Howard v. StateHoward v. State
We decide: (I) whether a circuit court judge other than a county administrative judge or that judge‘s designee may deny a motion to postpone; (II.A) whether a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to postpone to obtain counsel because the trial court does not ask questions of a self-represented defendant who has expressly waived the right to counsel after being advised of the right to counsel under
We hold that: (I) any circuit court judge may deny a motion to postpone; (II.A) a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to postpone to obtain counsel because the trial court does not ask questions of a self-represented defendant who has expressly waived the right to counsel after being advised of the right to counsel under
BACKGROUND
On October 8, 2008, law enforcement arrested Gregory Howard (“Howard“), Petitioner. The State, Respondent, charged Howard with first-degree rape and other crimes. On December 2, 2008, Howard was arraigned in the Circuit Court
Thereafter, the circuit court postponed trial eight times; Howard requested, either jointly with the State or separately, five of the postponements. On February 23, 2009, the circuit court granted a jointly-requested postponement, for which the circuit court charged both parties because the State had just provided discovery materials to Howard‘s counsel, who needed time to investigate. On May 5, 2009, the circuit court granted a State-requested postponement, for which the circuit court charged the State because Howard‘s counsel had not yet received DNA test results; on that date, in the circuit court, Howard stated: “[T]hey took my DNA four times.” On August 11, 2009, the circuit court granted a jointly-requested postponement, for which the circuit court did not charge either party because Howard‘s counsel was awaiting her expert‘s analysis of the DNA test results. On November 4, 2009, the circuit court granted a State-requested postponement, for which the circuit court charged the State because a State‘s witness was unavailable.
On December 17, 2009, on his own behalf, Howard filed in the circuit court the first of multiple motions to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial.1 On January 22, 2010, the circuit court granted a State-requested postponement because a State‘s witness was unavailable.2 On April 27, 2010, the circuit court granted a defense-requested postponement, for which the circuit court charged Howard because he had discharged his first lawyer3 and needed time to be assigned a
On January 21, 2011, the circuit court made certain that Howard had received a copy of the charging document containing notice as to the right to counsel; informed Howard of the right to counsel and the importance of assistance of counsel; and ensured that Howard was aware of the allowable penalties for the charges. Afterward, Howard expressly waived the right to counsel. On January 24, 2011, the circuit court denied the motions to dismiss for violation of Howard‘s right to a speedy trial.
On January 26, 2011, Howard appeared before the trial judge, who was not the circuit court‘s administrative judge or that judge‘s designee. Howard requested a postponement and requested the appointment of counsel, alleging that, within the previous week, the State had provided him with discovery materials. The trial judge denied the request for a postponement and the request for the appointment of counsel.
On January 31, 2011, trial began. A jury convicted Howard of first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense. Howard
DISCUSSION
I.
Howard contends that the trial judge lacked the authority to deny the motion to postpone because only a county administrative judge or that judge‘s designee may deny a motion to postpone.4 Specifically, Howard argues that
An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court‘s interpretation of a statute or a Maryland Rule. See Lowery v. State, 430 Md. 477, 487, 61 A.3d 794, 800 (2013) (“[W]e review a trial court‘s interpretation of a statute through a non-deferential prism.” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Fuster v. State, 437 Md. 653, 664, 89 A.3d 1114, 1120 (2014) (“An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court‘s interpretation of a Maryland Rule.” (Citation omitted)).
In interpreting a statute or a Maryland Rule, a court first considers the statute‘s or Maryland Rule‘s language, which the court applies if the statute‘s or Maryland Rule‘s language “is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute‘s [or Maryland Rule‘s] apparent purpose[.]” State v. Weems, 429 Md. 329, 337, 55 A.3d 921, 926 (2012) (citation omitted); Fuster, 437 Md. at 664, 89 A.3d at 1120 (“A court interprets a Maryland Rule by using the same canons of construction that the court uses to interpret a statute.” (Citation omitted)).
In Jones v. State, 403 Md. 267, 302, 941 A.2d 1082, 1102 (2008), this Court held that two circuit court judges “properly exercised their respective discretion ... to deny [a defendant] a postponement of his trial.” The defendant made a motion to postpone, which a county administrative judge‘s designee denied. See id. at 282-83, 285, 941 A.2d at 1091, 1092. On “the same day[,]” the defendant appeared before another circuit court judge, before whom the defendant “asked that he be sent back to” the county administrative judge‘s designee. Id. at 285-86, 941 A.2d at 1093. The circuit court judge stated: “I will consider that motion to be renewed and denied again[.]” Id. at 301, 941 A.2d at 1102. This Court concluded: “While it was within [the circuit court judge]‘s discretion to send [the defendant] back to [the county administrative judge‘s designee], he was not duty-bound to do so on the facts of this case.” Id. at 301, 941 A.2d at 1102.
Here, we unequivocally conclude that any circuit court judge may deny a motion to postpone in a criminal case. Since before
The plain language of
Howard mischaracterizes Jones in contending that, in Jones, id. at 301-02, 941 A.2d at 1101-02, this Court held only that the circuit court judge did not abuse his discretion in declining the defendant‘s request to return to the administrative judge‘s designee. The circuit court judge explicitly treated the defendant‘s request as a “renewed” motion to postpone, which the circuit court judge denied. Id. at 301, 941 A.2d at 1102. Thus, Jones belies Howard‘s contention that only a
Permitting any circuit court judge to deny a motion to postpone fulfills
We reject Howard‘s contentions that: (1)
Moreover, Howard‘s interpretation would frustrate
We are unpersuaded by Howard‘s reliance on isolated quotations from cases in which this Court stated in dicta that only a county administrative judge or that judge‘s designee may deny a motion to postpone. See Frazier, 298 Md. at 450, 470 A.2d at 1284 (A “judge [other than a county administrative judge or that judge‘s designee] has been deprived of the authority to exercise independent judgment concerning good cause for postponement.“); Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1, 7, 472 A.2d 436, 439 (1984) (“[T]he exercise of judgment in determining the presence or absence of good cause for postponement is vested in the administrative judge or his [or her] designee.” (Citing Frazier, 298 Md. at 450, 470 A.2d at 1284)); State v. Brown, 355 Md. 89, 98, 733 A.2d 1044, 1048 (1999) (“The
As Howard points out, under our holding, where a circuit court judge refrains from denying a motion to postpone, the circuit court judge will refer the motion to postpone to a county administrative judge or that judge‘s designee, who will rule on the motion to postpone. In short, neither the plain language nor the purpose of
For the above reasons, any circuit court judge may deny a motion to postpone.9 Thus, here, the trial judge had the authority to deny the motion to postpone.
Howard contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to postpone to obtain counsel because the trial judge did not ask him any questions. Alternatively, Howard argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to postpone to review discovery materials because he alleged that, within the previous week, the State had provided him with discovery materials. The State responds that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to postpone because the trial judge was not required to question Howard and Howard‘s motion to postpone was to obtain counsel, not to review discovery. Simply put, we agree with the State.10
An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to postpone. See Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 706, 759 A.2d 764, 794 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1115, 121 S.Ct. 864, 148 L.Ed.2d 776 (2001) (“[T]he decision whether to grant a postponement is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” (Citations omitted)).
A. Motion to Postpone to Obtain Counsel
“After there has been an express waiver [of the right to counsel], no postponement of a scheduled trial or hearing date will be granted to obtain counsel unless the court finds it is in the interest of justice to do so.”
Here, we conclude that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to postpone to obtain counsel because the trial court does not ask questions of a self-represented defendant who has expressly waived the right to counsel after being advised of the right to counsel under
We reject Howard‘s contention that, under Jones, 403 Md. 267, 941 A.2d 1082, before denying a motion to postpone to obtain counsel, a trial court is required to question a self-represented defendant who has expressly waived the right to counsel. In Jones, id. at 300, 272, 941 A.2d at 1101, 1085, this Court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a self-represented defendant‘s motion to postpone to obtain counsel after the defendant expressly waived the right to counsel. The trial court “questioned [the defendant] extensively about both [a] discovery issue and the need for an attorney.” Id. at 299, 941 A.2d at 1101. Nowhere in Jones did this Court state that a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to postpone to obtain counsel because the trial court does not ask any questions of a self-represented defendant who has previously expressly waived the right to counsel. Indeed, in Jones, id. at 300, 941 A.2d at 1101, this Court simply stated: “We find it preferable that [ ] a [trial court] review all relevant and available facts when determining whether to grant or deny a postponement.” (Emphasis in original).
Here, in accepting Howard‘s waiver of the right to counsel, the circuit court complied with
Here, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to postpone because Howard alleged that, within the previous week, the State had provided him with discovery materials.
In short, after discharging two lawyers and expressly waiving the right to counsel, Howard requested a postponement. Howard contends that the request for a postponement was based, in part, on his desire to review discovery materials. The State argues that Howard‘s request for a postponement was limited to a request for counsel.
Without addressing the accuracy of Howard‘s contention, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Howard‘s postponement request under either circumstance. As Howard‘s counsel conceded at oral argument, the State complied with
The record indicates that, far in advance of January 26, 2011 (the date on which Howard moved to postpone), Howard was on notice of this case‘s complexity and seriousness. On De
The record indicates that Howard was also made aware that discharging his second lawyer carried serious consequences. On October 27, 2010, the circuit court informed Howard of the importance of assistance of counsel, and informed Howard that trial would proceed as scheduled with Howard unrepresented by counsel if Howard discharged counsel and did not obtain new counsel. Thus, Howard knowingly and voluntarily decided to discharge his second lawyer even though he was aware that his case involved complex DNA evidence and that he could be convicted of an offense with a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life.
We find no merit in Howard‘s contention that the trial judge erred in failing to expressly find that a postponement would not have been in the interest of justice. In denying Howard‘s motion to postpone, the trial judge observed that the case was “old,” that Howard had moved to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, that discovery had been provided to Howard‘s counsel, and that the court was “not unconvinced” that Howard had not been “privy” to discovery, but that this was a consequence that Howard faced by discharging his lawyer. The trial judge also noted that Howard had discharged two lawyers. Although the trial judge did not state that it considered whether granting the postponement was in the interest of justice, the trial judge took into account
Under these circumstances, we are not at all convinced that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to postpone to review discovery materials. See
III.
Howard contends that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated because of the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, his assertion of his right, and presumed prejudice to him. The State responds that Howard‘s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated because of the neutral reasons for the delay and the lack of actual prejudice to Howard.
An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court‘s conclusion as to whether a defendant‘s constitutional
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial[.]”
In determining whether a defendant‘s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, a court considers the “[l]ength of [the] delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant‘s assertion of his [or her] right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (2009) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)) (first alteration in original). None of these four factors alone establishes a violation of the right to a speedy trial; thus, a court considers the four factors “together[.]” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182.
Here, we conclude that Howard‘s right to a speedy trial was not violated.
As to the length of the delay, Howard‘s trial began approximately twenty-eight months after Howard‘s arrest.14 Generally, a delay of “at least ... one year” “trigger[s] a speedy trial analysis[.]” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (citations omitted). However, “the length of the delay is the
In the aggregate, the reasons for the delay are neutral. Howard caused 183 days of delay because he discharged his first lawyer and his second lawyer needed time to prepare.15 Neither party caused 223 days of delay;16 thus, the reason for such delay was neutral. Both parties caused 71 days of delay;17 thus, the reason for such delay was neutral. The State caused 270 days of delay due to States’ witnesses’ unavailability;18 however, “a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The State also caused 98 days of delay because Howard‘s counsel had not yet received DNA
As the State concedes, Howard “frequently and strongly asserted his right to a speedy trial” through motions filed on his own behalf.
Howard, however, does not allege that the delay caused him actual prejudice; and a review of the record demonstrates that the delay did not cause any actual prejudice. In his brief, Howard exclusively relies on “[t]he assumed inherent prejudice” and does not explicitly allege that he suffered “oppressive pretrial incarceration [or] anxiety and concern“;20 and, even more importantly, Howard does not allege that his “defense [was] impaired.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (Impairment of a defense is “the most serious” form of prejudice to a defendant. (Quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182)). Howard does not speculate—much less proffer—that the delay caused any evidence to go missing, caused any witnesses to become unavailable, or caused any memory to fade. Indeed, some of the delay was intended to benefit Howard by allowing time for him to be assigned a new lawyer after he discharged his first lawyer and allowing time for the second lawyer to prepare.
Weighing all four factors, we conclude that the lack of actual prejudice and the neutral reasons for the delay outweigh the length of the delay and Howard‘s assertion of his right to a
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.
Notes
This Court has also implicitly distinguished a grant of a motion to postpone from a denial of a motion to postpone. See State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 317, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979) (“[T]he [General Assembly] expressed the will of the people (in [
If a defendant who is not represented by counsel indicates a desire to waive counsel, the court may not accept the waiver until after an examination of the defendant on the record conducted by the court, the State‘s Attorney, or both, the court determines and announces on the record that the defendant is knowingly and voluntarily waiving the right to counsel. If the file or docket does not reflect compliance with section (a) of this Rule, the court shall comply with that section as part of the waiver inquiry.