In re A.N.
The Legislature has established a detailed statutory scheme to govern juvenile truancy. (See e.g.,
By the time A.N. entered high school, she was struggling with difficult circumstances at home and in her personal life. Beginning in eighth grade, she developed school attendance problems that continued throughout her ninth grade year.
On October 6, 2015, the principal of A.N.‘s school mailed a truancy notice to her parents. In the letter, the principal explained that A.N. had accumulated four unexcused absences or tardies, and he invited her parents to contact the school‘s attendance supervisor to “discuss solutions that will improve [A.N.‘s] attendance.” A week later, on October 13, the principal sent a second truancy notice listing another five unexcused absences or tardies. In this letter, the principal warned A.N.‘s parents that their daughter was “at risk of being classified as a habitual truant,” and he urged them to contact the attendance supervisor “as soon as possible.” On December 15, the principal sent a third truancy notice documenting another 10 unexcused absences or tardies. In it, he stated that A.N. was a habitual truant, and he again requested that her parents contact the attendance supervisor “as soon as possible.”2
Three days earlier, on December 12, a police officer had issued A.N. a citation for habitual truancy under
On December 31, the District Attorney filed a wardship petition against A.N. in the juvenile court. (See
Almost two weeks later, on January 12, 2016, A.N. and her mother attended a SARB meeting. They signed a contract stating that A.N. would attend school regularly and that her mother would provide information about any future absences.
During late April and early May, the juvenile court held a trial on the wardship petition. At trial, the school attendance supervisor testified that a computerized system automatically sends a report to the school district whenever a teacher records a student as absent from or tardy to class. He explained that the system also generates student attendance profiles that provide attendance supervisors with a list of each student‘s recorded absences and tardies. Additionally, he testified that he had spoken with A.N. on multiple occasions and provided her with information about available services. A.N.‘s attendance profile and the letters sent from the principal to A.N.‘s parents were admitted into evidence.
On appeal, A.N. claimed that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction because, at the time the petition was filed, (1) she had not yet appeared before a SARB and (2) a fourth truancy report had not been sent to her and her parents. (In re A.N. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 403 (A.N.).) The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court‘s judgment, holding that neither of these steps were prerequisites to the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction over a minor on the basis of the minor having “four or more truancies within one school year” under
II. DISCUSSION
Before turning to the issues before us, we review our familiar principles of statutory construction. “We start with the statute‘s words, which are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 627.) ” ‘We interpret relevant terms in light of their ordinary meaning, while also taking account of any related provisions and the overall structure of the statutory scheme to determine what interpretation best advances the Legislature‘s underlying purpose.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 293.) “If we find the statutory language ambiguous or subject to more than one interpretation, we may look to extrinsic aids, including legislative history or purpose to inform our views.” (John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 96.)
As is relevant here, Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b) provides: “If a minor between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, has four or more truancies within one school year as defined in Section 48260 of the Education Code or a school attendance review board or probation officer determines that the available public and private services are insufficient or inappropriate to correct the habitual truancy of the minor, or to correct the minor‘s persistent or habitual refusal to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of school authorities, or if the minor fails to respond to directives of a school attendance review board or a probation officer or to services provided, the minor is then within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court.” In brief, this subdivision lists three bases of juvenile court jurisdiction: (1) “four or more truancies within one school year“; (2) a determination by a SARB or a probation officer that available services are insufficient or inappropriate to correct the minor‘s truancy; or (3) a minor‘s failure to respond to the directives of a SARB or a probation officer or to services provided.
In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court possessed jurisdiction in the formal wardship proceeding against A.N. on the basis of her “four or more truancies within one school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b). (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 406.) Consequently, we limit our consideration to whether (1) the use of a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program, or (2) the issuance of a fourth truancy report to the pupil and his or her parents or guardians, is a prerequisite to the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction in a formal wardship proceeding upon this basis.
First, if a pupil “is absent from school without a valid excuse three full days in one school year or tardy or absent for more than a 30-minute period during the schoolday without a valid excuse on three occasions in one school year, or any combination thereof,”
Meanwhile,
B. Use of a SARB or a Similar Truancy Mediation Program
First, we consider A.N.‘s claim that the statutory scheme and In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283 (Michael G.) require the use of a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program before a pupil comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
In Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d 283, we considered whether the juvenile court may exercise its contempt power to detain a minor during nonschool hours. Our opinion recognized that the Legislature had previously amended the statutory scheme “to require referral of truants to [SARBs] before juvenile court intervention,” and we described referral to a SARB as a “condition precedent to the juvenile court‘s intervention.” (Id. at p. 290.) As we explain below, this dictum was abrogated by subsequent amendments to the statutory scheme.
So, as our dictum in Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d 283, recognized, former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code mandated initial referral to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program, and section 601(b) formerly provided only two bases of juvenile court jurisdiction—both of which contemplated the prior use of a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program. In 1994, however, Senate Bill No. 1728
Without discussing the fact that Senate Bill 1728 repealed former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, A.N. asks us to read
For support, A.N. looks to Senate Bill 1728‘s legislative history. Specifically, she points to a bill analysis prepared by the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, which commented: ”Upon the failure of the earlier steps to alleviate the truancy problem, the juvenile court may exert jurisdiction over the minor pupil. . . . Court intervention is reserved until after other
First, we observe that nothing in the current statutory scheme expressly requires initial referral to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program. Section 48264.5‘s subdivisions refer to actions that “may” be taken in response to a pupil‘s continued truancy or failure to complete assigned programs. Specifically,
Second, we note that multiple analyses of Senate Bill 1728 informed legislators that the bill would repeal the requirement that a minor be referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program before the juvenile court. (See, e.g., Assem. Com. on Education, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 30, 1994, pp. 1, 2; Sen. 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 19, 1994, pp. 1, 2; Sen. 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1728 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 26, 1994, pp. 1, 2.) To this end, the Legislative Counsel‘s summary digest cited by A.N. also stated: “Under existing law, a juvenile who is an habitual truant is required to be referred to a school attendance review board or truancy mediation program, before referral to the juvenile court. . . . [¶] This bill would repeal the
Any contradictory statements in Senate Bill 1728‘s legislative history may be explained by the Legislature‘s joint passage of Senate Bill 1728 and Assembly Bill No. 2658 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2658). (Stats. 1994, ch. 1024, p. 6218.) As is relevant here, Senate Bill 1728 contained a single provision to repeal former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (Stats. 1994, ch. 1023, § 7, p. 6217), but Assembly Bill 2658 contained alternate provisions: one that would amend former section 601.1, and another that would repeal former section 601.1 (Stats. 1994, ch. 1024, §§ 5, 5.5, pp. 6222–6223). Assembly Bill 2658 clarified that if Senate Bill 1728 was enacted first and Assembly Bill 2658 was enacted second, its provision repealing former section 601.1 would take effect, and its provision amending former section 601.1 would not.5 (Stats. 1994, ch. 1024, § 8, p. 6225.) Because the Legislature passed both bills on the same day, it effectively delegated the decision whether to amend or repeal former
A.N. and amicus curiae California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) also contend that referring truants directly to the juvenile court undermines the purposes of SARBs and similar truancy mediation programs: to address the underlying sources of attendance problems primarily through the provision of community services and to make juvenile court intervention a matter of last resort.
This argument is supported by several sections of the current statutory scheme. In the article of the Education Code governing SARBs, the Legislature has declared its intent that “intensive guidance and coordinated community services may be provided to meet the special needs of pupils with school
Even in counties without a SARB or a probation department that receives habitual truant referrals,
As explained above, however, after Senate Bill 1728‘s repeal of former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, no section expressly requires initial referral to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program.10 Because Senate Bill
For this reason, we hold that the use of a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program is not a prerequisite to the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction in a formal wardship proceeding on the basis of a minor having “four or more truancies within one school year” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b). We recognize that this conclusion may be in tension with several sections of the statutory scheme, and we appreciate A.N. and CRLA‘s contention that referring habitual truants directly to the juvenile court is counterproductive to the goal of improving attendance. (See generally, conc. opn., post, at pp. 3–7.) But it is up to the Legislature to resolve any such tension and to act upon such policy arguments, if it deems such action appropriate.12
C. Jurisdiction on the Basis of “Four or More Truancies”
We next turn to A.N.‘s claim that Education Code section 48264.5, subdivision (d) (section 48264.5(d)) requires (1) a fourth truancy report to be issued, and (2) that the report be issued to the pupil and the pupil‘s parents or guardians, before the
Again, Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b) provides in relevant part: “If a minor . . . has four or more truancies within one school year as defined in Section 48260 of the Education Code . . . , the minor is then within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court.” (Italics added.) And, as stated above, Education Code section 48264.5(d) provides: ”The fourth time a truancy is issued within the same school year, the pupil may be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court that may adjudge the pupil to be a ward of the court pursuant to Section 601 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” (Italics added.)
Because these subdivisions are in pari materia, we construe them together “so that all parts of the statutory scheme are given effect.” (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1090–1091.) In particular, we note that the same bill (Senate Bill 1728) that amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b) to provide that a minor with “four or more truancies” is “within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” also added Education Code section 48264.5(d), which originally provided that “[u]pon the fourth truancy within the same school year,” a pupil is “within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Stats. 1994, ch. 1023, § 4, pp. 6215–2616.) For this reason, and because one section expressly references the other, we believe the Legislature intended “four . . . truancies” in Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b) and “fourth truancy” in Education Code section 48264.5(d) to refer to the same set of circumstances, upon which the minor comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
As already discussed,
The Court of Appeal determined that the Legislature intentionally omitted “report” from section 48264.5(d), and it concluded that a pupil comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if she is “truant a fourth time (i.e., accrues six or more unexcused absences [or tardies]),” even if a fourth truancy report has not been issued. (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 406.) Under its reasoning, a “truancy” is the minimum number of unexcused absences or tardies needed to require the issuance of a truancy report. Because three unexcused absences or tardies are needed to require a first report (
To begin, we find the phrase “[t]he fourth time a truancy is issued” in section 48264.5(d) to be ambiguous. As used in each of section 48264.5‘s subdivisions, “issued” is a transitive verb—one that requires a direct object. In the first three subdivisions, “report” follows naturally as an object of “issued” because it is a concrete noun. In the fourth subdivision, “truancy” follows awkwardly because it is an abstract noun, generally defined as
The Court of Appeal may have implicitly read “[t]he fourth time a truancy is issued” in
We believe a better interpretation of
Even if the Legislature intentionally omitted the term “report” from subdivision (d), we do not believe it intended the omission to have substantive significance. When the Legislature added
For these reasons, we interpret “[t]he fourth time a truancy is issued” in
2. Recipient of Truancy Reports
Next, we must determine the appropriate recipient of the truancy reports referenced in
The Attorney General has the better interpretation. Section 48264.5‘s references to “truancy report[s]” must be interpreted in light of the entire statutory scheme. “[W]hen the same word appears in different places within a statutory scheme, courts generally presume the Legislature intended the word to have the same meaning each time it is used.” (People v. Gray (2014) 58 Cal.4th 901, 906.) Accordingly, we presume the Legislature used “report” in
A.N. and CRLA argue that this construction would violate the due process rights of pupils and their parents and guardians. Assuming A.N. did not forfeit this argument by failing to raise it in her opening brief, we reject it on the merits. Although
Therefore, we hold that a fourth truancy report must be issued to the attendance supervisor or the superintendent of the school district before the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a minor on the basis of the minor‘s “four or more truancies within one school year” under
D. The District Attorney‘s Petition Against A.N.
Finally, we consider whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction over A.N.
The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court had jurisdiction on the basis of A.N.‘s “four or more truancies within one school year” under
III. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeal declared that A.N. “refused to go to school” and “demonstrated [an] unwavering commitment to avoiding an education.” (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 405.) But the record suggests that A.N.‘s attendance problems arose out of difficult circumstances at home and in her personal life. Both parties and amicus curiae CRLA agree that students often fall into truancy for reasons beyond their control. (See conc. opn., post, at p. 4.) The Court of Appeal also opined that school officials “did everything they could and should do to educate—not abandon—A.N.” (A.N., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 406.) But a SARB meeting was not held until A.N. had accumulated dozens of unexcused absences or tardies, and there is no evidence that any services were provided to her or her parents. When a habitual truant is adjudged a ward of the juvenile court but is never offered any services to address the underlying causes of his or her attendance problems, we question whether the statutory scheme functions as the Legislature expected.
CHIN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
I agree with today‘s opinion that
Other provisions of the Education Code also evince the Legislature‘s intent that “minors typically be referred to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program before the juvenile court.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)
The desirability of such alternatives is supported by empirical studies. (See, e.g., Petrosino et al., Formal System Processing of Juveniles: Effects on Delinquency: A Systematic Review (2010) Campbell Systematic Reviews, at p. 36 [reviewing 29 controlled trials and finding that juvenile court intervention increases the severity and frequency of subsequent delinquency,
A 2012 Judicial Council of California report noted that “[t]ruant children and children with school behavior problems tend to come from poor minority families that may be experiencing unemployment, hunger, housing issues, transportation issues, family dissolution or dysfunction, domestic violence, or community safety issues. Children may also have learning disabilities or other issues that impact their ability to attend school. . . . As such, truancy and school behavior interventions should involve addressing child and family issues holistically . . . . Interventions should be supportive and involve the least punitive responses available, while at the same time reinforcing student and parent accountability . . . . They should also focus on re-engaging the student in school, including attention to both attendance and academic problems.” (Judicial Council of Cal., Truancy and School Discipline: An Overview of the Literature and Statistics (2012) p. 11, citations omitted.)
Before 1994, “former section 601.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code mandated initial referral to a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program, and section 601(b) formerly provided only two bases of juvenile court jurisdiction—both of which contemplated the prior use of a SARB or a similar truancy mediation program.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.) In that context, we explained that “[t]he Education Code establishes a comprehensive mechanism for dealing with truants ranging from resort to various community programs, to special mediation programs. [Citations.] Truants are not, except in aggravated circumstances involving ‘habitual’ offenders, subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.” (In re James D. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 903, 910.) Six unexcused absences, comprising four truancies, did not constitute “aggravated circumstances” at that time. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8–9.) We observed that “[t]he Legislature‘s move towards utilizing the school attendance review boards as a condition precedent to the juvenile court‘s intervention is understandable and in keeping with legal commentary calling for greater participation of school and social welfare professionals, even to the exclusion of the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction.” (In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 290.)
As today‘s opinion explains, the Legislature in 1994 repealed
In cases like A.N.‘s, the diversionary purpose of SARBs appears compromised by section 601(b)‘s grant of jurisdiction to the juvenile court before the student has had an opportunity to benefit from SARB services. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 26 [“we question whether the statutory scheme functions as the Legislature expected“].) The record here indicates that at least some of A.N.‘s school attendance difficulties arose from challenging circumstances beyond her control. Less than a year
The broad prosecutorial discretion arising under
Not all counties have pursued truancy prosecutions as aggressively as Ventura County, where the petition against A.N. was filed. According to Ventura County‘s 2015–2016 annual SARB report, the District Attorney cited 869 students and 482 parents for truancy that school year. (Ventura County Off. of Education, Ventura County School Attendance Review Board Data Summary 2015-2016 (2016).) Amicus curiae California Rural Legal Assistance notes that Ventura County children and their parents were criminally charged at “much higher rates than students and parents in other counties.” (See
In sum, although the language of
LIU, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.