*1 оf damages reasonable, that different fered as a result of the breaches of warran- measure may Lord, be used. supra. Any ty- incidental and consequential damages remanded for a new trial. Reversed and
proved may also be recovered. I.C. 28- §§ No fees al- appellants. attorney’s Costs to 2-714(3), 28-2-715. lowed. At trial the court refused to admit Jen- DONALDSON, C.J., BISTLINE, J., sens’ and tendered relating evidence to the val- ue of the WALTERS, tern., home pro because of the defects as J. concur. contrasted with the value of the home had BAKES, J., concurs in the result. it been retrial, Upon warranted. BAKES, Justice, concurring specially: Jensens may submit such additional evi- dence tending reviewing show that difference in After the instructions as a valuation. We specifically whole, 12, 13, do not reverse particularly Instruction Nos. the exercise of discretion of the trial court relating to formation and in refusing to admit the tendered evidence. contract, revocation of the I agree with the Nelson, See Stoddard v. those majority instructions are suffi- upon If remand the Jen- ciently contradictory confusing to re- sens are unable to prove the amount of loss However, quire a new trial. agree cannot in value caused the breaches of warran- with much of the majority opinion as it ty, such would constitute a “special circum- law, relates to sales and warranty much of stance” which may enable them to recover really which is not applicable peculiar on an alternate measure of damages. See facts of this case which involve a written Shouse, Downs Ariz.App. contract for sale of a 17 month old mobile 401 (Ariz.Ct.App.1972). condition, home in an “as is” but neverthe- year less with a one manufacturer’s written In summary, we hold that the trial court warranty repair any defects which are erred in failing to adequately instruct during year period discovered after jury on the matters of revocation of accept- sale. ance home, of the mobile the breaches of express warranties, damages for breach express must, warranties. The cause
therefore, be remanded for a new trial lim-
ited to those enumerated issues. Upon re-
mand,
if the jury finds the existence of
which are demonstrated as some other “rea-
sonable measure” of damages direct suf- *2 Hannon, B. Gabourie
Kenneth Howard of d’Alene, Howard, for appellants- & Coeur defendants and cross-defendants. Elаm, Burke, Ev- Tyler, Robert M. Jr. of Koontz, ans, Boise, respondents- Boyd & defendants and cross-plaintiffs. SHEPARD, Justice. appeal by defendants-appel-
This is an judgment awarding lants from a Griesmer and in favor of against them of Idaho respondents-defendants State Jane Doe Brink. We af- Michael and firm. one for personal action was principal a
injury damages arising from collision be- an motorcycle tween a Idaho State was a police car. Plaintiff Masters patrol motorcycle owned and passenger on Brink Roger driven Griesmer. Michael and the Police Officer an Idaho State car. Brink operator police patrol of a state motorcy- pursuing Griesmer-driven cle, speed ap- at a traveling which was When per 90 miles hour. proximately U-turn, Brink make a оbserved Griesmer him, stopped Brink and start back toward car, patrol blocking highway patrol vehi- motorcycle collided with cle. injured in the accident and
Masters Griesmers, filed suit the State trial, Idaho, Upon Brinks. joint “6-803. Contribution tort- state moved for directed in its right Excep- verdict feasors—Declaration of — on favor the basis that the acts of fell Brink tion—Effect of comparative negligence. discretionary duty within “a —(1) function or of contribution exists governmental tortfeasors, entity among joint tort- employee thereof” and hence was no judg- there feasor is to a money not entitled *3 liability of either the state or its by ment for contribution until he has employee. 6-904(1). plain- I.C. See Both payment discharged liability § the common tiff op- Masters and defendants paid pro Griesmer or hаs than share more rata posed the briefing motion with extensive thereof. argument. and The trial court denied that “(2) joint A tortfeasor who enters into a appeal motion. No that was taken from the is not injured person settlement with
ruling. entitled recover an- contribution from joint liability tortfeasor whose jury defendant, The found that the Gries- injured extinguished by the is not person mer, was negligent and negligence that his the settlement. proximately Ninety- caused the collision. “(3) a disproportion When there is such percent five the negligence causal was among joint of fault assigned tortfeasors to Griesmer. jury The also found equal render inequitable the State of Idaho distribution and its Brink employee among liability by of the common negligent were their them that proximately degrees caused the relative of fault jury the collision. The joint attributed of the shall con- 5% the causal tortfeasors the State determining pro of Idaho and Brink. sidered in their rata The found that plaintiff the not solely purpose Masters was shares for the of determin- negligent and assessed damages ap- ing her rights their of contribution $97,000. proximately trial en- themselves, remaining severally The court each lia- judgment tered accordingly, de- finding injured all for whole person ble the the jointly fendants and severally liable. No injury as at common law.
appeal was taken
by
therefrom
the
any of
“(4)
herein, ‘joint
As used
tortfeasor’
parties.
(1)
(2) or
persons
means one
of two
more
jointly
severally
in tort
the
or
liable
for
Thereafter,
$10,000
Griesmers
the
paid
person
same
injury
property,
wheth-
judgment, and the State of Idaho
the
paid
been
judgment
er
has
recovered
$87,000.
remaining approximately
against all or some of them.”
Idaho had in its cross-claim assert-
ed that in
judgment
the event a
en-
was
definition,
state
By statutory
here
against
tered
it that it
turn
seek
would
clearly a
since
“joint tortfeasor”
the action
contribution from the Griesmers. Since
brought against
was
both
state and
judgment had been
against
entered
judgment thereon
ren-
Griesmers and
was
state, it
for summary
moved
for
both,
holding
jointly
dered
them
contribution against the
assert-
Griesmers
same
liable in tort
severally
that
the state
paid approximately
had
argue,
to Masters. The Griesmers
$82,000in excess of the state’s proportional however,
statutorily
that certain limitations
liability.
share
That motion for sum-
the state result
placed upon
liability
mary judgment
granted
was
and the Gries-
footing
standing
in the state
on a different
appeal
mers
therefrom.
do
hence the state
than
the Griesmers and
a “common
Griesmers
not share
Griesmers first
state
argue
liability”.
disagree.
We
is not a
tortfeasor
meaning
within the
of I.C. 6-803 because it does not share a
immu
sovereign
§
To the extent that
liability”
state,
“common
with
nity
abrogated by
the Griesmers and
has been
hence the
state
for its
subjected
liability
negligent
entitled
contribu
itself to
provides:
tion.
I.C. 6-803
employees,
of its
negligent
§
acts
acts
accident,
extent,
ment at the time of
and there-
the state shares a
and to
same
liability,
immune
party
fore the
from
liability
private
with third
state
6-904(1),
any payment
case is an
and hence
example
tortfeasors. The instant
see I.C. §
tort claims act
by
voluntary
thereof. Under the fеderal
made
the state
claims
(after which
tort
act was
now
our state
for which it cannot
seek contribution.
patterned)
many
evidently
state tort
is clear that
defense
record
claims acts
some or all of the
which contain
exception
function
discretionary
exceptions contained in
Idaho tort
state at
by
state’s
was asserted
act,
governmen
claims
held that
has been
trial,
Griesmers,
was resisted
tal entities
both sue and be sued for
may
of an
subject
position
state’s
Cab,
contribution.
United States
Yellow
court,
the trial
ruling by
adverse
presentations of the issue at stake —to
a proper determination as to whether the
I.
can be said to have
legislature
sequel
Here we have
Odenwalt v.
plaintiff’s contributing neg
intended that a
Zaring,
(1980),
act
ligence might
precluding
still
bar
wherein the split on the Court was three-to-
is
recovery
given
from a
tortfeasor. The
two. By
single
vote the lot of tort vic-
sue presented was extremely important.
tims in the
of Idaho was thrown
On the
go-around
first
Court had the
victims,
with that of Wisconsin’s tort
not-
benefit of
briefs of the
parties,
withstanding
legislature expressed
that the
favor
naturally
who
advocated contentions
no intent whatever that such should hap-
say
their
That is not to
that the
purses.
pen.
said, however,
It
the three-
well,
briefs,
argument
and oral
were not
majority
6-801,
member
I.C. §
well
well
They
done.
were
done.
“enacted in
virtually
identical to the
suggest, however,
here there was far
Wisconsin comparative negligence statute
question
more at stake thаn
in effect in 1971.” 102 Idaho at
whether Odenwalt
entitled to have his
at 386. Upon
premise
that slender
of a
against Zaring
run
at stake
—but
statute,
“virtually identical”
the majority
was a
law vital
question of
to the entire
simply declares that “we should follow the
state.
It must be remembered that
interpretation
Wisconsin Su-
ten years
the enactment
following
of House
preme
placed upon
Court had
their compar-
law1,
Bill
No. 265 into
had not
*5
ative negligence
prior
statute
to 1971.” 102
arisen,
either
presumably
proper
because a
5,
Idaho at
referring
being
to a defendant
but
unlike Odenwalt
Today,
Wisconsin.
regard
magnitude
with due
for the
own reason
indulges
its
properly
Court
issue,
being
and the court
decided three-to-
meaning
application
ing as to the
two, it
rehearing
is unbelievable that
is as it should
This
legislative language.
not allowed and
matter
reconsidered
be,
in Odenwalt.
have been
and as
should
with the benefit of amicus briefs and oral
if
opinion,
the Court’s
The rationale of
to be. The three
argument.
was not
it,
that, under I.C.
understand
correctly
comprised
who
members of the Court
6-803,2
be determined
contribution shall
§
petition;
stone-walled the
majority simply
neg
percentages
simply by applying
enlightening
an
rehear-
opportunity
approach does have
ligence.
an
Such
away.
single
ing was turned
One
vote
correct,
simplicity,
may
virtue
majority
one of the
would have at least
so,
greatly
if
troubled
am
receptive
attitude of
displayed
open
easily
provide in rather
does not so
statute
Court,
rehearing
on a
the entire
the stat
contrary,
On the
language.
stated
beneficiary.
been the
state would have
“inequitable,”
in terms of
ute
couched
contribution, “rela
section,
only,
“equal
distribution”
One
one and one
“fault,”
“determining
Act,
comparative
tive
negli-
degrees,”
dealt with
*6
mind,
This, my
rata
pro
ma-
shares.”
brought
which fact was
to the
their
gence,
applica
than a mechanical
opinion,
suggests more
dissenting
in the
jority’s attention
If
percentages.
jury-determined
at
P.2d at 389. Yet the
tion of
102 Idaho
simplistic
then
such,
approach,
accepts
sim-
one
majority,
responding
without
judicial action
really no need for
its
there is
ply
pat
stood
declaration
as
of the court can
the whatever —the clerk
adopting
in 1971
legislature
Idaho
damages
does,
against
easily apply percentages
act. This it
notwithstand-
Wisconsin
is,
judge.
can a
there
other
for section
than
among
equal
inequitable
them
provides:
distribution
I.C.
6-803
§
by
liability
of the
among
joint
“6-803. Contribution
tort-
joint
degrees
tort-
right Exception—
of fault
relative
feasors —Declaration
—
determining
comparative negligence.
(1)
be considered
shall
Effect
feasors
—
among joint
solely
purpose of
pro
tort-
for the
of contribution exists
rata shares
their
feasors,
joint
not
determining
rights
but a
tortfeasor
entitled
of contribution
their
money judgment
severally
for
until
themselves,
remaining
to a
contribution
each
discharged
the common
by payment
he
injured person
for
whole
liable
liability
pro
paid
rata
or has
more than
law.
as at common
share thereof.
herein, ‘joint
“(4)
tortfeasor’ means
As used
“(2)
joint
set-
A
who enters into a
tortfeasor
persons jointly
(2)
(1) of
or more
two
injured person is
enti-
tlement with the
injury to
severally
in tort for the same
liable
contribution
from another
tled to recover
property,
person
or not
whether
injured
joint
tortfeasor whose
or some
all
has been recovered
person
extinguished
is not
the settlement.
added.)
(Emphasis
them.”
disproportion
“(3)
When there
such
among tortfeasors
as to render
fault
mind,
With such in
and turning to the
“A. No.”
case,
facts of the
instant
would seem that
Brief, p. 13.
Appellant’s
judicial
the statute contemplates
interven-
Questioned
speed,
about vehicle
investi-
tion in passing upon
of contri-
this:
gating officer said
bution. Here the
did
assess
five
“Q.
make a
you
Did
determination
percent negligence
police
to the
officer.
Idaho
to how fast the
State Patrol vehicle
Probably,
surmise,
one would
not because
might
going
have been
at
the time
the officer’s
not grossly
conduct was
negli-
impact?
intentional,
gent and even
but because the
all,
underlying cause was the
I
speeding
motorcy-
going any speed
“A.
If he was
though
cle—even
not speeding
when
per
two miles
hour....
say
would
one or
officer,
in what has to be gross disre-
put
reason
“Q.
why you
Is there
gard of the motorcycle passenger’s life and
per
opposed
miles
hour as
down two
safety, abruptly placed two tons of steel
zero?
glass
path.
its
directly in
Juries are
Well,
No,
particularly.
“A.
more often right than
wrong,
we ought
than Mr.
statement.
Brink’s
not shut our
fact
eyes
juries
he
“Q.
acknowledge
Did he
to you
See,
go awry.
example,
for
Odziemek v.
was still in
at the time of impact?
motion
Wesely,
Idaho
(1981);
way
acknowledged
“A. The
he
Finch,
Dinneen v.
me is
was a
he felt it
transaction where
(1979);
Bentzinger McMurtrey, 100
at the
time.
everything happened
Idaho
same
(1979);
“A. Yes. stopped right center line there? “Q. please Then tell us. Well, the “A. time of impact “A. He drove it there. either almost stopped stopped; or I can’t “Q. you Did any find indication that it exаctly. recall was driven there than intentionally by the officer?
“Q. Brief, What your purpose per- Appellants’ pp. 15-16. forming this maneuver? course, upon to jury, was not called The “A. my intention to block his willful or between indulge in distinctions escape stop.” route so he would negligence. ordinary wanton Brief, Appellant’s pp. 14-15. been, are better have matters Such patrolman deny The did he that suited, The court’s determination. for a knew there was a passenger aboard could, apportioned causal jury, best motorcycle, gave weird view that negligence. off, get she could or part otherwise become bring our attention The Griesmers crime, al- notwithstanding that Supreme Wyoming recent case from leged crime of speeding the driver’s earlier nearly to be on аll appears Court which had to an come end and the motorcycle Wyoming this case. fours with the facts of no longer speeding: are much generally statutes on contribution words, 16th, “Q. Ok. In other on July Idaho’s, provision in addition to a like use you thought you high then could 6-803, provi- there is identical to I.C. § stop risk procedure to Mr. Griesmer explicitly provides: which sion ignore danger passenger to the so favor “There is no of contribution road you keep people could down the intentionally, who any tortfeasor What public you protecting? safe? are contribut- wantonly or caused or willfully down the people “A. road. wrongful or death.” ed “Q. passenger What about 1-1-110 Wyo.Stat. § motorcycle? noted, I, is my understanding
“A. Well of that as have Wyoming op- has the passenger vehicle “thе negligence statutes comparative under ride, off, get refuse the portunity can neg percentage must determine refuse to be with the violator. There- to each rather ligence party, attributed fore, she of the crime. becomes ‘ordinary categorizations than the broad ” ‘gross Dan negligence’ negligence.’ Now, Brown, 187, 192
“Q. your testimony, (Wyo. is it Officer culovich v. Brink, 16,1976, you July you felt on 1979). were not two de Although there duty no to Pam Masters as far case, owed and the fendants in that her safety? sole plaintiff between the arose legal conclusions do you defendant, know how mean the court’s really
“A. don’t two that. arises between apply issue where which, tortfeasors, That here as here. Well, “Q. your the best of recollec- Idaho, inequitable, to as statute refers tion, рrior July immediately on fault, is proportion traffic lane turning oncoming because of into line, you are statute calls intention past fog Wyoming and even going you owed opinion al, willful, negligence. it’s Ida telling your us or wanton motorcy- fault,” no to her duty of care “proportion language, ho speeding had been they cle driver because claims resolving issue in further? down road ascertaining equities— hinged deter No, hence, simply “inequitable” not true. “A. that's jury-formed repetition a mere mined you think owe “Q. duty you What *8 court under Wyoming percentages. passenger? to her as a stands this: get get stopped to her or Trying “A. stopped.
them and wan- of ‘willful category “But the likewise rele- lane can not be “Q. oncoming Is into an ton’ misconduct turning traffic, advent of endanger- in an your opinion, оf to obsolescence gated ‘ordinary’ While comparative negligence. act? in degree, negligence differ ‘gross’ cases, yes.” In some
“A.
205 and under consequences, disregard of and ‘willful ‘ordinary’ negligence a and conditions In such circumstances differ kind. wanton’ misconduct know, rea- or have would reasonable man degrees negligence apportioning the of would, in know, conduct to that such longer son a will no parties, between result degree probability, of high which a point at be with concerned v. Mitchell to another. It substantial harm gross. ordinary negligence becomes Am.Jur.2d, Negli- Walters, and 57 supra; relativity negligence consider the will But, p. this degree degrees. gence, 100 § to not the dif- apportionment does concern contributory “Ordinary negligence kind of whiсh dis- ference conduct where defendant’s precluded recovery not willful and tinguishes negligence from v. or willful. Mitchell conduct is wanton ligence, since misconduct, than wanton than the element of conduct “ gence so-called constructive intent.’ while both differ in kind from “ ‘ * * * ought “ ““ and intentional conduct which injure.” [******] negative. inadvertence, * * * ** misconduct. differ in “Willful misconduct is be * Willful ’ Ordinary known to have a involves strict degree and is Willful and wanton sense, equivalent positive intent gross negli- inattention, is not ” ’ tendency involves the in- willful rather rather is or neg- to a ples tion with inequitable, International which discussed Other fendant cites is (Wyo.1979) (emphasis omitted). Danculovich [508 tral R.R. Walters, “Representative of (Pa.1973): attendant authority P.2d liability to Pennsylvania supra; 602], supra.” Co., Harvester v. per furnished Brown, Cage and Sanders Idahо’s distributing a F.Supp. equitable plaintiff, Act is the eases the added) Co., New statute) princi- the Griesmers Rubright (otherwise, in connec- York Cen (footnotes shares v. Pitner (W.D.Pa. F.Supp. at 193 de 1967). tracing genesis In after doing something Cage,
tentional done, or fail- and evolution of should not be intentional Pennsylva interpreted Weber something Judge ure to do which should Joint done, Among automo- nia Uniform Contribution operation act that the bile, so as to hold tending Tortfeasors Act under circumstances principles ex- embodies operator’s knowledge, equitable disclose the wil will allow a wanton equity or that an press implied, contribu negligent party such to extract guest probable fully will be a result of negli merely party tion from a negligence, conduct. It differs from being ratio Cage decidendi gross mаy gent. even negligence, although culpa where tortfeasor is more gross negligence, include and involves another, equi in the moral sense than distin- ble positive distinct element making the burden of ty prefers ele- guished merely negative from the fall the tort upon whole injured party ment of or carelessness. type the more onerous with accomplish feasor willfully designed ” result, ‘guilt.’ and is aimless specific ’ results.” purpose regardless F.Supp. at 1398. Mitchell v. 317], Walters, [102] supra 106-107. [55 Wyo. Among “The Pennsylvania Joint Tortfeasors Uniform Contribution Act embodies 9(l)(c). cost of Negligence spreading C.J.S. favors § “See policy injured party compensating an mis- in willful and wanton “The intent who cause parties injuries intent to cause is not an conduct application act, injuries. general those intent do аn but it is an injury, interests the best policy serves act, reckless this do an intent to not *9 the ex- The justice. agree explained We with decision Bielski court how numerical about, rata had come pro apportionment the Cage to the effect pressed in judicial legislation comparing history its of equitable principle of contribution should jurisdictions: to that of other obliga- not be used to transfer of the part is an eq doctrine of contribution “The to pay compensation party tion from a justice on uitable doctrine based natural to quasi intentionally acted so as recognized suretyship and well do a act to wilfully negligent wanton it was of the law before areas party merely negligent.” applied As con adapted negligence. at 1400. F.Supp. tracts, equity, either equality genuine There no should be doubt but such reimbursement implied promise of principles equity inequity of will gov- nature of the or because of the contribution, things ern claims for all other (1914), Ryan for debt. See Estate of the fact, equal. In for being counsel the State 576, 147 L.R.A. 1917A 157 Wis. N.W. argument, concluding presen- at oral con Naturally, prorata 443. share tation, eq- declared that “contribution is an parcel of doc cept, being fact, equitable In the term concept. uitable trine, the doctrine was was used when statute, 6-803, subsection 3.” At negligence. is used applied in the field of transition, “It’s immediately negligence But he went on add: time of this basis, comparative not on a way to allocate loss determined appropriate tortfeasors negligent or more we two сomparative negligence system, our as to each other as equal stood in relation do, percentages in terms of of cause Palmer v. Wick and co-debtors did. I am unable to see how negligence.” Co., Ltd. Shipping Pulteneytown Steam first, but premise last is said follow (1894), 318. A.C. lan- persuaded “inequitable” am date, “Wisconsin, early relatively at a guage brings play of our Idaho statute into step by judicial decision took the forward passive negli- considerations of active and neg between recognized contribution gence which are before properly Chicago & in Ellis v. ligent tortfeasors mat- on a judge claim 392, 167 Wis. N.W. (1918), N.W.R. Co. concern. ters today, 1048. Even Wisconsin ascribing equi- That counsel states, which, by minority origins to the doctrine contribution table decisions, of con recognizes doctrine Supreme the Wisconsin fortified cases, although negligence tribution in Schulze, to Bielski Prior Court. states, have by legislation, adopt some 20 (1962), judi- N.W.2d 105 Wis.2d general application ed the rule doctrine contribution cially created pur negligent cases or for more limited aon joint applied tortfeasors was amongst state has determined poses. No other i.e., basis, plain- of a pro rata the amount on comparative amongst damages apportioned equally tiff’s decision, by legisla judicial basis by tortfeasors, or, Biel- worded in better tion, in adopting states have done so some ski: Among Uniform Contribution is whether “The crux of Act. 9 U.L.A. 233.” Tortfeasors determining automatic method of present 114 N.W.2d 108. equal between the number of shares pros and lengthy After discussion number of tortfeasors involved its cons, modified earli- the Wisconsin court equitable and as a determination er rule conclude that: determining the amount contribution as there is equity, to do “If the doctrine is proportion percent- of the shares in justice or in natural no in logic reason attributable age causal liability of why shares of each tortfeasor.” translated joint tortfeasors should negli- of the causal into percentage 114 N.W.2d at
207
gence
injury.
(Miss.1977);
which contributed to the
1316
Kennedy
So.2d
Co
merely
equita-
hen,
(Fla.
This is
a refinement
VanEyck,
Inc. v.
347
1085
So.2d
principle.
justify,
is difficult
ble
Dist.Ct.App.1977);
County
State v.
of Sulli
justice
either on a
sense of
or on
layman’s
van,
29,
253 (App.
54 A.D.2d
386 N.Y.S.2d
justice,
natural
tortfeasor
why
Div.1976); Graphic Arts Mutual Insurance
causally negligent
who is 5%
should
Co.,
Co. v. Bakers Mutual
Insurance
58
paid
recover 50% of the amount he
397,
(App.Div.1977);
A.D.2d
interesting day
jurors
indeed when
are in-
III.
structed that
their verdicts
on
can turn
today
square
opinion
It is difficult to
our
they perceive
what
as doing equity.
years
which we issued
short
with that
I have endeavored to illustrate that
Lee,
Brockman Mobile Home Sales
ago.
today simply
up
Court
does not live
to its
There is also in the Griesmers’ should attention, it inconceiv for a that I find exposure damages tention that further wanton act of liability to exist that the willful and common cannоt be said able an inno directed toward patrolman it is not assuming where the State — allowing equitable is not an bar paying girl to suit —is cent immune immune motorcycle legislature the State any damages, substantial prior act of having back in 1971 set a maximum driver whose nothing to with $100,000 tort which had any speeding, recovery surely place. such ex- the collision took victim. No limitation of officer, even not be said that in favor of Such need ists other tortfeasors. the driver he felt defense, affronted because regularly though a limitation is and is could pursuit, him while in ignored utilized It is a won- had as such. pleaded means more humane you us if have found bargaining leverage: derful “Sue going quarry including will, win, only even if will have you apprehend we — an arrest obtaining $100,000.” magistrate need to a doubting to pay Anyone liabili- nothing see warrant.3 peruse opinion this Court’s recent result). Whelan, 651, 656, State v. See J., (1982) (Bistline, concurring in ty. opinion I see an which is at odds with case,
our though recent Brockman and even
the issue here is two obviously between carriers,
insurance I see opinion the Court’s law,
as creating bad approving mani- injustice.
fest
BENEWAH COUNTY CATTLEMEN’S
ASSOCIATION, INC., an cor-
poration, Plaintiff-Appellant,
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS COUNTY,
OF BENEWAH Jack A.
Buell, County Commissioner; Norman McCall, County
L. Commissioner; “Bud” Mills, Jr.,
George County Commissioner; Baltz,
Robert M. Sheriff of Benewah
County, Hutchinson, and Peter J. Prose- County,
cutor for Benewah Defendants-
Respondents.
No. 13516.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
May 1983.
Rehearing Denied Sept. “Initially, resulting inju- speed to be noted officers automobile in the chases ry engaged parties Dedrick and Von Puckett’s are com- actions death of the bystanders Their first mendable. contact with de- or innocent have been all chase pursuit prevalent years. fendant resulted Under automobile too circumstances, recent these apparently by judg- good exercise decision officers’ high-speed following day ment did not turn into a chase— could defendant be located determining justify the officers minor traffic infrac- and that the incident did not extraor- dinary procedures apprehension worth tions were not the risk of was cer- persons property. high- reports tainly Media admirable.”