ILLINOIS ROAD AND TRANSPORTATION BUILDERS ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. THE COUNTY OF COOK, Appellee.
Docket No. 127126
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
April 21, 2022
2022 IL 127126
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Neville, Michael J. Burke, Overstreet, and Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Theis dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 In 2016, an amendment shielding transportation funding from other uses was added to the state revenue article of the Illinois Constitution (
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 In 2016, nearly 80% of Illinois voters voted to amend the
¶ 4 On March 6, 2018, plaintiffs, self-described contracting firms in the public transportation construction and design industry, filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County. All parties agree that the County is a home-rule unit pursuant to
¶ 5 Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief seeks the following: entry of declaratory judgment that the County‘s diversion of revenue from the Cook County Transportation Revenue Ordinances to undifferentiated costs within the Public Safety Fund is unconstitutional; that plaintiffs be awarded preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin the County from diverting revenue derived from the Cook County Transportation Revenue Ordinances to any purpose other than those provided in subsection (b) and (c) of the Amendment; to mandate that the County restore all such diverted revenue; to order the County to provide plaintiffs a line-item accounting of how the County allocates or appropriates revenue derived from the Cook County Transportation Revenue Ordinances; the award of reasonable attorney fees to plaintiffs; and any such other award and further relief as deemed proper.
¶ 6 The County filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
¶ 8 We allowed plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. See
¶ 9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 This appeal comes to this court following the circuit court‘s dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to
¶ 11 I. Standing
¶ 12 Because it is an affirmative defense, it is defendant‘s burden to plead and prove lack of standing. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148 v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 215 Ill. 2d 37, 45 (2005) (citing Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000)). Lack of standing avoids the legal effect of or defeats the plaintiff‘s claim. See
¶ 13 A plaintiff has standing where there has been some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest, i.e., “the claimed injury, whether ‘actual or threatened’ [citation] must be: (1) ‘distinct and palpable’ [citation]; (2) ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant‘s actions [citation]; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief [citations].” Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492-93 (1988). Furthermore, where the cause of action seeks declaratory relief, “there must be an actual controversy between adverse parties, with the party requesting the declaration possessing some personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected by the grant of such relief.” Id. at 493.
¶ 14 The County maintains that plaintiffs lack associational standing. An association may have standing to sue on behalf of its members where “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization‘s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”
¶ 15 According to the County, plaintiffs have not identified any “distinct and palpable” injury. See Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 492-93. Thus, the County contends that the first requirement for associational standing—that an association‘s members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right—is not met. See International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148, 215 Ill. 2d at 46. In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the County‘s diversion of the subject funds “is depriving the plaintiffs’ members of opportunities to work to improve the County‘s failing transportation infrastructure.” Per the County, this is insufficient to show that any of plaintiffs’ members “‘are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action.‘” See id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). To determine whether the County has shown that plaintiffs’ members are not suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action requires consideration of whether plaintiffs’ members have suffered (1) a distinct and palpable injury that (2) is fairly traceable to defendant‘s actions and (3) is substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the relief sought. See Wexler v. Wirtz Corp., 211 Ill. 2d 18, 23 (2004).
¶ 16 Plaintiffs are a coalition of nonprofit associations representing businesses in every sector of the transportation infrastructure construction and design industry. As noted by the appellate court, many individual members of the plaintiff associations are based in Cook County; conduct business with Cook County; and/or produce or supply material, equipment, or services to Cook County or to those working in Cook County. See 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶¶ 24-36.
¶ 17 First, we find that the County has failed to show that plaintiffs have not suffered a “distinct and palpable injury.” “A distinct and palpable injury refers to an injury that cannot be characterized as ‘a generalized grievance common to all members of the public.‘” Alliance for the Great Lakes v. Department of Natural Resources, 2020 IL App (1st) 182587, ¶ 32 (quoting Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494). Where plaintiffs have hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of job opportunities they stand to benefit from, plaintiffs cannot be said to have a mere curiosity or concern for the outcome of the instant controversy. See Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 171 (1993). By way of contrast, in Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, the plaintiffs
¶ 18 Here, plaintiffs assert that the County‘s yearly diversion of revenue from the Cook County Transportation Taxes has already decreased the number of projects that are available to bid on in Cook County, which results in loss of business opportunities. See 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 36. Unlike in Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, where the plaintiff teachers’ tenure afforded them protection against diminution of job security despite the real potential of physical education classes being reduced or eliminated, here, the diversion of more than $200 million2 worth of funds per year that are earmarked for transportation purposes certainly would negatively affect the pool of jobs and contracts available to plaintiffs’ members. As plaintiffs state in their complaint, its members would be “suffering economic harm due to the County‘s ongoing violations of [the Amendment].” “Economic injuries have long been recognized as sufficient to lay the basis for standing ***” Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493. Accordingly, we find that the claimed injury is one that is distinct and palpable.
¶ 20 We are not persuaded by the County‘s argument that there are too many steps of attenuation between plaintiffs’ success in this case and a given member being able to show that they would receive business. For example, the County asserts that it would “reconfigure” its revenue sources to allow it to fund government according to its “predetermined priorities,” e.g., public safety, public health, public housing, waste management, water and sewer infrastructure, and parks and recreational opportunities for residents. In an explanation of how, the County vaguely provides that it “would alter its mix of revenue, perhaps even adding new sources of revenue, in order to maintain funding for its predetermined priorities.” Simply, we decline to speculate that the County would or could so radically change its revenue sources in a way that would prevent any increase in transportation infrastructure projects.
¶ 21 Further, we are likewise unimpressed by the County‘s suggestion that it would from here on out manage to spend the funds on only transportation-related projects that do not even incidentally involve infrastructure or require the types of products or services plaintiffs’ members provide. The County represents that it could, for example, choose to only spend the money on “the costs of administering laws related to vehicles and transportations,” “payment of highway obligations,” and “costs for *** betterment of *** mass transit *** or other forms of transportation,”
¶ 22 The County contends the above distinguishes the instant case from U.S. Women‘s Chamber of Commerce v. (RBW) U.S. Small Business Administration, No. 1:04-CV-01889, 2005 WL 3244182 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2005) (SBA), where the plaintiffs had submitted unsuccessful bids and thus lost certain contracts. The County stresses that, unlike in SBA, plaintiffs do not claim that they lost any contracts during bidding.
¶ 23 Like the appellate court, we are inclined to agree with plaintiffs’ position that such certainty is not required. See 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 40. SBA held that an association of women contractors had standing to challenge a governmental defendant‘s failure to complete a congressionally mandated study and establish procedures to identify underrepresented women-owned small businesses in federal procurement contracts. 2005 WL 3244182, at *1. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing because not all women-owned small businesses would benefit, the industries that would benefit had not been identified, and even qualifying businesses might not benefit due to a competitive contract process. Id. at *4. The SBA court observed that, as to the traceability prong, “the plaintiff must only prove that if not for defendants[‘] unreasonable delay ***, ‘it reasonably could be inferred that’ had the defendants conducted the study and adopted the procedures[,] *** ‘there is a substantial probability’ that one of its members would have benefitted.” Id. at *8 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 504). The plaintiffs argued, and the SBA court agreed, that the defendant‘s argument imposed a “catch-22.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Essentially, the defendant was illegally refusing to implement the mandates but arguing that its refusal to do so insulated it from judicial review. Id. Accordingly, the court “decline[d] to adopt the defendants’ circular reasoning as justification for denying the plaintiff standing.” Id. Further, as to judicial redressability, the court held that “it need not be shown that the Women‘s Act‘s implementation would have definitely resulted in contracts being awarded to the plaintiff‘s members.” Id. at *9. Instead, it need only be substantially probable that “the defendants’ failure to comply caused the plaintiffs members to be denied the federal contracts they bid on.” Id.
“the County is weaponizing its unconstitutional behavior to insulate itself from judicial review: divert transportation funds, thereby fail to fund new transportation projects, and then claim that the firms that would have been eligible to bid on this work lack standing because they cannot point to any projects they lost out on. Under that circular theory, say plaintiffs, nobody could ever challenge the County‘s alleged unconstitutional diversion of funds.” 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶ 39 (describing plaintiffs’ response to the County‘s arguments as to the traceability and judicial-redress prongs).
Accordingly, we dismiss the County‘s argument regarding Hunt, 432 U.S. 333, which the County contends is distinguishable for the same reasons as SBA, i.e., because the plaintiffs in Hunt alleged actual, concrete, nonspeculative injuries in that they were incurring extra costs by virtue of North Carolina‘s labeling law. Here, the plaintiffs cannot show an exact injury due to the County‘s conduct. We also add that Illinois law “tends to vary in the direction of greater liberality” than federal law on matters of standing. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 491.
¶ 25 Again, for these same reasons, we reject the County‘s reliance upon I.C.S. Illinois, Inc. v. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 403 Ill. App. 3d 211 (2010). According to the County, “even assuming Cook County were to end up spending transportation-related revenues on construction projects, none of plaintiffs’ members can show that they would have won a bid on any such project.” The County argues that, unlike here, in I.C.S. there was a specific contract and the primary contractor was in place. Id. at 212-13. However, as here, the plaintiff subcontractors alleged that they were “deprived of the opportunity to bid.” Id. at 225. Nonetheless, the I.C.S. court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not allege a legally cognizable injury. Id. at 233-34. Specifically, the I.C.S. court held:
“a plaintiff cannot establish standing to challenge the result of a bidding competition without establishing that he would have been successful but for defendants’ conduct. Without such an allegation, a subcontractor would be hard put to claim to have suffered an injury. It is all the more difficult to recognize an injury to a legally cognizable interest that is distinct and palpable if plaintiff does not allege that he, at the very least, actively entered into the competitive fray.” Id. at 225.
We also agree with the appellate court that I.C.S. is distinguishable. See 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶¶ 52, 59 (noting that I.C.S. did not involve a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief against the government but concerned a class action brought by private firms against a private contractor that sounded in tort and sought lost profits for failing to pick a plaintiff for a subcontracting job). Further, as noted by plaintiffs, plaintiffs are not challenging the award of any contract to a competitor or the outcome of any bidding process and they do not assert tort claims or seek the award of lost profits from a competitor. We reject the County‘s citation of I.C.S. and now address the traceability and judicial-redress prongs.
¶ 26 If the County is required to exclusively spend the subject funds on transportation purposes but is instead impermissibly diverting the funds to other purposes, then there is no question that plaintiffs’ injury is ” ‘fairly traceable’ ” to the County‘s conduct. See, e.g., Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494. The County does not explain how plaintiffs misidentify its control and unpermitted diversion of funds as the cause of their injury. See, e.g., Carr, 2012 IL 113414, ¶¶ 36, 51 (finding that the plaintiffs’ alleged injury—paying higher local property taxes than residents of property-rich school districts—was not fairly traceable to the defendants’ actions in enacting an education funding statute because the defendants did not have control over the amount of local property taxes that were imposed). Similarly, if plaintiffs are granted the relief sought, hundreds of millions of dollars would be diverted back to transportation purposes, which would be substantially probable to inure to plaintiffs’ economic benefit and thus remedy their alleged injury. See Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493.
¶ 27 Lastly, we reject the County‘s arguments regarding several federal cases that the appellate court cited in support of the proposition that certainty as to judicial redress is not required for standing, “[p]articularly when the injury to a plaintiff is
¶ 28 Because we conclude that plaintiffs have associational standing, we need not address the County‘s argument that plaintiffs lack standing as taxpayers. We now turn to the party‘s substantive arguments.
¶ 29 II. Scope of the Amendment
¶ 30 At issue is the scope of the Amendment—whether it applies without exception to revenues generated from transportation-related taxes even where the taxing body is a home-rule unit. See Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 35 (noting that such a question presents a question of constitutional interpretation). We will first set forth the parties’ general arguments and later address their more specific assertions.
¶ 31 Plaintiffs maintain that the Amendment contains no exemption for home-rule units of government or for expenditures of transportation tax revenue pursuant to home-rule authority. According to plaintiffs, subsection (a) explains which taxes and fees fall within the Amendment‘s scope. Plaintiffs note how subsection (d)
¶ 32 In turn, the County‘s brief states:
“Plaintiffs can only get to this outcome by urging the Court to read subsection (a) of the Amendment in narrow isolation and to put blinders on against the overall picture—blinders to the Amendment‘s overall import, blinders to the stated intent of the bill‘s sponsors, and blinders to what Illinois voters were told about the limits of the Amendment‘s impact.”
The County explains that plaintiffs’ interpretation of subsection (a) fails as a matter of statutory construction because the Amendment as a whole can only be read to apply exclusively to state-imposed tax revenues, not revenues imposed by home-rule authority. The County asserts that “[a] constitutional provision must be construed, if possible, in a manner consistent with other provisions relevant to the same subject matter.” Rock v. Thompson, 85 Ill. 2d 410, 429 (1981) (citing People ex rel. Nauert v. Smith, 327 Ill. 11 (1927)). Thus, according to the County, it is appropriate to consider the various subsections of the Amendment together to
¶ 33 We now consider whether the Amendment is plain or ambiguous. “The construction of constitutional provisions is governed by the same general principles that apply to statutes.” Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36 (citing People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass‘n v. State Board of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 526-27 (1990)). When construing a constitutional provision, our objective “is to determine and effectuate the common understanding of the citizens who adopted it [citations], and courts will look to the natural and popular meaning of the language used as it was understood when the constitution was adopted [citation].” Id. A court should “first and foremost look to the plain language.” Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 47. If the language of the provision is plain, we will give effect to the language and will not consider extrinsic aids of construction. Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36. Accordingly, “[o]nly if the provision is ambiguous will we ‘consult the drafting history of the provision, including the debates of the delegates to the constitutional convention.‘” Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 35 (quoting Walker v. McGuire, 2015 IL 117138, ¶ 16).
¶ 34 We turn first to subsection (a) of the Amendment, which the County argues is the determinative provision. Subsection (a) provides:
“(a) No moneys, including bond proceeds, derived from taxes, fees, excises, or license taxes relating to registration, title, or operation or use of vehicles, or related to the use of highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit, intercity passenger rail, ports, airports, or to fuels used for propelling vehicles, or derived from taxes, fees, excises, or license taxes relating to any other transportation infrastructure or transportation operation, shall be expended for purposes other than as provided in subsections (b) and (c).”
Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(a) .
¶ 36 Nonetheless, the County maintains that the Amendment‘s various references in subsections (b) and (c) to “laws” and derivations of the word “statute” refer to acts of the General Assembly and not ordinances. See
“(b) Transportation funds may be expended for the following: the costs of administering laws related to vehicles and transportation, including statutory refunds and adjustments provided in those laws; payment of highway obligations; costs for construction, reconstruction, maintenance, repair, and betterment of highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit, intercity passenger rail, ports, airports, or other forms of transportation; and other statutory highway purposes. Transportation funds may also be expended for the State or local share of highway funds to match federal aid highway funds, and expenses of grade separation of highways and railroad crossings, including protection of at-grade highways and railroad crossings, and, with respect to local governments, other transportation purposes as authorized by law.”
Id.
Clearly, subsection (b) provides a list of permissible ways in which transportation funds may be expended. Subsection (b) contains two sentences. The first sentence provides four categories of permissible purposes, which are separated by semicolons. Although the first and fourth purposes contain the terms “laws” and “statutory,” the second and third categories are not modified by these terms. The County fails to explain how, for example, both home-rule units and non-home-rule units would not be able to spend funds on “costs for construction, reconstruction, maintenance, repair, and betterment of *** roads, streets, [or] bridges” absent statutory directive to do so. See
¶ 38 As to the second sentence of subsection (b), the County contends that the clause “and, with respect to local governments, other transportation purposes as authorized by law” also demonstrates that the Amendment is only referring to when state and local governments are “following the spending dictates of a statute“—not when
” ‘Authorized by law,’ as we have said, means authorized by statute. The reference there to ‘local governments’ includes both home-rule and non-home-rule units, of course. The fact that this language treats home-rule and non-home-rule units the same, both requiring ‘authoriz[ation] by law,’ is telling because home-rule units do not always require authorization by law when they spend tax revenue. As noted at length above, sometimes, a statute authorizes a home-rule unit to impose a tax but does not mandate how that home-rule unit will spend the tax revenue ***. And of course, other times, a home-rule unit will impose a tax based on its own constitutional taxing power and will spend that tax revenue under its general home-rule powers, with no statute entering the picture at all. If plaintiffs are correct that revenues spent pursuant to traditional home-rule power are included within this scope, what ‘authorization by law’ should that home-rule unit consult? If no statute governs its spending, what statute could the home-rule unit possibly consult for authority?
This language only makes sense one way: In allowing for ‘local governments’ to spend transportation tax revenues for ‘other transportation purposes as authorized by law,’ the Amendment can only be referring to those situations where home-rule and non-home-rule units have the same spending powers—which is when, and only when, they are following the spending dictates of a statute. It is nearly impossible to reconcile plaintiffs’ position, that all revenue spending is restricted by this Amendment, even that which is not governed by statute, with this language in the second sentence of subsection (b).” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶¶ 106-07.
Again, the first sentence of subsection (b) details four categories of permissible spending—and the County does not explain how the third category does not apply to local governments even absent statutory dictate.3 Before the last clause of the second sentence (“with respect to local governments, other transportation purposes as authorized by law“), the second sentence begins by explaining that
¶ 39 The County‘s cited cases fall short of supporting its contention that “as authorized by law” can only mean that a statute is in place that specifically directs the spending of both non-home-rule units and home-rule units. Burritt, 120 Ill. at 333, held that a joint resolution by both houses did not yet constitute a law because it did not comply with certain constitutional mandates, e.g., because it was “without a title, ha[d] no enacting clause, [wa]s not signed by Speakers of both houses, or either house, [and] ha[d] not the signature and approval of the executive.” Id. No one disputes the proper lawmaking process in this case.
¶ 40 Next, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority explained that “[t]he language ‘as provided by law’ contained in
“reimbursement of attorney fees is not required as part of just compensation under our constitution.” Id.
¶ 41 As mentioned, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority relied on Peile for the proposition that ” ‘[as] provided by law’ means as prescribed or provided by the General Assembly.” Id. In support of this statement, Peile in turn relied on three cases. See Peile, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 518 (citing Quinn v. Donnewald, 107 Ill. 2d 179 (1985), County of Kane v. Carlson, 140 Ill. App. 3d 814 (1986), and Oak Park Federal Savings & Loan Ass‘n v. Village of Oak Park, 54 Ill. 2d 200 (1973)). We examine these cases in turn.
¶ 42 At issue in Quinn was whether the Compensation Review Act (Act) (
¶ 43 The second case relied on by Peile was County of Kane. There, the dispute ultimately concerned whether the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (
¶ 44 Finally, Peile cited Oak Park Federal Savings & Loan Ass‘n. There, the plaintiffs instituted a suit for declaratory judgment against the defendant, the Village of Oak Park, seeking to declare invalid several ordinances purportedly adopted pursuant to its home-rule powers under the second provision of section 6(l)4 of article VII of the
provide special services under section 6(l).” Id. at 203. This court agreed, explaining that
“[a]lthough the first part of section 6(l) appears to command that the General Assembly not interfere with the home-rule power specified in this subsection, paragraph (2) of subsection (l) seems to require that the power be exercised only pursuant to a law adopted by the General Assembly. If we hold that the provisions of section 6(l)(2) are self-executing and that a home-rule unit may enact ordinances creating special service areas and imposing taxes to provide special services without enabling legislation, then no effect is given to the words ‘in the manner provided by law’ and such a construction will render these words meaningless.” Id. at 203-04.
Thus, Village of Oak Park equated the phrase “in the manner provided by law” in section 6(l) with “specific enabling legislation.” Id. at 204. The foregoing review of the above cases simply demonstrates the general bounds of the legislature‘s constitutional lawmaking mandate and permissible delegation or implementation thereof.
As plaintiffs correctly observe, the County and the appellate court‘s position narrowly focuses upon the legal authority for spending transportation tax revenue as opposed to that for collecting such revenue. On this point, we would be remiss to ignore the fact that the Amendment does not exclusively deal with money derived from taxes. It also encompasses money sourced from “bond proceeds, *** fees, [and] excises.”
It is the Amendment itself that decides what certain proceeds must be spent on. The Amendment‘s use of the phrase “as authorized by law” in the second sentence of subsection (b) does not swallow the rest of that provision. It grants the legislature the ability to define additional categories of transportation purposes. Stated differently, though units of local government vary in their respective powers or abilities to generate money from bonds, taxes, fees, excises, or license taxes, the legislature may broaden or limit the reach of such powers or abilities. However, if the money generated therefrom relates to transportation, then the Amendment—and not the legislature—decides how that money is spent.
As mentioned, the County‘s position is that the Amendment leaves it up to the legislature to statutorily direct whether money derived from transportation-related taxes imposed by home-rule units is to be spent on transportation-related purposes. The problem with the County‘s interpretation is that, if a statute does not direct how money is to be spent at the local government level, then the legislature could block the local reach of the Amendment by making sure such money never falls into the transportation fund “pot” to begin with. See
The County‘s argument also presents the potential issue of whether the legislature could statutorily direct (and thus preempt) how home-rule units spend money from their transportation-related taxes. Following the Amendment, the legislature no longer has the discretion to decide whether such funds can be spent on nontransportation purposes. Section 6(i) of article VII, which provides for statutory preemption of home-rule powers, presupposes that both the legislature and home-rule unit have concurrent authority as to the power at issue. See
Next, the County directs our attention to subsection (e), which it maintains prevents any future use of transportation revenues by anyone who may in the future wish to use those revenues for “modes of transportation” not discussed in the Amendment. See
Finally, the County argues that plaintiffs’ interpretation would mean that the Amendment could “radically diminish” the constitution‘s home-rule article without ever mentioning home-rule authority. The County asserts that a fundamental power and function pertaining to the government and affairs of a home-rule unit is deciding how to spend its money. See Pechous v. Slawko, 64 Ill. 2d 576, 591 (1976); Independent Voters of Illinois Independent Precinct Organization v. Ahmad, 2014 IL App (1st) 123629, ¶ 54; Rajterowski v. City of Sycamore, 405 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1115 (2010). According to the County, the drafters should have amended section 6 of article VII if it intended for the Amendment to encompass funds generated from home-rule unit transportation-related taxes or specifically stated in the Amendment that it was preempting the home-rule power to spend revenue—as would be required if a statute was preempting that power. See
We find that the import of these cases is not as simple of a proposition as urged by the County, i.e., that “a fundamental power and function pertaining to the government and affairs of a home rule unit is deciding how to spend its money.” All three cases show that this “power” is not as unfettered and absolute as the County suggests. See Pechous, 64 Ill. 2d at 591 (holding that it was permissible for an ordinance to fix the salaries of home-rule unit officers because it concerned the municipality‘s government and affairs and because it did not fall within one of the exceptions of section 6(f)); Ahmad, 2014 IL App (1st) 123629, ¶¶ 1, 25, 54 (finding that the plaintiff taxpayers failed to plead facts to defeat the deference afforded to
Plaintiffs correctly observe that home-rule units are always subject to constitutional limits on governmental power. Under the County‘s logic, other constitutional provisions would be called into question because they do not explicitly state that they govern home-rule units. See
In a similar vein, the County next explains that it “is not asserting that, as a general matter, a given constitutional provision could not restrict another constitutional provision” but that section 6(a) of article VII “should only be alterable by more than implication.” We reject the County‘s characterization that section 6(a) has been “altered” or that the Amendment limits home-rule units’ power by “implication.” The Amendment plainly applies to home-rule units’ revenues generated from transportation-related taxes. Again, the County cites no legal authority in support of this argument.
III. Extrinsic Sources
The County asserts that, “to the extent the amendment could be interpreted as plaintiffs suggest, it is ambiguous, and the extrinsic evidence uniformly supports the County and the lower courts’ interpretation.” This argument assumes that the County‘s interpretation is also reasonable. Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass‘n, 236 Ill. 2d 433, 440 (2010) (explaining that “if a [provision] is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways, the statute will be deemed ambiguous” (emphasis added)); see also People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 26 (stating that “[i]f a statute‘s language is unclear or ambiguous, if it is susceptible of more than one reasonable reading, we must resort to other sources to aid our inquiry” (citing People ex rel. Department of Professional Regulation v. Manos, 202 Ill. 2d 563, 571 (2002))). As we have explained, the County‘s interpretation of the Amendment is unreasonable.
If the Amendment is plain such that there is no ambiguity, then we have no reason to consider extrinsic aids. Neiberger v. McCullough, 253 Ill. 312, 323 (1912) (stating that, where “the language of the constitution is not ambiguous it is not permissible to interpret it differently from its plain meaning“); see also Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184 (1999) (explaining that “[t]he primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to legislative intent by first looking at the plain meaning of the language” (emphasis added)). However, the County has every motive to argue that the Amendment is ambiguous to direct our attention to several items of extrinsic evidence.5 See 2021 IL App (1st) 190396, ¶¶ 127-60 (examining the legislative debates, the Secretary of State‘s published explanations of the Amendment that were sent to Illinois voters (ballot summary) (see
Furthermore, we do not defer to the legislative branch for its opinion as to whether certain language is plain or ambiguous. See Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 334 (2006) (stating that “each of the three branches of government retains its own sphere of authority, free from undue encroachment by the other branches“). The plain language of a provision “remains the best indication” of intent. In re Marriage of Dynako, 2021 IL 126835, ¶ 14. The County attempted to create ambiguity by discussing these extrinsic sources at the outset of its brief.6 However, “[w]here the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the [provision] without resort to further aids of statutory construction.” (Emphasis added.) Andrews v. Kowa Printing Corp., 217 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (2005).
Finally, we reject the County‘s argument that, if we agree with plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Amendment, this means that the Amendment must be voided because voter confusion contributed to its passage. Unsurprisingly, the County cites the published explanation of the Amendment that was sent to voters. For the reasons we have just explained, we will not consider that extrinsic source. Accordingly, because the Amendment, by its plain language, applies to all moneys derived from transportation-related taxes, fees, excises, or license taxes, we hold that the circuit court erroneously dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint.
CONCLUSION
Because plaintiffs have associational standing and the moneys derived from the Cook County Transportation Taxes are subject to the Amendment, we reverse the
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Circuit court judgment reversed.
Cause remanded.
JUSTICE THEIS, dissenting:
Article VII, section 6(a), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 confers broad powers upon a home rule unit, including the power to tax and spend. See
As this court has observed, “[t]he concept of home rule adopted under the provisions of the 1970 constitution was designed to drastically alter the relationship which previously existed between local and State government.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) City of Rockford v. Gill, 75 Ill. 2d 334, 339 (1979). The home rule provisions delegated greater autonomy to home rule units in determining their government and affairs. Id. at 339-40. “Home rule is based on the assumption that municipalities should be allowed to address problems with solutions tailored to
Section 6(a) of article VII of the Illinois Constitution provides:
“Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” (Emphasis added.)
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a) .
This provision “was written with the intention that home rule units be given the broadest powers possible.” Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 174 (1992); see also
In November 2016—nearly 50 years after the home rule provisions were incorporated into this state‘s constitution—Illinois voters approved the safe roads amendment. Section 11(a) of the amendment, which the majority insists is the determinative provision, reads:
“No moneys, including bond proceeds, derived from taxes, fees, excises, or license taxes relating to registration, title, or operation or use of vehicles, or related to the use of highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit, intercity passenger rail, ports, airports, or to fuels used for propelling vehicles, or derived from taxes, fees, excises, or license taxes relating to any other transportation infrastructure or transportation operation, shall be expended for purposes other than as provided in subsections (b) and (c).”
Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 11(a) .
When this court construes a constitutional provision, “our primary purpose is to effectuate the common understanding of the persons who adopted it—the citizens of this state.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 35; see also Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36 (“The construction of constitutional provisions is governed by the same general
The safe roads amendment must be construed together with the home rule provisions that preceded it by nearly five decades. See Blanchard, 2016 IL 120315, ¶ 23. The majority‘s reading of the amendment severely limits a home rule unit‘s authority to appropriate funds, in conflict with article VII, section 6(a). It does so, even though the plain language of article VII, section 6(a), confirms that home rule powers can only be limited by that section. See
Thus, article IX, section 11, is ambiguous. “If doubt as to the meaning of a provision exists after the language has been considered, it is appropriate to consult” extrinsic aids, including “the drafting history of the provision, including the debates of the delegates to the constitutional convention.” Blanchard, 2016 IL 120315, ¶ 16.
Our objective in construing a constitutional provision “is to determine and effectuate the common understanding of the citizens who adopted it.” Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36. Accordingly, we must review the explanation provided to the citizens when they were voting on the safe roads amendment. See
In relevant part, the ballot summary read:
“This new Section is a limitation on the power of the General Assembly or a unit of local government to use, divert, or transfer transportation funds for a purpose other than transportation. It does not, and is not intended to, impact or change the way in which the State and local governments use sales taxes, including the sales and excise tax on motor fuel, or alter home rule powers granted under this Constitution.” (Emphases added.)
As this passage shows, there is no doubt that voters approved of the safe roads amendment with the understanding that it would not alter the operation of home rule powers. Again, the purpose of our inquiry is to understand the voters’ intent in adopting this amendment. The answer to that critical question is that voters knew that the adoption of the safe roads amendment would not change their local government‘s constitutional authority to address problems with solutions tailored to their local needs.
The legislative debates confirm that members of the General Assembly also did not intend for this amendment to limit the home rule unit‘s spending power as the majority concludes. The following exchange between Senators Raoul and Haine illustrates that intent.
“SENATOR RAOUL: As mentioned, this—this language is very ambiguous to me, so I just want to ask these questions. Senator Haine, Cook County imposes several taxes that provide revenue for public safety operations, including, but not limited to, the criminal court system, the Cook County Jail, Cook County Sheriff, the Cook County State‘s Attorney, the Office of the Chief Judge of Cook County. These taxes are imposed by virtue of Cook County‘s home-rule taxing authority under the Illinois Constitution. Specifically, Cook County imposes the Wheel Tax, New Motor Vehicle Tax, Motor Fuel Taxes, the Use Tax, the Non-Retailer Vehicle Transaction Tax, and the Non-Retailer Use Tax. Again, revenues from these taxes are used to pay for Cook County‘s public safety operations, including workers’ compensation claims for affected public safety employees. Am I correct that under this constitutional
amendment, Cook County could continue to spend the monies—from these taxes on its public safety operations? ***
SENATOR HAINE: The answer is yes for four reasons. First, as I explained earlier, this proposed constitutional amendment is intended to be on par with Article VII, Section 6 of the Constitution and current home-rule power. The proposed constitutional amendment is not intended to eliminate, restrict, or apply to current constitutional and statutory authority that home-rule units have—have relative to taxes, spending, and public safety functions. Secondly, since the Cook County‘s Use Tax and Non-Retailer Use Tax are general taxes on all tangible personal property just like the State sales tax, those taxes are not covered by this constitutional amendment, as I‘ve explained earlier. Thirdly, as I stated earlier, it is a valid transportation purpose to spend monies under this amendment on the enforcement of traffic, railroad, and motor carrier laws. As a result, Cook County can continue to spend monies from these taxes on these public safety operations at—as it is today.
***
Finally, I draw to your attention page 2, lines 13-14 of the constitutional amendment. Here the amendment provides that transportation funds may be expended ‘with respect to local government, other transportation purposes as authorized by law‘. The key phrase is ‘authorized by law‘.
***
This phrase, ‘as authorized by law‘, includes local governments’ current use as authorized by current law—for instance, critical public safety functions as police departments, jail operations, and courts. This provision is intended to be construed broadly so as not to interfere in any way with local governments’ current authority and practices. The language permits the General Assembly to determine, with respect to local governments, what are other proper transportation purposes by statute. It is also permitting home-rule units to determine what are other proper transportation purposes as well by virtue of their home-rule taxing power under Article VII, Section 6 of the Constitution.
Given that Cook County and the City of Chicago as well as other home-rule units have the home-rule power to impose taxes that you listed, the language provides a further basis allowing the home-rule units to spend these monies on public safety.” (Emphases added.) 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 5, 2016, at 67-70 (statements of Senators Raoul and Haine).
The majority closes its eyes to this evidence, asserting that the language of the safe roads amendment is unambiguous and thus the clear understanding of the voters and the General Assembly must be ignored. Yet, article IX, section 11, is ambiguous because its plain language does not state that it is a limitation on article VII, section 6(a)—indeed, it does not mention article VII, section 6(a), at all. This ambiguity compels us to consider the relevant extrinsic sources. And once we do, it is clear that the neither the General Assembly nor the voters intended for the amendment to limit Cook County‘s ability to spend funds from the challenged tax ordinances.
In sum, the majority‘s construction fails to effectuate both the citizen‘s understanding of the safe roads amendment and the legislature‘s intent in supporting it, thereby undermining the will of the people. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.