In re J.A.
{¶ 1} Appellant K.B. (“Mother“) appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights and awarding custody of her minor son, J.A., Jr., to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “agency“). After a thorough review of the law and applicable facts, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
{¶ 2} CCDCFS became involved in this matter in January 2020, when J.A. was placed in agency custody after suffering burns to his lower extremities when he was just 18 months old. Mother stated that she believed that he had “[done] this to himself.” J.A. had suffered immersion burns from his knees to his feet, requiring skin-graft surgery. Medical professionals opined that the injuries were non-accidental and not consistent with the explanation provided by the family.
{¶ 3} In December 2020, the agency moved to modify temporary custody to permanent custody. In April 2021, a trial was held on the agency‘s motion, after which the trial court denied the motion and continued temporary custody. In its entry denying the motion, the juvenile court ordered Mother to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, to submit to drug testing by CCDCFS by April 28, 2021, and to submit to random drug testing twice a month, as requested by the agency.
{¶ 4} CCDCFS worker T‘ara Williams (“Williams“) was assigned to the case after the denial of permanent custody in April 2021. At that time, she learned that Mother was engaged in a domestic violence program and a parenting program; she also claimed to be engaged in mental health services. However, Williams did not believe that Mother had benefitted from those services. Mother was still residing with her family in the same home where the incident with J.A. happened where one of the family members had inflicted serious abuse on J.A. With regard to how the
{¶ 5} Williams was also concerned that Mother had not benefitted from the domestic violence services. J.A.‘s alleged father1 had been charged with domestic violence against Mother, and Mother had failed to appear at two different trial dates, resulting in the case against him being dropped. Further, when Williams asked Mother if she still maintained a relationship with J.A.‘s alleged father, she stated that she could not because the agency told her she could not. This concerned Williams because Mother seemed to not recognize that the relationship was unhealthy and dangerous, but instead only that the agency would not allow her to continue it.
{¶ 6} While Williams did not ever see Mother and J.A.‘s alleged father together, she still had concerns that they were still involved. During the pendency of this matter, J.A.‘s alleged father had been charged with felonious assault (against another victim), a felony of the second degree. The indictment stated that he had caused or attempted to cause physical harm using a deadly weapon, which was a gold SUV. This concerned Williams because Mother also drives a gold SUV, which Williams had personally seen her drive.
{¶ 7} Williams was also concerned whether Mother was receiving mental health services. Mother provided a phone number for her therapist at Ohio
{¶ 8} During the pendency of the case, Mother was charged with aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth degree. Williams stated that the offense was for cocaine, but Mother had told her that it was ecstasy and later stated that it was marijuana.
{¶ 9} Mother was sentenced to probation and was required to provide drug screens. She was inconsistent with reporting to her probation officer and was later arrested for failing to comply with the terms of her probation.
{¶ 10} Substance abuse services were added to Mother‘s case plan. Williams referred her for a drug assessment through Recovery Resources, but Mother did not go to the initial intake because she stated that she was “not a crackhead.”
{¶ 11} Mother submitted to several urine screens and tested positive for cocaine and marijuana in June 2021. In July 2021, she tested positive for marijuana. Mother was referred for additional screens but did not comply.
{¶ 12} Mother‘s visitation with J.A. had been inconsistent but became more consistent in early July 2021. Many of her visits with J.A. had been virtual due to COVID concerns, and Mother was often not engaged during these visits. When Williams was assigned to the case, the visits became in-person each week with
{¶ 13} In July 2021, CCDCFS again moved to modify temporary custody of J.A. to permanent custody. The motion stated that Mother had failed to complete the ordered drug and alcohol assessment, had failed to consistently submit to random drug screens, had tested positive for cocaine and marijuana in June 2021, and had failed to engage in mental health services. The motion further noted that Mother had failed to address ongoing domestic violence concerns and failed to consistently visit with J.A.
{¶ 14} Trial was held on the motion in October 2021. Testimony was presented from Williams and the guardian ad litem, Paul Berman. Both Williams and the GAL testified that granting permanent custody to the agency was in the best interest of J.A. Following the hearing, the trial court granted the motion for permanent custody to CCDCFS and terminated Mother‘s parental rights.
{¶ 15} Mother then filed the instant appeal, raising one assignment of error for our review:
The evidence presented to the trial court did not support, by clear and convincing evidence, a finding that permanent custody to the agency was in the best interests of the child; whereas an extension of temporary custody should have been granted.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 16} The right to raise one‘s own child is “‘an essential and basic civil right.‘” In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67, quoting In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997); see also In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 156, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990), quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (a parent has a “‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and management” of his or her child). However, this right is not absolute. It is “‘always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.‘” In re L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, 86 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).
{¶ 17} Because termination of parental rights is “‘the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case,‘” In re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546, 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66, quoting In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14, it is “an alternative of last resort.” In re Gill, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79640, 2002-Ohio-3242, ¶ 21. It is, however, “sanctioned when necessary for the welfare of a child.” In re M.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101693 and 101694, 2015-Ohio-1028, ¶ 7, citing In re Wise, 96 Ohio App.3d 619, 624, 645 N.E.2d 812 (9th Dist.1994). “‘All children have the right, if possible, to parenting from either natural or adoptive parents which provides support, care, discipline, protection and motivation.‘” In re J.B. at ¶ 66, quoting In re Hitchcock, 120 Ohio App.3d 88, 102, 696 N.E.2d 1090 (8th Dist.1996). Where parental rights are terminated, the goal is to create “a more stable life for the dependent children” and to “facilitate adoption to foster permanency for children.” In re N.B. at ¶ 67, citing
{¶ 18} Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody of a child to CCDCFS, it must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) of
section 2151.413 of the Revised Code , the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child‘s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child‘s parents.(b) The child is abandoned.
(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody.
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of
section 2151.413 of the Revised Code , the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state.(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated
an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state.
{¶ 19} Second, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that granting permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child.
{¶ 20} In this case, CCDCFS moved for permanent custody under
{¶ 22} Mother further contends that the agency had no concerns with Mother‘s visitation with J.A. Williams testified that as J.A. has become older and has seen his mother more regularly, he understands better who she is and becomes excited to see her.
{¶ 23} We review a juvenile court‘s determination of a child‘s best interest under
{¶ 24} In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held pursuant to
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;
(d) The child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶ 25} A juvenile court is required to consider each relevant factor under
{¶ 26} Here, the juvenile court stated that it considered the relevant factors set forth under
{¶ 27}
{¶ 28} While Mother‘s visitation with J.A. had become more consistent as the case went on, there was testimony that she did not show or canceled approximately 25 percent of the visits. She was engaged with J.A. during these visits, and he had grown to be excited for the visits and come to recognize her as his mother. However, this court has stated that “‘the mere existence of a good relationship is insufficient. Overall, we are concerned with the best interest of the child, not the mere existence of a relationship.‘” In re K.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95374, 2011-Ohio-349, ¶ 23, quoting In re R.N., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83121, 2004-Ohio-2560.
{¶ 29} There was also testimony that Mother did not appear to have empathy toward J.A. regarding the burns he had incurred and did not seem to accept that
{¶ 30} Under
{¶ 31}
{¶ 32}
{¶ 33} Under
{¶ 34} The above-mentioned findings were all supported by the testimony presented at trial. Moreover, the court was guided by the recommendation of the GAL, who spoke on behalf of J.A. and recommended that it was in J.A.‘s best interest to grant the agency permanent custody.
{¶ 35} Mother argues that the sole issue that remained, and that she should have been given additional time to address, was the substance abuse aspect. Mother
{¶ 36}
{¶ 37} We disagree with Mother that an extension was warranted in this matter. J.A. had been in the custody of CCDCFS for over 20 months and yet Mother had not completed her case plan. She did not fully comply with the juvenile court‘s order to submit to urine screens, and when she did actually submit to screens, she twice tested positive for drugs. In addition, Mother was charged with felony drug possession and later violated her probation from that case.
{¶ 38} While Mother contends that the substance abuse was the only problem, Williams testified that there were other concerns about Mother, including
{¶ 39} Williams testified that J.A. is a very sweet child, but he does not communicate well. He is three years old but verbalizes and functions as an 18-month-old. He cannot express if there is a problem and cannot identify the cause of any discomfort or frustration. Williams testified that this concerned the agency because if he were to be returned to Mother and something happened, they would not know.
{¶ 40} In addition, there are concerns that J.A. may be autistic, and at the time of trial, he was on a waiting list to be evaluated. Mother does not believe that there is an issue regarding autism and that “that‘s just how he is,” which also presented a concern for the agency.
{¶ 41} Moreover, J.A. suffers from lingering trauma from the burns he incurred. Williams testified that she is concerned because Mother does not appear to have empathy for J.A. nor does she acknowledge that someone in her family seriously abused J.A.
{¶ 43} We note that Mother was already given additional time to complete her case plan when the court originally denied the agency‘s motion for permanent custody in April 2021. Rather than utilizing the additional time, appellant did not comply with the amendments to her case plan ordered by the trial court and continued to abuse drugs, even being charged with aggravated possession of cocaine. There is no evidence in the record that it would be beneficial to J.A. to allow Mother to have additional time to try to achieve what she already should have accomplished. Accordingly, the juvenile court properly found that an extension of temporary custody was not in J.A.‘s best interest.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 44} After thoroughly reviewing the entire record, we affirm the juvenile court‘s judgment granting permanent custody of J.A. to CCDCFS. The juvenile court‘s judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and an extension of temporary custody was not warranted. Mother‘s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 45} Judgment affirmed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR