Levy v. IvieLevy v. Ivie
{¶ 1} Appellant, Robert K. Levy, appeals from a journal entry issued by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas on June 18, 2010, which he construes as a judgment dismissing his creditor’s bill against appellee, Teresa L. Ivie. As explained below, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
{¶ 2} On May 11, 2007, appellant filed a creditor’s bill in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. According to the complaint, appellant had obtained an $82,764.51 judgment against Ivie based on Ivie’s default on a cognovit note that she executed to purchase appellant’s company, Confidential Court Services, L.L.C., d.b.a. Confidential Interlock (“Confidential”). Claiming that Ivie did not have sufficient personal or real property subject to levy on execution to satisfy the judgment, appellant’s complaint sought an order making Ivie’s interest in Confidential subject to satisfaction of the judgment.
{¶ 3} After Ivie answered the complaint, the trial court referred the case to a magistrate. On April 15, 2008, Ivie filed a notice announcing that she had recently petitioned for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The trial court, acknowledging the automatic
{¶ 4} On September 8, 2008, appellant notified the trial court that Ivie was discharged from bankruptcy on July 31, 2008. After the trial court reactivated the case, the magistrate held a hearing on November 18, 2008. At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate ordered the parties to file supplemental memoranda explaining whether appellant’s creditor’s bill could perfect a lien on Ivie’s interest in Confidential. The parties submitted their memoranda on November 25, 2008. The magistrate then ordered Ivie to submit proof that her obligation to appellant had been discharged in bankruptcy. Ivie provided additional information on December 10, 2008.
{¶ 5} In a decision filed on December 10, 2008, the magistrate found that Ivie presented sufficient information to prove that her debt was discharged in bankruptcy and ordered that the case be dismissed with prejudice. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision on December 18, 2008; however, on that same day, appellant filed a motion asking the magistrate to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellant did not pursue an appeal from the trial court’s December 18, 2008 judgment.
{¶ 6} On October 28, 2009, after appellant personally inquired about the status of his December 18, 2008 request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, the magistrate filed a decision denying that request. The magistrate found appellant’s request to be untimely under
{¶ 7} Appellant filed an objection on November 9, 2009. At the outset, appellant purported to object to the magistrate’s October 28, 2009 decision denying his request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. He argued that
{¶ 8} On June 18, 2010, the trial court filed a journal entry in response to appellant’s objections. In its entry, the trial court declared appellant’s request for findings of fact and conclusions of law to be a nullity, stating that “none were necessary, or even possible, and had no effect on the finality of the dismissal.” Then, without expressly adopting the magistrate’s decision or overruling appel
{¶ 9} Appellant now appeals from the June 18, 2010 entry, raising the following assignment of error:
The trial court erroneously dismissed the plaintiffs creditor’s bill on account of the defendant’s bankruptcy even though the plaintiff was a secured creditor and could proceed against Teresa Ivie and Confidential Court Services in rem.
{¶ 10} Appellant construes the trial court’s June 18, 2010 journal entry as a final order dismissing his creditor’s bill. Before we can address appellant’s assignment of error, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
{¶ 11} Pursuant to Civ.R,. 53(D)(3)(b)(i), a party may file objections to a magistrate’s decision within 14 days of the filing of the decision, “whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that fourteen-day period.”
{¶ 12} Here, the magistrate filed her decision to dismiss the case on December 10, 2008, and the trial court adopted that decision on December 18, 2008. Appellant did not object within 14 days after the filing of the magistrate’s decision, as permitted by
{¶ 13} Appellant argued below that the seven-day time period for requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was extended by
{¶ 15} Without a timely objection to the magistrate’s decision, the trial court’s December 18, 2008 final judgment remained in full effect. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on appellant’s untimely November 9, 2009 objections in its journal entry filed on June 18, 2010. “[U]ntimely objections filed after the entry of a final judgment are tantamount to a motion for reconsideration, which is a nullity.” Murray v. Goldfinger, 2d Dist. No. 19433,
{¶ 16} Accordingly, had the trial court purported to rule on the objection in its June 18, 2010 journal entry, any such ruling would have been a nullity and therefore unreviewable on appeal. See, e.g., In re J.A.M., 12th Dist. No. CA2010-07-174,
Appeal dismissed.