In the Matter of D.F., III, and D.D.
Nos. 18AP-811 and 18AP-813
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Rendered on September 13, 2019
2019-Ohio-3710
SADLER, J.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In the Matter of: :
D.F., III, : No. 18AP-811
(C.P.C. No. 17JU-06-7422)
(N.D., :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellant). :
In the Matter of: :
D.D., : No. 18AP-813
(C.P.C. No. 17JU-06-7421)
(N.D., :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellant). :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on September 13, 2019
On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Ian J. Jones, for appellant.
On brief: Robert J. McClaren, for appellee Franklin County Children Services.
On brief: Michelle Mumaw, Guardian ad Litem.
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch
SADLER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, N.D., appeals from judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, awarding custody of N.D.‘s two minor children, D.F., III, and D.D., to plaintiff-appellee, Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS“).
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} Appellant is the biological mother of D.D., born in May 2014, and D.F., born in February 2017. In June 2017, FCCS filed a dependency complaint for D.D. requesting a
{¶ 3} Both cases were tried before a magistrate on August 30, 2017, and on September 6, 2017, the magistrate issued written decisions in both cases finding each child to be dependent, pursuant to
{¶ 4} On October 7, 2017, appellant filed a motion for leave to file objections to the magistrate‘s decisions, along with her objections and a request for a transcript at the state‘s expense. The motion for leave to file objections states that after the magistrate provided an oral decision at the hearing, counsel wrote appellant a letter giving her instructions to contact counsel in order to file timely objections, as counsel would be on vacation and unavailable prior to and during the deadline for objections. According to the motion for leave to file objections, appellant left messages for counsel over Labor Day weekend; counsel‘s staff returned appellant‘s call but left appellant a message under the incorrect name because counsel‘s staff had written appellant‘s name down incorrectly. After counsel got back, appellant told counsel that she decided to wait until counsel returned from vacation to inquire about the status of the appeal. FCCS filed a motion to dismiss appellant‘s motion for leave to file late objections, arguing appellant‘s failure to file timely objections deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.
{¶ 5} The trial court granted appellant‘s motion for leave to file objections and held a hearing on the objections. On September 21, 2018, the trial court issued a decision addressing both cases overruling appellant‘s objections and approving and adopting the magistrate‘s June 6, 2017 decisions. On October 19, 2018, appellant filed notices of appeal in each case from the trial court‘s September 21, 2018 decision and associated judgment entries.
{¶ 6} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:
[1.] The trial court‘s adjudication of dependency of D.D. and D.F. was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
[2.] Sufficient evidence was not presented to support the finding that D.D. and D.F. were dependent children.
[3.] The trial court‘s permanent court commitment of D.D. to FCCS was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence that the commitment was in D.D.‘s best interest.
[4.] Sufficient evidence was not presented to support the trial court‘s finding by a preponderance of the evidence that temporary court commitment of D.F. to FCCS was in D.F.‘s best interest.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶ 7} As a preliminary issue, FCCS contends this court lacks jurisdiction to hear these appeals. For the following reasons, we agree.
{¶ 8} Pursuant to
{¶ 10} In this case, it is undisputed that the trial court adopted and entered judgments on the magistrate‘s decisions on September 6, 2017, within the 14-day window appellant had to object to the magistrate‘s decision under
{¶ 11} Appellant, in reply to appellee‘s argument regarding jurisdiction, points to Tenth District Court of Appeals cases which recognize, in certain circumstances, the discretion of a trial court to consider untimely objections to magistrate decisions. Having reviewed these cases, we find them distinguishable from the case at hand and therefore not grounds to deviate from the reasoning of Levy and Akin. Specifically, Ramsey v. Ramsey, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-840, 2014-Ohio-1921, ¶ 20, and Wiltz v. Accountancy Bd. of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-169, 2016-Ohio-8345, ¶ 22, found the trial court had discretion to review untimely objections to the magistrate‘s decision before it entered final judgment. As previously stated, it is undisputed in this case that the trial court entered judgments adopting the magistrate‘s decisions prior to appellant filing the untimely objections.
{¶ 12} Likewise, Blevins v. Blevins, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-175, 2014-Ohio-3933, ¶ 18, and Watley v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1128, 2007-Ohio-1841, ¶ 10,
{¶ 13} Finally, we note and find persuasive the opinions of other districts that considered similar issues involving untimely objections to magistrate‘s decisions and have determined, in line with Levy and Akin, that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to review untimely objections if the trial court already entered judgment on the magistrate‘s decision. See, e.g., Olson v. Olson, 7th Dist. No. 15 CO 2, 2015-Ohio-5550, ¶ 37; J.B. v. R.B., 9th Dist. No. 14CA0044-M, 2015-Ohio-3808, ¶ 8; Hasch v. Hasch, 11th Dist. No. 2007-L-127, 2008-Ohio-1689, ¶ 22-23; Learning Tree Academy, Ltd. v. Holeyfield, 12th Dist. No. CA2013-10-194, 2014-Ohio-2006, ¶ 16-18.
{¶ 14} Considering all the above, we find the reasoning of Levy and Akin applies in this case. Therefore, consistent with Levy and Akin, appellant‘s failure to file timely objections caused the September 6, 2017 final judgments of the trial court to remain in full effect and the trial court‘s later judgment on the untimely objections to be a nullity which is “unreviewable on appeal.” Akin at ¶ 9. Because appellant did not appeal from the trial court‘s September 6, 2017 judgments within the time parameters of App.R. 4(A), we lack jurisdiction and these appeals should be dismissed. Levy at ¶ 16.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 15} Based on the foregoing, we lack jurisdiction to hear these appeals. Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.
BEATTY BLUNT, J., concurs
BRUNNER, J., dissents.
In the Matter of D.F., III, and D.D.
Nos. 18AP-811 and 18AP-813
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Rendered on September 13, 2019
2019-Ohio-3710
BRUNNER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 16} FCCS in response to N.D.‘s appeals has raised a challenge to this Court‘s jurisdiction, with which the majority agrees. FCCS argues that, because the domestic and juvenile court adopted the magistrate‘s decisions the same day they were filed and the mother of the two children who are the subject of these two cases, N.D., delayed objecting or appealing until one day after the 30 days after the domestic and juvenile court adopted the magistrate‘s decisions, we lack jurisdiction to hear N.D.‘s appeals. I respectfully disagree on this point.
{¶ 17} I would find that this Court does have jurisdiction to hear N.D.‘s appeals, according to the procedural issues related to
{¶ 18} The late-filed objections were accompanied by a motion for leave to file them will a full explanation of why the objections were late. Moreover, they were filed on the cusp of the 31st day, just one hour and eight minutes past the midnight electronic filing deadline following the domestic and juvenile court‘s orders adopting the magistrate‘s decisions. And no appeal had been filed at this point.
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20} To illustrate:
{¶ 21} In reaching this conclusion on jurisdiction, I would distinguish a line of cases wherein we have found that when no timely objection is made to a decision adopting a magistrate‘s decision, that decision becomes final.2 This is because N.D.‘s counsel filed her motion for leave to file late objections under
{¶ 22} One further point—even though
{¶ 23} The record shows that the domestic and juvenile court‘s decisions in these two consolidated cases involving D.D. and D.F. were adopted and entered simultaneously with the filing of the magistrate‘s decisions.3 As such, it seems incredible that
{¶ 24} The administrative efficiency of adopting a magistrate‘s decision before the filing of objections cannot be denied, but the process cannot be “rocket-docketed” to the point that meaningful review is denied or even appears to have been denied. A great number of matters in the domestic and juvenile division of the common pleas court are litigated pro se. A vast proportion of hearings in the domestic and juvenile division are presided over by magistrates subject to orders of reference pursuant to
{¶ 25} It is more than conceivable that an unrepresented litigant could view the simultaneous adoption of a magistrate‘s decision by the trial court, or one adopted so quickly before the 14-day objection period expires, to have cut off that right of objection no matter how bold the language is in the magistrate‘s decision about the filing of objections to it. I raise this matter as a caution of great concern, especially when matters involving the permanent custody of children—matters of constitutional import—are involved.
{¶ 26} Because I would find that the trial court, and we, respectively did and do have jurisdiction, I would proceed to find no error in the domestic and juvenile court‘s conclusions that D.D. and D.F. were dependent children and that D.D. and D.F. should be committed (permanently and temporarily, respectively) to the custody of FCCS pursuant to the terms of
{¶ 27} Thus, I would affirm the decisions of the domestic and juvenile court. Because the majority holds otherwise on the jurisdictional question, I will not belabor this dissenting opinion with the required, specific findings needed under
{¶ 28} Also important, litigants in the PCC context of domestic and juvenile jurisprudence would have the benefit of knowing that courts in Franklin County operate
trial judge reviewed the magistrate‘s decisions before it was filed, I would not move to a consideration of plain error.