IDAHO COUNTY PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Mardell J. Edwards, its president and individually, and Betty DeVeny, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SYRINGA GENERAL HOSPITAL DISTRICT, a hospital district organized and operating under the laws of the State of Idaho and its Board of Trustees, John Link, Ray Stowers, Mildred Asker, Gretta Anderson, Kathie Snodgrass, Carm Spencer, and Wayne Hollopeter, in their official capacity, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 18286
Supreme Court of Idaho, Lewiston, October 1990 Term.
Feb. 8, 1991.
805 P.2d 1233
tional, the plaintiffs’ alleged negligence cannot be used to decrease the defendant‘s liability. For this proposition the plaintiffs cite Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977), overruled on other grounds, Owen v. Boydstun, 102 Idaho 31, 624 P.2d 413 (1981), and Weitzel v. Jukich, 73 Idaho 301, 251 P.2d 542 (1952). While these cases do stand for the proposition that contributory negligence cannot be used as a defense to intentional conduct, the cases cited by the plaintiffs are inapplicable to the facts of this case. The jury‘s verdict finds that the release of water by the defendant was intentional and knowing and was not the result of an accident. The special verdict cannot be used to find other intentional conduct on the part of the defendant. Specific questions concerning whether the defendant intentionally damaged the plaintiffs or intentionally invaded the plaintiffs’ property were not submitted to the jury. The plaintiffs’ argument is without merit.
The parties also attack the apportionment of liability and the determination of the right to contribution. The determination and apportionment of negligence is for the trier of fact to determine and will not be set aside if supported by competent and substantial evidence. Nelson v. Northern Leasing Co., 104 Idaho 185, 657 P.2d 482 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980). See also
Because we remand this action to the trial court, it is unnecessary to discuss other assignments of error raised by the parties. An analysis would not materially aid in determining the outcome of this action.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that the trial court erred in determining that SRCC had a duty of flood control. We reverse the trial court‘s judgment and remand for a new trial. The trial court improperly excluded evidence as to prior years’ operating experience, a possible plugging of the culvert, evidence as to the natural carrying capacity of Salmon Falls Creek, and evidence as to what the Salmon Falls Creek flow would have been in 1984 without the dam.
The trial court also erred in determining that the highway districts were immune from liability. We find based upon the record before us that there are material issues of fact as to whether the highway districts fulfilled the requirements of
Costs to appellant.
BAKES, C.J., and BISTLINE, JOHNSON and BOYLE, JJ., concur.
Roger L. Williams, Kamiah, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Clements, Brown & McNichols, Lewiston, for defendants-respondents. Michael E. McNichols, argued.
This is an action by the plaintiffs for a writ of mandamus, a writ of prohibition, or in the alternative, an injunction to prohibit the Syringa Hospital District from expending taxes levied and collected by the district. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition as moot, as it determined that the taxes had already been expended. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Syringa Hospital District (“Syringa“) is a taxing district that encompasses most of Idaho County. Syringa was duly formed in 1975. It has operated at a small profit since its inception. It was not until 1984 that Syringa began issuing tax levies to create a fund for future building expansion and renovation.
Starting with fiscal year 1985, Syringa began issuing and collecting a one (1) mill tax levy pursuant to
In the years 1987 and 1988, Syringa levied and collected a one (1) mill levy pursuant to
In May of 1988, Syringa was successful in obtaining an Idaho Community Development Block Grant to renovate the existing hospital facilities. Syringa needed $538,000.00 of its own monies to complete the renovation. Syringa used the funds in the capital improvement fund to help pay this cost.
In September of 1988, plaintiffs instituted the present action seeking a writ of prohibition, a writ of mandamus, or injunctive relief. Plaintiffs sought an order prohibiting the expenditure of any funds remaining in the capital improvement fund and returning them to the taxpayers.
The trial court found that the issue was moot as the monies in the capital improvement fund were either already spent or had been committed to pay the cost of the renovation. Finding no justiciable issues, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against Syringa and the plaintiffs appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
ISSUES
The issues on appeal are:
- Were the
I.C. § 39-1334 taxes properly levied and expended by Syringa? - Was Syringa Hospital District a “taxing district newly created” for purposes of
I.C. § 63-2220 ? - Were the
I.C. § 39-1333 taxes properly levied and expended? -
Was relief available through a writ of prohibition, a writ of mandamus, or an injunction? - Were the issues raised by plaintiffs moot?
- Did Syringa Hospital District violate the budget certification process required by
I.C. §§ 63-624 and63-624A ?
To determine whether the tax levies were proper, it is necessary to approach each levy separately. First we will address the
At the outset, we are mindful that all tax statutes are to be strictly construed and any ambiguities will be resolved in favor of the taxpayers. Futura Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 92 Idaho 288, 442 P.2d 174 (1968). Statutes must be interpreted to effectuate the intent and purpose of the legislature. Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d‘Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983).
1. IDAHO CODE § 39-1334 LEVIES
The pertinent part of
(a) If it becomes necessary and expedient so to do, it shall be lawful for the board to levy additional taxes and collect revenue for the purpose of creating a reserve sinking fund for the purpose of accumulating moneys with which to add new buildings or necessary equipment, and to provide extensions of and betterments to the improvements of the district, and for such purposes may levy an additional tax not to exceed one (1) mill on the dollar on all taxable property in the district.
We find no ambiguity in this statute. Where no ambiguity exists, we must follow the law as written. Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 393 P.2d 35 (1964). This statute allows for an accumulation of monies for capital improvements as determined by the board of the taxing district. There are no requirements for a public hearing, or a specific plan of renovation, nor a maximum period allowed for accumulation. The board of directors of the taxing district are allowed complete discretion to assess this levy.
Syringa levied and collected monies pursuant to this statute and placed them in a separate capital improvement fund. These monies accumulated for a period of years and were then used to pay for the renovation of the existing facilities, as contemplated by the statute. We hold that this tax was properly levied and expended.
2. “TAXING DISTRICT NEWLY CREATED”
We next turn our attention to the
Idaho Code § 39-1333 allows for an ad valorem tax for the purpose of raising “the amount required by the district annually to supply funds to pay for expenses of organization, purchase of necessary equipment, operation, maintenance and upkeep of the works and equipment of the district ...,” or in other words, the district‘s annual operating budget. This section limits the amount the district can levy to three (3) mills on the dollar and provides that any levy in excess of two (2) mills requires a public hearing before the board can issue the levy.
A district‘s budget request is controlled by
Since
- Districts that levied in any one of the previous three fiscal years preceding the current tax year;
- Districts that had levied previously, but not for the fiscal years 1978, 1979, or 1980;
- Taxing districts newly created;
- School districts;
- Highway districts; and,
- Recapture formula for previous budget requests where no increase over the previous year was requested.
A district can override the limitation imposed by
Pertinent to this discussion are the first three subsections, as they are the ones that seemingly would apply to Syringa. Syringa cannot fit into subsection (i) as it did not issue a levy any of the three years previous to the first levy for fiscal year 1987. Likewise, subsection (ii) is inapplicable as Syringa did not issue a levy in 1978, 1979 or 1980. Syringa also failed to issue a levy in any previous year.
The only category that might apply is subsection (iii). Taxing districts newly created are allowed to budget for their current needs with minimum limitations. An ambiguity arises because the statute fails to define the term “taxing districts newly created.” We must determine whether this subsection could apply to Syringa.
If it is determined that Syringa did not belong in any category, two results are possible. The first would deny Syringa the ability to issue a levy because it would not have a base from which to work. This is absurd as it would deny Syringa the ability to ever issue a levy, clearly contrary to legislative intent.
The other result would be to determine that
The only logical way to construe the statute is to define newly created taxing districts as those districts that have not previously issued a levy. This is the position that Syringa was in in 1987 when it issued the
Another factor leading us to believe in this interpretation is the amount of time that has transpired since this statute was first enacted. The original statute was enacted in 1980, the amendment allowing for newly created taxing districts was enacted in 1981. Over nine years have passed and the legislature has failed to take any action to amend this statute. The legislature‘s acquiescence leads us to believe the Tax Commission‘s interpretation is correct.
3. IDAHO CODE § 39-1333 LEVIES
Since we determine that Syringa is a taxing district newly created, the next step is to determine whether the
For fiscal year 1987, in order to obtain a base for
For fiscal years 1988 and 1989, Syringa would obtain its base pursuant to
Appellants would have us aggregate both the one (1) mill request pursuant to
Syringa issued a one (1) mill levy pursuant to
Although the levies for fiscal years 1987 through 1989 were imposed properly, they were not expended properly. The placing of the taxes collected into the capital improvement account and allowing those levies to accumulate violates the statute. The statute allows a levy to provide funds to be used in the current fiscal year. It does not provide for the funds to accumulate over a period of years.
Idaho Code § 39-1333 does not demonstrate an intent by the legislature to let the district accumulate funds for future use. This section states that taxes are to be raised “annually to supply funds.” The wording of this section instructs the board of directors of a taxing district to prepare a budget for the coming fiscal year and then the board is allowed to levy a tax if it is necessary to supply funds for the coming fiscal year. It does not allow the placement of the funds in a capital improvement account.
4. AVAILABLE REMEDIES
Having determined that the
The plaintiffs sought mandamus to compel Syringa to return the taxes. Mandamus is properly used to compel the performance of an act required by law. A writ is only issued upon a showing that the petitioner has a clear legal right to relief. Brooks v. Edgington, 40 Idaho 432, 233 P. 514 (1925). Mandamus will not lie to coerce or control discretion. Fitzpatrick v. Welch, 96 Idaho 280, 527 P.2d 313 (1974). Here, issues involving taxes are left to the discretion of the hospital board. The board is free to levy a tax or not levy a tax; nor are they under a legal duty to pay a tax refund. A writ of mandamus is not proper in this case.
The plaintiffs next asked for a writ of prohibition. A writ arrests any tribunal that is about to act without or in excess of authority.
The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief in their petition, but failed to pursue this avenue of relief. An injunction is a proper remedy in this situation. A preliminary injunction could have been issued to prohibit Syringa from placing the
5. MOOTNESS
An issue is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome. Cenarrusa v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 395, 509 P.2d 1316 (1973); Tryon v. Baker, 94 Idaho 222, 485 P.2d 964 (1971). The trial court determined that it could not grant any relief as any justiciable controversy had ended. At the time summary judgment was heard, there still remained a substantial amount of the
Thus, the requirements for an injunction were present and it was error for the district court to deny the injunction. We remand to the trial court to ascertain whether any
6. CERTIFICATION PROCESS
Plaintiffs also complain that Syringa failed to comply with the certification requests of
CONCLUSION
We hold that the
We award costs to appellants on appeal.
BAKES, C.J., and BISTLINE and BOYLE, JJ., concur.
JOHNSON, Justice, dissenting:
The basic premise of that portion of the Court‘s opinion dealing with
ing
I cannot agree that we should characterize the imposition of the levy under
I also believe we should consider not only the