In re L.L.
Alison Boggs for Appellant
Natasha Wagner for Appellee
{¶1} Appellant, Marla Lewellen (“Lewellen“), appeals the December 3, 2014 judgment entry of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas, Family Court–Juvenile Division, granting permanent custody of her three minor children, H.M., L.L., and J.L., to appellee, Logan County Children Services (“LCCS“). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} These cases were before us in prior consolidated appeals. In re H.M., 3d Dist. Logan Nos. 8-13-11, 8-13-12, and 8-13-13, 2014-Ohio-755. We recited the following facts in our opinion disposing of those appeals:1
While this appeal concerns three separate cases, we will discuss their procedural histories together, as they are intertwined.
On March 26, 2011, LCCS received a referral regarding the care and well-being of two minor children: H.M. and L.L. Lewellan and her husband, James Lewellan (“James“), father of L.L., entered
into a Voluntary Case Plan with LCCS to rectify problems with the cleanliness of their home. On September 1, 2011, the LCCS received another referral indicating that Lewellan had attacked H.M., stabbing her with a fork in the head and hand, believing she was a demon. On September 7, 2011, a Family Team Meeting was held where LCCS expressed its concerns for the safety of the children with Lewellan and James. Lewellan stated that she was eight months pregnant, and due to the pregnancy she had needed to stop taking her medicine for her mental health problems. She also stated that she was under extreme stress, partially due to the involvement of LCCS through the Voluntary Case Plan, and she had been told by three different doctors that she was on the verge of a mental or nervous breakdown. James stated that he had a temper, but that he thought it was under control. As a result of the meeting, H.M. was voluntarily sent to stay with a relative, Nancy Losey [“Losey“], and L.L. was voluntarily sent to stay with his grandparents, Marlene and Ferlyn Butler.
On September 8, 2011, LCCS filed a complaint in Case Nos. 11-CS-0060 and 11-CS-0061, alleging H.M. and L.L., respectively,
to be dependent and neglected children. On that same day, LCCS filed a motion for orders to grant temporary custody of H.M. to Losey and temporary custody of L.L. to LCCS. The trial court, upon its own motion, appointed attorney James Gudgel [“Gudgel“] as both counsel and [guardian ad litem (“GAL“)] for the children. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion for temporary custody for September 23, 2011. Lewellan gave birth to J.L. in September of 2011. LCCS filed a complaint on September 23, 2011, in Case No. 11-CS-0067, alleging J.L. to be a dependent child. In its complaint, LCCS asserted that Lewellan‘s home was unsafe and unsanitary for a newborn, Lewellan would need time to readjust to her mental health medication, and that J.L. had been born premature and required treatment. LCCS moved for orders to grant temporary custody of J.L. to LCCS and the court, on its own motion, appointed Gudgel as J.L.‘s counsel and GAL. Further, it scheduled the hearing on the motion for that day, September 23, to coincide with the hearing already scheduled for H.M. and L.L. As a result of the hearing, Losey was granted temporary custody of H.M. and LCCS was granted temporary custody of both L.L. and J.L.
On October 18, 2011, Lewellan and James reached an agreement with LCCS and stipulated that all three children were dependent. As a result, the trial court, after a review of the record, found by clear and convincing evidence that all three children were dependent and dismissed the allegations that H.M. and L.L. were neglected. On November 21, 2011, the day of the dispositional hearing, Gudgel filed a GAL report stating that he had reviewed the terms of the case plan and found them to be in the best interests of the children while reunification, at that time, was not. The court ordered that Losey remain the temporary custodian of H.M. and that LCCS be granted protective supervision of H.M. and remain the temporary custodian of both L.L. and J.L. At two subsequent status hearings, where evidence was presented that inadequate progress had been made on the case plan, the court continued its previous orders. On June 13, 2012, LCCS moved the trial court to grant it temporary custody of H.M., as the placement with Losey was not intended to last beyond the end of the school year. At a hearing held on June 25, 2012, Lewellan agreed that LCCS should have temporary custody of H.M., and the motion was granted. At the children‘s annual review hearings, the trial granted an extension of
temporary custody of the children to LCCS. In response to psychological evaluations of both Lewellan and James and out of concern that they did not fully comprehend the recommendations of the providers they were working with or how to be adequate parents, the court appointed them each a GAL. On December 12, 2012, LCCS moved for permanent custody of all three children. On June 17, 2013, Gudgel submitted his GAL report regarding the three minor children. In the report, Gudgel stated that the cleanliness of the house remained unsuitable for the children, visitations were chaotic and dysfunctional, and that the recent separation of Lewellan and James was a detriment to reunification, as neither parent had demonstrated that they could adequately parent the children alone. Ultimately, Gudgel did not believe that reunification would be in the best interests of the children.
The permanent custody hearing for all three children commenced on June 18, 2013. At the time, H.M. was nearly ten years old, L.L. was nearly six, and J.L. was nearly two. At the hearing, testimony was elicited that, when LCCS obtained custody of the children, H.M. was on an Individualized Education Program at
school for ADHD, behavioral and impulsivity issues, and for some psychological issues related to sexual abuse. L.L. was on the autism spectrum, had some additional developmental delays including difficulty in understanding his speech, and had physical problems as a result of having muscular dystrophy. J.L. was typically developing, although he had some urinary tract problems. * * *
At the conclusion of the evidence the court found that permanent custody was in the best interests of all three children. The court did not orally state its findings on the record, and instead directed “the Prosecutor to prepare the judgment entry.” Jun. 21, 2013 Tr., p. 11. * * * The court filed its judgment entry stating findings of fact and conclusion of law on July 8, 2013, granting permanent custody of all three children to LCCS.
(Footnote omitted.) In re H.M., 2014-Ohio-755, at ¶ 2-10, 20.
{¶3} Lewellen appealed the trial court‘s July 8, 2013 judgment entry. (Doc. No. 217). In March 2014, we reversed the trial court‘s decision and remanded for further proceedings because “the finding [in the July 8, 2013 judgment entry] that the court considered the wishes of the children [was] against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re H.M. at ¶ 43.
{¶5} On March 14, 2014, the trial court granted LCCS‘s “motion for issuance of orders to come into compliance with decision issued by the Third Appellate District” and ordered that the children‘s GAL interview the children and file a supplemental report. (Doc. No. 266). The trial court also scheduled in camera interviews of each of the children, in the presence of the children‘s GAL, for June 5, 2014. (Id.).
{¶6} On July 23, 2014, LCCS filed a “motion for extension of temporary custody and for annual court review.” (Doc. No. 296). On September 3, 2014, the trial court held a hearing concerning LCCS‘s motion. (See Doc. Nos. 301, 311). On September 12, 2014, Lewellen filed a “brief in response to motion hearing held September 3, 2014.” (Doc. No. 310). On September 23, 2014, the trial court filed an entry granting an extension of temporary custody of the children. (Doc. No. 311).
{¶8} Lewellen filed a notice of appeal and an amended notice of appeal on December 5 and 9, 2014, respectively. (Doc. Nos. 333, 343). She raises nine assignments of error for our review. We consider her fourth and fifth assignments of error together, followed by her second, seventh, and eighth assignments of error together, followed by her first, third, sixth, and ninth assignments of error together.
Assignment of Error No. IV
The trial court‘s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellee did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the court should grant its motion for permanent custody of the minor children.
Assignment of Error No. V
The trial court erred in granting the motion for permanent custody when it primarily focused on appellant‘s mental health
and relied on that as the basis for depriving appellant custody of her minor children.
{¶9} In her fourth assignment of error, Lewellen argues that the trial court “ignored the testimony of almost every witness from the June 2013 hearings.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 8). Specifically, she argues that the evidence does not support the trial court‘s findings under
{¶10} The right to raise one‘s child is a basic and essential right. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). “Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and management of the child.” Id., quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). However, the rights and interests of a natural parent are not absolute. In re Thomas, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-03-08, 2003-Ohio-5885, ¶ 7.
{¶11} When considering a motion for permanent custody of a child, the trial court must comply with the statutory requirements set forth in
may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, * * * and the child cannot be
placed with either of the child‘s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child‘s parents. * * *
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *.
{¶12} Specifically concerning
In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section * * * whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section * * * that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child‘s parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child‘s home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child‘s home. In determining whether the parents have substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties. (2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, mental retardation, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division (A) of this section * * *;
* * *
(14) The parent for any reason is unwilling to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities for the child or to prevent the child from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or physical, emotional, or mental neglect.
[T]he court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *; (d) The child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶14} “Clear and convincing evidence is more than a preponderance of the evidence but not as much evidence as required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as in a criminal case; rather, it is evidence which provides the trier of fact with a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re H.M.K., 3d Dist. Wyandot Nos. 16-12-15 and 16-12-16, 2013-Ohio-4317, ¶ 42, citing In re Meyer, 98 Ohio App.3d 189, 195 (3d Dist.1994), citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale, 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 (1991). “Upon review, an appellate court ‘must examine the record and determine if the trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this burden of proof.‘” Id. at ¶ 43, quoting In re Meyer at 195, citing In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985). “A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court‘s determination unless it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Id., citing In re
{¶15} We will first discuss the trial court‘s determinations under
{¶16} In determining that the circumstances described in
{¶17} Our review of the record reveals that the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the clear-and-convincing burden of proof required to support a
{¶18} The record of the permanent-custody hearing reveals that, while Lewellen may have remedied some of the conditions causing H.M. to be placed outside the home—for example, by taking her medications as prescribed and by separating from James—she failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the home conditions and her supervision of the children in the home. Cookee Boyer (“Boyer“), a family coach to Lewellen and James since August 2011, testified that while the condition of the home has improved over the course of the case, Lewellen “still falls back a lot” by “[l]eaving trash around, medication around, cigarettes, ash trays, the smell of the home, the dog. Clothing is a
{¶19} Grace Schoessow (“Schoessow“) is a behavior specialist and family coach hired by LCCS to coach Lewellen and James weekly beginning in February 2013. (Id. at 137-138). She testified that while Lewellen “works hard” and has “made some progress toward goals,” problems remain. (Id. at 140). For example, Schoessow testified, “[W]e still haven‘t been able to successfully have a meal with safe supervision maintained throughout.” (Id. at 141). She also testified, “There were frequent lapses in supervision” during Schoessow‘s coaching sessions. (Id.). According to Schoessow, the home was “straightened up,” but not “clean.” (Id. at 157). Schoessow testified that she continues to have concerns regarding safety in the home. (Id.).
{¶21} Kylie Moon (“Moon”), a former case aide and caseworker with LCCS who oversaw 16 to 20 of Lewellen and James’s visitations with the children, testified that visitations were “chaotic.” (Id. at 104). When asked if Lewellen was able to implement instructions “to make the visitations better,” Moon responded, “No.” (Id.). Moon testified that when James did not accompany Lewellen at visitations, the visitations “were more chaotic.” (Id. at 106). Moon testified that Lewellen told her that “she didn’t know how she was going to handle the 3 children.” (Id.).
{¶22} Krista Brey (“Brey”), a former case aide with LCCS who supervised eight of Lewellen and James’s visitations with the children, testified that Lewellen
{¶23} Kylee Bednarki (“Bednarki”), an ongoing caseworker at LCCS, testified that she assisted with Lewellen’s visitations in 2012 as a case aide and in 2014 as a caseworker. (Dec. 3, 2014 Tr. at 65-66). According to Bednarki, the first two of four visitations she supervised in 2014 were “okay,” whereas the third visit was “very chaotic” and “almost like a flash back to the visits of 2012.” (Id. at 67-68). During that visit, while Lewellen was coloring with L.L., J.L. began climbing a bookshelf, and H.M. had to go stop him. (Id. at 68). According to Bednarki, Lewellen’s visitations have not improved. (Id. at 73).
{¶24} Even assuming Lewellen remedied some of the conditions causing H.M. to be placed outside the home, and setting aside Lewellen’s cognitive abilities, the record reveals that, despite substantial coaching, Lewellen failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the home conditions. While Lewellen may have been somewhat more diligent in her efforts to improve her home’s conditions, safety issues remained, and the home was not always clean enough for children. Lewellen’s lapses in supervision and her inability to avert chaos during her visitations only compound concerns that the home conditions
{¶25} Based on its determination of the existence of a
{¶26} Having concluded that the trial court properly determined that
{¶27} We discussed above the testimony concerning the chaotic and dysfunctional nature of Lewellen’s visitations with her children and Lewellen’s frequent lapses in the supervision of her children. Schoessow testified that Lewellen’s “interactions with the kids * * * would be more as a friend, or a confidant. There was not mindfulness of appropriate adult child boundaries.” (June 18, 2013 Tr. at 144). According to Schoessow, Lewellen’s “interaction with [H.M.] is unhealthy. It’s friend-like.” (Id. at 153). Schoessow testified that, during Lewellen’s visitations, H.M. “has stepped in as the other adult in the environment.” (Id. at 150-151). According to Schoessow, Lewellen’s relationship with H.M. “repeatedly” interfered with Lewellen’s ability to provide for the safety
{¶28} In describing the chaotic nature of Lewellen’s visitations, Christensen testified that J.L. “would get lost in the mix of interaction with [Lewellen] and [Lewellen] wanting to interact with [L.L.] and [H.M.].” (Id. at 64, 67). According to Christensen, L.L. “would become over emotional over the majority of the visits, with [Lewellen] trying to appease him, a lot of times, with an electronical [sic] device. And then [H.M.], she would have misbehaviors and not follow any direction of [Lewellen].” (Id. at 64). Christensen testified that Lewellen left J.L. “unattended numerous times” during the majority of the visitations. (Id. at 66). Christensen testified that Lewellen “was, a lot of time
{¶29} When asked to describe the relationship between H.M. and her foster parents, Christensen stated that H.M. is “thriving academically,” “making more advances socially, within the environment,” and “liking the quality of life.” (Id. at 70). H.M. “understands the boundaries that she can not cross, the zero tolerance things.” (Id. at 71). H.M.’s foster parents “have been able to protect her from any incidents that could occur” and “have given her adequate supervision.” (Id.). H.M. “respects them as caregivers.” (Id.). Christensen testified that H.M. “feels comfortable, safe and consoled within that environment.” (Id.). According to Christensen, since L.L. was placed with his foster parents, he is speaking more clearly, walking without assistance, taking pride in his academics, and making strides with cognitive skills. (Id. at 72-73). Unlike during Lewellen and James’s
{¶30} Boyer testified that Lewellen had difficulty playing with the children, and she “usually just talked about off the wall subjects.” (Id. at 128). For example, after H.M.’s first day of school, James asked H.M. how her day was, and “[a]ll [Lewellen] wanted to do was talk about her hair. That happened quite often.” (Id.). Boyer also testified that H.M. was placed in a parental role during visitations. (Id. at 127). According to Boyer, she observed the children’s interactions with their foster parents and that “[t]hey all seem to be doing very well. They are loving and caring and meeting the children’s needs.” (Id. at 131).
{¶31} Brey testified that James “did most of the parenting” and provided structure during Lewellen and James’s visitations. (Id. at 115). According to Brey, during the visitations, James, in addition to filling the main parenting role for the children, would also parent Lewellen. (Id. at 116). In addition, H.M. was placed in a parental role during the visitations, and Lewellen would often ask H.M. to do things “that [Lewellen] should have been doing.” (Id.).
{¶33} Bednarki testified that, based on her observations of Lewellen’s visitations, L.L. is Lewellen’s favorite child. (Dec. 3, 2014 Tr. at 71-72). Lewellen spends the most time with L.L. and refers to him as “her baby.” (Id. at 72). According to Bednarki, the relationship between Lewellen and H.M. is “standoffish” on H.M.’s end. (Id.). Bednarki testified that H.M. “looked worried” when Lewellen told H.M. that she would have lots of bunnies, which Lewellen had at her house, when H.M. was returned to Lewellen. (Id.). According to Bednarki, there is usually no interaction between Lewellen and J.L. at the visitations, although Bednarki did recall one visit in 2014 when J.L. was sick and sat on Lewellen’s lap. (Id.). Bednarki acknowledged that the over-one-year-long period when Lewellen did not see the children could be related to the apparent disconnect between Lewellen and H.M. and J.L. (Id. at 81). Bednarki testified that there are no issues with H.M.’s and L.L. and J.L.’s foster placements. (Id. at
{¶34} Ashley Day (“Day”), one of L.L. and J.L.’s current foster parents, testified that she has four children in her home, two of whom are L.L. and J.L. (Id. at 12). According to Day, her relationship with L.L. was a struggle at first, but they have built “a really good relationship.” (Id.). Day testified that L.L. “loves everybody” and is well-integrated. (Id. at 12-13). According to Day, while L.L. has had “some behavioral issues,” “[i]n the past year, * * * they are pretty much gone.” (Id. at 13). Day testified that when L.L. was first placed in her household, “[h]e was real whiney. He drank out of a sippy-cup. He was in a diaper. He really couldn’t do anything from himself. He wanted everybody to do everything for him.” (Id. at 17). Since then, L.L. has become potty trained, talks in sentences, is more independent, and “is his own person.” (Id. at 14, 17). According to Day, when L.L. returns to Day’s household from visitations with Lewellen, “[h]e pushes limits.” (Id. at 15). Day testified that when she picks L.L.
{¶35} Regarding J.L., Day testified that he “is typical,” aside from a “possible sensory processing disorder.” (Id. at 18). J.L. has no mental-health needs or behavioral issues. (Id.). When asked how J.L. is integrated with Day’s family, Day responded, “He is our family. He was never not our family.” (Id.). According to Day, her two-year-old son, who resides in the household, and J.L. “are inseparable.” (Id.). Day testified that L.L. and J.L. “are pretty close,” although J.L. is “the little brother” and “usually follows [L.L.] around and irritates [L.L.].” (Id. at 16). According to Day, since June 2013, L.L. has seen Lewellen two or three times. (Id. at 21). Before that, Lewellen’s visitations were weekly. (Id.).
{¶36} Angela Moeller (“Moeller”) resides with Day and is a foster parent to L.L. and J.L. (Id. at 34). When asked to describe the interaction and relationship between the four children in her and Day’s household, including L.L. and J.L., Moeller responded, “They play. They have fun. And they act like brothers.” (Id. at 35). L.L. sometimes has behavioral problems in that “he won’t listen,” including when he comes home from visitations with Lewellen, but Moeller testified that she has taken steps to correct that behavior. (Id. at 35-37). Moeller testified that since June 2013, L.L. and J.L. have seen H.M. only during
{¶37} Christina Tronsgard (“Tronsgard”) testified that she is H.M.’s current treatment foster parent, along with Tronsgard’s husband, and H.M. is the only child in her household. (Id. at 51, 53, 62). Tronsgard explained that foster parents in a “treatment home” are specially trained to address emotional and physical needs of children. (Id. at 61-62). According to Tronsgard, when H.M. first arrived in Tronsgard’s home in December 2013, she was very emotional and would break down easily, but she now shares her feelings with Tronsgard. (Id. at 52). Tronsgard testified that H.M. has been in five different foster homes since she was removed from Lewellen’s household. (Id. at 58). When asked about the interaction and relationship between Tronsgard and her husband and H.M., Tronsgard responded, “I think it’s pretty good. You know we have our moments just like any other family would have. But we pretty much welcomed her into our family, just so she would have that secure environment * * *. Kind of makeup for the childhood that she kind of lost * * * before.” (Id. at 53). When asked about the relationship between H.M. and Tronsgard’s extended family, Tronsgard responded, “She loves them.” (Id. at 54). According to Tronsgard, “[H.M.] loves spending time with her family. She is learning * * * a lot about family. What they do for each other, and how they treat each other, their respect of family.” (Id. at
{¶38} Lewellen testified that she helped L.L. by doing flash cards, some sign language, and potty training with him. (June 20, 2013 Tr. at 23-24). Lewellen has noticed improvements in the children since they were removed from her home. (Id. at 24). According to Lewellen, during her visitations with the children, she holds J.L.’s hand, and H.M. “likes to hug on [Lewellen].” (Id. at 25). When asked about what she does with the children, Lewellen testified that, before the children were removed from her home and now during visitations, she and the children paint and color in coloring books. (Id.). Lewellen testified that she “always give[s] the kids gifts every time they come” to visitations. (Id.). When asked if her children “[w]ere * * * pretty close to [her] parents,” Lewellen responded, “Yes.” (Id. at 26). Lewellen testified that, while she was living with James, she “was more like a single parent” because he did not help with the children. (Id. at 31). When asked if L.L. is her “favorite,” Lewellen responded,
{¶39} The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusions concerning the interaction and interrelationship of the children with their parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers, and out-of-home providers. As Lewellen acknowledged in her testimony, the children have improved in foster care. They are integrated into their foster homes. L.L. and J.L. have a close relationship, and J.L. and Day’s son, who resides in the household, are “inseparable.” H.M. is the only child in her treatment foster home, in which her foster parents are specially trained to address her emotional and physical needs. H.M. has a good relationship with her foster parents and enjoys spending time with her extended foster family. L.L.’s behavior issues have subsided, and he is more independent. J.L. is typically developing. Unlike before, H.M. now shares her feelings with her foster parents. As for the children’s interaction with Lewellen, whether Lewellen’s visitations with her children were weekly or, since June 2013, on a more limited basis, the visitations have been chaotic and dysfunctional. Lewellen has made some positive parenting strides; however, she often has difficulty interacting appropriately with her children. See In re R.M., 4th Dist. Athens Nos. 12CA43 and 12CA44, 2013-Ohio-3588, ¶ 69. H.M. is “apprehensive” about seeing Lewellen, and H.M. and L.L. have behavioral issues after their visitations with Lewellen. Therefore,
{¶40} Next, we address the second best-interest factor: “The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child.”
{¶41} Contrary to Lewellen’s arguments, Gudgel met with the children and the parents, attended four visitations after the case was remanded in 2014, and participated in the in camera interviews of the children. (Dec. 3, 2014 Tr. at 110).
{¶42} The third best-interest factor is: “The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *.”
{¶43} Once again, Lewellen’s arguments are meritless. Lewellen cites no authority in support of her proposition that, under this factor, we “must determine whether [LCCS] unjustly kept the children out of the home.” Nevertheless, we concluded above that the record reveals that Lewellen failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the home conditions, thereby supporting the trial court’s
{¶44} The fourth best-interest factor is: “The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency.”
{¶45} The parties and their witnesses agree that, especially given the duration of these cases, the children need legally secure permanent placements. They disagree over whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to LCCS. When asked about his recommendation concerning permanent custody, Gudgel testified, “All of the children are in very loving, stable homes. I believe at this point it would be an absolute detriment to
{¶46} The fifth best-interest factor is: “Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.”
{¶47} Based on our discussion above, we can dispose of Lewellen’s fifth assignment of error. In making the required determinations under
{¶48} For the reasons above, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determinations under
{¶49} Lewellen’s fourth and fifth assignments of error are overruled.
The trial court erred when it failed to record the in camera interview with the minor children.
Assignment of Error No. VII
The children’s guardian ad litem failed to perform necessary duties pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.281 and Superindent [sic] Rule 48, thereby not acting in the children’s best interest, to appellant’s detriment and in violation of her due process.
Assignment of Error No. VIII
Appellant’s court appointed guardian ad litem failed to perform his duties to appellant’s detriment and in violation of her due process.
{¶50} In her second assignment of error, Lewellen argues that the trial court’s failure to record the in camera interviews of the children under Juv.R. 37(A) amounts to reversible error. In her seventh and eighth assignment of error, Lewellen argues that the children’s GAL and her GAL, respectively, failed to perform their duties.
{¶51} In appears from the record that Lewellen failed to object or otherwise raise these issues in the trial court. “It is well established that if a party fails to object at the trial court level, that party waives all but plain error.” In re M.R., 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-18, 2013-Ohio-1302, ¶ 84. See also In re Knight, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2002-T-0158, 2003-Ohio-7222, ¶ 24; In re B.W., 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0016-M, 2012-Ohio-3416, ¶ 44-45; In re B.E., 4th Dist.
{¶52} Even if we were to address Lewellen’s arguments, “[i]n appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 (1997), syllabus. This is not one of those extremely rare cases involving exceptional circumstances where error seriously affected the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process. Regarding Lewellen’s second assignment of error, even assuming the trial court erred by not recording the in camera interviews, Lewellen failed—aside from sweeping and conclusory statements—to demonstrate how she was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to record the in camera interviews. See In re E.G., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-26,
{¶53} Lewellen’s second, seventh, and eighth assignments of error are overruled.
Assignment of Error No. I
The trial court erred when it failed to implement the case plan for reunification when the case was remanded back because the matter was resolved in favor of appellant in appellate case number 8-13-13 when this court sustained the assignment of error that the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Assignment of Error No. III
The trial court erred when it granted appellee’s motion to extend temporary custody of the minor children to appellee.
Assignment of Error No. VI
The trial court erred in finding appellee used reasonable efforts for reunification throughout the case.
Assignment of Error No. IX
The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to put its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record by directing appellee to draft the judgment entry based on her perceived findings and conclusions and not the court’s independent review of the evidence presented at the permanent custody hearing.
{¶55} Lewellen’s first, third, sixth, and ninth assignments of error are overruled.
{¶56} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Judgments Affirmed
ROGERS, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
/jlr