JOHN HOOKER et al., Appellees, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al. (Support Independent Maps, Appellant).
No. 121077
Supreme Court of Illinois
August 25, 2016
October 20, 2016
2016 IL 121077
the Hon. Diane J. Larsen, Judge, presiding
Illinois Official Reports; Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016 IL 121077
Decision Under Review:
Judgment: Affirmed. Mandate to issue immediately.
Counsel on Appeal: Michele Odorizzi, John A. Janicik, Lori E. Lightfoot, and Chad M. Clamage, all of Mayer Brown LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.
Robert T. Shannon and Adam R. Vaught, both of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, and Richard J. Prendergast and Michael T. Layden, both of Richard J. Prendergast, Ltd., and Michael J. Kasper, of Chicago, and Eric M. Madiar, of Springfield, for appellees.
Constantine L. Trela, Jr., Tacy F. Flint, and Neil H. Conrad, all of Sidley Austin LLP, of Chicago, for amici curiae League of Women Voters of Illinois et al.
Ruth Greenwood and Annabelle Harless, both of Campaign Legal Center, of Chicago, for amici curiae Illinois Public Interest Research Group et al.
Justices: JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Freeman, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. Chief Justice Garman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and Karmeier. Justice Thomas dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Garman and Justice Karmeier. Justice Karmeier dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Garman and Justice Thomas. Justice Karmeier dissented upon denial of rehearing, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Garman and Justice Thomas.
OPINION
¶ 1 This case addresses the question of whether the circuit court erroneously held that the redistricting initiative petition submitted by Support Independent Maps (Independent Maps) failed to comply with the requirements of
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 2 The
¶ 4 In May 2016, Independent Maps filed with the Secretary of State a petition proposing the amendment of
“(a) Legislative Districts shall be compact, contiguous and substantially equal in population. Representative Districts shall be compact, contiguous, and substantially equal in population.
(b) In the year following each Federal decennial census year, the General Assembly by law shall redistrict the Legislative Districts and the Representative Districts.
If no redistricting plan becomes effective by June 30 of that year, a Legislative Redistricting Commission shall be constituted not later than July 10. The Commission shall consist of eight members, no more than four of whom shall be members of the same political party.
The Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives shall each appoint to the Commission one Representative and one person who is not a member of the General Assembly. The President and Minority Leader of the Senate shall each appoint to the Commission one Senator and one person who is not a member of the General Assembly.
The members shall be certified to the Secretary of State by the appointing authorities. A vacancy on the Commission shall be filled within five days by the authority that made the original appointment. A Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be chosen by a majority of all members of the Commission.
Not later than August 10, the Commission shall file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan approved by at least five members.
If the Commission fails to file an approved redistricting plan, the Supreme Court shall submit the names of two persons, not of the same political party, to the Secretary of State not later than September 1.
Not later than September 5, the Secretary of State publicly shall draw by random selection the name of one of the two persons to serve as the ninth member of the Commission.
Not later than October 5, the Commission shall file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan approved by at least five members.
An approved redistricting plan filed with the Secretary of State shall be presumed valid, shall have the force and effect of law and shall be published promptly by the Secretary of State.
The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions concerning redistricting the House and Senate, which shall be initiated in the name of the People of the State by the Attorney General.”
Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 3 .
¶ 5 Since the adoption of the
¶ 6 To replace the current system, Independent Maps’ proposed amendment to
“(a) The Independent Redistricting Commission comprising 11 Commissioners shall adopt and file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan for Legislative Districts and Representative Districts by June 30 of the year following each Federal decennial census. Legislative Districts shall be contiguous and substantially equal in population. Representative Districts shall be contiguous and substantially equal in population. The redistricting plan shall comply with Federal law. Subject to the foregoing, the Commission shall apply the following criteria: (1) the redistricting plan shall not dilute or diminish the ability of a racial or language minority community to elect the candidates of its choice, including when voting in concert with other persons; (2) the redistricting plan shall respect the geographic integrity of units of local government; and (3) the redistricting plan shall respect the geographic integrity of communities sharing common social and economic interests, which do not include relationships with political parties or candidates for office. The redistricting plan shall not either intentionally or unduly discriminate against or intentionally or unduly favor any political party, political group or particular person. In designing the redistricting plan, the Commission shall consider party registration
and voting history data only to assess compliance with the requirements in this subsection (a). (b) For the purpose of conducting the Commissioner selection process, an Applicant Review Panel comprising three Reviewers shall be chosen in the following manner. Beginning not later than January 1 and ending not later than March 1 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Auditor General shall request and accept applications to serve as a Reviewer. The Auditor General shall review all applications and select a pool of 30 potential Reviewers. The Auditor General should select applicants for the pool of potential Reviewers who would operate in an ethical and non-partisan manner by considering whether each applicant is a resident and registered voter of the State and has been for the four years preceding his or her application, has demonstrated understanding of and adherence to standards of ethical conduct and has been unaffiliated with any political party for the three years preceding appointment. By March 31 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Auditor General shall publicly select by random draw the Panel of three Reviewers from the pool of potential Reviewers.
(c) Beginning not later than January 1 and ending not later than March 1 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Auditor General shall request and accept applications to serve as a Commissioner on the Independent Redistricting Commission. By May 31, the Panel shall select a pool of 100 potential Commissioners. The Panel should select applicants for the pool of potential Commissioners who would be diverse and unaffected by conflicts of interest by considering whether each applicant is a resident and registered voter of the State and has been for the four years preceding his or her application, as well as each applicant‘s prior political experience, relevant analytical skills, ability to contribute to a fair redistricting process and ability to represent the demographic and geographic diversity of the State. The Panel shall act by affirmative vote of two Reviewers. All records of the Panel, including applications to serve on the Panel, shall be open for public inspection, except private information about applicants for which there is no compelling public interest in disclosure.
(d) Within 45 days after the Panel has selected the pool of 100 potential Commissioners, but not later than June 23 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and the President and Minority Leader of the Senate each may remove up to five of those potential Commissioners. Thereafter, but not later than June 30, the Panel shall publicly select seven Commissioners by random draw from the remaining pool of potential Commissioners; of those seven Commissioners, including any replacements, (1) the seven Commissioners shall reside among the Judicial Districts in the same proportion as the number of Judges elected therefrom under
Section 3 of Article VI of this Constitution , (2) two Commissioners shall be affiliated with the political party whose candidate for Governor received the most votes cast in the last general election for Governor, two Commissioners shall be affiliated with the political party whose candidate for Governor received the second-most votes cast in such election and the remaining three Commissioners shall not be affiliated with either such political party and (3) no more than two Commissioners may be affiliated with thesame political party. The Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and the President and Minority Leader of the Senate each shall appoint one Commissioner from among the remaining applicants in the pool of potential Commissioners on the basis of the appointee‘s contribution to the demographic and geographic diversity of the Commission. A vacancy on the Panel or Commission shall be filled within five days by a potential Reviewer or potential Commissioner from among the applicants remaining in the pool of potential Reviewers or potential Commissioners, respectively, in the manner in which the office was previously filled.
(e) The Commission shall act in public meetings by affirmative vote of six Commissioners, except that approval of any redistricting plan shall require the affirmative vote of at least (1) seven Commissioners total, (2) two Commissioners from each political party whose candidate for Governor received the most and second[-]most votes cast in the last general election for Governor and (3) two Commissioners not affiliated with either such political party. The Commission shall elect its chairperson and vice chairperson, who shall not be affiliated with the same political party. Six Commissioners shall constitute a quorum. All meetings of the Commission attended by a quorum, except for meetings qualified under attorney-client privilege, shall be open to the public and publicly noticed at least two days prior to the meeting. All records of the Commission, including communications between Commissioners regarding the Commission‘s work, shall be open for public inspection, except for records qualified under attorney-client privilege. The Commission shall adopt rules governing its procedure, public hearings and the implementation of matters under this Section. The Commission shall hold public hearings throughout the state both before and after releasing the initial proposed redistricting plan. The Commission may not adopt a final redistricting plan unless the plan to be adopted without further amendment, and a report explaining its compliance with this Constitution, have been publicly noticed at least seven days before the final vote on such plan.
(f) If the Commission fails to adopt and file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan by June 30 of the year following a Federal decennial census, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the most senior Judge of the Supreme Court who is not affiliated with the same political party as the Chief Justice shall appoint jointly by July 31 a Special Commissioner for Redistricting. The Special Commissioner shall adopt and file with the Secretary of State by August 31 a redistricting plan satisfying the requirements set forth in subsection (a) of this Section and a report explaining its compliance with this Constitution. The Special Commissioner shall hold at least one public hearing in the State before releasing his or her initial proposed redistricting plan and at least one public hearing in a different location in the State after releasing his or her initial proposed redistricting plan and before filing the final redistricting plan with the Secretary of State. All records of the Special Commissioner shall be open for public inspection, except for records qualified under attorney-client privilege.
(g) An adopted redistricting plan filed with the Secretary of State shall be presumed valid and shall be published promptly by the Secretary of State.
(h) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in cases relating to matters under this Section.”
¶ 7 Independent Maps filed a petition to bring this proposed amendment before the voters by using the ballot initiative process governed by
¶ 8 Five days after Independent Maps submitted its petition, a “taxpayer‘s suit” was filed in the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to
¶ 9 The action was filed by a political committee called People‘s Map, along with its chairperson, John Hooker, and individual members and leaders of other groups,3 each alleged to be Illinois residents and taxpayers. The named defendants were the Board of Elections and its chairperson and members; Leslie Munger, the State Comptroller; Jesse White, the Secretary of State; Michael Frerichs, the State Treasurer; David Orr, the County Clerk of Cook County; and the Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago, its chairperson, and members. Later, the circuit court entered an agreed order dismissing Orr and the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, along with its chair and members, without prejudice.
¶ 10 Although Independent Maps was not originally included as a party, it was later granted leave to intervene. See
¶ 11 The complaint at issue here had 11 counts. The first six were directed against all defendants and sought a declaratory judgment that the amendment to
¶ 12
¶ 13 Alternatively, counts I through IV and VI alleged that, even if redistricting constitutes a “structural and procedural subject[ ] contained in Article IV,” the proposed ballot initiative is invalid because it is not “limited” to those subjects, violating
¶ 14 Similar to counts I through VI, count VII sought a declaratory judgment against all defendants. Count VII did not, however, allege a violation of
¶ 15 Counts VIII through XI present no new substantive claims for challenging the validity of this proposed ballot initiative. Instead, they merely incorporated by reference the complaint‘s previous allegations and requested a permanent injunction to preclude public funds from being disbursed to evaluate the sufficiency of the petition or to place the measure on the ballot at the November 8, 2016, general election. Count VIII was directed at the State Board of Elections, its officers, and members, while Count IX was directed at the Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago and its officers and members, as well as the County Clerk of Cook County. These defendants have already been dismissed from the case. Accordingly, count IX was stricken and is not before this court. Count X was directed at the Comptroller and State Treasurer, and
¶ 16 On May 20, 2016, the plaintiffs were given leave to file their complaint, and Independent Maps filed its answer. The remaining defendants filed a separate, joint answer. The plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
¶ 17 The circuit court held a hearing on both motions before granting the plaintiffs’ motion as to counts I through VII, concluding that the proposed ballot initiative did not comply with the requirements in our constitution. The court then denied Independent Maps’ motion on those counts. The court entered no judgment on counts VIII, X, and XI, seeking injunctive relief. To prevent the absence of a judgment on those three counts from delaying appellate review, the court expressly found that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of its judgment pursuant to
¶ 18 Independent Maps immediately filed a notice of appeal to the appellate court and asked that the case be expedited. See
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 In its appeal, Independent Maps argues that the circuit court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiffs pursuant to
¶ 21 The standards guiding our review of this appeal are well established. Judgment on the pleadings is proper only where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
¶ 22 In challenging the ballot initiative, the plaintiffs advanced two basic lines of constitutional argument: (1) the ballot initiative exceeds the scope of permissible amendments pursuant to
“‘the will of the people to this end can only be expressed in the legitimate modes by which such a body politic can act, and which must either be prescribed by the constitution whose revision or amendment is sought, or by an act of the legislative department of the State, which alone would be authorized to speak for the people upon this subject ***.’ 1 Cooley‘s Constitutional Limitations, 84-85 (8th ed. 1927). (Emphasis added.)” Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 460-61.
¶ 23 In our constitution, the framers chose to limit the scope of ballot initiatives in
“[t]he controlling legal principles are settled. The prior constitutions of this State did not provide for amendment through the direct initiative process. ([CBA I], 137 Ill. 2d at 398.) The Framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution intended article XIV, section 3, to be a very limited form of constitutional initiative. The Framers considered that a general initiative provision was unnecessary due to the liberalized amendment procedures of the new constitution. ([CBA I], 137 Ill. 2d at 401.) ***.
Based on the Framers’ concerns, article XIV, section 3, provides only for amendment of the legislative article, article IV. Further, not every aspect of the legislative article is subject to amendment through the initiative process. Rather, ’ “Amendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV.” ’ (Emphasis added.) [CBA I], 137 Ill. 2d at 398, quoting
Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, § 3 .” CBA II, 161 Ill. 2d at 508-09.
The Proposed Role of the Auditor General
¶ 25 Because we find this issue dispositive, we first examine count I of the plaintiffs’ complaint. That count inserts the Auditor General into the redistricting process for the first time.
¶ 26 In its appeal before this court, Independent Maps presents three main arguments: (1) assigning the Auditor General duties related to redistricting does not “change” his constitutional duties established in
¶ 27 Our constitution mandates that the Auditor General (1) “shall conduct the audit of public funds of the State,” (2) “shall make additional reports and investigations as directed by the General Assembly,” and (3) “shall report his findings and recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Governor.”
“[f]or the purpose of conducting the Commissioner selection process, an Applicant Review Panel comprising three Reviewers shall be chosen in the following manner. Beginning not later than January 1 and ending not later than March 1 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Auditor General shall request and accept applications to serve as a Reviewer. The Auditor General shall review all applications and select a pool of 30 potential Reviewers. The Auditor General should select applicants for the pool of potential
Reviewers who would operate in an ethical and non-partisan manner by considering whether each applicant is a resident and registered voter of the State and has been for the four years preceding his or her application, has demonstrated understanding of and adherence to standards of ethical conduct and has been unaffiliated with any political party for the three years preceding appointment. By March 31 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Auditor General shall publicly select by random draw the Panel of three Reviewers from the pool of potential Reviewers.”
After the Applicant Review Panel is constituted, the auditor must undertake another task, that of “request[ing] and accept[ing] applications to serve as a Commissioner on the Independent Redistricting Commission.”5
¶ 28 Objecting to these changes, count I of the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that imposing duties on the Auditor General violates
¶ 29 While it is unclear from the record exactly how great a burden the additional duties imposed by the proposed initiative would create, two points appear certain. First, winnowing the number of applicants statewide down to a pool of 30 reviewers is likely to be a time-consuming and resource-intensive task. Indeed, the mandate that the Auditor General evaluate the “ethical conduct” and partisan leanings of “each applicant” who applies from across the state is likely to require considerable effort, time, and expense. Conversely, the time and resources expended on that process will necessarily be unavailable to perform the duties already specifically assigned to the Auditor General in
¶ 30 Second, and more importantly, the parties do not explain how the Auditor General‘s hypothetical ability to perform the newly assigned redistricting tasks affects the constitutionality of the proposal. Indeed, this argument conflicts with Independent Maps’ own, quite accurate, description of the proper division of labor in the review process. As explained in its reply brief, “whether or not a provision is a good idea is beside the point for purposes of the constitutional analysis. It is for the voters to decide whether a proposed constitutional amendment is wise or workable; the courts’ task is simply to decide whether it is limited to a structural and procedural subject in Article IV.” (Emphasis added.) We agree and reject Independent Maps’ claim that the new duties assigned to the Auditor General under its plan are constitutional because they are not unduly burdensome.
¶ 32 What these arguments fail to recognize, however, is twofold. First, nothing in our current constitution, its development, or this court‘s case law requires a proposed ballot initiative to be designed intentionally to undercut or otherwise even affect another constitutional provision to be found invalid under
¶ 33 Certainly, during the debates at the 1970 Constitutional Convention, the possibility that a ballot initiative could provide a “backdoor” means of altering other constitutional provisions or even the substantive law was discussed. However, the intentional abuse of the ballot initiatives was not the sole incentive for enacting the limitations in
¶ 34 Moreover, the framers of our constitution intended this court alone “to determine whether constitutional requirements for a proposed amendment were satisfied.” Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 462. That role does not require us to read between the lines of every proposal in an attempt to discern the propriety of the proponent‘s underlying intentions; our role is solely to determine whether the proposal comports with the strict limitations set out in
¶ 35 Second, at its core, the question in this case requires us to construe the relevant constitutional provisions, a purely legal question. As this court recently explained in Walker v. McGuire, we apply the same general principles to construe both statutory and constitutional provisions. When construing a constitutional provision, our primary purpose is to effectuate “‘the common understanding of the persons who adopted it—the citizens of this state‘.” Walker v. McGuire, 2015 IL 117138, ¶ 16 (citing Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36). If the language of the provision is unambiguous, we must give it effect without resorting to aids of statutory construction. Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36. Only if the provision is ambiguous will we “consult the drafting history of the provision, including the debates of the delegates to the constitutional convention.” Walker, 2015 IL 117138, ¶ 16 (citing Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 225 (1999), and Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1996)). In
¶ 36 The plain language of
¶ 37 In Coalition I and Coalition II, we quoted from an explanation provided by the spokesman for the majority on the Constitutional Convention Committee on the legislature, Louis Perona, addressing the intentionally limited nature of amendments that could be enacted by ballot initiative. Delegate Perona emphasized the framers’ rationale for limiting the reach of ballot initiatives,
“As I indicated preliminarily in my remarks, I think the limitation on this initiative eliminates the abuse which has been made of the initiative in some states. The attempt has been made here to prevent it being applied to ordinary legislation or to changes which do not attack or do not concern the actual structure or makeup of the legislature itself. (4 Proceedings 2911.)” (Emphasis added.) Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 470.
¶ 38 We further stated in Coalition I,
“Any offered amendment under the initiative obviously must comply with the procedure and the limitations on amendment set out in [article XIV,] section 3 before it can be submitted to the electorate. As this court has observed: ‘The constitution is the supreme law, and every citizen is bound to obey it and every court is bound to enforce its provisions. It is a most extraordinary doctrine that the court has a discretion to enforce or not enforce a provision of the constitution according to its judgment as to its wisdom or whether the public good will be subserved by disregarding it.’ People ex rel. Miller v. Hotz, 327 Ill. 433, 437.” Coalition I, 65 Ill. 2d at 460.
Thus, this court is obliged to respect the imitations placed on the scope of ballot initiatives by
¶ 39 Returning to the task of construing article XIV‘s limitation on the permissible subject matter of the ballot initiative process, our only concern in this case must be the proposed initiative‘s compliance with the applicable standard expressed in
¶ 40 In CBA I, this court was similarly asked to address a ballot initiative‘s effects on another constitutional provision. There, the proposed amendment required each legislative house to create a “revenue committee” possessing a designated number of members. More critically, any bill that increased the state‘s revenue required a three-fifths vote in each house before becoming law. In analyzing whether that proposal violated
¶ 41 “[W]e [found] that the proposed Amendment [was] not limited to the structural and procedural subjects of article IV. Wrapped up in this structural and procedural package is a substantive issue not found in article IV—the subject of increasing State revenue or increasing taxes.” (Emphasis in original.) CBA I, 137 Ill. 2d at 404. We further explained that
“if this court finds that the proposed Amendment falls within the limitations of section 3 of article XIV then almost any substantive issue can be cast in the form of an amendment to the structure and procedure of the legislative article by using the same scenario.” CBA I, 137 Ill. 2d at 405.
¶ 42 Here, the sole provision in our constitution currently addressing the “subject” of the Auditor General‘s job duties is indisputably
¶ 43 Finally, Independent Maps makes the policy argument that upholding the circuit court‘s finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment on the pleadings will “make it largely impossible to make meaningful reforms in the redistricting process.” We respectfully disagree. The Auditor General is not the only potential nonlegislative actor capable of filling the duties outlined in its proposal. Certainly Illinois has other offices or individuals that are unencumbered by the limitations expressed in Article XIV. Indeed, the scheme proffered in the instant proposal is not the only model of redistricting reform that could be imagined. The constitutional right of the citizens of this state to alter the legislative article by ballot initiative is not tied to any particular plan, and we trust that the constitutional confines of
¶ 44 We conclude that the duties assigned to the Auditor General by the ballot initiative at issue in this case do not comport with the strict limitations in
¶ 45 Because we affirm the circuit court‘s grant of the plaintiffs’ motion on the pleadings, we need not consider the remaining arguments on appeal, including the parties’ invitation to determine whether any hypothetical ballot initiative addressing the redistricting process could be constitutional. Accordingly, we leave that question for another day.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 47 Even when concerned citizens legitimately attempt to exercise their constitutional right to seek changes in their state government through ballot initiatives, this court is constrained by the expressed intent of the framers of our constitution to review the propriety of only the specific provisions in the proposal before it. In conducting that review, we must first and foremost look to the plain language adopted by the framers. That is the most certain route to determining the framers’ intent.
¶ 48 In this case, our inquiry is limited to the intent expressed by the plain language of
¶ 49 Here, after closely examining the framers’ carefully chosen language, as previously interpreted by this court, we conclude the ballot initiative in this case fails to comport with the restrictions incorporated into
¶ 50 Affirmed.
¶ 51 Mandate to issue immediately.
CHIEF JUSTICE GARMAN, dissenting:
¶ 53 I join and agree with Justice Karmeier‘s dissent. I write separately to express my concern with the impact of the majority‘s conclusion on the future of redistricting in Illinois.
¶ 54 This check against the legislature‘s self interest is especially important when the issue at hand is one so crucial to our democracy. As I noted fifteen years ago, following the redistricting triggered by the 2000 federal census:
“In any action involving redistricting, much more is at stake than simply who will control the legislature for the next 10 years. ‘If any fundamental principle underlies our American system of government, it is the notion that government exists only to serve the governed.’ [Citation.] Today, that fundamental principle is dealt a serious blow.” Cole-Randazzo v. Ryan, 198 Ill. 2d 233, 248 (2001) (Garman, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.).
¶ 55 I again lamented in Beaubien v. Ryan that the court had failed its “duty to ensure that the process that ultimately results in a redistricting map that will represent the people of Illinois for the next decade will be ‘equitable, balanced, and fair.‘” 198 Ill. 2d 294, 308 (2001) (Garman, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.). The majority opinion fails this duty and deals another serious blow to our fundamental principles.
¶ 56 JUSTICES THOMAS and KARMEIER join in this dissent.
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
¶ 58 The
¶ 59 Today, just as a critical election board deadline is about to expire, four members of our court have delivered, as a fait accompli, nothing less than the nullification of a critical component of the
¶ 60 The majority‘s ruling in this case comes at a particularly unfortunate time. In Illinois, as throughout the United States, there is a palpable sense of frustration by voters of every political affiliation that self-perpetuating institutions of government have excluded them from meaningful participation in the political process.
¶ 61 In their wisdom, the drafters of the 1970 Constitution foresaw just this problem and fashioned a clear and specific mechanism to insure that the legislature could never have the upper hand on the people of Illinois, in whose hands the sovereign power of this State rests.
That
¶ 62 Today a muzzle has been placed on the people of this State, and their voices supplanted with judicial fiat.
¶ 63 The whimper you hear is democracy stifled.
¶ 64 I join that muted chorus of dissent.
¶ 65 CHIEF JUSTICE GARMAN and JUSTICE KARMEIER join in this dissent.
JUSTICE KARMEIER, dissenting:
¶ 67 The issue in this case is whether the circuit court erred when it held that a redistricting initiative petition submitted by Support Independent Maps (Independent Maps) and supported by the number of signatures required by law may not be placed before Illinois voters at the November 8, 2016, general election because it fails to comply with the requirements of
BACKGROUND
¶ 69 The
¶ 70 In May 2016, Independent Maps—a “ballot initiative committee” duly organized in accordance with
“(a) Legislative Districts shall be compact, contiguous and substantially equal in population. Representative Districts shall be compact, contiguous, and substantially equal in population.
(b) In the year following each Federal decennial census year, the General Assembly by law shall redistrict the Legislative Districts and the Representative Districts.
If no redistricting plan becomes effective by June 30 of that year, a Legislative Redistricting Commission shall be constituted not later than July 10. The Commission shall consist of eight members, no more than four of whom shall be members of the same political party.
The Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives shall each appoint to the Commission one Representative and one person who is not a member of the General Assembly. The President and Minority Leader of the Senate shall each appoint to the Commission one Senator and one person who is not a member of the General Assembly.
The members shall be certified to the Secretary of State by the appointing authorities. A vacancy on the Commission shall be filled within five days by the authority that made the original appointment. A Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be chosen by a majority of all members of the Commission.
Not later than August 10, the Commission shall file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan approved by at least five members.
If the Commission fails to file an approved redistricting plan, the Supreme Court shall submit the names of two persons, not of the same political party, to the Secretary of State not later than September 1.
Not later than September 5, the Secretary of State publicly shall draw by random selection the name of one of the two persons to serve as the ninth member of the Commission.
Not later than October 5, the Commission shall file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan approved by at least five members.
An approved redistricting plan filed with the Secretary of State shall be presumed valid, shall have the force and effect of law and shall be published promptly by the Secretary of State.
The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions concerning redistricting the House and Senate, which shall be initiated in the name of the People of the State by the Attorney General.”
¶ 71 A central feature of the current version of
¶ 72 In place of the current provision, the amendment to
¶ 73 The new system is not unlike the one adopted through a citizen initiative in Arizona with the hope of “ending the practice of gerrymandering and improving voter and candidate participation in elections” (internal quotation marks omitted) (Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm‘n, 576 U.S. 787, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2015)) and recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court against a federal constitutional challenge (id. at 2661). Specifically, the provision
“(a) The Independent Redistricting Commission comprising 11 Commissioners shall adopt and file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan for Legislative Districts and Representative Districts by June 30 of the year following each Federal decennial census. Legislative Districts shall be contiguous and substantially equal in population. Representative Districts shall be contiguous and substantially equal in population. The redistricting plan shall comply with Federal law. Subject to the foregoing, the Commission shall apply the following criteria: (1) the redistricting plan shall not dilute or diminish the ability of a racial or language minority community to elect the candidates of its choice, including when voting in concert with other persons; (2) the redistricting plan shall respect the geographic integrity of units of local government; and (3) the redistricting plan shall respect the geographic integrity of communities sharing common social and economic interests, which do not include relationships with political parties or candidates for office. The redistricting plan shall not either intentionally or unduly discriminate against or intentionally or unduly favor any political party, political group or particular person. In designing the redistricting plan, the Commission shall consider party registration and voting history data only to assess compliance with the requirements in this subsection (a).
(b) For the purpose of conducting the Commissioner selection process, an Applicant Review Panel comprising three Reviewers shall be chosen in the following manner. Beginning not later than January 1 and ending not later than March 1 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Auditor General shall request and accept applications to serve as a Reviewer. The Auditor General shall review all applications and select a pool of 30 potential Reviewers. The Auditor General should select applicants for the pool of potential Reviewers who would operate in an ethical and non-partisan manner by considering whether each applicant is a resident and registered voter of the State and has been for the four years preceding his or her application, has demonstrated understanding of and adherence to standards of ethical conduct and has been unaffiliated with any political party for the three years preceding appointment. By March 31 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Auditor General shall publicly select by random draw the Panel of three Reviewers from the pool of potential Reviewers.
(c) Beginning not later than January 1 and ending not later than March 1 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Auditor General shall request and accept applications to serve as a Commissioner on the Independent Redistricting Commission. By May 31, the Panel shall select a pool of 100 potential Commissioners. The Panel should select applicants for the pool of potential Commissioners who would be diverse and unaffected by conflicts of interest by considering whether each applicant is a resident and registered voter of the State and has been for the four years preceding his or her application, as well as each applicant‘s prior political experience, relevant analytical skills, ability to contribute to a fair redistricting process and ability to represent the demographic and geographic diversity of the State. The Panel shall act by affirmative vote of two Reviewers. All records of the Panel, including applications
to serve on the Panel, shall be open for public inspection,
(d) Within 45 days after the Panel has selected the pool of 100 potential Commissioners, but not later than June 23 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and the President and Minority Leader of the Senate each may remove up to five of those potential Commissioners. Thereafter, but not later than June 30, the Panel shall publicly select seven Commissioners by random draw from the remaining pool of potential Commissioners; of those seven Commissioners, including any replacements, (1) the seven Commissioners shall reside among the Judicial Districts in the same proportion as the number of Judges elected therefrom under Section 3 of Article VI of this Constitution, (2) two Commissioners shall be affiliated with the political party whose candidate for Governor received the most votes cast in the last general election for Governor, two Commissioners shall be affiliated with the political party whose candidate for Governor received the second-most votes cast in such election and the remaining three Commissioners shall not be affiliated with either such political party and (3) no more than two Commissioners may be affiliated with the same political party. The Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and the President and Minority Leader of the Senate each shall appoint one Commissioner from among the remaining applicants in the pool of potential Commissioners on the basis of the appointee‘s contribution to the demographic and geographic diversity of the Commission. A vacancy on the Panel or Commission shall be filled within five days by a potential Reviewer or potential Commissioner from among the applicants remaining in the pool of potential Reviewers or potential Commissioners, respectively, in the manner in which the office was previously filled.
(e) The Commission shall act in public meetings by affirmative vote of six Commissioners, except that approval of any redistricting plan shall require the affirmative vote of at least (1) seven Commissioners total, (2) two Commissioners from each political party whose candidate for Governor received the most and second[-]most votes cast in the last general election for Governor and (3) two Commissioners not affiliated with either such political party. The Commission shall elect its chairperson and vice chairperson, who shall not be affiliated with the same political party. Six Commissioners shall constitute a quorum. All meetings of the Commission attended by a quorum, except for meetings qualified under attorney-client privilege, shall be open to the public and publicly noticed at least two days prior to the meeting. All records of the Commission, including communications between Commissioners regarding the Commission‘s work, shall be open for public inspection, except for records qualified under attorney-client privilege. The Commission shall adopt rules governing its procedure, public hearings and the implementation of matters under this Section. The Commission shall hold public hearings throughout the state both before and after releasing the initial proposed redistricting plan. The Commission may not adopt a final redistricting plan unless the plan to be adopted without further amendment, and a report explaining its compliance with this Constitution, have been publicly
(f) If the Commission fails to adopt and file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan by June 30 of the year following a Federal decennial census, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the most senior Judge of the Supreme Court who is not affiliated with the same political party as the Chief Justice shall appoint jointly by July 31 a Special Commissioner for Redistricting. The Special Commissioner shall adopt and file with the Secretary of State by August 31 a redistricting plan satisfying the requirements set forth in subsection (a) of this Section and a report explaining its compliance with this Constitution. The Special Commissioner shall hold at least one public hearing in the State before releasing his or her initial proposed redistricting plan and at least one public hearing in a different location in the State after releasing his or her initial proposed redistricting plan and before filing the final redistricting plan with the Secretary of State. All records of the Special Commissioner shall be open for public inspection, except for records qualified under attorney-client privilege.
(g) An adopted redistricting plan filed with the Secretary of State shall be presumed valid and shall be published promptly by the Secretary of State.
(h) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in cases relating to matters under this Section.”
¶ 74 As noted earlier, the proponent of this amendment, Independent Maps, petitioned to bring it before the voters for approval using the ballot initiative process in article XIV, section 3, of the Illinois Constitution (
¶ 75 On May 11, 2016, five days after Independent Maps submitted its petition to the State Board of Elections, a “taxpayer‘s suit” was filed in the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to
¶ 77 Independent Maps was not included as a party. Shortly after the action was filed, however, it sought and was granted leave to intervene. See
¶ 78 Plaintiffs’ complaint contained 11 counts. Counts I through VI were directed against all defendants, and all sought a declaratory judgment that the amendment to
¶ 79 As noted earlier,
¶ 80 Counts I through IV and VI alleged, in the alternative, that even if redistricting does qualify as one of the “structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV” within the meaning of
¶ 81 Count VII also sought a declaratory judgment against all defendants. Unlike the previous six counts, however, Count VII did not allege a violation of
¶ 82 Counts VIII through XI advanced no additional substantive grounds for challenging the validity of Independent Maps’ ballot initiative. They merely incorporated by reference the allegations in the prior counts and, rather than seeking declaratory relief, requested a permanent injunction to prevent the various defendant agencies and officials from disbursing any more public funds to assess the sufficiency of Independent Maps’ petition or to place the measure on the ballot for consideration by the voters at the November 8, 2016, general election. Count VIII was directed against the State Board of Elections, its officers, and members. Count IX was directed against the Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago and its officers and members as well as the County Clerk of Cook County. As noted earlier, these defendants were later dismissed from the case. Correspondingly, count IX was stricken and is no longer at issue. Count X was directed at the Comptroller and State Treasurer. Count XI sought to enjoin the Secretary of State.
¶ 83 On May 20, 2016, following the requisite notice and hearing, the circuit court entered an order allowing plaintiffs leave to file their complaint. Independent Maps promptly filed an answer. A separate, joint answer was also filed by all of the defendant State agencies and their members and the State officials. At the same time, plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
¶ 84 The circuit court conducted a hearing on the parties’ respective motions on June 30, 2016. Approximately three weeks later, it granted plaintiffs’ motion with respect to counts I through VII, which sought declaratory relief, and denied Independent Maps’ motion with respect to those same seven counts, agreeing with plaintiffs that the proposed ballot initiative
¶ 85 Independent Maps filed an immediate appeal to the appellate court and requested that the matter be placed on an accelerated docket. See
¶ 86 ANALYSIS
¶ 87 As grounds for its appeal, Independent Maps argues that the circuit court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiffs pursuant to
¶ 88 As set forth earlier in this dissent, plaintiffs have advanced two basic lines of constitutional attack against Independent Maps’ ballot initiative: (1) that it exceeds the scope of amendments permitted through ballot initiative under
¶ 89 I will begin with plaintiffs’ challenge under
¶ 90 In evaluating whether or not ballot questions are “separate and unrelated,” we have held that multiple questions “may be combined in a single proposition as long as they are reasonably related to a common objective in a workable manner.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 254, 256. If the various parts of the proposal have a reasonable, workable relationship to the same subject, if they are germane to the accomplishment of a single objective, the proposal may be submitted for approval or rejection by the voters. Id. at 257-58.
¶ 91 Independent Maps’ ballot initiative plainly meets this test. It proposes a single question narrowly focused on a single objective: replacing the current system for redistricting set forth in
¶ 92 It is true, of course, that the proposed amendment at issue here does touch on a range of matters, including the authority of various State officials and the jurisdiction of this court. As I have just pointed out, however, the mere fact that a proposition may touch on multiple issues does not render it infirm for “free and equal” purposes. The critical inquiry is whether the various components are directed at accomplishing the same objective. In this case, they are.9
¶ 94 Putting aside the logistical challenges, which would be formidable, dividing up the proposal‘s constituent parts for separate consideration by the voters could be disastrous. As Independent Maps has pointed out in its brief,
“[i]t would take numerous separate votes to consider just the procedural issues that plaintiffs claimed *** were ‘separate and unrelated‘—votes concerning the role of the Auditor General, the role of the Supreme Court, the role of the Attorney General, and the basic Independent Commission structure. If the provisions regarding the Auditor General failed, there would be no coherent process for choosing the Independent Redistricting Commission. And if the provisions regarding the Supreme Court failed, there would be no back-up mechanism in the event the Commission could not agree.”
The result could well be a hybrid system that no one wanted, that no one had ever suggested, and that could not possibly work. The confusion and uncertainty in the electoral process that would follow from such a development is manifest.
¶ 95 Decades ago we held the combination of related questions in a single proposition is not constitutionally prohibited where presentation of the questions separately might yield incongruous results and create uncertainty and confusion through a “legislature in an intermediate stage of development.” See Coalition II, 83 Ill. 2d at 255. For the reasons just described, that would certainly be the case here.
¶ 96 Finally, I note that to the extent the amendment proposed by Independent Maps may be complex, it is because the very process the amendment seeks to change is itself complex. The redistricting mechanism set forth in
¶ 97 This is a construction of the law we cannot countenance. It is incumbent upon us to give meaning to every section and clause of the constitution, and whenever different parts of the constitution might appear to be in conflict, it is our obligation to harmonize them, if practicable. One clause will not be allowed to defeat another if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together. Oak Park Federal Savings & Loan Ass‘n v. Village of Oak Park, 54 Ill. 2d 200, 203 (1973). I would therefore hold that the circuit court erred when it granted judgment for the pleadings in favor of plaintiffs and against Independent Maps on count VII of plaintiffs’ complaint alleging violation of the “free and equal” clause. That count should have been dismissed.
¶ 98 I turn then to counts I through VI of plaintiffs’ complaint. Those counts, as described earlier, were directed against all defendants, and all sought a declaratory judgment that the amendment to
¶ 99
“Amendments to Article IV of this Constitution may be proposed by a petition signed by a number of electors equal in number to at least eight percent of the total votes cast for candidates for Governor in the preceding gubernatorial election. Amendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV. *** If the petition is valid and sufficient, the proposed amendment shall be submitted to the electors at that general election and shall become effective if approved by either three-fifths of those voting on the amendment or a majority of those voting in the election.”
Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, § 3 .
¶ 100 The parties agree that the viability of counts I through VI of plaintiffs’ complaint turns solely on the question of how the provisions of
¶ 101 Illinois courts have grappled with the language of
¶ 102 Most lawmaking in the United States occurs through representative bodies elected by the people. Direct lawmaking by the people themselves was virtually nonexistent at the time the United States Constitution was drafted. It did not gain a foothold in our country until the turn of the twentieth century. Since then, two principal forms of direct legislation have been adopted, the initiative and the referendum. The referendum serves as a negative check on action by the legislature, allowing the voters to petition to refer legislative action to the voters for approval or rejection at the polls. The initiative, by contrast, allows the voters to adopt positive legislation independently of their state‘s representative assemblies by petitioning to place proposed statutes or constitutional amendments directly before their fellow voters for adoption or rejection at the polls. It has been said that the referendum corrects sins of commission by elected representative bodies, while the initiative corrects the sins of omission by such bodies. Arizona State Legislature, 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2659-60.
¶ 103 For most of this state‘s history, the initiative process could not be used to amend our constitution. Originally, the only way the constitution could be changed was by convening a constitutional convention.
¶ 104 Although the initiative does not have a counterpart in the federal constitution, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
“invention of the initiative was in full harmony with the Constitution‘s conception of the people as the font of governmental power. As Madison put it: ‘The genius of republican liberty seems to demand . . . not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people.’ [The Federalist], No. 37, at 223.
The people‘s ultimate sovereignty had been expressed by John Locke in 1690, a near century before the Constitution‘s formation: ‘[T]he Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the People a Supream [sic] Power to remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them. For all Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the Power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security.’ Two Treatises of Government § 149, p. 385 (P. Laslett ed. 1964).
Our Declaration of Independence, ¶ 2, drew from Locke in stating: ‘Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.’ And our fundamental instrument of government derives its authority from ‘We the People.’
U. S. Const., Preamble . As this Court stated, quoting Hamilton: ‘[T]he true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.’ Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 540-541 (1969) (quoting 2 Debates on the Federal Constitution 257 (J. Elliot ed. 1876)).” Arizona State Legislature, 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2674-75.
¶ 105 Our court recently addressed these principles in the context of Illinois government. In In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶¶ 77-78, we explained:
“Unlike Great Britain, where the sovereignty of the nation resides in Parliament, ‘[u]nder our institutions this sovereignty or transcendent power of government resides in or with the people.’ Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302, 305-06 (1883). See 33A Ill. L. and Prac. State Government § 3 (2012). Sovereignty is lodged in the people (People ex rel. Dickinson v. Board of Trade, 193 Ill. 577, 589 (1901)), and the people are the sovereign power (Field v. People ex rel. McClernand, 3 Ill. 79, 110-11 (1839)). The people therefore possess all power originally, including all legislative power. Harder‘s Fire Proof Storage & Van Co. v. City of Chicago, 235 Ill. 58, 68 (1908).
As the ultimate sovereign, the people can, ‘within constitutional restrictions imposed by the Federal constitution, delegate the powers of government to whom and as they please. They can withhold or [e]ntrust it, with such limitations as they choose.’ Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. at 306; accord City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (‘all power derives from the people’ who can delegate it to representative instruments which they create or reserve to themselves the power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise be assigned to the legislature). *** Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876).”
¶ 106 The drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution acted in accordance with these principles when they formulated the initiative provision set forth in
¶ 107 In the course of the convention‘s debate regarding the desirability and scope of ballot initiatives, Delegate Perona elaborated:
“[O]ne important area in which I think [initiatives] would be very beneficial would be in regard to the legislative article. I am convinced, from serving on the Legislative Committee, that neither by the process of legislative amendments or by the process of Constitutional Convention are we going to get any substantial change in our present legislative article. Now whether we need change or not, I am not arguing that point. But sometime, possibly, in the next 100 years, we may need some change in the legislative article; and if we are dependent upon an amendment suggested by the legislature to reduce its size or to abolish cumulative voting or possibly to change to a unicameral legislature, I don‘t think we are going to get it done. I would also feel that it is unlikely that the Constitutional Convention—because of its ties, in many cases, or obligations to members of the legislature and in saying these things, I am not being critical of the legislature or of any of its members; I just think we have to recognize that all of us are affected by our point of view, and that this is a necessary and inherent ingredient in human nature. And so if we are to leave open the possibility of effective change in the legislative article, I think we have to have something like the initiative ***.” 2 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 583 (hereinafter Proceedings).
¶ 108 During the same discussion, Delegate Garrison followed the foregoing observations with similar points bearing even more directly on the issue at hand in this case. He stated:
“The initiative would provide a safety valve through which the people may act directly if sufficiently aroused. It would furnish a salutary effect on the legislature. For example, we could hardly expect the legislature ever to propose a Constitutional amendment to reduce the size of its membership, to establish a reapportionment commission comprised entirely of nonlegislative members, or perhaps even to establish single-member districts.” (Italics in original, bold added for emphasis.) 2 Proceedings 584.
¶ 109 The specific provision which would ultimately become
“One, to give the people an opportunity to participate in government, but on a limited basis in an attempt to prevent some of the abuses that have occurred in some areas. ***
This provision has been structured to apply only to the legislative article and to be limited to the area of government which it is most likely will not be changed in the constitution by amendment. The legislature, being composed of human beings, will be reluctant to change the provisions of the constitution
that govern its structure and makeup ***. *** [A]nd also I think the General Assembly will be more—have its ear tuned to a greater degree as to what the people desire, because they will know that if they do not suggest amendments that the people would desire, that it can be done in another manner ***.” 4 Proceedings 2911.
¶ 110 When the convention‘s Committee on the Legislature subsequently made its report on what became
“The primary reason for offering a limited constitutional initiative proposal for the Legislative Article is quite simple: members of the General Assembly have a greater vested interest in the legislative branch of government than any other branch or phase of governmental activity.
Cognizant of this fundamental fact of life, the Legislative Committee proposes that the people of the State of Illinois reserve the right to propose amendments by the initiative process to the Legislative Article. ***
In addition to this primary reason for proposing a limited form of Constitutional initiative, the Legislative Committee believes:
—(1) the greatest virtue in having this provision rests in the potential for keeping the General Assembly more responsive on matters directly and vitally affecting them;
—(2) voters can better decide on the merits of proposals suggesting changes in the Legislative Article since they are not directly and personally involved; and
—(3) this is a method to circumvent a legislature which might be dominated by interests opposing legislative changes.” 6 Proceedings 1399-1400 (quoted in Coalition II, 83 Ill. 2d at 245).
¶ 111 In sum,
¶ 112 When courts are called upon to intervene in the initiative process, as we have been here, “they must act with restraint, trepidation and a healthy suspicion of the partisan who would use the judiciary to prevent the initiative process from taking its course.” Committee for a Healthy Future, Inc. v. Carnahan, 201 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). The need for caution and restraint may be especially compelling in cases such as this one, challenging an initiative related to legislative redistricting, for it is a core principle of republican government “‘that the voters should choose their representatives, not the other way around.‘” Arizona State Legislature, 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2677 (quoting Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 781 (2005)).
¶ 114 When the court first adopted this standard in 1980, we noted that the initiative procedure was then relatively new to Illinois and that there were no Illinois cases directly on point. We therefore looked to relevant authority from sister states, as we frequently do in such circumstances. In developing the standard, we cited, with approval, decisions from other jurisdictions that had “carefully protected constitutionally provided initiative plans from unnecessarily burdensome legislative restrictions.” Id. at 248. Our decision quoted at length an earlier opinion from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, In re Initiative Petition No. 23, 127 P. 862, 866 (Okla. 1912), which admonished “‘[t]he right of direct legislation in the people must be administered by the officers charged with that duty in such manner as to make it operative. If technical restrictive constructions are placed upon the laws governing the initiation and submission of these measures, the purpose and policy of the people in establishing the same will be entirely defeated ***.‘” Coalition II, 83 Ill. 2d at 249. Decisions from Nebraska and Arizona to similar effect were also invoked. Id. at 248-50.
¶ 115 The standard is a liberal one. Courts from Maine to Michigan to Hawaii have so recognized when interpreting constitutional provisions applicable to the initiative process in their respective states. League of Women Voters v. Secretary of State, 683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me. 1996) (“[w]hen the people enact legislation by popular vote, we construe the citizen initiative provisions of the Maine Constitution liberally in order to facilitate the people‘s exercise of their sovereign power to legislate“); Welch Foods, Inc. v. Attorney General, 540 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (“[i]nitiative provisions are liberally construed to effectuate their purposes and facilitate rather than hamper the exercise of reserved rights by the people“); Ruggles v. Yagong, 353 P.3d 953, 969 (Haw. 2015) (“direct democracy and the initiative process have had considerable influence on public policy, and they remain as one of the most precious rights of our democratic process. In order to protect this fundamental democratic right, ‘courts are required to liberally construe [the initiative process] and accord it extraordinarily broad deference’ “). Other decisions to the same effect are legion. See, e.g., Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Alaska 1999); Blocker v. Sewell, 75 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Ark. 1934); Pedersen v. Bennett, 288 P.3d 760, 762 (Ariz. 2012); Marblehead v. City of San Clemente, 277 Cal. Rptr. 550, 553 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Statement of Sufficiency for 1997-98 # 40 (Medical Use of Marijuana), 968 P.2d 112, 118-19 (Colo. 1998) (en banc); Billings v. Buchanan, 555 P.2d 176, 178 (Colo. 1976) (en banc); Chouteau County v. Grossman, 563 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Mont. 1977); Rothenberg v. Husted, 129 Ohio St. 3d 447, 2011-Ohio-4003, 953 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 5; State ex rel. Carson v. Kozer, 217 P. 827, 829 (Or. 1923). Plaintiffs have not cited and I have not found any authority from Illinois or elsewhere holding otherwise.
¶ 116 It is true, of course, that when assessing ballot initiatives, we must keep in mind that if the constitution has placed limitations on the initiative power, such limitations are also an expression of the people‘s sovereign power and must likewise be obeyed. See Committee for a Healthy Future, Inc. v. Carnahan, 201 S.W.3d at 507. Reservation of the right to propose an initiative regarding eligibility to serve as Governor, for example, could scarcely be interpreted as contemplating the right to bring an initiative regarding income tax. With respect to whatever particular sphere or spheres of power the people have chosen to reserve for themselves, however, courts must act with deference and restraint to insure that such power may be exercised as the people intended. A contrary view, i.e., that a provision reserving sovereign authority to amend the constitution through initiative must be read in a narrow, technical, and restrictive fashion, would require us to assume that when they reserved their sovereign powers, it was the hope of the people that the courts would prevent them from actually exercising those powers except in the most limited possible way. Such a view is incompatible with the very concept of popular sovereignty under the American constitutional order. It has no foundation in the history or text of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. It is why we have held that the provisions of
¶ 117 Applying the standards our court has established for construing
¶ 118 The objection asserted in count V of plaintiffs’ complaint as to why Independent Maps’ proposed ballot initiative fails to meet the requirements of
¶ 119 Count V was premised on the notion that when
¶ 120 There is no support for plaintiffs’ contentions in either the language or the history of
¶ 121 Plaintiffs seek support for their argument in the title of
¶ 122 More than that, it overlooks basic principles of statutory construction. While an enactment‘s title can sometimes provide guidance in resolving ambiguities (see Home Star Bank & Financial Services v. Emergency Care & Health Organization, Ltd., 2014 IL 115526, ¶ 40), our interpretation cannot turn on particular words or phrases viewed in isolation. We must construe the enactment as a whole. In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459, 466 (2008).
¶ 123 Even a cursory review of
¶ 124 It is also completely unsupported by the record of the debates at the convention that led to
¶ 125 This was intentional. As Delegate Perona explained,
“[W]e intend to limit this to the sections—to the sections presently—the type of sections presently in the legislative article. We toyed with the idea or considered the idea of naming the specific sections and limiting it to those; but you run into problems with that, also. *** I think the courts could iron out those questions and protect against abuse.” (Emphasis added.) 4 Proceedings 2711.
¶ 126 In response to Perona‘s remarks, Delegate Tomei stated: “I take it it is not the intention of the committee to limit the initiative just to those things presently contained in the legislative article.” Id. Delegate Perona answered:
“Yes. That‘s correct. We—that‘s the problem. If you get too specific with the limitation, you inhibit the possibility of change within the legislative setup. *** So we‘ve attempted to do it by the explanation as to what our purposes are, and then to leave the question of abuse to the courts.” Id. at 2711-12.
¶ 127 The delegates then explored the scope of changes that could be accomplished through the initiative process under
¶ 128 Delegate Tomei then asked if the same would be true with a range of other matters, including “apportionment,” which was the term initially used in
affirmative but stated ”[t]hose are the critical areas, actually.” (Emphasis added.) Id. In light of this, there can be no serious question that the drafters of our constitution regarded the redistricting provision of the legislative article to be an altogether proper subject of change through the ballot initiative process.
¶ 129 In urging us to reach a contrary conclusion, plaintiffs invoke this court‘s prior decision in CBA II, 161 Ill. 2d 502. Plaintiffs assert, as they did in the circuit court, that under that decision, redistricting cannot qualify as a structural and procedural subject of
¶ 130 I note, moreover, that the focus of the court‘s discussion in CBA II was whether the provisions of the term limit initiative challenged there could be considered both “structural and procedural” or even either of those things within the meaning of
¶ 131 In the course of its discussion in Coalition I, this court gave as examples of initiatives that would qualify as both structural and procedural ones involving the conversion from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature or for the conversion from multiple- to single-member legislative districts. Id. at 466 (quoted in CBA II, 161 Ill. 2d at 529). Nothing in Coalition I suggests, however, that the subject matter of the two examples are the only things that may be the sole topics of initiative authorized by
¶ 132 I turn then to the remaining counts of plaintiffs’ complaint, I through IV and VI. Those counts alleged, in the alternative, that even if redistricting qualifies as one of the “structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV” within the meaning of
¶ 133 As a preliminary matter, a number of plaintiffs’ assertions regarding the effect of the proposed ballot initiative are simply incorrect. For example, contrary to the claim made in count II of plaintiffs’ complaint, the ballot initiative, if adopted, would not impact the jurisdictional provisions of the judicial article (
¶ 134 By its terms, this jurisdictional grant is entirely conditional. If Independent Maps’ ballot initiative were to be approved by the voters and this court‘s jurisdiction over redistricting was thereby changed from “original and exclusive” to simply “original” in article IV, there would therefore be no conflict at all with
¶ 135 That such is the case reflects, we think, how carefully and thoughtfully the 1970 Constitution was crafted. By placing the Illinois Supreme Court‘s jurisdiction over redistricting in the legislative article and thereby making it among the matters subject to amendment through the ballot initiative process under
¶ 136 Also erroneous is the claim made by plaintiffs in count IV of the complaint that the ballot initiative is fatally defective because the part of the proposed process that would require participation by two members of this court in the event the redistricting commission failed to adopt a redistricting plan would impermissibly impose a political affiliation requirement on supreme court judges. Contrary to plaintiffs’ view, the proposal would not alter current judicial eligibility requirements in any way. One does not need to be affiliated with a political party to serve as a judge of the supreme court.
¶ 137 It is true that judges who seek to remain on the bench following expiration of their terms may seek retention through an election process in which their names appear on the ballot “without party designation” (
¶ 138 In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful that difficulties in application of the proposed amendment could arise if it were somehow to happen that all seven members of the court ended up belonging to the same political party. In light of modern Illinois history and politics, such an alignment seems so unlikely as to be impossible. But even if there were a theoretical possibility that the process proposed by plaintiffs’ initiative could one day prove problematic in practice, that is an entirely separate question from the one before us, which is simply whether the initiative meets the requirements of
¶ 139 In count III of their complaint, plaintiffs protested that the very act of involving the Chief Justice and another member of this court in the process when the redistricting commission fails to adopt a plan also crosses an impermissible constitutional line in that it imposes additional
The authority for our involvement in that process emanates entirely from article IV, section 3, itself. It is unrelated to anything in the judicial article or our rules. The proposed initiative would therefore have no spillover effects on any other provisions of the constitution. Its effect would be confined to the court‘s role under section 3 of article IV. While the nature of that role would be different, the change is therefore not subject to challenge on the grounds that it is not “limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV” as article XIV, section 3, requires. To hold otherwise would mean that the provisions of the legislative article could never be altered unless the supreme court‘s role in redistricting remain fixed precisely as it is today. That is not what article XIV, section 3, says, and it is incompatible with what the drafters intended when article XIV, section 3, was placed before the voters for ratification. Count III of plaintiffs’ complaint is therefore meritless as a matter of law and should also have been dismissed on the pleadings.
¶ 140 Count VI of plaintiffs’ complaint, which challenged the ballot initiative based on its removal of an express reference to the Attorney General, is similarly flawed.
¶ 141 That leaves only count I of plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged that the initiative cannot be said to be limited to procedural and structural subjects contained in article IV because, if adopted, it would confer on the Auditor General additional
¶ 142 It is true that, unlike this court and the Attorney General, the Auditor General is not presently involved in the redistricting process. The constitution references the Auditor General only in
¶ 143 The amendment proposed by Independent Maps would supply the requisite authority for the Auditor General‘s participation in the process. That the additional authorization would appear in a different constitutional provision than the one in which the Auditor General‘s basic duties are defined poses no constitutional problem. Nothing in the 1970 Constitution requires that all of a constitutional officer‘s responsibilities be set out in a single article, and such is certainly not the case with respect to the redistricting-related duties of this court and the Attorney General under the current redistricting mechanism.
¶ 144 Moreover, the additional duties the Auditor General would assume under the amendment would not alter any of the responsibilities the Auditor General already possesses under
¶ 145 When the delegates to the 1970 Constitution drafted
¶ 146 I close my discussion with a few additional observations. As noted earlier in this dissent, the drafters of
¶ 147 There can be no serious dispute that the drafters and adopters of
¶ 148 As an attempt to refute the conclusion that plaintiffs’ construction of
¶ 149 First, it would have the effect of stripping away powers and duties of officials who have responsibilities defined in other parts of the constitution. As I have just pointed out, that is a consequence which, under plaintiffs’ logic, would doom the proposal on the grounds that it was not limited to a structural and procedural subject of
¶ 150 Second, as discussed earlier,
¶ 151 In its opinion, the majority states that “we trust that the constitutional confines of article XIV, section 3, are sufficiently broad to encompass more than one potential redistricting scheme.” Supra ¶ 43. This observation is unquestionably true. The confines are broad enough to include a range of possible systems for carrying out redistricting. The problem is that under the contorted and restrictive approach urged by the majority, none of these potential redistricting schemes could possibly pass constitutional muster. All would fail just as this one has failed and for the same reasons. If that were not so, someone, at some point in this litigation, would surely have been able to come up with an example of a redistricting initiative that would actually meet the test the majority has set. No one, including and especially the majority, has been able to do so. The promise my colleagues offer is therefore an empty one.
¶ 152 In Cole-Randazzo v. Ryan, 198 Ill. 2d 233, 244 (2001), Justice Thomas warned in his dissent that “gone forever is the Illinois voter‘s confidence that *** the highest court of this State will ensure that the process of approving and adopting [new legislative maps] will be equitable, balanced, and fair.” Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.). If that was not true then, it will certainly be true once the majority‘s opinion is filed. If we do not permit this ballot initiative to go forward in accordance with the law, our authority over the redistricting process and, indeed, our status as an institution, will forever be suspect.
¶ 154 CONCLUSION
¶ 155 For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court erred when it granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiffs on counts I through VII of their complaint and denied the cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Independent Maps. Counts I through VII should have been dismissed with prejudice. The judgment of the circuit court should therefore be reversed. Because the remaining counts of plaintiffs’ complaint all depend on the viability of the claims asserted in counts I through VII, there would be no need for remand. Those counts also fail as a matter of law. Pursuant to the power conferred on us by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) “to make any other and further orders and grant any relief *** that the case may require,” we should dismiss those counts with prejudice as well. I therefore dissent.
¶ 156 CHIEF JUSTICE GARMAN and JUSTICE THOMAS join in this dissent.
DISSENT UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING
¶ 157 JUSTICE KARMEIER, dissenting:
¶ 158 Independent Maps moved to recall the mandate in order to permit it to seek rehearing pursuant to
¶ 159 First, the majority‘s opinion all but ignored the substantive discussion of plaintiffs’ various claims and Independent Maps’ response. It based its entire judgment on a single argument—involvement of the Auditor General—and left every other point unaddressed. This was so notwithstanding the fact that I addressed every objection in my lengthy dissent.
¶ 160 The dissent laid out why Independent Maps’ proposal passed constitutional muster in accordance with the intent of the drafters of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, setting out in detail not only the rationale but the words of the delegates supporting the dissent‘s position. Rehearing would give the majority the opportunity to rebut the dissent‘s rationale.
¶ 161 I believe the majority would have considerable difficulty doing so, for long before the constitutional convention at which
¶ 162 When an attempt was made to establish a municipal court in Chicago as the amendment permitted, a taxpayer action was brought to challenge the legislation on the grounds that the constitutional amendment, which provided authorization for the legislation, exceeded the bounds for amendments permitted by the 1870 Constitution because it was not limited to article IV, the legislative article, but also changed articles VI and IX. Surveying numerous decisions from sister states as well as prior case law from Illinois, we found it “obvious” that while amendments to a particular article of the constitution “must relate to and be germane to the subject-matter of the article proposed to be amended,” if
“the effect of the amendment of a particular article is to change other articles of the constitution, and such changes are germane and only incidental to the object sought to be accomplished by the express amendment, then the fact that articles of the constitution other than the article expressly amended are changed does not render the express amendment invalid by reason of the fact that other articles of the constitution are changed to bring the constitution into a harmonious whole, after an amendment has been incorporated into the constitution as a part of a particular article thereof.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 290.
¶ 163 It could not be otherwise, this court reasoned, because “[a]ny other view would be so narrow as to prohibit *** in many, if not in all, cases” amendments to the constitution,
“as the several articles of the constitution are so far connected and dependent upon each other that a change in any article, generally, if not universally, has the effect to produce changes of more or less importance in one or more of the articles of the constitution other than that which is expressly amended.” Id. at 284.
¶ 164 We made clear, of course, that
“if the effect of the amendment of a particular article of the constitution is to work changes in other articles of the constitution, and there is no connection between the object sought to be accomplished
by the express amendment to a particular article and the changes wrought in other articles of the constitution, that is, the changes worked, by implication, in other articles than that expressly amended are entirely foreign to the object sought to be accomplished by the express amendment, a different result would follow.” Id. at 290.
¶ 165 We also cautioned, however, that when assessing whether a proposed amendment satisfies constitutional requirements governing such amendments, courts should proceed with deference and restraint. Proposed amendments should not be invalidated “unless it clearly appear[s] that the limitations imposed [by the constitution] upon the grant of the power *** to propose amendments to the constitution had been abused, [for] the limitations imposed upon the power *** to propose amendments should not be so construed as to defeat the power itself, except in a case falling clearly within the terms of the limitation.” Id. at 290-91. In accordance with these principles, the court held that the challenged amendment was, in fact, valid.
¶ 166 Drafters of constitutional provisions are presumed to know existing law and constitutional provisions and to have drafted their provisions accordingly. Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 41. Although Reeves was decided 64 years before the constitutional convention at which
¶ 167 While the challenge in Reeves involved a different mechanism for amending the constitution and arose in a different posture than the controversy before us, the reasoning and analysis are fully applicable to this case. The object sought to be accomplished by Independent Maps’ proposed amendment is an overhaul of the current mechanism for carrying out redistricting, which is unquestionably a structural and procedural subject of
¶ 168 Rather than taking the opportunity to speak up and explain why it believes the initiative proposed by Independent Maps here must nevertheless be rejected, the majority simply said, without comment, “denied.”
¶ 169 Second, the majority suggested that some alternative plan involving a nonlegislative actor other than the Auditor
¶ 170 Finally, Independent Maps urges the court to reconsider its refusal to consider the other substantive points in the case because it believes that we should, at a minimum, provide some guidance for formulation of future initiatives. I agree, particularly in light of the importance of the rights at stake. Without the critical clarification that rehearing would provide, the majority‘s disposition not only fails to provide a road map, it erects a roadblock that seems insurmountable.
¶ 171 For all of the foregoing reasons and for the reasons set forth in my original dissent, rehearing should have been granted. I therefore dissent from the denial of rehearing.
¶ 172 CHIEF JUSTICE GARMAN and JUSTICE THOMAS join in this dissent.