*1 No. Jan. 24917. [S.F. 1988.] G., Minor,
In re MICHAEL Corpus. on Habeas G., Petitioner, MICHAEL COUNTY,
THE SUPERIOR OF Respondent; COURT FRESNO PEOPLE, Party THE Real in Interest.
Counsel Villarreal, Sarkisian, Jr., Defender, Public Jose Deputy Edward Public and Defender, for Petitioner. Simon, Littlefield, Alan H. Angeles),
Wilbur F. (Los Public Defender Defenders, Burrell, as Albert J. Susan L. Public Deputy Menaster and Amici behalf of Petitioner. Curiae on
No for Court. appearance Respondent Hahus, Hunt, W. and Kenneth District Attorney, Deputy Edward District Attorney, Party for and for Real in Interest. Respondent Heard, as Amici Myron N. Nicholson and Moskovitz Christopher George Curiae and in Interest. Party on behalf Real Respondent Opinion
ARGUELLES, J. In this case we decide whether minor made ward of the pursuant to Welfare Institutions Code as (b)1 truancy, a result of his later found school, wilfully disobeying may court order to attend hours, punished with in a facility confinement during nonschool whether sections prohibit disposi tion. Like the majority other state courts which have addressed schemes, similar statutory we conclude that a court retains the secure, authority, pursuant its to order the non- contempt power, *5 school-hours confinement of a section 601 contemptuous ward. time, theAt same juvenile order to harmonize the court’s exercise of its power with contempt the determination that status offenders, truants,2 including ordinarily should not be confined in secure facilities, we conclude—again following the lead a number of of out-of-state a juvenile decisions—that before court such pursuant orders incarceration to its authority, a it should make number specified findings of establishing necessity a of course action.
Facts G., minor, Petitioner Michael was a ward of adjudged the Fresno Court, Division, County Superior Juvenile to pursuant section statutory 1All further references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated. creation, statutory “The occupies juvenile status offender is a unique position who in the child, justice system. neglected, In dependent contrast to the or abused the status offender behavior, jurisdiction comes within the of the court because of his or her rather than finding of improper parental on guidance. charged care or Unlike children with or found guilty delinquency, alleged adjudicated have status offenders not committed acts which incarcerated, by would be if considered criminal done an adult. When status offenders are therefore, any code, it is penal not for violation of the but for behavior which is considered solely unacceptable age.” (Costello Incarcerating Worthington, because of their & Status Attempts Delinquency Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Act Prevention Offenders: L. Worthington].) 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. cited as & In Califor Costello [hereinafter nia, juvenile jurisdiction over opinion status offenders is conferred section 601. This will use interchangeably. the terms “status and offender” “section ward” ordered, inter a condition he was probation As (b)—truancy. alia, Following tardy be or absent.” regularly to “attend school and not school, petitioner absences from court ordered numerous unexcused A of court. demurrer he held in why show cause should be cause were filed the order to show and alternative motion dismiss order receiving copy probationary of the acknowledged which petitioner comply “he order and failed to and that was able to with each comply such orders.” 3, 1984, after which December were held on November and
Hearings the order of the wilfully disobeyed court concluded petitioner tardy Rejecting absent. not be regularly court to attend school dismiss, the court ordered demurrer alternative motion petitioner’s Director Institutions custody to the delivered petitioner a 48-hour peri- confinement for County Fresno Probation Department any sight hearing be held out of od. The court also ordered petitioner Friday on that the 48-hour would commence period wards and following Sunday. and end at p.m., p.m., him- to deliver petitioner court thereafter ordered the opportunity afford the minor custody days self into some hence “[t]o Indeed, “earnestly” ask review the court.” appellate review, it is deter- stating: asked counsel to seek writ petitioner’s “[a]nd imposed against mined that or sanctions cannot proceedings orders, its then I enforce 601(b) Section ward and that Court cannot truancy got Court out of certainly think it’s time that the high business, it will in the where position the Court [Legislature place [and] *6 the courts have to be Certainly nothing gained some dignity again. later The matter was here and orders.” sitting pronouncing meaningless District but stayed upon the Court the Fifth Appellate of for Appeal reflection, for a writ of denied a stay petition that court vacated the We review. granted habeas then corpus prohibition. and/or
Discussion order, the
In a valid court finding violating for contempt petitioner in judicial inherent juvenile power court exercised the traditional of that the right “We the premise start with officials. lies at the way in an untrammeled courts to conduct their business must necessarily system of and that courts government foundation our of directly tends the for when conduct possess contempt means punishing 370 U.S. Georgia (1962) discharge the functions.” prevent (Wood their 375, 576, that a court “It is established 1364].) L.Ed.2d S.Ct. well re (In has of court punish contempt inherent power [citation].” 237, 247, Buckley (1973) Cal.3d den. U.S. 910 cert.
121, 514 P.2d 248].) A.L.R.3d thus exists power legislative from in this case the independent although sanction specifically recognized juvenile ordinary that court retains the contempt powers. (§ 213.)3
Although juvenile concedes that court petitioner general authority disobey retains hold who its he wards orders contempt, offenders, that, argues respect with to truants and other the Legisla status ture has as a specifically juveniles the incarceration even proscribed sanction for He relies on sections subdivision and 207. In contempt. (b) argue (1) that the limitations of are response, People those sections to the inapplicable setting, that the sections were intend ed to limit the contempt power, they could not do As we constitutionally so.
shall explain, we find that there is no need to reach the constitutional in this question case because we conclude that the can statutes applicable and should be harmonized to both trial court’s au preserve thority and at the same time give recognition to the legislative policy reflected in sections subdivision 207.
We begin the actual language those sections. The relevant portion of section “it (b) states intent of the that no minor who is adjudged ward of the solely pursuant subdivision shall be custody removed from the parent guardian except during school hours.” Section (a) states in pertinent hall, minor part: shall be in any jail, detained lockup, or other “[n]o facility who is taken custody solely into upon ground that he or she is a person described in Section 601 or to be such or adjudged made ward solely . . . upon ground .” While the language clearly statutes indicates that the Legislature has determined that no jail is to detained in hall “solely 601,” upon ground that he or she is a described in section person neither statute indicates that expressly it intended to apply was contempt setting. Although the ascertainment of in *7 is the tent of paramount principle statutory v. De interpretation (Pollack 367, 748, Motor partment (1985) Vehicles 38 Cal. 3d 372 Cal.Rptr. [211 of 141]; 554, 696 P.2d see also 41 (1986) Cal.3d People Craft 626, 585]), statutory P.2d the does not reveal language “[a]ny any 213 states Section willful disobedience or interference of with lawful order the of judge court or or referee thereof a of constitutes court.” While no case section, yet scope penalties has ap construed the of this the for violation of section 213 are parently contempts set Civil generally: those forth in Code of Procedure section 1218 for $1,000, up up days, imprisonment fine of to of to five or both. 601, and 207 to intended sections Legislature whether the to situation. the apply as as the history of the well of “the statute legislative
A consideration 32 Cal.3d v. Black (1982) of its enactment” (People circumstances historical Truancy has 1, 454, 104]) similarly unhelpful. 648 P.2d its in largely but section 601 was codified of the state long been a concern 2, 1961, 1616, Over the 3471-3472.) pp. 1961. ch. (Stats. form in present ways times in not several altered and renumbered the statute was years, was to change The overall our most present inquiry. important material to juve boards before school attendance review of truants to referral require hours added the school In the Legislature nile court intervention. § 2, ch. (b). (Stats. to section limitation 2917-2918.) pp. review the school attendance utilizing move towards
The Legislature’s is under- the court’s intervention as a precedent boards condition commentary for calling greater partici- with keeping legal and in standable of even to the exclusion of welfare professionals, school social pation However, of pur- statement jurisdiction.4 no the court’s limita- of a school-hours concerning Legislature’s imposition exists the pose suggesting there is no evidence point, tion. More to the contemners. except juvenile to either include or intended this new provision detention for 207 and its on secure history prohibition of section whether the intended also fails to inform us status offenders 4 Ketcham, Why Juvenile Should Eliminated Jurisdiction OverStatus See from Offenders jurisdiction (advocating elimination of 57 B.U.L. Rev. 645 Courts offenders). support the 1977 tentative draft of Judge writing in Ketcham was over status Misbehavior, Institute Ad written of Judicial Relating to Noncriminal the Standards Association, on Juvenile Justice Stan Bar Joint Commission ministration and American Arthur, (1977) B.U.L. Rev. (But Last Resort Status Need Court dards. see Offenders [assailing standards].) the same professionals and interven- an referral social welfare Others recommended initial have Comment, Legislative only Re- proved a referral fruitless. tion after such S.; [proposing (1978) 5 Pepperdine L.Rev. sponse to re Ronald Cal. A.B. In Comment].) the commentators seem cited as as an same [hereafter alternative] profession- health calling greater and mental intervention social welfare unanimous in recently conclusion. In came to same Revision Commission als. The Juvenile Court Law confinement January (Report), that the secure report the commission concluded its 1984 final strengthening power of reconmended appropriate but instead of truants was may “Truancy symptom problems which is often school attendance review boards. disabilities, school, misprogramming learning may undiagnosed as not be related conflicts, school, authority, problems, inner home problems personal the student review would bet- strengthened attendance problems like. A SARB board] and the [school appropriate to the student from diagnose problem prescribe program ter able *8 community pro- through system many the education among programs available and/or (id., 66, original.) grams.” p.at in italics added to affect the Section 207 was first power. court’s (Stats. as Law in 1976 part code the Amold-Kennick Juvenile Court 1976, 1068, 1.5, ch. was mirror of former section 4741), image p. § 507, 1961, 1616, in (Stats. § 2, 3461.)5 added to the code 1961. ch. p.
This initial version of status of section 207 the secure detention permitted amend- offenders no other was available. option ed offenders. the statute the next to such detention of status year prohibit 1977, 1241, 1, (Stats. ch. were made Slight alterations § years following but none of these amendments shed on the light applicabili- Thus, ty of of the section to contemners. an examination 601, history of whether (b) yields sections subdivision and 207 no clue as to to power intended these sections to limit a court’s place non- contemptuous surroundings during status offender school hours.
The structure of Legisla section 207 itself some hint as to our provides intent, ture’s however. In deten generally addition to the secure proscribing offenders, tion of status “Un permits that section three exceptions.6 alterius, construction, der the rule familiar unius est exclusio expressio statute, where to exceptions a general specified by rule are other exceptions course, are not rule, to be implied or presumed. This [Citations.] inapplicable where its and con operation would contradict discernible trary legislative intent. (Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) [Citation.]” 190, 377, Cal.3d 553 P.2d see also Cianci 537]; 903, 575, Superior Court (1985) Cal.3d 710 P.2d 375] Thus, [citing Chickering].) subject contrary legislative to “discernible and intent,” it is possible the Legislature, by three to the specifying exceptions general ban against secure for also ex detention status offenders without rule, cepting general contemners from the rule general intended the to apply contemners.
This reasoning is arguably consistent with the the enactment of timing of exceptions section 207. than year Little more to the prior one People timing The find the year of the enactment of section 207—one after the enactment 601, of the school They argue hours limitation in (b)—significant. section this timing Legislature’s reveals the intent apply that the school-hours to sec limitation should 601, tion (i.e., truants) subdivision wards while the secure-confinement ban in section 207 601, apply only (i.e., (a) minors). should wards Inas out-of-control much as section 207 was a verbatim back reenactment of former section 507 which dates argument is meritless. wants, exceptions up outstanding are: for determine are hours to whether there warrants, against or holds arresting probation the minor officer officer has where or the (§ up cause to believe (b)(1)); such holds exist to 24 minor’s subd. hours to locate the parents (§ (b)(2)); up parents subd. and for 72 hours where location minor’s reasonably return to accomplished (§ his them cannot within 24 hours. subd. 1061, 1, (b)(3); 3271-3272.) see Stats. ch. pp.
292 the instant a court confronted of the section 207 exceptions,
enactment Cal.App.3d 69 statutory (1977) first time. In In re Ronald S. scheme for the 601 and sent a section ward 387], adjudged 866 a minor was [138 away. A center, walked promptly to a crisis from which he nonsecure filed, violated minor had petition alleging section was thereafter “any 166.4, disobey wilfully it a misdemeanor to making Penal Code section sustained was lawfully by any or order issued Court.” process petition hall, facility. juvenile a secure and he was ordered detained by Division was granted The minor’s for a writ of habeas petition corpus The court District. Two of the Court of of the Fourth Appeal Appellate by law, 602 ward become a section noted that under could prior Thus, out by walking order of the court. failing obey lawful school, trans- 601 ward was a section failing foster home to attend ward, i.e., that Observing formed into a a juvenile delinquent. section delet- by a 1976 amendment eliminated express “bootstrapping” was a section sustaining failure to a basis for ing obey court order as 1071, 12, that court reasoned (see 4819), Stats. ch. petition p. 602 petition resort to Penal Code 166.4 to sustain a section To intent. thereby contrary justify secure incarceration was noted, the “deletion such a would render permit procedure, revert to simply in section 602 . . . we would language meaningless and indirection doing by be operation The court would bootstrapping again. stands, the directly. Legislature that which cannot be done As law now run, him run. While if a let said that wants to [section] [ward] ours may judge, to the maddening, baffling annoying S., (Ronald supra, is to question Legislature.” the wisdom of the S., Thus, the secure it clear that after Ronald was Cal.App.3d into a him converting of a justified detention status offender could not be D. Mary In re also (See section 602 ward via a criminal citation. S. on Ronald [following (1979) Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 829] [156 different facts].) later, year over just
Because the section were enacted exceptions S. Ronald decision. may those have been a to the provisions response Comment, in section since none of the exceptions supra.) situa contemner (b) (then (c)) numbered embrace tion, the Ronald initially preserve we can infer intended “ deci judicial construed S. ‘Where a statute has been holding. sion, it must by subsequent legislation, and that construction not altered construction judicial presumed aware ” 345, 353 38 Cal.3d (Wilkoff (1985) of it.’ v. Court approves Superior 43 Cal.2d Hallner 134], People 696 P.2d quoting 715, P.2d 393].)
293 offender, Ronald S. involved a status it also Although contemptuous elevating involved 601 to of the ward status as result delinquency Thus, in contempt, not done case. even we something petitioner’s assuming can infer that the intended holding the Ronald S. preserve Code, 166, (i.e., that a conviction to Pen. 4 is contempt pursuant subd. § justify via impermissible confinement a section 602 wardship that decision proceeding), juve- does not answer the of whether a question 601, nile court is prohibited by (b) sections subdivision and 207 from order- secure, ing the non-school-hours detention of a status contemptuous offender without converting youth into a section 602 ward.7 similarly
We are
unable to infer
intent from the comparatively
601,
recent enactment of sections 207 and
subdivision
as
(b)
compared
general
more
section 213.
213
Section
has existed
form for
some
contrast,
601,
By
decades.8
sections 207 and
(b)
subdivision
were enacted
Thus,
recently.
comparatively
one could infer that the Legislature
601,
intended sections 207 and
(b)
subdivision
to limit a court’s power
under section 213 because later enacted statutes
control over
ordinarily
previously enacted statutes and we should assume the Legislature was
aware of
601,
section 213 when it enacted sections 207 and
(b).
(In
543,
569,
re Misener
38
(1985) Cal.3d
637];
698 P.2d
Cal.Rptr.
[213
Fuentes
1,
v. Workers’
Bd.
Comp.Appeals
(1976)
Cal.3d
673,
Similarly, 601, one could argue sections 207 and should control they 213, because are more specific than section scope spe statutory cific provisions relating to a particular subject normally control as against more general provisions concerning subject. same (Bailey Superior 970, 976-977, 669, Court 19 Cal. 3d fn. 8 P.2d 394]; Statutes, 108, see also Cal.Jur.3d p. 483.) § broadly 7The dissent thus reads Ronald S. too it “[n]othing when concludes that could clearer than the court’s contempt conclusion that even dispositional [Ronald S'.] of court’s order in a wardship section 601 punished cannot be (post, p. incarceration.” As at the dissent states in an passage, earlier purpose the “whole of the 1976 was to amendments practice 302, end the bootstrapping (Post, p. status offender into a section 602 ward.” added.) italics Inasmuch attempt as there was no petitioner’s in this case to elevate status delinquent, that of a fully we reiterate that Ronald S. question does not resolve the of whether secure confinement of contemptuous permissible attempt truants is if no to convert made them into section 602 wards. express statutory court, power an uncooperative hold ex 213, pressed today in section long part been a of the code. It was first inserted into the (see code p. 1228), in 1915 Stats. ch. and existed in it various versions until was codified as former section substantially 579 in present the same formulation form. as its 369, p. 1022; Stats. ch. [recodifying see also Stats. ch. former § 512].) as former that we they require are inasmuch as these tenuous inferences court’s infer the intended to override the fundamental Given power without expressly stating purpose. discussion, (see ante), presume nature we should power *11 “unless power the such Legislature long-established intended to override by or declaration clearly such intention is made either appear express Cal.3d (1985) v. necessary Davenport implication (People [citation].” Fuentes, 247, Cal.3d 794, 861], citing supra, 710 P.2d [221 at p. 7.) estab- program from a pilot dissent would divine intent legislative conditions, se- the
lished under certain by the which Legislature permits, i.e., wards, 601, runaways and cure (a) confinement (Post, a Legislature passed Because the out-of-control minors. at p. confinement, finds the conclusion special law to such the dissent permit that must understand “unavoidable” that the Legislature confinement is for status offenders. impermissible otherwise creating program a the pilot close the reading legislation incar- merely shows the much than Legislature permitting farther gone as safeguards (such ceration of runaways. Subject procedural to enumerated 601, may (a) a subdivision ward timely hearing), cause a section probable hours, nonjudicial including held in for secure confinement up to days, merely alleged dispositional it is he violated related that or she 1986, Hence, 1369, 1, program order. (Stats. added.) pilot ch. italics it prehear- authorizes hearing, does not incarceration after a simply permit confinement against both ing as a means of crimes preventing Therefore, that secure understood juveniles. even if the Legislature offender’s confinement was a for a status permissible sanction court, would authorization it would still follow that such special legislative by the pilot justify permitted be needed to confinement prehearing the Legislature’s can infer program. To the extent the dissent asserts we enact- its from general intent offenders regarding incarceration of status ment of it pilot program, is unpersuasive. whole, that we thus conclude statutory
Viewing scheme as a to prohibit while intent history demonstrates an justification order as a from a court relying on a ward’s violation of S., (Ronald supra, section 601 ward to a elevating delinquent indicates specifically which 866), history there is that Cal.App.3d nothing enforcing court from that the prohibit intended not alter that does sanction obedience through to court order Moreover, of the ward.9 failure to Legislature’s expressly status 207, mention section 213 in either section itself, did not amend section some evidence it intend provides affect scope secure detention ban or the school hours limitation to juvenile court’s contempt powers.
By so could consti concluding deciding we avoid whether the of the courts. tutionally override the inherent power do absolutely not reach unless questions required do constitutional “[W]e so to Williams 16 Cal.3d (1976) of the matter before us.” dispose (People Theatres, v. Stockton 1000]; 547 P.2d Palermo Cal.Jur.3d, 1]; Inc. Cal.2d 65-66 also 13 Consti P.2d see Law, tutional *12 106-107.)10 pp. argue may preserve The People Legislature we the a con infer that intended to court’s 601, tempt powers by “solely” (b) its use of the and word both section subdivision this, they custody “solely” From petitioner 207. a was contend was not ordered into because he interpre section 601 Although ward but that it flowed from his as a contemner. status 601, “solely” may (b) tation of the word as used in and 207 well be cor sections subdivision rect, light nothing legis we need not reach that issue in of our that is in the conclusion there history lative demonstrating juvenile longstanding power an intent to circumscribe the of the punish to contemners with incarceration. question 10There a Legislature severely serious whether the limit the could so inherent contempt power permitted, Legislature of the court. While limitations are cannot the “fetter (In power the itself’ impinging without the powers on constitutional of the court. re Shor 526, tridge (1893) 227].) 99 Cal. approved P. on previously We some limitations a [34 1218, contempt power validity upheld court’s when we the Code Civil Procedure section punishment $500 then days jail which limited the contempt (In for to five a re and fine. (1918) Garner 179 Cal. 162], disapproved Lynch (1972) P. point on another in In re [177 424, 410, 217, 8 Cal.3d fn. 15 921].) 503 P.2d [105 Garner, note, however, In we were impose careful to that while the could some upon contempt power, any regulation limitations the power the all which “takes from courts punish to contempt, penalty wholly for a inadequate purpose, the would not fixes for by 411-412, (Garner, supra, countenanced the pp. added.) courts.” Cal. italics Stated forthrightly, court, more eliminating a act available sanctions for court, remaining penalties wholly which leaves the inadequate power to vindicate the the 630, unconstitutional. In re (1934) San Francisco Chronicle 1 Cal.2d 634-665 P.2d [36 369]; Shortridge, supra, 99 Cal. secure, arguable ability It is that without the to order the of a nonschool hours detention offender, contemptuous remaining status “wholly inadequate” court’s sanctions are to 601, purpose underlying achieve the power. the Under sections 207 and (b), by, the punish contemptuous things, court could among ordering minor other hours, fine, facility him or her detained in a during pay perform nonsecure to school to community work. impuni- recalcitrant ward could refuse those directives with ty confinement, power since without to order options court’s effective below, would then Appeal be exhausted. As the Court equate observed is difficult to “[i]t view, punishment. this result with upon punish In our such a power constraint the court’s to court, completely dignity authority would undermine and of the make [and] laughing eyes court a very duty stock persons charged super- in the it is vise and . control. . .” above, however, As question stated we need reach this we not because find the has not contempt powers circumscribed court’s its enactment of sections 601, (b). as in sections 207 the limitations stated
Although we conclude 601, court’s power not affect the subdivision were intended to during detention section 601 ward with secure contemptuous punish hours, intent general ignore Legislature’s need not nonschool we “ should be con statute ‘[Ejvery deinstitutionalize status offenders. it is a so system part of law of which strued with reference the whole ” Superior v. (Landrum effect. may all be harmonized and have [Citations.]’ 352], quoting 634 P.2d (1981) 30 Cal.3d Court P.2d Realty Service 39 Cal.2d Corp. (1952) Bond Stafford Thus, on the general 241].) although Legislature’s prohibition does for section wards during secure detention nonschool hours contemners, govern branch of coequal for the intent of our apply respect sanctions imposing ment demands that courts exercise caution when offenders. against status contemptuous a status ordering
In that courts exercise caution before mandating act, do not on custody paint for a we contemptuous offender into secure the Juvenile Justice wholly passed blank canvas. In Congress 5601-5640 Act) Act U.S.C. Delinquency (hereafter (42 Prevention §§ Amendments III as Juvenile Justice & amended Supp. *13 96-509, grants Pub. L. No. 94 block 2750), conditioning Stat. deinstitutionaliza on with the compliance requirement states Act’s result, union nearly every passed tion of As state in the status offenders.11 a at Worthington, supra, p. (See statute similar to section 207. Costello & fn.
Thus,
of
already
problem
of
confronted
many
our sister states have
continual
effectively
offenders who
juvenile courts can
deal with status
how
an available
is not
ly disobey the court’s orders
secure incarceration
contempt
power
Most
affirmed
courts’ use of
option.
states have
their
an
despite
status offenders
order the secure detention of contemptuous
(In the
detention
generally
of
intent
expression
banning
Interest
682];
D.L.D.
that Supreme Court of Wisconsin was faced with minor declared offender) “child need of or services” a status who was protection (i.e., following previously supervision. court’s ordered conditions court, minor trial court found the to serve ordered the minor detention, 20 days in secure and the intermediate court affirmed. appellate The high although court reasoned that the Wisconsin Children’s Code generally prohibited the secure incarceration status offenders with some exceptions,12 statutory limitation operate cannot deprive its inherent contempt powers to enforce its orders.
However, the Wisconsin Court then stated: Supreme recog- “[t]his nizes an power extraordinary one that should be used sparingly with the sensitivity. utmost This caveat is true especially since the 1977 revisions to the Children’s Code adopted general policy of deinstitutionalizing status offenders. we determine that a Accordingly, incarcerated, status offender may be found but with the following limitations: (1) the sufficient notice to given comply order understands its the violation of the court provisions; *14 order egregious; (3) is less restrictive alternatives were considered and found to be ineffective; and confinement (4) special arranged conditions are consis- tent . . with . statutory barring with delin- provisions intermingling [the D.L.D., (Interest quents].” 110 182 supra, Wis.2d at N.W.2d at p. [327 p. 689].) four
These qualifications are hold sound we California courts should adhere to them. on Imposition qualifications of these court’s contempt power achieves the vindicating twin the inherent goals power of the courts while giving practical effect to the Legislature’s intent express 12Exceptions probable (1) injure include where there is cause to believe the child will him others, self or subjected injury by others; herself or or be (2) parents legal guard will child; ians of unwilling the child are unable or provide adequate supervision or care of (3) away away child will run or be supervi taken thus unavailable for aftercare D.L.D., Code, 48.205, sion. Wis. quoted Child. supra, in Interest 110 Wis.2d at p. p. 686].) N.W.2d at [327 necessity of the first The general. status offenders deinstitutionalize implicated concerns would self-evident; due
requirement process held in notice of the court’s orders was juvenile who lacked 408- Cal.2d (Arthur (1965) v. Court violating Superior those orders. Court 777]; Rosenstock Municipal P.2d [42 Cal.Rptr. 59].) 6-7 Cal.App.3d [132 incarcera- that secure The of an violation ensures egregious requirement Legis- in contravention not become a sanction commonplace tion will the federal mandate to deinstitutionalize lature’s intent to comply at Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d (Accord supra, p. status offenders. hours, most for the detention sanction reservation of the nonschool secure whether, on the to decide based require severe cases will record, no other justified because penalty entire of this harsh imposition Moreover, benefit has the additional requirement sanction suffice. will inherent of their our courts will exercise this facet ensuring effect to give so as to maximum possible to the least extent contempt power in nonsecure avowed intent to house status offenders Legislature’s surroundings. less restrictive rejection
The third requirement—consideration the violation closely sanctions—is akin to the second requirement in the idea that genesis the court’s order be since it too its egregious need While the court incarceration be the not the rule. exception, should necessarily imposing before attempted penalties have lesser (cf. confinement In re John H. (1978) Cal.3d to have 577 P.2d need not be shown dispositional alternatives 177] [lesser will derive in a where shows the minor failed case the evidence delinquency commitment]), the record Authority benefit from a Youth probable juvenile court that lesser considered should indicate alternatives were Norlund, at (Contra Wn.App. before incarceration. ordering supra, record that less on the p.729 [requiring showing P.2d 727] 294 N.W.2d at “failed”]; Hammergren, supra, restrictive alternatives have [same].) 707-708 pp. record, its on the findings court to memorialize
By requiring *15 that, the secure confinement by ordering we ensure the court is aware again offense, the taking it of a has committed a criminal juvenile who not but is contrary of the extraordinary of to the wishes step acting no other alternative in it is there is justified doing so because convinced citation. the of the purpose which will serve adequately con- requirements with these agree We can infer the would less restrictive of the and that violation cerning egregiousness when we consider alternatives to secure detention were not feasible Proce- the Code of Civil recent addition of section 1219.5 to Legislature’s that a dure. Stats. ch. That section p. 5919.) provides § testify minor of 16 refuses to the oath or when age under the who take officer in before charge called to do so should be to the probation referred of of sanctions for court. imposition determi-
This new section makes two other limitations to the applicable First, nation of the for such a court. appropriate punishment home, her where court is the minor outside his or considering placing (Code “the in available.” Civ. placement setting shall be the least restrictive Proc., 1219.5, Second, “the not order the minor (b).) subd. court shall § facility in a have made placed unless other been placements custody the minor has fled the and control under control person of the of whom obey he or she has been placed has refused to persistently reasonable and orders or control person directions of the under the proper whom he or she been less placed.” (Ibid.) place- restrictive ments need not be first attempted court makes a on the record finding that Proc., minor likely would flee if in placed facility. (Code a nonsecure Civ. 1219.5, subd. (d).) Although these requirements are applicable special type contemner, they are substantially similar on courts to those we impose passing judgment on contemptuous may status in We general. offenders thus infer our requirements are consistent Legislature’s with the manifested that ordered, intent if the secure detention that underage contemners decision is made with sensitivity relevant interests competing that court’s decision be justified on the record.
Finally, the juvenile court ordering the of a offender incarceration status should also prohibit the minor from in minors coming contact with those i.e., confined due to crime, their commission wards. Al- section 602 other though states also impose only we turn to requirement, need section 207 for a clear expression our on this Legislature’s own intent subject. Recall section (b) subdivision three to the provides exceptions general prohibition on secure detention of fn. 6.) section wards. (Ante, Subdivision (c) of that section “[a]ny minor in provides detained pursuant hall may remain permitted come or contact with any on person detained the basis he or taken that she has been custody into upon he or ground that she is a Section person described 602 or adjudged to be such or made a ward upon of the ground.”
As if to emphasize the importance point, (d) further clarifies the “[mjinors matter: pursuant detained hall *16 they are facility in provided 601 and 602 be the same may
to Sections held Moreover, facility.” within that to come or remain in contact permitted finds 602 wards clear ban of section and intermingling on the 601.1, subd. as well. statutory provisions other expression [to § feasible, community ser- participating the extent 601 wards practically § contact with 602 wards shall not be to come in vice programs permitted § old years minor under in the same cf. participating program]; [no or in a state (subd. (a)) in an are confined detained institution where adults come be (subd. (b)) permitted are committed shall where adults hospital that incarcerated status with such It seems manifest adults].) in contact thus section 602 wards be so to avoid contact with offenders must as segregated others confined due their criminal conduct. status offender to We the contemptuous realize our decision permits wards: major heretofore reserved for disadvantage suffer the nature during confinement nonschool hours. differs in at least status offender by contemptuous confinement suffered he in contact other section respect: one substantial cannot come with limitation, as may facility. recog who same This wards confined below, status ensure the important nized court time, min noncriminal offender’s at that are not exacerbated problems, “the unsavory whereby with We gling thus avoid the situation delinquents. not get along he could youngster only society whose offense was that against rapist, by jowl underage with his found himself cheek parents, S., peddler.” (Ronald supra, Cal.App.3d robber or heroin
Conclusion here, although these standards we hold that
Applying orders, ensured of and the court’s had notice understood petitioner con prevent arranged ordered confinement properly petitioner’s wards, petitioner’s that express findings tact with section 602 it made no alternatives contumacious conduct was or that less restrictive egregious case, course, the trial incarceration were not feasible. In the present ordering before unaware it must make these specific findings was of the Court authority. The pursuant judgment confinement to its contempt cause to the to remand the Appeal therefore reversed with directions with this opinion. trial court further consistent proceedings Kaufman, J., Lucas, J., Panelli, J., J., concurred. C. Eagleson, juve- it made clear BROUSSARD, J. I dissent. The hold that majority are not to be incarcerated. nile status offenders can be school order to attend disobeys a court status offender who *17 incarcerated, law, case statutory the is no despite language, fact that there or of a majority evidence such conclusion. intent support the the harm incarcer- ignore Legislature’s judgment considered that which the ation causes be even when great permitted, status offender too the majority status offender fails to exalt obey court orders. Instead the minor. dignity of the court over best interest of the order issuing Neither nor can such a result. logic compassion countenance
Welfare and Institutions for provides wardship pro Code section 6011 for ceedings beyond guard minors who are of their or parents control ians, or are who truant. Minors of the court under declared wards offenders, minors of section are called status wards in contrast with made the court and of or incarcerated under section 602 for violation state federal law. “A only status offender be defined as offense might against one whose society is doing that not done something legally would be prohibited (In 866, 867, an adult.” re fn. 1 Ronald S. Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 387].) A minor of court may made a ward under subdivi sion (a) of section 601 for or persistent parents guard disobedience of his ians, and under subdivision truancy. (b) Subdivision concludes with (b) these words: is the intent that no minor who “[I]t adjudged a ward shall be pursuant solely this subdivision removed from the custody during or school parent guardian except hours.”
Section are (a) provides, argues no one exceptions here, applicable that in any lockup, minor shall be jail, detained “[n]o hall, facility solely other secure custody who is taken into upon ground that he she person is a 601 or adjudged described Section to be such or solely made ward of the upon ground that
Sections jailing subdivision (a) prohibit Nonetheless, of truants or other status offenders. hold that majority directive to jail not truants does not who prohibit habitual truants jailing are in a court I with this go agree order school. do not conclusion. It is perfectly from the clear of the relevant statutes that history the Legislature has jailing determined offender for contempt status idea, court is a good that the Legislature meant to prohibit incarceration.
Before section 602 that a minor could made ward provided the court under that section the minor had been made a ward under when statutory 1All are Welfare and references to the Code unless otherwise indicat Institutions ed. *18 obey juvenile minor lawful order of the any
section 601 and the failed “to 1972, 1, 84, meant that a status offender 109.) ch. This (Stats. p. court.” § a as was in of juvenile contempt could be treated as a criminal as soon he However, in was language 601. 1976 this order under section dispositional 1976, 1071, 12, Obviously, 4819.) 602. (Stats. p. deleted from section ch. § statute, it to change from a intends Legislature when the deletes language 227, Cal.2d 231-232 (Clements law. v. T. R. Bechtel Co. 43 existing (1954) act, of section 5].) In enacted the part P.2d the same Legislature [273 601, custody from the status offenders removing subdivision prohibiting 1976, 1071, 11, 4818.) during p. school hours. ch. parents except (Stats. § wards section It also eliminated contact between status offenders and under 602, juvenile not in by that the status offender could be detained providing facility in facility, hall or but must be detained a sheltered-care other secure 507, by Stats. former subd. as amended (b), or crisis-resolution home. § 1976, 1071, 4817, §7, renumbered ch. now
This all status clear indication that the intended Legislature separate wards, status 602 that even incorrigible offenders from section intended facilities, in In re not in made express offenders be incarcerated was S., court, 866, Ronald 69 faced 873. There supra, Cal.App.3d a a sheltered-care runaway obey stay who would not court orders to in Code facility, caused a be filed a violation of Penal petition alleging of this 4: a violation section of court. Since offense, 602 ward and adjudged section is a criminal the minor was a section The placed pur- hall. whole Wrong, said the Court Appeal. a bootstrapping to end the pose practice 1976 amendments was con- by status into the minor with charging offender a section 602 ward runaway may “While tempt place of court. it seem ridiculous nevertheless, has ordained. setting, nonsecure that what the in or com- The determined that 601’s shall be detained look judges mitted to secure institutions even this makes . 602 would . . in section language ridiculous. deletion [Otherwise] bootstrapping oper- become would revert to the meaningless we simply cannot doing by ation The court would be indirection that which again. stands, if a 601 directly. has said that done As the law now the Legislature run, may baffling maddening, wants to let him run. While this the wisdom to the ours not to annoying judge, question (Id. be clearer than the 873-874.) could Legislature.” pp. Nothing order in court’s conclusion that even of a court’s dispositional 601 by cannot be incarceration.2 wardship punished Mary (1979) Cal.App.3d Appeal re D. Court of reached a similar conclusion In 829], parental home vio placed who was in the where section 602 ward [156 held her in probation by running away juvenile court lated from to another state. The home spend up to six her to under Penal Code section and ordered The Legislature has in this of its intent. acquiesced interpretation “ decision, ‘Where a statute has been construed judicial and that con struction is not altered it must be legislation, presumed subsequent ” the Legislature is aware of the it.’ judicial construction and approves (Wilkoff Court Superior (1985) Cal.3d 134], P.2d v. Hallner 43 Cal.2d quoting People *19 129,
P.2d 393]; see also
v. Rogers
5 Cal.3d
136
People
601,
The in court Ronald 69 supra, Cal.App.3d relied on new provi- 507, sions of section 601 and the then applicable section and on the fact that the Legislature amended 602 section to eliminate the to power make section 601 ward into a section ward for court. Later amendments have never repudiated contradicted the Ronald S. interpre- fact, tation. In they have reinforced it. Although language origi- nal section 207 the secure permitted detention of status offenders if no other available, option 1977, was after Ronald S. was decided in the Legislature amended 1977, the section flatly to prohibit such a detention. (Stats. ch. 1241, 1, 4180, 1, eff. p. Oct. A 1977.) later amendment added certain § exceptional circumstances in which the status offender could be incarcerat- 1978, 1061, 1, ed. (Stats. ch. pp. The 3271-3272.) Legislature explained: § “It is the intent of the Legislature that this act restores to local entities the ability detention, to conditions, provide secure under specified for persons (Id., described in 3, Section 601 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” § p. 3273.) The Legislature evidently thought that the 1976 and 1977 legisla- tion had eliminated the power to order entirely, secure confinement so that it was necessary to some specify Since the do not exceptions. exceptions court, to apply contempt the inference stronger becomes even that the S., Legislature acquiesced in the holding of Ronald supra, Cal.App.3d 866, and did not intend to allow disobey incarceration of truants who court order to go to school. (See Alive v. Chickering (1976) Wildlife 190, 377, Cal.3d P.2d to a exceptions 537] [“where general statute, rule are specified by other are not to be exceptions implied or presumed”].)
Though neither section 601 nor section 602 has been amended since decided, Ronald S. was the Legislature has added an uncodified statute facility. reversed, months in a secure Appeal The Court of finding that a court could offense, placement away, order running only since this was a status and since section 602 longer subjected had been placement amended so that it no a minor to section for disobeying a court order. obey “It is technical violation of the court’s order to probation terms of which the court uses to make it a The more serious offense. court has used intent, criminal contempt indirectly to attempted contravene to do what it directly.” could (Id. not do p. 38.) the Ronald S. a section which reinforces conclusion Depart- order incarceration. statute punished requires cannot county to Authority ment to establish a one pilot program of Youth under study in secure facilities status offenders placing the effectiveness ch. a court Stats. (a) who violate order. 301-303, Service, 12 West’s No. Adv. No. Deering’s Legis. pp. Service, obviously designed respond Cal. This statute is Legis. disobey orders runaways in Ronald S. that will expressed concern In statute the finds stay in nonsecure facilities. who violated (a) that wards under section have declares (i.e., court) greater “have dispositional related orders been crimes, involved either as a victim as a propensity perpetra- become necessary finds that it establish tor. Consequently, county in one to assess the effectiveness court-ordered pilot program *20 (Ibid.) five the days secure for for the benefit of minor.” detention up for a elaborate provided pilot the Accordingly, program, than days for five not more procedures, placement up secure allowing a year twice a section subdivision who have violated (a) wards under order to the order. of Youth dispositional wardship Department related The causes Authority is to whether secure of these placement determine wards the number of on the fall the during pilot crimes committed or wards to (Ibid.) program.
The in conclusion is unavoidable the understands that every (a) but a county county, the pilot program disobeys ward held in dispositional place- who order cannot be secure otherwise, ment. If it were there be no for the authoriza- special would need Further, tion for the data placement pilot secure contained this program. or on wards collected on whether secure reduced crime these placement already county would be pilot meaningless placement available of the through court. power for
Legislative authority for truants a section jailing system order I in a infirmity does not exist. also see no constitutional simply has the which incarceration of habitual prohibits Though truants. reasonable punish Legislature may place inherent power contempt, re 10-11 power. (In McKinney (1968) limitations on 70 Cal.2d 580, 447 A 972].) away contempt power P.2d statute that took all con- “wholly from for a inadequate” the court fixed class penalty p. at tempts power. (Id. would be an unconstitutional invasion the court’s authority 11.) But as as to “vindicate long power retains [its] [it],” legislative regulation and maintain the due to dignity respect (Id. within constitutional bounds. contempt power considered staying court can the repeat truant for punish contempt, fines, within the compul- bounds of the section by imposing wardship, sory community, during service to detention in nonsecure facilities law, school Under county, hours. present except pilot court cannot incarcerate a minor made a the court of his ward of as result truancy willfully obey In failing the court’s order to attend school. otherwise, holding reach majority too far.
Mosk, J., concurred.