In re Charli M.
The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgment rendered for the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating the father’s parental rights as to his minor child, C. On appeal, the father claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify him with C. Held:
The trial court’s finding that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent father with C was supported by sufficient evidence in the record.
The trial court properly determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent father failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of C, he could assume a responsible position in her life.
It was not improper for the trial court to rely on certain police reports in support of its finding that the respondent father was involved in incidents of domestic violence because the father did not object to the admission of the police reports at trial and the court considered and weighed the contents of the admitted police reports as only one factor supporting its ultimate conclusion that the father failed to rehabilitate.
The trial court properly found that the respondent father’s inconsistent visitation history with C, considered in light of the record in its entirety, supported the conclusion that the father failed to rehabilitate.
The trial court properly credited the testimony of R, a court-appointed evaluator and expert in clinical and forensic psychology, and relied on that testimony in support of its conclusion that the father failed to rehabilitate
Opinion
CLARK, J. The respondent father, Tyler M., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating his parental rights as to his minor child, Charli M. (Charli).1 The respondent claims that
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. ‘‘[Charli] was born [in March, 2021]. . . . [Charli] is [the] fourth biological child [of the respondent and Charli’s mother]. The mother and [the respondent] began a relationship in 2012. The department became involved with the family in 2013 after receiving a report of domestic violence between the parents when the mother was approximately eight months pregnant. The department’s concerns at that time particularly centered on substance abuse by the parents, domestic violence between the parents, and the need for mental health treatment. In 2014, the department received reports of ongoing domestic violence between the mother and [the respondent], including the issuance of protective orders. In 2015, further reports of domestic violence between the parents were received, including violation of an active protective order. The parents’ second child was born in 2015. In 2016, the department received more reports of domestic violence as well as reports that [the respondent] was abusing pills and heroin. In March, 2016, [the respondent] was arrested for possession of heroin with intent to sell. At the time, it was noted that the parents were homeless, and the department believed they lacked insight into their parenting deficits.’’ The two oldest children were removed from the care of the respondent and the mother in March, 2016, and committed to the custody of the petitioner in July, 2016. ‘‘[G]uardianship of the two oldest
‘‘[O]n September 12, 2018, the mother gave birth to the [parents’] third child. On September 14, 2018, the third child was removed from their care. [The respondent’s] parental rights to this child were terminated on July 27, 2021 . . . . The presenting issues in that child’s case were largely the same as the two older siblings: domestic violence, substance abuse, unstable housing, and a need for consistent mental health treatment.
‘‘The department was notified of Charli’s birth by the hospital on the day of [her] birth. The mother at the time was a resident of an inpatient drug treatment program in Putnam. [The respondent] was incarcerated at the time. The mother had entered the [drug treatment] program on February 2, 2021, having been referred there by the office of adult probation. At the time of admission, the mother tested positive for cocaine and benzodiazepines. She also attempted to bring in multiple syringes, unidentified pills, and two containers of urine. On April 7, 2021, the department imposed an administrative ninety-six hour hold on [Charli]. On April 8, 2021, the [petitioner] obtained an ex parte order of temporary custody from the court, Hoffman, J., vesting temporary custody of Charli in the [petitioner]. The child then was placed with fictive kin, her only placement to date. On April 16, 2021, the order of temporary custody was sustained. On November 16, 2021, the mother and [the respondent] submitted pleas of nolo contendere, [and] [Charli] was adjudicated neglected and committed to the [petitioner’s custody]. Specific steps for reunification of the child were set [at] the time of the order of temporary custody and served on [the respondent].
‘‘[The respondent’s] presenting issues for Charli were essentially the same as they had been for his three
‘‘[The respondent] first met [Charli] when she was five months old at the office of Dr. [Nancy] Randall. The department had made a timely referral for a psychological evaluation of [the respondent], including a parent-child interactional. . . .
‘‘Randall evaluated [the respondent] in August, 2021. She opined that [the respondent] had a significant history of substance abuse, as well as significant anger issues. She also noted his guarded disclosures. She was concerned about [the respondent’s] criminal history, particularly his domestic violence, his long history of substance abuse, and his instability in housing and employment. She indicated that [the respondent] should address his individual issues in order to provide parenting reunification. She recommended that he participate in at least weekly, consistent visitation. She recommended that he participate in individual counseling to work on interpersonal relationships, domestic violence, and moving toward more independence and stability. She recommended continued substance abuse treatment including drug testing and regular drug counseling with a consistent counselor, supplemented by twelve step meetings at least three times [per] week. Most importantly, she recommended that [the respondent] should not be considered appropriate for reunification if further incidents of domestic violence occurred and that stable housing and income were necessities for reunification. . . .
‘‘[The respondent] was involved in domestic violence incidents with the mother thrice following [Randall’s]
On March 23, 2023, the petitioner filed a petition to terminate the respondent’s parental rights, which alleged that the respondent failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to
I
The respondent first claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify him with Charli.4 We disagree.
‘‘Our review of the court’s reasonable efforts determination is subject to the evidentiary sufficiency standard of review [which asks] whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . In so doing, we construe the evidence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial court and will not disturb the court’s subordinate factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Judah B., 221 Conn. App. 387, 394–95, 300 A.3d 1253 (2023).
In reviewing the trial court’s reasonable efforts determination, this court ‘‘[does] not examine the record to
The evidence before the trial court reveals that the department referred the respondent to the Quality Parenting Center at The Village (QPC) for supervised visitation with Charli, in which the respondent participated from April through July, 2022. After the respondent missed two visits in April, 2022, due to reported issues with transportation, the department offered to arrange transportation for him. Despite the department’s efforts, the respondent was discharged from QPC after he missed consecutive visits without notice in July, 2022. The department then referred the respondent to Kids Advocates, which provided supervised visitation beginning in August, 2022. Although the department again offered to arrange transportation for the respondent, he missed nine of forty-five scheduled visits, several of which were due to alleged transportation issues.
The department also assisted the respondent with locating a therapist by providing him with online resources from which he could search for a provider in his area based on his specific needs. Once the respondent reported that he had found a therapist, the department communicated with the therapist to review the respondent’s specific steps and the issues that needed to be addressed to facilitate reunification, including intimate partner violence (IPV). The department also discussed with the respondent the importance of
The department also referred the respondent to supportive housing, a housing assistance program, in an effort to help him find a home suitable for raising a child. The trial court found that, ‘‘[f]ollowing his discharge from incarceration, [the respondent] was in a halfway house until October, 2021, at which time he moved into a shelter. In March, 2022, [the respondent] provided documentation indicating he had been living in a motel [since] November, 2021.’’ Amanda Parsons, the social worker employed by the department who oversaw the respondent’s case, testified that she visited the respondent at the motel and told him that, to facilitate reunification, it was important that he find housing appropriate for raising a child. Initially, the respondent was ineligible for supportive housing because the program allows only one parent to participate at a time, and the department already had referred the mother. In May or June, 2022, the department transitioned the supportive housing referral from the mother to the respondent and started working with employees of the program to locate appropriate housing for the respondent. In September, 2022, however, the respondent obtained an apartment on his own, which made him ineligible for supportive housing.
In addition, there was evidence that the department made other reunification efforts. The respondent was referred to Boys & Girls Village for a reunification readiness assessment, which was conducted from December, 2022, through January, 2023. The respondent, however, cancelled two of the eight scheduled appointments
In challenging the trial court’s reasonable efforts determination, the respondent focuses primarily on the fact that the department did not refer him to a specialized IPV program. The respondent argues that ‘‘[t]he failure to provide appropriate IPV counseling significantly impacted the case’’ because IPV ‘‘was the most significant issue preventing reunification.’’ As noted previously, however, the department communicated with the respondent and his therapist about the importance of addressing IPV as part of his counseling, and the therapist confirmed that she was addressing such issues with the respondent. There is no evidence that the respondent ever claimed that his therapist’s efforts were insufficient or that he requested that the department refer him to a specialized IPV program. To the contrary, the record suggests that, to the extent the respondent did not sufficiently address his IPV issues in therapy, it was due to his failure consistently to engage with his therapist, rather than any deficiency with respect to the department’s reunification efforts. See In re Nevaeh W., 154 Conn. App. 156, 164–66, 107 A.3d 539 (2014) (determination of whether department made reasonable efforts to reunify may be assessed in light of respondent’s failure to engage in services), rev’d in part on other grounds, 317 Conn. 723, 120 A.3d 1177 (2015).
Moreover, it is well established that ‘‘[r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible,’’ and that ‘‘courts are instructed to look
II
The respondent also claims that the trial court erred in concluding that he failed to rehabilitate. We disagree.
The following legal principles and standard of review govern the respondent’s claim. ‘‘In the adjudicatory phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding, the court must determine whether one of the . . . statutory grounds that may serve as a basis for termination of parental rights exists. . . . Failure of a parent to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation is one of [the] statutory grounds on which a court may terminate parental rights pursuant to
‘‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [
‘‘A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial court’s factual findings and from its weighing of the facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this claim. On August
At trial, Parsons testified regarding the department’s reunification efforts and its concerns about the respondent’s ability to provide a safe and stable home for Charli. Parsons testified that, although the respondent was able to maintain his sobriety, he did not meaningfully address the other concerns reflected in his specific steps, namely, his involvement in domestic violence, lack of stable housing and employment, and need for consistent mental health treatment. In addition, Parsons testified that the respondent was not forthright with the department about his lack of progress in complying with his specific steps. With respect to the domestic violence incidents involving the mother, Parsons testified that the respondent did not notify the department about the arrests or the underlying incidents. In fact, the respondent repeatedly insisted to the department that, other than to speak about Charli, he no longer maintained a relationship with the mother. Contrary to his representations to the department, the respondent told the police at the time of his January 2, 2023 arrest
Parsons also testified that, around the time the department referred the respondent to supportive housing, he told Parsons that he would not have any problem affording an apartment and that his primary obstacle was locating an apartment close to his work. Yet the respondent stopped paying rent for his apartment in November, 2022, just two months after he signed the lease, and his landlord commenced eviction proceedings in March, 2023. In addition, the respondent lost his job in February, 2023, but he did not notify the department until May, 2023. Even then, he told the department that ‘‘he was able to pay his rent and utilities based on his unemployment [benefits],’’ even though at that point he had not paid rent for approximately six months.
As discussed previously, the respondent also told the department that he found a therapist in February, 2022, but the therapist told Parsons in November, 2022, that she had been seeing the respondent for only three months. At the time of trial, the respondent had not seen his therapist in approximately five months. Parsons also testified that the respondent missed four supervised visits with Charli before being discharged from QPC and nine of forty-five visits while engaged with Kids Advocates. The respondent often cited difficulties with transportation as a reason for missing such visits, even though the department repeatedly offered to arrange transportation for him. The respondent also missed two visits without notice while engaged with QPC and one while engaged with Kids Advocates.
The court also considered the report and testimony of Randall, a court-appointed evaluator and expert in clinical and forensic psychology. Based on her in person
At trial, Randall testified that, following her in person evaluation of the respondent, she reviewed the social study prepared by Parsons, an addendum to the social study, the respondent’s criminal history, and the police reports relating to the August, 2022 and January, 2023 incidents between the respondent and the mother. On the basis of that review, Randall had several concerns regarding the respondent’s ability to properly care for Charli. First, she found it ‘‘very concerning’’ that ‘‘there have still continued to be incidents of domestic violence between [the respondent and the mother].’’ Relatedly, Randall was concerned that in light of the couple’s long history of domestic violence and the mother’s active substance abuse, the respondent’s ongoing, close interpersonal relationship with the mother may put Charli at risk. Specifically, Randall testified that spending time with a person who is actively using illegal drugs is ‘‘probably the most common trigger to relapse’’ and that by maintaining an ongoing relationship with the mother, the respondent ‘‘put himself at risk for relapsing . . . .’’ She further testified that substance abuse can be a trigger for episodes of domestic violence and that the respondent’s relationship with the mother while she was actively using illegal drugs ‘‘increases the risk for domestic violence’’ and calls into question the respondent’s ability to provide ‘‘a stable, safe home’’ for Charli.
Finally, Randall testified that she was especially concerned that the respondent’s failure consistently to follow through with supervised visitation calls into question his ability to establish and maintain a consistent relationship with Charli. She testified that, especially at Charli’s age, the respondent’s failure consistently to be there for her could create trust issues and have a damaging impact on how Charli views relationships in general. Ultimately, Randall opined ‘‘that it would not be appropriate or safe for Charli to be returned to [the respondent] at this time.’’
On the basis of the evidence presented, the trial court found that, although the respondent ‘‘has made a laudable effort’’ by achieving and maintaining sobriety since his release from incarceration, ‘‘[the respondent’s] sobriety is his only consistent compliance with his reunification steps.’’ The court found that the respondent ‘‘did not obtain stable housing, employment, visitation, or an appropriate interpersonal relationship with the mother.’’ The court further found that the respondent’s involvement in three incidents of domestic violence ‘‘directly contravened [Randall’s] recommendation’’ and demonstrated that the respondent ‘‘had not mastered his anger or learned coping skills to deal with
On appeal, the respondent presents three arguments in support of his claim that the trial court erred in concluding that he failed to rehabilitate. First, the respondent argues that the court improperly relied on the police reports in support of its finding that he was involved in incidents of domestic violence. Second, the respondent argues that the record does not support the court’s factual findings regarding the respondent’s visitation history. Third, the respondent argues that the court gave undue weight to the expert opinion of Randall. We address each argument in turn.
The respondent first argues that the trial court could not rely on the police reports to support its finding that he was involved in incidents of domestic violence because such reports ‘‘can only show that a police officer determined there was probable cause to make an arrest,’’ which ‘‘does not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence.’’ This argument is unavailing for two reasons.
Second, the respondent’s argument misapprehends the manner in which the court relied on the police reports. Although the mere fact that the respondent was arrested would, as the respondent contends, ‘‘only show that a police officer determined there was probable cause to
The trial court was not required to make these subsidiary factual findings on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. In In re Zamora S., 123 Conn. App. 103, 998 A.2d 1279 (2010), this court recognized that ‘‘
We further note that the incidents of domestic violence that were documented in the police reports were not the sole basis for the court’s conclusion that the respondent failed to rehabilitate. Rather, as noted previously, the court also found that the respondent ‘‘did not obtain stable housing, employment, visitation, or an appropriate interpersonal relationship with the mother.’’ The court further found it significant that, ‘‘[e]ven with a termination petition pending, [the respondent] could not demonstrate consistent follow-through on services.’’ Finally, the court credited Randall’s testimony ‘‘that whatever efforts [the respondent] was making were too little and too late’’ and ‘‘[gave] added weight to her opinion that it would not be appropriate or safe to return [Charli] to [the respondent] . . . .’’ On the basis of all of its subsidiary findings, the court determined by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation to ‘‘encourage the belief that within a reasonable period
With respect to the respondent’s argument that the record does not support the trial court’s subsidiary factual findings regarding his visitation history, the respondent points to a finding, contained in the portion of the memorandum of decision addressing whether termination of parental rights was in the best interest of Charli, that the respondent ‘‘missed 20 percent of his scheduled visits without a valid excuse.’’8 The respondent argues that the evidence does not support the finding that he had no ‘‘valid excuse’’ because, of the nine visits he missed while engaged with Kids Advocates, he missed three visits due to illness and five visits due to ‘‘transportation issues.’’ We are not persuaded.
We first note that the respondent appears to assume that, because the record demonstrates that he had provided a reason for missing the visits in question, there was no basis for the trial court to find that he missed such visits ‘‘without a valid excuse.’’ In reviewing the record for evidentiary sufficiency, however, ‘‘[o]ur function as an appellate court is to review and not retry the proceeding . . . . The probative force of conflicting
Moreover, the respondent focuses solely on the trial court’s statistical finding that he missed 20 percent of his visits while engaged with Kids Advocates, while ignoring the full context of the court’s factual findings regarding his visitation history. The court, however, took a broader view of the evidence by discussing the respondent’s overall commitment to supervised visitation based on his record with QPC and Kids Advocates. Specifically, the court found that when the department referred the respondent to QPC, ‘‘[i]t took at least four attempts before an intake could be scheduled,’’ and that, although ‘‘[the respondent] participated in this visitation, [he] was discharged in August, 2022, after two consecutive no call/no show visits.’’ The court then found that after the department referred the respondent to Kids Advocates, he received ‘‘[a] very positive report’’
Additionally, Randall testified that, ‘‘regardless of the reason, for [the respondent] to miss multiple visits ongoing with his daughter, that’s a letdown for her . . . [e]very time that she expects there to be a visit, and then he doesn’t show up. So that to me is something that is very significant for her.’’ The court relied on Randall’s opinion in finding that the missed visits ‘‘would have a deleterious effect upon a young child, creating trust issues for that child.’’ On the basis of the entire record, the court ultimately found that ‘‘[the respondent’s] inability or unwillingness to maintain consistent, regular visitation demonstrates a lack of insight into his parenting obligations and his daughter’s needs.’’ Considering the record in its entirety and construing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s judgment, we conclude that the court properly found that the respondent’s inconsistent visitation history supported the conclusion that he failed to rehabilitate.
Finally, the respondent argues that the trial court erred by giving ‘‘added weight’’ to Randall’s testimony because her opinion was based on outdated information. Relying on this court’s decisions in O’Neill v. O’Neill, 13 Conn. App. 300, 536 A.2d 978, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 806, 540 A.2d 374 (1988), and Merkel v. Hill, 189 Conn. App. 779, 207 A.3d 1115 (2019), the respondent argues that Randall’s testimony was ‘‘stale’’ because her in person evaluation occurred more than two years before trial.
Similarly, in Merkel, this court reversed a judgment modifying a child custody and parental access plan because the trial court adopted recommendations from a family relations custody report completed ten months before trial, despite the family relations counselor’s testimony that she had no updated information about the family and could not confirm that her recommendations were still valid. See Merkel v. Hill, supra, 189 Conn. App. 788–89. The counselor ‘‘testified that she could not opine as to the particulars of the report at issue because she was not expecting to testify that day’’ and ‘‘had not reviewed the file, report, or notes’’ prior to her testimony. Id., 784. The counselor further testified that she believed her report would have been ‘‘outdated after six months’’ and that she had ‘‘no basis to say that it’s still valid . . . [and] would be doing a disservice to the minor child to say that.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 785. This court concluded that the trial court erred because, ‘‘[n]otwithstanding the staleness
Unlike in O’Neill and Merkel, Randall testified that, prior to trial, she reviewed Parsons’ social study, an addendum to the social study, the respondent’s criminal history, and the police reports and that her present opinions and recommendations were based on her review of such records. All of the materials that Randall reviewed were admitted as full exhibits, so the respondent had ample opportunity to cross-examine Randall concerning her testimony. The record reflects that the respondent availed himself of that opportunity. For example, the respondent’s counsel elicited from Randall that her knowledge of the respondent’s visitation history and reunification assessment was based solely on the social study and that she had not reviewed the underlying documentation. In addition, the respondent’s counsel emphasized during closing argument that ‘‘Randall had only met Charli and . . . [the respondent] once’’ and argued that her evaluation ‘‘was so long ago at this point [that] the recommendations are not up to date.’’
Contrary to the respondent’s argument, it was not improper for the trial court to credit Randall’s testimony and to rely on that testimony in support of the conclusion that the respondent failed to rehabilitate. ‘‘It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony. . . . The credibility and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible. . . . On appeal, we do not retry
On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the respondent failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of Charli, he could assume a responsible position in her life.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.