In re Annessa J.
The respondent parents filed separate appeals to this court from the judgment of the trial court terminating their parental rights with resрect to their minor child, A, and denying their motions for posttermination visitation with A. Held:
1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her unpreserved claims that the trial court violated her state and federal constitutional rights during the termination proceedings.
a. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claims that that the trial court violated her rights under article fifth, § 1, and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution by conducting the proceedings to terminate her parental rights over the Microsoft Teams platform, a collaborative computer meeting program, and her right to due process of law by denying her motion for permission to allow her expert witness to review certain information and conduct an independent evaluation, her claims being unpreserved and evidentiary, not of constitutional magnitude: she failed to establish that there exists a fundamental right under our state constitution to an in person, in court termination of parental rights trial; moreover, the court did not deny her the use of an expert but merely denied her late motion for release of confidential records and for permission to conduct an independent evaluation on the eve of trial; accordingly, the claims were not reviewаble under the second prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233).
b. The respondent mother could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that the trial court violated her right to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution by precluding her from confronting witnesses in person by conducting the termination of parental rights proceedings over the Microsoft Teams platform; although the mother requested an in person, in court trial, she did not argue on appeal that she had an absolute right to an in person, in court trial where she could physically confront witnesses, even if there was evidence of a need for a remote trial, rather, she contended that there was no evidence as to the need for a remote trial, and, because she did not ask the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the need for such a trial, the record was not adequate to review the claim, and the claim failed under the first prong of Golding.
2. The trial court did not err in terminating the respondent father‘s parental rights with respect to A.
a. This court declined to review the respondent father‘s claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to reunite him with A as that claim was moоt; the court also found that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts and, as the father failed to challenge that independent basis for the court‘s finding that the department made reasonable efforts to reunite him with A, this court could not afford him any practical relief.
b. The trial court‘s finding that the respondent father had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of A, he could assume a responsible position in her life, as required by statute (
c. The trial court‘s determination that the termination of the respondent
3. The trial court erred in denying the motions of the respondent mother and the respondent father for posttermination visitation with A, the court having failed to consider the appropriate standard under the applicable statute (
BRIGHT, C. J. In Docket No. AC 44405, the respondent mother (mother) appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights to, and denying her motion for posttermination visitation with, her minor child, Annessa J. On appeal, the mother claims that the trial court (1) violated her right to a “public civil trial at common law” by conducting proceedings over the Microsoft Teams platform,1 rather than in court and in person, in violation of article fifth, § 1, and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution, (2) violated her right to due process of law by precluding her from confronting witnesses in court and in person when it conducted proceedings over the Microsoft Teams platform, and (3) violated her right to due process of law when it denied her motion for permission to allow her expert witness to review certain information. We are not persuaded.
In Docket No. AC 44497, the respondent father (father) appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights to, and denying his motion for posttermination visitation with, his minor child, Annessa. On appeal, the father claims that the trial court improperly concluded that (1) the Department of Children and Families (department) had made reasonable efforts to reunify him with his daughter, (2) there was sufficient evidence to conclude that he was unable or unwilling to rehabilitate, and (3) termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of Annessa. We are not persuaded.
In addition, in Docket Nos. AC 44405 and AC 44497, the mother and the father, respectively, claim that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when it considered their posttermination motions for visitation with Annessa. We are persuaded that the court employed an improper standard, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the denial of the posttermination motions for visitation, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings on those motions.
The following facts, as found by the trial court by clear and convincing evidence, and procedural history inform our review of both appeals.
On February 10, 2001, duе to physical abuse at the hands of her mother, the mother was committed to the care and custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, where she remained until reaching the age of eighteen. The mother also elected to receive additional voluntary services from the department until she reached the age of twenty-three. She has become a licensed professional nurse.
At the time of the trial in this matter, the mother and the father had been married for six to seven years but had been in a relationship for approximately twelve
“On November 17, 2017, the department‘s Careline received a report alleging sexual abuse by the father of Annessa and physical neglect of Annessa by the mother. The mother had reported that sometime in late fall/early winter of 2016, or as late as March, 2017, the father [had] disclosed to her that Annessa‘s foot touched his penis and he woke up with an erection. This matter was never addressed further by the mother or the father. Then, sometime in July, 2017, the father admitted to the mother that he had touched Annessa‘s genitals over her underpants in order to teach her a lesson. According to the mother, she asked the father to leave the house in August, 2017. The father has reported that he was not asked to leave until October, 2017. After the department was alerted to the incident, efforts were made to connect with the mother and specifically to have her place Annessa in therapy. The mother [however] would not commit to doing so.”
On December 8, 2017, after the father left the home, he was arrested after he kicked in thе door to the mother‘s apartment. Shortly thereafter, the first of four protective orders was issued against him in favor of the mother. The father pleaded guilty to numerous charges as a result of his December 8, 2017 arrest, and he received a sentence of one year of incarceration, execution suspended, with two years of probation.2
Annessa later reported that the mother would leave her alone for days at a time, that she would not know the whereabouts of the mother at those times, and that the apartment would have no heat or electricity. On December 4, 2017, during a forensic interview at Klingberg Children‘s Advocacy Center, Annessa reported that the father had touched her “bikini area” over her underwear.
“On January 16, 2018, the [petitioner] filed a petition of neglect. On April 5, 2018, the [petitioner] invoked a [ninety-six] hour administrative hold on [Annessa]. On April 9, 2018, the [petitioner] filed an ex parte motion
The mother and the father were given specific steps to facilitate reunification with Annessa, including addressing mental health issues, parenting deficiencies, and intimate partner violence; the father also was ordered to address the sexual abuse of his daughter. The mother neither kept appointments set by the department nor cooperated with the department. The father missed several administrative case review appointments, but he participated in counseling and made some progress. However, he falsely reported to the department that he had discussed with his therapist the sexual abuse of his daughter.
“On March 28, 2019, and February 6, 2020, the court approved a permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. The trial on the [termination of parental rights] petition was conducted on September 2, 3, and 17, and October 6, 2020. The mоther and the father appeared and were zealously represented by counsel.”3
In its October 23, 2020 memorandum of decision, the court found, in accordance with
In its memorandum of decision, the court also considered the motions for posttermination visitation that the mother and the father each had filed, finding that “neither the mother nor the father have met their burden
We begin by setting forth the general legal principles relevant to the respondents’ claims. “Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed by
Additionally, our Supreme Court has determined that “the trial court . . . [has] the authority to grant posttermination visitation” when, during the proceedings to terminate parental rights, a respondent files a motion requesting such visitation. In re Ava W., 336 Conn. 545, 577, 590 n.18, 248 A.3d 675 (2020). “[T]he standard for evаluating posttermination visitation [derives] from the authority granted to [the trial court] under [
“‘Whether [it is appropriate] to order posttermination visitation is, of course, a question of fact for the trial court, “which has the parties before it and is in the best position to analyze all of the factors [that] go into the ultimate conclusion that [posttermination visitation is in the best interest of the child].” ’ . . . Our dedicated trial сourt judges, who adjudicate juvenile matters on a daily basis and must make decisions that concern children‘s welfare, protection, care and support, are best equipped to determine the factors worthy of consideration in making this finding. As examples—which are neither exclusive nor all-inclusive—a trial court may want to consider the child‘s wishes, the birth parent‘s expressed interest, the frequency and quality of visitation between the child and birth parent prior to the termination of the parent‘s parental rights, the strength of the emotional bond between the child and the birth parent, any interference with present custodial arrangements, and any impact on the adoption prospects for the child. . . . [The trial court] should, of course, evaluate those considerations independently from the termination of parental rights considerations.”7 (Citations omitted; footnote added.) In re Ava W., supra, 336 Conn. 588–90. We now consider separately the appeals from the judgment terminating parental rights in AC 44405 and in AC 44497, followed by our consideration of the court‘s denial of the motions for posttermination visitation.
I
AC 44405
The mother claims that the trial court (1) violated her right to a “public civil trial at common law” by conducting proceedings over the Microsoft Teams platform, rather than in court and in person, in viоlation of article fifth, § 1, and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution, (2) violated her right to due process of law by precluding her from confronting witnesses in court and in person when it conducted proceedings over the Microsoft Teams platform, and (3) violated her right to due process of law when it denied her
A
The mother first claims that the court violated article fifth, § 1, and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution9 by conducting proceedings over the Microsoft Teams platform, rather than in court and in person. She argues that “[a]rticle [f]ifth, § 1, creates a duty on the part of the Superior Court to find facts by observing firsthand the parties and witnesses in physical proximity to each other [and] [a]rticle [f]irst, § [10], creates a right of the citizenry to a public civil trial of the kind that existed at common law in 1818.” The mother concedes that she did not raise a constitutional claim before the trial court, although she did object to holding the hearing via Microsoft Teams, and, therefore, she requests review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).10 The petitioner argues that the mother‘s claim is not reviewable because the claim fails the second prong of Golding and that, even if the claim can be viewed as constitutional, it also fails under the third and fourth Golding prongs. We conclude that the mother has failed to establish that there exists a fundamental right under article fifth, § 1, or article fifth, § 10, of our state constitution to an in court, in person trial, as opposed to a trial conducted over a virtual platform such as Microsoft Teams, during a termination of parental rights proceeding.11 See State v. Fuller, 178 Conn. App. 575, 582, 177 A.3d 578 (2017) (procedural right does not “give rise in and of itself to a constitutional right” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 1001, 176 A.3d 1194 (2018). Accordingly, her claim is not reviewable because it fails under Golding‘s second prong. See footnote 10 of this opinion.
“With respect to the second prong of Golding, [t]he [respondent] . . . bears the responsibility of demonstrating that [her] claim is indeed a violation of a fundamental constitutional right. Patently nonconstitutional claims that are unpreserved at trial do not warrant special consideration simply because they bear a constitutional label.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, 106 Conn. App. 238, 257, 941 A.2d 989, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 903, 947 A.2d 343 (2008).
In the present case, the mother contends that, at common law, there was a right to an in person, in court public trial in all civil cases. She argues that this right was codified in our state constitution. Although the mother agreed during oral argument before this court that a public trial is not constitutionally required in juvenile matters, she, nevertheless, contends that our state constitution requires that termination of parental rights proceedings be conducted in a physical court
After reviewing the mother‘s arguments and considering the provisions of article fifth, § 1, and article first, § 10, and the common law she cites, we are not persuaded that she has established that there exists a fundamental right under our state constitution to an in person, in court termination of parental rights trial.
B
The mother next claims that the trial court violated her right to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution by precluding her from confronting witnesses in court and in person when it conducted proceedings virtually over the Microsoft Teams platform. She argues that, “[a]lthough the trial court referenced the COVID-19 public emergency as the reason for conducting the trial virtually, there was no actual evidence before the court that the COVID-19 virus threatened the health or safety of any of the persons involved in this particular case. Under suсh circumstances, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of parental rights created by virtual fact-finding outweighed the court‘s concern for the health and safety of the participants in this matter under the applicable due process balancing test.” Because this claim is unpreserved, the mother requests review under State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40. See footnote 10 of this opinion.
The petitioner argues that this claim is not reviewable for two reasons: first, because there is no evidentiary record regarding the health and safety procedures necessary for the participants in the proceedings and, second, because the mother has only a statutory right to confront witnesses in a termination of parental rights proceeding, not a constitutional right. The petitioner also argues, “[t]o the extent that [the mother] claims she has a general procedural due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in-person, it is subject to an analysis pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, [96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18] (1976) . . . [and] [s]he is unable to meet her burden [under that analysis].” We agree with the petitioner that the record is inadequate to review this unpreserved claim.
Although the mother requested an in person, in court trial, she did not ask the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the need for a remote trial. It is important to note that the mother does not argue on appeal that she had the absolute right to an in person, in court trial where she could physically confront witnesses, even if there was evidence of the need for a remote trial.
C
The mother next claims that the trial court violated her right to the due process of law when it denied her motion for permission to allow her expert witness to review certain information. Specifically, she argues that “she was without the adequate assistance of an expert in preparing her defense when the court denied her pretrial motion for permission to allow her expert to review documents in the court‘s file and to speak with the child‘s individual therapist. . . . Where the court precluded [the mother‘s] expert from reviewing the petitioner‘s documents filed with the court, or from talking with the child‘s therapist, it denied [the mother] a fundamentally fair proceeding by impeding her ability to have her expert effectively assess her defense, to include probing the state‘s case for weaknessеs and identifying questions to ask the witnesses on cross-examination.” (Citations omitted.) Because this claim was not preserved, the mother requests review pursuant to Golding. The petitioner responds that this claim is evidentiary in nature and that “the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying [the mother‘s] untimely motion to release records to her private evaluator.” We agree with the petitioner and, accordingly, conclude that review of the mother‘s unpreserved claim is inappropriate under Golding‘s second prong. See footnote 10 of this opinion.
The following procedural history is informative. On August 4, 2020, the mother filed an ex parte motion for the release of confidential court documents to her evaluator and for permission for the evaluator to conduct an independent evaluation of the child. In her motion, she contended that the information was “necessary in order for [her] to receive a fair trial . . . .” The petitioner objected to the mother‘s untimely motion on several grounds, including the lateness of the motion and that an independent evaluation, at this late date, would “unnecessarily delay the proceedings . . . .” The court denied the mother‘s motion on August 10, 2020.
Pursuant to
”In re Sheldon G. involved a delinquency proceeding, but the principles of confidentiality embodied in
The mother attempts to avoid application of these principles to this case by trying to equate her situation to the situation presented to the Court of Appeals of Michigan in In re Yarbrough Minors, 314 Mich. App. 111, 885 N.W.2d 878, cert. denied, 499 Mich. 898, 876 N.W.2d 818 (2016), in which the court held that the trial court had employed an improper standard when it denied the respondents’ motion for funding of an expert witness. Id., 114. Such a case is inapposite to the present situation. Here, the mother was not denied the use of an expert. Rather, her late motion for release of confidential records and for permission to conduct an independent evaluation, on the eve of trial, was denied. The mother‘s expert witness, in fact, did testify during the trial, and the mother was able to ask questions about the records that were in evidence. Although the mother now attempts to frame the denial of her motion as a constitutional due process claim under Golding, we conclude that her claim is evidentiary in nature. See In re Sheldon G., supra, 216 Conn. 577, 584; State v. William B., supra, 76 Conn. App. 756–57; In re Amy H., supra, 56 Conn. App. 62; see also In re Miyuki M., 202 Conn. App. 851, 860, 246 A.3d 1113 (2021) (“[t]he fact that this is a termination of parental rights case does not transform an evidentiary matter into a constitutional matter“). Accordingly, the claim fails under Golding‘s second prong.
II
AC 44497
In AC 44497, the father appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights to, and
A
The father claims that the trial court erred in concluding, pursuant to
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the department had made reasonable efforts to locate the father and to reunify him with his daughter. The court further found that the father is ”unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . . [and] that it is no longer appropriate for the department to make further efforts to reunify the father with [Annessa].” (Emphasis added.) On appeal, the father claims that the court improperly concluded that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify him with his daughter. The father does not claim, however, that the court‘s conclusion that he was ”unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts” was improper.14 (Emphasis added.) Because the father fails to challenge a separate independent basis for upholding the court‘s decision, we conclude that this claim is moot.
“Mootness raises the issue of a court‘s subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore appropriately considered even when not raised by one of the parties. . . . Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates [a] court‘s subject matter jurisdiction. . . . [I]t is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the [petitioner] or [the respondent] in any way.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 555–56, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).
“[
In In re Angela V., this court explained that “in [In re] Jorden R., our Supreme Court, sua sponte, vacated the judgment of this court after concluding that this court had lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the respondent‘s appellate claim that the trial court had erred in concluding that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. . . . Our Supremе Court determined that the respondent‘s claim was moot because she had failed to challenge on appeal a second alternative basis of the trial court‘s decision. . . . [T]he [trial] court found that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent and [the child] and that the respondent was unwilling and unable to benefit from reunification services. . . . In light of the trial court‘s finding that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with [the child] and the respondent‘s failure to challenge that finding, the [decision of this court], which disturbed only the trial court‘s finding that reunification efforts were not required, [could not] benefit the respondent meaningfully [because there remained an undisturbed independent basis that supported the trial court‘s decision]. . . . Accordingly, our Supreme Court concluded that the respondent‘s claim was moot because the Appellate Court could not have afforded her practical relief.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 752–53.
In the present case, the father does not claim that the court erred in concluding that he was ”unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.” (Emphasis added.) Because the father fails to challenge a separate independent basis for uphоlding the court‘s decision, we conclude that this claim is moot.
B
The father next claims that that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that he could not rehabilitate within a reasonable period of time given Annessa‘s needs.15 We disagree.
“Although the trial court‘s subordinate factual findings are reviewable only for clear error, the court‘s ultimate conclusion that a ground for termination of parental rights has been proven presents a question of evidentiary sufficiency. . . . That conclusion is drawn from both the court‘s factual findings and its weighing of the facts in considering whether the statutory ground has been satisfied. . . . On review, we must determine whether the trial court could have reasonably con
One of the factors for termination for the court to consider is set forth in
In this case, the court found that the father had “failed to achieve such a degree of rehabilitation as to encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, [he] could assume a role as a safe and responsible parent for this child.” The court cited the following evidence in support of its conclusion: the father‘s compliance with several of his specific steps was belated, he failed to have stable housing until very recently, he has gained only some insight into his sexual abuse of his daughter and how to control his urges, and he has “a long way to go” regarding the sexual abuse. The record demonstrates that, although the neglect petition in this matter was filed on January 18, 2018, and the petition for termination of parental rights was filed on November 15, 2019, the father did not begin to engage in therapy to address his inappropriate sexual behavior until December, 2019. The father argues that he knows he has not fully rehabilitated at this time, but, nonetheless, if given more time, perhaps six months, he could further resolve the issues related to his inappropriate sexual behavior and gain more understanding of its effect on Annessa. We are not persuaded.
Although we acknowledge, as did the trial court, that the father has made progress, that progress was a long time in the making. The father was reluctant to cooperate with the department, and he initially lied to the department about whether he was getting therapy for
C
The father next claims that the trial court erred in concluding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of Annessa. The father contends that he has a strong bond with Annessa and that his visits with her have been positive. In his appellate brief, the father has not examined each of the seven statutory factors delineated in
“In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child. . . . It is well settled that we will overturn the trial court‘s decision that the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the [child] only if the court‘s findings are clearly erroneous. . . . The best interests of the child include the child‘s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [his or her] environment. . . . In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent‘s parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven statutory factors delineated in [
“On appeal, our function is to determine whether the trial court‘s conclusion was factually supported and legally correct. . . . In doing so, however, [g]reat weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because of [the court‘s] opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence. . . . We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . [Rather] every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court‘s ruling. . . .
In the present case, the court considered each of the seven statutory factors delineated in
The record reveals that, although Annessa wanted to remain in contact with the father, she also stated that she wanted to continue to remain in the care of her foster mother, the person with whom she had a strong bond and with whom she had been living for more than two years. We conclude that there is evidence in the record to support the court‘s conclusion and that it is legally sound.
III
POSTTERMINATION MOTIONS FOR VISITATION IN AC 44405 AND AC 44497
In AC 44405 and AC 44497, the mother and the father, respectively, claim that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard when it considered their posttermination motions for visitation with Annessa. The mother argues that “the trial court mistakenly believed that it could not consider the child‘s ‘best interests’ when
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our consideration of the claims. Both the mother and the father filed a motion for posttermination visitation with Annessa. In its October 23, 2020 memorandum of decision, the court ruled in relevant part that “neither the mother nor the father have met their burden to prove posttermination visitation for such parent is necessary or appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support of [Annessa]. The mother avers that it is in the best interest of Annessa for visitation to continue. That is not the standard under . . .
“The question of whether a trial court has held a party to a less exacting [or more exacting] standard of proof than the law requires is a legal one. . . . Accordingly, our review is plenary. . . . Kaczynski v. Kaczynski, 294 Conn. 121, 126, 981 A.2d 1068 (2009). Similarly,
The recent decision of our Supreme Court in In re Ava W., supra, 336 Conn. 545, informs and controls our review of these claims. In In re Ava W., our Supreme Court discussed the trial court‘s authority to order posttermination visitation in a termination of parental rights case. Id., 585–86, 588–89. The court expressly held that, pursuant to
Thе petitioner in the present case contends that the trial court correctly stated that our Supreme Court explicitly rejected the best interest standard in In re Ava W. We disagree. Our reading of In re Ava W. leads us to conclude that our Supreme Court, instead, held that, when considering a motion for posttermination visitation during a termination of parental rights case, the trial court‘s consideration of the traditional best interest of the child is only part of the consideration of whether such visitation is “necessary or appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support of [the] child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 589. Our conclusion is supported by the court‘s explanation that, “[w]hether to order posttermination visitation is, of course, a question of fact for the
The mother claims that the court expressly rejected any reliance on the best interest of Annessa in ruling on her motion for posttermination visitation. In addition, the mother and the father claim that the court in the present case improperly required each of them to establish that posttermination visitation was required for Annessa‘s well-being. On the basis of the clear language employed by the court in this case, we agree. Although the court cited to
On the basis of these statements by the court, we are persuaded that the court failed to consider the appropriate standard under
The orders of the trial court denying the motions for рosttermination visitation by the mother and the father are reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings on the respondents’ motions; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
Article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”