In re A.M.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.:
{¶ 1} In these consolidated cases, appellant An.M. (“father“) appeals the August 19, 2024 judgments of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court“), which granted permanent custody of his twin children, Ar.M. and Ah.M. (“the children“), to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency“) pursuant to
{¶ 2} Both parents were minors when the children were born in 2020. The children had been subject to CCDCFS proceedings that same year, when they were adjudicated abused and placed in temporary custody after sustaining injuries that neither parent could reasonably explain. They were later returned to mother under an order of protective supervision, owing particularly to Ar.M.‘s special needs, which necessitate 24/7 assistance. Ar.M. suffers from cerebral palsy, is blind, has mobility issues, and is fed through a “G-Tube.”
{¶ 3} Testimony indicated that after the first removal, father saw the children once a week during supervised visitation and subsequently lived with them and mother for a brief time. Social worker Lauren Hopkins testified that father‘s involvement with the children later tapered off even further. Moreover, Hopkins stated that while she was assigned to the case between June 2022 and April 2024, she was unaware of father providing financial support for the children and that while he had been referred to resources for securing housing, he failed to establish stable, appropriate housing. In addition, father failed to submit to paternity testing.2
{¶ 5} Hopkins testified that after the children had been located and Ar.M. taken to the hospital, she “spoke with [father] about how [Ar.M] was in the hospital and what led to that, and he said he had concerns prior, but he did not contact the Agency or the police.” Mother was later arrested and jailed on charges relating to a domestic violence incident and child endangering, with the subject children identified as victims.
{¶ 6} On April 4, 2024, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging the children were abused and neglected and requesting a dispositional order of permanent custody to
{¶ 7} A family case plan was filed June 10, 2024. The explicit goal was permanent reunification. In addition to securing services for mother — coordinated while she was in jail — agency case worker Keshia Turner referred father to the Community Collaborative for parenting and domestic violence victim services. She also provided bus tickets to father to facilitate paternity testing and work transportation.
{¶ 8} On July 2, 2024, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing. Both father and mother were present, represented by counsel. The parties entered into stipulations with respect to several allegations in the complaint, including the previous adjudication of abuse, the prior commitment to agency custody, mother‘s child endangerment charges relating to the April 2024 removal, mother‘s other pending criminal charges, that Ar.M. has special needs, and that father had both not yet established paternity and lacked appropriate housing. The children were adjudged to be neglected, and the case was continued for further hearing.
{¶ 9} A dispositional hearing was held on August 15, 2024. The juvenile court heard testimony, and exhibits were admitted. This court has thoroughly reviewed both the hearing transcript and the exhibits.
{¶ 10} The juvenile court filed journal entries on August 19, 2024, ordering that the children be placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS and terminating
{¶ 11} Father timely appealed as well, filing separate notices of appeal with respect to each child. His cases were consolidated sua sponte for disposition. Father raises three assignments of error for review.
{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, father claims the juvenile court‘s decision to terminate his parental rights and award permanent custody of the children to CCDCFS was not supported by sufficient evidence. When considering a sufficiency challenge to the juvenile court‘s decision in which “‘the proof required must be clear and convincing,‘” we “‘examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.‘” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990). See also Ford v. Osborne, 45 Ohio St. 1 (1887), paragraph two of the syllabus. A reviewing court should affirm the trial court when the evidence is legally sufficient to support the judgment as a matter of law. In re Z.C. at ¶ 13; Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶ 3.
{¶ 13}
{¶ 14} Pursuant to
“Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.”
In re Z.C. at ¶ 7, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. Moreover, “[a] juvenile court is only required to find that one of [the
{¶ 15} Here, in accordance with
{¶ 16} Among other evidence, there was testimony indicating that after the previous removal in 2020, CCDCFS developed a case plan for the parents regarding parenting, housing, and domestic violence. Father nevertheless failed to submit to paternity testing until just before the final hearing because he did not want to pay child support and further failed to secure safe, appropriate housing. He bounced between homes of different relatives, two of whom refused to allow social worker Hopkins access to their homes for purposes of inspection. Father himself refused to allow case worker Turner access to a third relative‘s home where he was staying at the time of trial. In April 2024, case worker Turner referred father to parenting and other courses, but she testified that he “has not been engaged in any of the services that w[ere] offered to him.” The evidence supported the juvenile court‘s finding, in accordance with
{¶ 17} The record evidence also supported the juvenile court‘s finding that as specified in the statute, father “demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent
{¶ 18} With respect to the juvenile court‘s finding of father‘s unwillingness to provide for the children to prevent abuse or neglect,
{¶ 19} In accordance with
{¶ 20} Our independent review confirms that the juvenile court‘s determination that one or more of the
{¶ 21} The juvenile court also found by clear and convincing evidence that for both children, “a grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.” In compliance with
{¶ 22} The juvenile court‘s decisions indicate it considered the required statutory factors with respect to the best interests of the children. This included their age, their relationship with father and mother, the children‘s needs for a legally secure permanent placement and whether such a placement could be achieved
{¶ 23} Our independent review confirms that the juvenile court‘s best-interest determination is supported by the record. As discussed above, the record reflects, for example, that father did not have a relationship with the children, as evidenced by his limited visitations, his lack of engagement during visitations, and the fact that he failed to visit when Ar.M. was hospitalized. With respect to the need for a legally secure placement, father never established appropriate housing and did nothing to address Ar.M.‘s significant medical needs. In addition, the guardian ad litem‘s report expressly recommends permanent custody as being in the best interest of both children.
{¶ 24} Upon review, we find that the juvenile court, in its written findings, engaged in a proper analysis and made the requisite statutory determinations pursuant to
{¶ 25} In his second assignment of error, father argues that the juvenile court‘s decision to terminate his parental right and award permanent custody of the children to CCDCFS was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 26} We recently reiterated that “[a] juvenile court‘s decision to grant permanent custody will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence when the record contains competent, credible evidence by which it could have found that the essential statutory elements for an award of permanent custody have been established.” In re A.M., 2024-Ohio-1168, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing In re B.M., 2020-Ohio-4756, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). When reviewing a manifest-weight challenge, we “must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 14, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20; see also In re J.F., 2024-Ohio-3311, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). “We will not reverse a juvenile court‘s termination of parental rights and award of permanent custody to an agency unless the judgment is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re S.H., 2019-Ohio-3575, at ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 48 (8th Dist.); see also In re M.J., 2013-Ohio-5440, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 27} As discussed above, the record indicates that father expressed little interest in the children, even when Ar.M. was in an intensive care unit, did not follow up on referrals to parenting classes, and only sporadically attended scheduled supervised visitations. He canceled one such visitation at the last minute, even though the children had traveled two hours to see him. He did not provide care or support and failed to establish safe and appropriate housing. Following a thorough
{¶ 28} In his third assignment of error, father contends that the juvenile court erred by terminating his parental rights and awarding permanent custody of the children to CCDCFS where CCDCFS had failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
{¶ 29} We have recognized that CCDCFS “has a duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify a family unit, including preparing and maintaining a case plan to bring a child back home.” In re T.S., 2024-Ohio-827, ¶ 66 (8th Dist.), citing
{¶ 30} We further held in In re T.S., that where CCDCFS “has filed a complaint for permanent custody under
{¶ 31} The record reflects that the juvenile court made multiple reasonable-efforts determinations prior to the dispositional hearing. On April 4, 2024, upon the second removal of the children, the juvenile court journalized separate entries specifying the agency was making “reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the [children] from the home, to eliminate the continued removal of the [children] from the home, or to make it possible for the [children] to return home,” and further specifying why those efforts had been unsuccessful.
{¶ 32} Similar entries were docketed May 6, 2024, June 27, 2024, and July 3, 2024. In its May 6, 2024 entries, the trial court noted “reasonable efforts” toward the goal of reunification, but remarked that while “[c]ase plan services and services [sic] have been in place during the pendency of the original case,” the children‘s “[f]ather has not completed case plan objectives for reunification.” The juvenile court‘s June 27, 2024 entries note “reasonable efforts,” but state that the parents need, among other things, “housing [and] parenting education.” The juvenile court‘s July 3, 2024 entries find that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal and that services were unsuccessful because, for example, the parents “are in need of housing, parenting education and paternity establishment.”
{¶ 33} Finally, while pursuant to In re T.S., 2024-Ohio-827, at ¶ 66 (8th Dist.), the juvenile court was not required to make specific reasonable-efforts findings in its entries following the dispositional hearing, it nevertheless wrote in
{¶ 34} As discussed above, during the pendency of this matter, the juvenile court journalized several entries indicating that CCDCFS was making reasonable efforts towards the goal of reunification and further documenting why those efforts had been unfruitful. We find that father‘s arguments with respect to CCDCFS‘s efforts at reunification lack merit. The third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 35} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR