loss when the victim is a governmental entity, we “decline[d] to construe the restitution laws to encompass costs incurred by [such] entities that are performing their routine functions, regardless of whether those costs can be traced back to a criminal act.” Id. ¶ 23. We stated in a footnote that we would leave to the “trial court‘s sound discretion the task of determining whether and to what extent travel costs are justifiable and amenable to restitution under the guidelines” we established in that case. Id. n.4.
¶ 23 We need not remand the issue to the juvenile court here, however. The mileage paid for the officers was not a “cost[ ] beyond the normal costs of operating” DPD. Id. ¶ 21. Applying the test we articulated in Guilliams, we conclude the mileage was an expense incurred as part of the routine functioning of DPD, like any law enforcement agency, of having its officers testify in criminal proceedings in connection with the prosecution of a criminal offense. Thus, in the absence of a statute expressly permitting these kinds of routine prosecution expenses as part of a restitution order, see, e.g.,
¶ 24 We affirm the juvenile court‘s order adjudicating J.U. delinquent and the disposition. We vacate the portion of the restitution order requiring J.U. to pay DPD $570 for its officers traveling to and from court, but affirm the order in all other respects.
PETER J. ECKERSTROM
CHIEF JUDGE