IN RE: B.P., ADJUDGED ABUSED AND DEPENDENT CHILD. [ROBIN PENNINGTON-RIVERS - APPELLANT]
CASE NO. 9-16-57
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY
May 22, 2017
2017-Ohio-2919
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court No. 15 AB 0111 Judgment Affirmed
Andrew S. Wick for Appellant
Justin J. Kahle for Appellee
PRESTON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Robin Pennington-Rivers (“Robin“), appeals the October 25, 2016 decision of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, Family Division, granting permanent custody of her minor child, B.P., to the Marion County Children Services Board (the “Agency“).1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} B.P. is the minor child of Robin and Vernon Pennington (“Vernon“). (Doc. Nos. 1, 2).2 B.P. was born prematurely on April 22, 2015 and “tested positive for opiates” at birth. (Doc. No. 1). Robin “also tested positive for opiates and marijuana,” and Robin admitted that “she had exposed the unborn baby to heroin.” (Id.). On May 19, 2015, the Agency filed a motion “for ex parte/emergency orders with notice of hearing” alleging that B.P. is an abused, neglected, and dependent child under
{¶3} After a shelter-care hearing on June 5, 2015, the trial court on June 10, 2015 granted the Agency temporary custody of B.P. (Doc. No. 10). After a hearing before a magistrate on August 10, 2015, the magistrate ordered on August 28, 2015
{¶4} On September 18, 2015 and November 2, 2016, the Agency submitted its case plans to the trial court, which the trial court approved and incorporated into its dispositional entries. (Doc. Nos. 17, 98). On November 25, 2015 and June 1, 2016, the Agency submitted its semi-annual administrative reviews, which were acknowledged by the trial court. (Doc. Nos. 31, 81).
{¶5} On August 28, 2015, the Agency filed a motion requesting the trial court to waive the Agency‘s requirement “to make reasonable efforts to eliminate the continued removal of [B.P], or return him to the care of [Robin] or [Vernon].” (Doc. No. 14). In that motion, the Agency argued that the “reasonable-efforts” requirement could be waived under
{¶6} On December 23, 2015, the Agency filed a motion for permanent custody of B.P. (Doc. No. 34).
{¶7} On January 21, 2016, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Robin. (Doc. No. 43).
{¶8} On June 1, 2015, the trial court appointed B.P. a Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL“). (Doc. No. 7). The GAL filed her report on September 28, 2016 recommending that the trial court award permanent custody of B.P. to the agency. (Doc. No. 94).
{¶9} The trial court held a permanent-custody hearing on June 1, 2016, September 26, 2016, and October 12, 2016. (June 1, 2016 Tr. at 1, 12); (Sept. 26, 2016 Tr. at 1, 152); (Oct. 12, 2016 Tr. at 1, 248). On October 25, 2016, the trial court filed its judgment entry granting the Agency permanent custody of B.P. (Doc. No. 96).
{¶10} On November 22, 2016, Robin filed her notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 104).3 She raises one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Trial Court committed plain error when it granted Agency‘s Motion for Permanent Custody based upon the inaccurate conclusion that the minor child had been in the Agency‘s custody for 12 of the previous 22 months preceding the date of the hearing on Agency‘s Motion.
{¶12} The right to raise one‘s child is a basic and essential right. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). “Parents have a “fundamental liberty interest” in the care, custody, and management of the child.” Id., quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). However, the rights and interests of a natural parent are not absolute. In re Thomas, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-03-08, 2003-Ohio-5885, ¶ 7. These rights may be terminated under appropriate circumstances and when the trial court has met all due process requirements. In re Leveck, 3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-02-52, 5-02-53, and 5-02-54, 2003-Ohio-1269, ¶ 6.
{¶13} When considering a motion for permanent custody of a child, the trial court must comply with the statutory requirements set forth in
may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, * * * and the child cannot be placed with either of the child‘s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child‘s parents.
* * *
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *.
{¶14} If the trial court makes these statutorily required determinations, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court‘s decision unless it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re H.M.K., 3d Dist. Wyandot Nos. 16-12-15 and 16-12-16, 2013-Ohio-4317, ¶ 43, citing In re Meyer, 98 Ohio App.3d 189, 195 (3d Dist.1994), citing In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985) and In re Adoption of Lay, 25 Ohio St.3d 41, 42 (1986). “Clear and convincing evidence is that which is sufficient to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re S.G. at ¶ 10, citing Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶15} Essentially, Robin argues that the trial court committed reversible error by erroneously concluding that B.P. was in the temporary custody of the Agency for 12 or more months of a 22-month period under
{¶16} Indeed, “[t]he factors contained within
{¶17} Robin‘s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶18} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr