IN RE ACADEMY, LTD. D/B/A ACADEMY SPORTS + OUTDOORS, RELATOR
No. 19-0497
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
June 25, 2021
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Argued October 6, 2020
JUSTICE
JUSTICE BOYD filed a concurring opinion.
This case arises out of the 2017 Sutherland Springs church shooting. Plaintiffs, who include victims of the shooting and their families, filed multiple suits against
I. Background
On November 5, 2017, Devin Kelley entered First Baptist Church in Sutherland Springs wielding a Model 8500 Ruger AR-556 semi-automatic rifle fitted with a detachable thirty-round magazine.2 He killed twenty-six people and injured twenty more. Kelley had purchased the rifle, which was packaged with a thirty-round magazine manufactured by Magpul Industries Corp., from an Academy store in San Antonio on April 7, 2016. As part of that sales transaction, Kelley purchased an additional Magpul thirty-round magazine, sold separately. Kelley reported a Colorado address and presented a Colorado ID when buying the rifle, prompting certain requirements imposed by the federal Gun Control Act on the sale of a firearm to an out-of-state resident. See
Academy also ran the required background check on Kelley through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System. Although federal law disqualified Kelley from purchasing a firearm at the time of the sale—based in part on his conviction in a 2012 court-martial for assaulting his wife and stepson and his dishonorable discharge from the United States Air Force—that disqualifying information was not in the system, which authorized Academy to “Proceed” with the sale. Litigation against the Air Force for failing to collect, handle, and report the required information is ongoing in federal court. See Holcombe v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 3d 777, 785 (W.D. Tex. 2019).
The mandamus proceeding at issue here arises from four lawsuits filed against Academy in Texas district court by some of the survivors of the shooting and relatives
purchased could not legally be sold in Colorado. And because the sale to Kelley violated Colorado law, plaintiffs allege, the sale in turn violated the Gun Control Act.
Academy answered with a general denial. Academy also affirmatively asserts in its answer, among other defenses, that the PLCAA bars the plaintiffs’ suits and that the sale complied with Texas, Colorado, and federal law because (1) Academy processed the required federal forms and conducted the required background check, which Kelley passed; (2) the Academy employees involved in the sale to Kelley observed no behavior that would disqualify him from purchasing a firearm; (3) the Gun Control Act‘s restrictions on sales to out-of-state residents apply to the sale of a firearm, not the sale of a magazine; and (4) the Colorado law at issue does not apply to sales outside Colorado.
Academy filed a traditional motion for summary judgment on the ground that the PLCAA, which generally prohibits a “qualified civil liability action“—that is, an action against a seller or manufacturer of firearms and related products for damages caused by a third party‘s criminal conduct—forecloses the plaintiffs’ suits and compels their dismissal.
The trial court held a hearing and denied Academy‘s motion for summary judgment. Academy moved for a permissive interlocutory appeal of the order, but the trial court denied that motion. See
II. Discussion
Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy requiring the relator to show that (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). We examine each prong in turn.
A. Abuse of Discretion
A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts with disregard of guiding rules or principles or when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding). A trial court‘s “failure to analyze or apply the law correctly is an abuse of discretion.” In re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding) (citation omitted). Here, the propriety of the trial court‘s order denying Academy‘s summary-judgment motion hinges on a legal issue: the proper interpretation and application of the PLCAA. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Tex. 2020) (reiterating that statutory interpretation is an issue of law).
In analyzing federal statutes, we apply principles substantially similar to those that govern our interpretation of Texas law. “The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text.” Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); see also Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019) (explaining that our goal in interpreting a statute is to effectuate legislative intent and that our most reliable guide is the statute‘s text). We enforce a statute according to its plain language unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534; Abutahoun v. Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d 42, 46 (Tex. 2015). We consider statutes as a whole, reading the chosen words “in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Mich. Dep‘t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); see also Zanchi v. Lane, 408 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. 2013). We thus begin our analysis by reviewing the structure of the PLCAA and its exceptions before turning to the applicability of the exceptions themselves.6
1. The PLCAA
In enacting the PLCAA in 2005, Congress expressly enumerated its underlying findings, including a finding that businesses “engaged in interstate and foreign commerce through the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, importation, or sale to the public of firearms or ammunition products ... are not, and should not, be liable for the harm caused by those who criminally or unlawfully misuse [such] products that function as designed and intended.”
To address the concerns underlying the statute‘s enactment, the PLCAA prohibits, with six exceptions, a category of civil actions against manufacturers and sellers of firearms and ammunition products. The PLCAA‘s prohibition is stated succinctly: “A qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State court.”
a civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, for damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party.
It is undisputed that the Ruger AR-556 rifle and Magpul magazines that Kelley purchased from Academy are qualified products under the PLCAA. Nor do the parties disagree that each of the plaintiffs’ suits fits within the PLCAA‘s general definition of a qualified civil liability action. Rather, the disagreement hinges on the applicability of two of the statute‘s six enumerated exceptions to what would otherwise constitute a qualified civil liability action.
Pursuant to those two exceptions, a qualified civil liability action “shall not include ... an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment” (the negligent-entrustment exception) or “an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought” (often referred to as the predicate exception).
2. Predicate Exception
The predicate exception applies when the manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violates a “State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product.”
Section 922(b)(3) states in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector to sell or deliver—
. . . .
(3) any firearm to any person who the licensee knows or has reasonable cause to believe does not reside in ... the State in which the licensee‘s place of business is located, except that this paragraph ... shall not apply to the sale or delivery of any rifle or shotgun to a resident of a State other than a State in which the licensee‘s place of business is located if the transferee meets in person with the transferor to accomplish the transfer, and the sale, delivery, and receipt fully comply with the legal conditions of sale in both such States (and any licensed manufacturer, importer or dealer shall be presumed, for purposes of this subparagraph, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have had actual knowledge of the State laws and published ordinances of both States) ....
transferor and transferee must meet in person “to accomplish the transfer“; and (2) the “sale, delivery, and receipt” must “fully comply with the legal conditions of sale in both” the state of the licensed dealer‘s place of business and the state of the transferee‘s residence.
The plaintiffs argue that Academy‘s sale of the Ruger AR-556 rifle to Kelley did not meet the second condition, and therefore violated the Gun Control Act, because the “sale, delivery, and receipt” of the rifle did not comply with the “legal conditions of sale” in Colorado, Kelley‘s state of residence at the time of the transaction.
As an initial matter, we note the differences in terminology that affect the scope of the two federal statutes at issue. A “qualified civil liability action,” which the PLCAA prohibits, includes an action against a manufacturer or seller of a “qualified product.”
(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device. Such term does not include an antique firearm.
The plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that a magazine, in and of itself and regardless of its capacity, is not a “firearm” subject to the Gun Control Act‘s restrictions on sales to out-of-state residents. See United States v. Guillen-Cruz, 853 F.3d 768, 772-73 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that a rifle magazine does not meet the Gun Control Act‘s definition of “firearm“). Nor do they argue that Colorado law bans the sale of AR-556 rifles. Instead, they argue that because the rifle Academy sold to Kelley was inseparably packaged with a large-capacity magazine, that “sale” could not have occurred legally in Colorado. The plaintiffs further argue that a “firearm” includes unlisted component parts like magazines “when they are packaged and sold together
with the weapon itself.”10 (Emphasis omitted.) We hold that the plaintiffs’ interpretation disregards the text and structure of both the PLCAA and the Gun Control Act, which denote a clear distinction between the treatment of firearms
First, we reject the plaintiffs’ contention that the packaging of the Model 8500 rendered the Magpul magazine part of the “firearm” that is subject to section 922(b)(3)‘s restrictions. As explained, both firearms and magazines (along with other component parts) are “qualified products” subject to the PLCAA‘s general prohibition against qualified civil liability actions,
To support their assertion that “the term ‘firearm’ includes those component parts that ... are bundled and packaged inseparably for purposes of the sale of a trigger-and-hammer skeleton,” the plaintiffs rely on federal regulations that consider a firearm and its packaged component parts together for the purpose of assessing and calculating taxes. See
Nor can we agree with the plaintiffs’ related argument that, even if the magazine was not part of the firearm Kelley purchased, the fact that the two were inseparably packaged means that the overall transaction did not comply with Colorado law and thus violated the Gun Control Act. See
Section 922(b)(3)‘s mandate that “the sale, delivery, and receipt” comply with state law may not be read in a vacuum. The “sale” to which the provision refers is the “sale or delivery of any rifle,”11
Indeed, although the transaction between Academy and Kelley on April 7, 2016, encompassed the sale of two Magpul large-capacity magazines—one packaged as a stand-alone product and one packaged with the Ruger AR-556 rifle—the plaintiffs do not contend that the
sale of the stand-alone magazine along with the rifle rendered the transaction unlawful even though it could not have taken place legally in Colorado. And the statutory text does
In sum, the sale of the Ruger AR-556 rifle to Kelley complied with the legal conditions of sale in both Texas and Colorado. Because the Gun Control Act did not regulate the sale of the magazines, the Colorado law prohibiting their sale was immaterial.12 Accordingly, we hold that Academy complied with section 922(b)(3) and thus committed no statutory violation that would give rise to the PLCAA‘s predicate exception. See
3. Negligent-Entrustment Exception
The plaintiffs next argue that, even if the predicate exception does not apply, another PLCAA exception entitles them to pursue their negligent-entrustment claims. Specifically, the PLCAA excepts from its prohibition “an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment.”
the supplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by another person when the seller knows, or reasonably should know, the person to whom the product is supplied is likely to, and does, use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person or others.
applies. See Prescott, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1132-33 (noting that “[b]ecause the PLCAA does not ‘create a public or private cause of action or remedy,’ courts look to state law” in determining whether the negligent-entrustment exception applies (internal citation omitted)); Phillips v. Lucky Gunner, LLC, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1225 (D. Colo. 2015) (“Although the PLCAA identifies negligent entrustment as an exception to immunity, it does not create the cause of action. Accordingly, the claim arises under state law.” (internal citation omitted)).
Academy moved for summary judgment on the ground that Texas does not recognize a cause of action for negligent entrustment based on the sale of property, and it argues that the PLCAA‘s negligent-entrustment exception thus does not apply. The plaintiffs disagreed, arguing that Academy‘s sale of the rifle to Kelley “satisfie[d] all the requisite elements of the tort of negligent entrustment under Texas law” and that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Academy supplied the rifle to Kelley with reason to know that he was likely to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of harm. We agree with Academy. As discussed below, we have expressly declined to recognize a negligent-entrustment claim premised on a sale and recently reaffirmed our agreement with the policy reasons underlying that conclusion.
Texas law on negligent entrustment developed in the context of entrustment of automobiles, but courts have recognized the tort‘s application to other types of property as well, including firearms. See 4Front Engineered Sols. v. Rosales, 505 S.W.3d 905, 908 n.5, 909 (Tex. 2016) (citing cases, in Texas and other jurisdictions, applying the theory to “a variety of chattel“); see also Prather v. Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (evaluating evidence supporting a claim for negligent entrustment of a firearm). In Rush v. Smitherman, we confirmed that “liability for negligently entrusting a vehicle
to an unlicensed driver is a part of the law of bailments, but not of the law of sales or gifts.” 294 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1956, writ ref‘d) (emphasis added). We explained: “A bailor entrusts, for what he entrusts is his. But a vendor does not entrust; he sells his chattel.” Id. at 877; see also id. at 878 (“As between seller and purchaser, when the accident occurred, the seller had no right to possess or control the car.“). The courts of appeals have consistently followed Rush and held that “negligent entrustment does not apply to the sale of a chattel.” Nat‘l Convenience Stores, Inc. v. T.T. Barge Cleaning Co., 883 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied); see also, e.g., Jaimes v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
The plaintiffs cite no Texas cases holding differently but note that section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (which depicts the tort of negligent entrustment),13 unlike the previous version of the Restatement that we cited in Rush, clarifies that it is intended to apply to one who supplies chattel by any means, including by sale. See Rush, 294 S.W.2d at 875; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965). But we have not adopted this section of the Second Restatement. Further, in F.F.P. Operating Partners, LP v. Duenez, we reaffirmed the policy reasons underlying the tort as we have recognized it, noting that “the basis for imposing liability on the owner of the thing entrusted to another is that ownership of the thing gives the right of control over its use.” 237 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. 2007)
(citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 73 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Atl. Indus. Inc. v. Blair, 457 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014) (“Without control [of the chattel] there can be no liability [for negligent entrustment].“), rev‘d on other grounds, 482 S.W.3d 57 (Tex. 2016). Extending a common-law negligent-entrustment claim to a sale of chattel, which results in the seller‘s relinquishing control over the very thing that is subsequently used in a manner that causes harm, contradicts that reasoning.
Therefore, we agree with Academy that no viable cause of action exists under Texas law for negligent entrustment based on a sale of chattel. In turn, we hold that the plaintiffs may not rely on the negligent-entrustment exception to pursue their claims. See Prescott, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (applying Nevada law on negligent entrustment to determine whether the PLCAA‘s negligent-entrustment exception applied); Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int‘l, 202 A.3d 262, 278, 283 (Conn. 2019) (holding that the plaintiffs had failed to plead a legally sufficient cause of action for negligent entrustment under
B. Adequate Appellate Remedy
Notwithstanding our conclusion regarding the trial court‘s abuse of discretion, we may grant mandamus relief only if Academy lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135-36. We determine whether an adequate appellate remedy exists by weighing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re United Servs. Auto. Ass‘n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 313 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding). This balancing test is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry that “resists categorization.” Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136. Thus, although we have held that “mandamus is generally unavailable when a trial court denies summary judgment,” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (emphasis added), that principle is not, and cannot be, absolute, see, e.g., In re United Servs. Auto. Ass‘n, 307 S.W.3d at 313 (granting mandamus relief from the trial court‘s order denying summary judgment where the relator was “facing a second trial on a claim that we have just held to be barred“).
The following discussion in Prudential guides us in our evaluation of the propriety of mandamus relief:
Mandamus review of incidental, interlocutory rulings by the trial courts unduly interferes with trial court proceedings, distracts appellate court attention to issues that are unimportant both to the ultimate disposition of the case at hand and to the uniform development of the law, and adds unproductively to the expense and delay of civil litigation. Mandamus review of significant rulings in exceptional cases may be essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.
148 S.W.3d at 136. Consistent with that discussion, we have recognized that “[t]he most frequent use we have made of mandamus relief involves cases in which the very act of
proceeding to trial—regardless of the outcome—would defeat the substantive right involved.” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 465. Academy asserts
We begin, as ever, with the statute‘s text. In enacting the PLCAA, Congress primarily sought to “prohibit causes of action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition products ... for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of [those] products by others when the product functioned as designed and intended.”
First, we note Congress‘s choice of language in section 7902(a). Congress did not say that “no liability may be imposed in a qualified civil liability action” or that “a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product may not be held liable in a qualified civil liability action“; it said that such an action “may not be brought in any Federal or State court.” We presume that this
distinction was purposeful, as Congress elsewhere has distinguished between a prohibition against bringing a suit or claim and a prohibition against imposing liability. See, e.g., Communications Decency Act,
contains no “explicit statutory or constitutional guarantee that trial will not occur.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 801 (1989).17 The plaintiffs contrast the PLCAA with other federal statutes that contain such an explicit guarantee.18 However, we have found no cases evaluating the applicability of the collateral-order doctrine to an order denying dismissal under the PLCAA, and several federal decisions interpreting the PLCAA recognize the exact substantive right that the plaintiffs claim is lacking.
For example, in Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit reviewed a district court‘s order dismissing a suit asserting various negligence and nuisance claims against a firearm manufacturer and distributor. The suit, filed by the victims of a mass shooting involving guns manufactured and distributed by the defendants, was pending on the date of the PLCAA‘s enactment and was dismissed under
plaintiffs’ assertion that the PLCAA violated their procedural due process rights by requiring dismissal of their pending suit without an adequate hearing. Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1141-42. The court explained that “the PLCAA does not impose a procedural limitation; rather, it creates a substantive rule of law granting immunity to certain parties against certain types of claims. In such a case, the legislative determination provides all the process that is due.” Id. at 1142 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
That description is consistent with the Second Circuit‘s discussion of the PLCAA in City of New York v. Beretta, in which the court held that the PLCAA mandated dismissal of a pending public-nuisance suit against numerous firearm manufacturers and wholesalers for failing to take reasonable steps to inhibit the flow of firearms into illegal markets. 524 F.3d 384, 389-90 (2d Cir. 2008). In addressing the City‘s constitutional challenges, the court described the PLCAA‘s impact as follows: “By its terms, the Act bars plaintiffs from courts for the adjudication of qualified civil liability actions, allowing access for only those actions that fall within the Act‘s exceptions.” Id. at 397. The PLCAA thus “immunizes a specific type of defendant from a specific type of suit” and “bars the commencement or the prosecution of qualified civil liability actions.” Id. at 398 (emphases added); see also Estate of Kim v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 388-89 (Alaska 2013) (citing Beretta and holding that “Congress‘s purpose and intent was to bar any qualified civil liability action not falling within a statutory exception“).
We find the reasoning of the Second and Ninth Circuits persuasive and consistent with the PLCAA‘s operative language providing that a qualified civil liability action “may not be brought in any Federal or State court.”
but also the improper use of the judiciary to circumvent legislative judgments.” Jefferies v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 2d 42, 47 (D.D.C. 2013). The Jefferies court noted that the Act‘s requirement of immediate dismissal of actions pending on the date of its enactment “suggests that Congress intended courts to weed out, expeditiously, claims the PLCAA bars.” Id. That intent is not served by allowing an action barred by the PLCAA to proceed to trial only to be inevitably reversed on appeal, regardless of the procedural device the defendant utilizes to seek dismissal.19
Accordingly, we hold that requiring Academy to “proceed[] to trial—regardless of the outcome—would defeat the substantive right” granted by the PLCAA. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 465; see also In re GlobalSanteFe Corp., 275 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (holding that “mandamus relief is available when the Legislature has enacted a statute to address findings ‘that traditional rules of litigation are creating an ongoing crisis,’ and ‘the purposes of the [enacted] statute would otherwise be defeated‘” (quoting In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 462)) (alteration in original).20
Further, while we have held that “an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely
Here, Academy faces multiple trials in the four underlying suits alone, plus multiple additional lawsuits arising from the Sutherland Springs shooting.21 Absent mandamus relief, Academy will be obligated to continue defending itself against multiple suits barred by federal law. As in United Services, this case presents extraordinary circumstances that warrant such relief.
III. Conclusion
We hold that the underlying lawsuits are qualified civil liability actions that the PLCAA bars as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Academy‘s motion for summary judgment. We further hold that Academy lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. We therefore conditionally grant Academy‘s petition
OPINION DELIVERED: June 25, 2021
Debra H. Lehrmann
Justice