IN RE: A.M. [TAMMY MARTIN - APPELLANT]
CASE NO. 9-14-46
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY
July 6, 2015
[Cite as In re A.M., 2015-Ohio-2740.]
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court Family Division Trial Court No. 2013-AB-00035 Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
Joel M. Spitzer for Appellant
Raymond A. Grogan, Jr. for Appellee
{¶1} Appellant, Tammy Martin (Martin), appeals the October 23, 2014 judgment entry of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, Family Division, granting permanent custody of her child, A.M., to appellee, Marion County Children Services (MCCS). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} Martin gave birth to A.M. in March 2013, while incarcerated at the Ohio Reformatory for Women (ORW). (Doc. Nos. 1, 3, 4). On March 20, 2013, MCCS filed a “motion for ex parte/emergency orders with notice of hearing.” (Id.). That day, a magistrate of the trial court granted ex parte, emergency temporary custody of A.M. to MCCS. (Doc. Nos. 2, 3).
{¶3} After filing several complaints in 2013 and 2014 that the trial court dismissed, on MCCS‘s motion, under
{¶4} At multiple points in the case, MCCS submitted case plans to the trial court, which the trial court approved and incorporated into disposition entries. (Doc. Nos. 10, 31, 37, 53, 58). MCCS also filed semiannual administrative reviews. (Doc. Nos. 62, 84).
{¶6} At a hearing on May 12, 2014, Martin and A.M.‘s father, Frank Stephens (Stephens), stipulated that A.M. is a dependent child. (See Doc. No. 93). Accordingly, the trial court found that A.M. is a dependent child. (Id.).
{¶7} On August 12, 2014, MCCS filed a motion for permanent custody of A.M. (Doc. No. 77).
{¶8} On October 14, 2014, the trial court held a permanent-custody hearing. (Oct. 14, 2014 Tr. at 1).
{¶9} On October 23, 2014, the trial court filed its judgment entry awarding permanent custody of A.M. to MCCS. (Doc. No. 96).
{¶10} Martin filed her notice of appeal on November 20, 2014. (Doc. No. 101). She raises three assignments of error for our review. We will address her first and third assignments of error together, followed by her second assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. I
The trial court committed reversible error in finding that factors existed that precluded the placement of [A.M.] with the appellant within a reasonable time as that finding was against the manifest wieght [sic] of the evidence.
The trial court committed reversible error in granting permanent custody of the child to Marion County Children Services as that decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶11} In her first assignment of error, Martin disputes the trial court‘s reliance on
{¶12} The right to raise one‘s child is a basic and essential right. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). “Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and management of the child.” Id., quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). However, the rights and interests of a natural parent are not absolute. In re Thomas, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-03-08, 2003-Ohio-5885, ¶ 7. These rights may be terminated under appropriate circumstances and when the trial court has met all due process requiremеnts. In re Leveck, 3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-02-52, 5-02-53, and 5-02-54, 2003-Ohio-1269, ¶ 6.
may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, * * * and the child cannot be placed with either of the child‘s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child‘s parents.
* * *
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies
for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-twо-month period * * *.
{¶14} “[T]he findings under
[T]he court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-оf-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;
(d) The child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶16} “Clear and convincing evidence is more than a preponderance of the evidence but not as much evidence as required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as in a criminal case; rather, it is evidence which provides the trier of fact with a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re H.M.K., 3d Dist. Wyandot Nos. 16-12-15 and 16-12-16, 2013-Ohio-4317, ¶ 42, citing In re Meyer, 98 Ohio App.3d 189, 195 (3d Dist.1994), citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale, 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 (1991). “Upon review, an appellate court ‘must examine the record and determine if the trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this burden of proof.‘” Id. at ¶ 43, quoting In re Meyer at 195, citing In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985). “A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court‘s determination unless it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Id., citing In re
{¶17} Here, the record supports the trial court‘s conclusion that, under
{¶18} Martin argues that the trial court “did not cite any specific reason for finding that it was in the best interest of the child to permanently sever custody.” (Appеllant‘s Brief at 7-8). “[I]n rendering its judgment, the trial court must either specifically address each of the required considerations set forth in
{¶19} Martin makes no specific arguments concerning why she believes the trial court‘s best-interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence. She fails to cite legal authorities or parts of the record on which she relies.
{¶21} For the reasons above, we conclude that clear and convinсing evidence supports the trial court‘s determinations under
{¶22} Martin‘s first and third assignments of error are overruled.
Assignment of Error No. II
The trial court committed reversible error in finding reasonable efforts were made to prevent the removal of [A.M.] from the home.
{¶23} In her second assignment of error, Martin argues that MCCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify A.M. and Martin. Specifically, Martin argues that “MCCS failed to makе reasonable efforts to enroll [Martin] in the [Achieving Baby Care Success Program (“ABC Program”)] at the Ohio Reformatory for Women.”2 (Appellant‘s Brief at 7).
{¶24} “’
{¶25} “‘Case plans are the tools that child protective service agencies use to facilitate the reunification of families who * * * have been temporarily separated.‘” In re T.S. at ¶ 26, quoting In re Evans, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-01-75, 2001 WL 1333979, *3 (Oct. 30, 2001). “To that end, case plans establish individualized concerns and goals, along with the steps that the parties and the
{¶26} In its October 23, 2014 entry granting MCCS permanent custody of A.M., the trial court determined that MCCS made reasonable efforts toward reunification:
The Court further finds pursuant to [R.C.] 2151.419(A)(1) that the Agency has made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child from the home of her parents, eliminate the continued removal of the child from the parents’ home and taken steps to make it possible for
the child to return home safely, but that parents’ failure to work with the Agency in achieving the goals and the objectives of the case plan in this regard have prevented return of the child to the parents’ home.
(Doc. No. 96 at 4).
{¶27} Martin‘s sole argument in support of this assignment of error—namely, that MCCS failed to use reasonable efforts to enroll Martin in the ABC Program—is problematic for multiple reasons. First, the ABC Program, in which mother-inmates can maintain custody of their infants, is not administered by MCCS; it apрarently is administered by ORW. (Doc. Nos. 58, 64, 84); (Oct. 14, 2014 Tr. at 14). See In re A.F. at ¶ 42 (“Though [mother-appellant] contends that [the counselor‘s] decision to continue with outpatient treatment is indicative of MCCS‘s unreasonable efforts, [mother-appellant] overlooks the fact that [the counselor] is not an agent of MCCS, but an employee of [Marion Area Counseling Center]. Consequently, this contention does not demonstrate that MCCS‘s efforts were unreasonable.”), citing In re Jo. S., 3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-11-16 and 5-11-17, 2011-Ohio-6017, ¶ 33 and In re Van Atta, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-05-03, 2005-Ohio-4182, ¶ 12. Martin cites nothing in the record to suggest how MCCS could have done more than it did concerning the ABC Program. See In re Jo. S. at ¶ 33. Second, according to Randy Lee, an ongoing caseworker at MCCS, Martin
{¶28} In fact, the record reflects that MCCS made reasonable efforts to reunify Martin with A.M., and the trial court‘s factual findings in its judgment entry granting MCCS‘s motion for pеrmanent custody clearly demonstrate the reasonableness of MCCS‘s efforts. See In re T.S., 2015-Ohio-1184, at ¶ 34. Specifically, MCCS developed a case plan, arranged for visits for Martin with A.M. when Martin was not incarcerated, and investigated the possibility of A.M. being placed with a relative. (Doc. Nos. 31, 58); (Oct. 14, 2014 Tr. at 16, 19, 22). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that MCCS made reasonable efforts toward reunification under
{¶30} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr