Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court. Digges, Cole and Davidson, JJ„ dissent and Davidson, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Digges and Cole, JJ., join at page 321 infra. See per curiam filed July 19, 1979, in denying motion for reconsideration at page 334 infra.
This appeal draws into question the proper application of Maryland Rule 746 which governs the scheduling of criminal cases for trial. The rule provides:
“a. General Provision.
Within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723 (Appearance — Provision for or Waiver of Counsel), a trial date shall be set which shall be not later than 120 days after the appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723 (Appearance — Provision for or Waiver of Counsel).
“b. Change of Trial Date.
Upon motion of a party made in writing or in open court and for extraordinary cause shown, the county administrative judge or a judge designated by him may grant a change of trial date.”
(1)
The Circuit Court for Wicomico County (Pollitt, J., administrative judge), deeming the provisions of Rule 746 to be mandatory, dismissed an eight-count criminal information
The record reveals that Hicks was serving a sentence in a Delaware prison when, on January 20, 1978, he invoked the provisions of the Interstate Agreement On Detainers, to which Maryland is a party state, to obtain a trial upon criminal charges then pending against him in Wicomico County.
When the case was called for trial before Judge Pollitt on August 8, 1978, the prosecutor advised the court that “arrangements” had been made to have Hicks in court, but that he was under sentence in a Delaware prison and had not “consented to come.” The court responded: “Obviously we can’t proceed without him.” The prosecutor informed the court that Hicks would finish serving his Delaware sentence in September at which time he would be returned to Maryland to begin serving the three-year sentence imposed upon him on April 4,1978. The prosecutor told the court that “we will have an opportunity to get custody of him sometime beginning in September.” The court ordered the case continued, remarking once again: “Obviously we can't do anything with the man [Hicks] not being here.”
On August 25, Hicks filed a motion to dismiss the criminal informatiоn on the ground that he had not been tried within the 120-day period prescribed by Rule 746. He contended that the State could have secured his attendance at trial on August 8 by invoking the Interstate Agreement On Detainers or by initiating extradition proceedings but had failed to do either. Hicks argued that the prosecutor made no motion at the August 8 hearing, either in writing or in open court, establishing the existence of “extraordinary cause” justifying a continuance beyond the 120-day period, as required by Rule 746.
A hearing on the motion was held before Judge Pollitt on October 2, 1978. The prosecutor argued that the requisite “extraordinary cause” under Rule 746 was shown at the August 8 hearing to justify the continuance in that the Delaware authorities refused to release Hicks for trial on August 8 unless the State invoked the provisions of the Interstate Agreement On Detainers. The prosecutor did not
“Our normal office procedure is not to do that unless there are very еxtraordinary circumstances, because usually there are costs involved and our budget does not provide for these extraordinary circumstances.”
The court said that it was concerned with whether Rule 746 was mandatory, and not with who was at fault in not having Hicks present for trial on August 8. Not having the benefit of a transcript of the August 8 hearing, the court remarked:
“I do not know what took place on August the 8th. I don’t know if there was a motion made at that time to change the trial date. The docket entry shows that he [Hicks] failed to appear because he was in the Delaware Correctional Center, and the case was continued.”
The court concluded that Rule 746 was mandatory and as a consequence the State was required to invoke the Interstate Agreement On Detainers and have Hicks present in court on August 8, or present a motion showing “extraordinary cause” for a continuance. Holding that “[t]here was no such motion,” Judge Pollitt dismissed the eight-count criminal information.
(2)
Maryland Rule 746 became effective on July 1,1977 as part of a complete revision of the Chapter 700 Rules relating to “Criminal Causes” in the circuit courts of the counties and in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. The precursor of Rule 746 was former Rule 740, adopted on June 1, 1972. It provided: “The date of trial and postponements shall be governed by Code, Article 27, section 591.” Section 591, enacted by ch. 212 of the Acts of 1971, provided:
“(a) Within two weeks after the arraignment of a person accused of a criminal offense, or within two weeks after the filing of an appearance of counsel or the appointment of counsel for an accused in any*316 criminal matter, whichever shall occur first, a judge or other designated official of the Circuit Court or the Criminal Court of Baltimore City in which the matter is pending, shall set a date for the trial of the case, which date shall be not later than six months from the date of the arraignment of the person accused or the appearance or the appointment of counsel for the accused whichever occurs first. The date established for the trial of the matter shall not be postponed except for extraordinary cause shown by the moving party and only with the permission of the administrative judge of the court where the matter is pending.
“(b) The judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland are authorized to establish additional rules of practice and procedure for the implementation of this section in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City and in the various circuit courts throughout the State of Maryland.”
In Young v. State,
Section 591 is plainly a declaration of legislative policy designed to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges; its enactment manifested the lеgislature’s recognition of the detrimental effects to our criminal justice system which result from excessive delay in scheduling criminal cases for trial and in postponing scheduled trials for inadequate reasons. Judge Jerrold Powers, speaking for the court, in Guarnera v. State,
“Postponement of cases from dates scheduled for trial is one of the major factors contributing to delay*317 in the administration of justice, civil as well as criminal. Courts and court supporting services spend substantial time ‘spinning their wheels’, in rescheduling cases. Available court time is lost. The time of attorneys and witnesses is lost. Witnesses themselves are lost. Those who are not are put to severe inconvenience as well as actual loss, and end up in despair at the frustrations of being involved in the trial of a case in the courts. The very image of the judicial system is in serious jeopardy. Public confidence in the courts as instruments of the people is impaired. Judges and lawyers cannot blame the ‘system’, for thеy are the people who run that system.
“When the Legislature has expressed the will of the people [in § 591] by saying that the date established for the trial of a criminal case shall not be postponed except for extraordinary cause, and has denied all judges but the administrative head of the court authority to exercise even that curtailed power, the message should be loud and clear to the bench, the bar, parties, witnesses, and to the public, that trials must not and will not be postponed for ordinary reasons.
“And all to whom this message has been sent must understand that it makes not the slightest difference whether a continuance requested is the fifth, the third, or the very first — the reasons for it must satisfy the administrative judge that they meet the test of extraordinary cause. All persons concerned with the trial of a criminal case in the courts of Maryland must be held to know that, barring good cause of an extraordinary nature, the case will go to trial on the date scheduled. And all persons concerned must be entitled to rely upon that knowledge.”
Judge Powers.’ admonitions in Guarnera were largely unheeded, a predictable result so long as under Young § 591
We think Judge Pollitt was in error, however, in concluding that the State had failed to make a motion at the August 8 hearing establishing the requisite “extraordinary cause” under the rule.
As heretofore indicated, the prosecutor at the August 8 hearing advised the court that Hicks was in a Delaware prison and for that reason was not present for trial. He also informed the court that Hicks would be available for trial the following month when he would be releаsed by Delaware authorities to serve an earlier imposed Maryland sentence. Judge Pollitt ordered the case continued on the ground that
Determining what constitutes “extraordinary cause” under Rule 746 is, of course, dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
It is true that the State could have invoked the provisions of the Interstate Agreement On Detainers in an effort to obtain Hicks’ presence in Maryland on the scheduled trial date, but it was under no obligation to do so simply to satisfy the requirements of Rule 746. See United States v. Bowl,
In so concluding, we intend no departure from the established law that the mere fact that a defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction does not relieve the State of its Sixth Amendment obligation to grant the accused his constitutional right to a speedy trial. As we said in Wilson v. State,
Judgment reversed; case remanded to the Circuit Court for Wicomico County with instructions that it reinstate the criminal information and schedule trial in conformity with Rule 746; costs to be paid by appellee.
Notes
. Maryland adopted the Interstate Agreement by ch. 627 of the Acts of 1965, now codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 616A, et seq. Pursuant to its provisions, either a prisoner incarcerated in a penal facility of another state, or the state in which untried criminal charges are pending against the prisoner may request his temporary transfer for trial on the untried charges. When the prisoner invokes the provisions of the Interstate Agreement, it is required that he be brought to trial within 180 days. Section 616D. When the State is the moving party, trial is to commence within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state. Section
. It charged Hicks with storehouse breaking and related offenses.
. Most jurisdictions with rules or statutes similar to Rule 746 appear to require a showing of “good” or “sufficient” cause, rather than “extraordinary cause.” Some jurisdictions specifically enumerate allowable causes for delay. See generally Ameriсan Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial (Approved Draft 1968).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that Maryland Rule 740 and Maryland Annotated Code article 27, section 591 (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), the predecessors of Maryland Rule 746, are “plainly a declaration of legislative policy designed to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges.” I also agree that by the adoption of Rule 746 this Court intended to “put teeth into a new regulation governing the assignment of criminal cases for trial.” I agree that the provisions of Rule 746 are mandatory and are not “mere guides or bench marks to be observed, if convenient.” I further agree that dismissal is the appropriate sanction for a violation of that Rule. Moreover, I agree that the proceedings on 8 August implicitly involved a motion for a postponement. I disagree, however, that in this case the State has shown “extraordinary cause” for a postponement.
The purpose of Rule 746, which requires an accused to bе tried within 120 days of his or his attorney’s appearance, is to protect society’s interest in an effective criminal justice system. Society’s representatives, and not the accused, are the ones who must protect that interest. Accordingly, it is the obligation of those responsible for the administration of justice and not the accused, to bring the accused to trial within the prescribed period of time. In my view, that obligation includes the duty to invoke the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement), Md. Ann. Code art. 27,
Here the accused’s failure to appear for trial resulted from the State’s failure to invoke the Agreement. Because it was the State’s fault and not the fault of the accused that he failed to appear for trial, the State failed to establish “extraordinary cause” for a postponement. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The requirеment that criminal offenses be promptly tried “has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage.” Klopfer v. North Carolina,
The societal interest in prompt trials “which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused,” Barker v. Wingo,
“The inability of courts to provide a prompt trial has contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban*323 courts which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate more effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system. In addition, persons released on bond for lengthy periods awaiting trial have an opportunity to commit other crimes... Moreover, the longer an accused is free awaiting trial, the more tempting becomes his opportunity to jump bail and escape. Finally, delay between arrest and punishment may have a detrimental effect on rehabilitation.
“If an accused cannot make bail, he is generally confined, as was Barker for 10 months, in a local jail. This contributes to the overcrowding and generally deplorable state of those institutions. Lengthy exposure to these conditions ‘has a destructive effect on human character and makes the rehabilitation of the individuаl offender much more difficult.’ At times the result may even be violent rioting. Finally, lengthy pretrial detention is costly. The cost of maintaining a prisoner in jail varies from $3 to $9 per day, and this amounts to millions across the Nation. In addition, society loses wages which might have been earned, and it must often support families of incarcerated breadwinners.
“A second difference between the right to a speedy trial and the accused’s other constitutional rights is that deprivation of the right may work to the accused’s advantage. Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so. And it is the prosecution which carries the burden of proof.” (Footnotes omitted.)
Additionally, in Dickey v. Florida,
“Deliberate governmental delay in the hope of*324 obtaining an advantage over the accused is not unknown. In such a circumstance, the fair administration of criminal justice is imperiled. The Speedy Trial Clause then serves the public interest by penalizing official abuse of the criminal process and discouraging official lawlessness. Thus the guarantee protects our common interest that government prosecute, not persecute, those whom it accuses of crime.” (Citation omitted.)
In Maryland, the societal interest in prompt trials has also been delineated in cases in which the requirement of prompt trials has been established by statute or court rule rather than by the United States or the Maryland Constitution. E.g., Guarnera v. State,
Although constitutional as opposed to statutory and court-made requirements
In Barker v. Wingo,
“The result of such a ruling would have the virtue of clarifying when the right is infringed and of simplifying courts’ application of it. Recognizing this, some legislatures have enacted laws, and some courts have adopted procedural rules which more narrowly define the right.
“But such a result would require this Court to engage in legislative or rulemaking activity, rather than in the adjudicative process to which we should confine our efforts. We do not establish procedural rules for the States, except when mandated by the Constitution. We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months. The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach must be less precise.”407 U. S. at 523 ,92 S. Ct. at 2188 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
This case establishes that state statutory prompt trial requirements may go beyond the Sixth Amendment balancing test and may broaden the scope and applicability of the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement by utilizing more rigid standards and narrower definitions in determining what constitutes a prompt trial. It demonstrates that state statutory prompt trial requirements are intended to implement the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement and to increase its effectiveness in reducing delay.
The legislative history of the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (1979 Cum. Supp.), which is analogous to state statutory prompt trial requirements in that it established a federal plan to insure that an accused is brought to trial within 100 days of arrest or summons,
“The purpose of this bill is to assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials____
“The Committee finds that the adoption of speedy trial legislation is necessary in order to give real meaning to that Sixth Amendment right.
“The Supreme Court has held that the right to a speedy trial is relative and depends upon a number of factors.. . . The task of balancing these factors and arriving at a conclusion which is fair in all cases is a difficult task. It provides no guidance to either the defendant or the criminal justice system. It is, in effect, a neutral test which reinforces the legitimacy of delаy.” H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in, [1974] U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7402, 7404-05 (emphasis added).
Additionally, practical experience shows that statutory requirements not only were intended to, but do in fact, exceed the prompt trial requirement of the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, where both Sixth Amendment and statutory prompt trial requirements exist, the Sixth Amendment requirement has proved of little practical use. Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial,
“If a statutory violation is found, there is seldom any inquiry into the alleged constitutional denial; and if the statute has not been violated, it is typically assumed that the constitution is satisfied.”
The majority recognizes that under the Sixth Amendment requirement “the defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty which is not excused merely because the prisoner is incarcerated in another jurisdiction.” Thus, the majority recognizes that in this case, if the accused were asserting a violation of the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement, the State, as part of its obligation to make a “diligent good-faith” effort to bring the accused to trial, would have had a duty to invoke the provisions of the Agreement or use other available procedures. Dickey r. Florida,
In my view, the majority offers neither a sound legal rationale, nor sound policy considerations, nor sound legal
In addition, the only policy consideration the majority offers in support of its position is that the. State should not be inconvenienced by being “required in every case, irrespective of the circumstances and without regard to the prisoner’s desire for a trial, to itself invoke the provisions of the Interstate Agreement and promptly try all prisoners incarcerated in penal facilities of the fifty states on outstanding Maryland criminal charges upon which detainers had been filed.” In short, the majority suggests that as a matter of policy the State should not be required to provide to persons accused of Maryland crimes, who are confined in penal facilities outside of Maryland, the same prompt trial that the State is required to provide to persons accused of Maryland crimes, who are either confined in Maryland penal facilities or released on bond. In my view, there is no rational basis for this distinction. The preservation of the societal interest in prompt trials should not be dependent upon the location of the accused.
Moreоver, the only legal authority offered by the majority in support of its position is inapplicable. United States v. Cappucci,
United States v. Dowl,
The majority additionally suggests that the State was excused from its duty to bring the accused to trial within the time specified by Rule 746 because the accused did not himself invoke the Agreement. In my view, the fact that the accused made no effort to invoke the Agreement is immaterial.
In Barker, when the Supreme Court was developing the Sixth Amendment standard to be used in determining whether an accused has been afforded a prompt trial, it considered whether an accused should be required to make
“placing the burden of protecting the right solely on defendants. A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process. Moreover, for the reasons earlier expressed, society has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and society’s representatives are the ones who should protect that interest.”407 U. S. at 527 ,92 S. Ct. at 2190 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court cited with approval the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial at p. 17 which said:
“[T]he demand requirement is inconsistent with the public interest in prompt disposition of criminal cases____The trial of a criminal case should not be unreasonably delayed merely because the defendant does not think that it is in his best interest to seek prompt disposition of the charge.”
The Court expressly rejected the rule that an accused “who fails to demand a sрeedy trial forever waives his right.”
In essence, the majority has done under Rule 746 what is forbidden under the Sixth Amendment. It has determined that an accused who does not make a demand for a prompt trial by invoking the Agreement has waived his right under Rule 746 and, therefore, the State is entitled to delay his trial. Because, in my view, Rule 746 was intended to implement the Sixth Amendment prompt trial requirement by broadening its application and scope and increasing its effectiveness in reducing delay, the majority’s result is untenable.
The conclusion that an accused’s failure to invoke the Agreement is immaterial is supported by a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. In United States v. Mauro,
The facts in Mauro are different from but analogous to the facts in this case. In Mauro, the government’s obligation to bring the accused to trial within 120 days was mandated by the Federal Agreement. Here the State’s obligation to bring the accused to trial within 120 days was mandated by Rule 746. In Mauro, the accused failed to invoke the Federal Agreement in order to assert his right under Article IV (c) of the Federal Agreement to be tried in New York before being returned to his original place of imprisonment in Massachusetts. Here the accused failed to invoke the Agreement in order to assert his right under Maryland Annotated Code article 27, section 616D
The majority is correct when it asserts that “where the defendant does not appear for trial, through no fаult of his own or of the State, ‘extraordinary cause’ for a postponement would plainly appear to exist.” But, in my view, because the State had a duty to invoke the Agreement while the accused had no such duty, the accused’s failure to appear for trial was the State’s fault and not the fault of the accused. Under the same or similar circumstances, courts in other states have found that the State’s failure to produce the accused for trial did not constitute either “cause” or “good cause” for a postponement. People v. McLaurin,
Judges Digges and Cole have authorized me to state that they join in this opinion.
The State has filed a motion requesting that we reconsider our holdings that Maryland Rule 746 is mandatory and that the sanction for non-compliance is dismissal of the criminal charges. The State further requests, in the event we decline to reconsider those holdings, that we give them purely prospective effect, controlling only those prosecutions which commence after the filing of our mandate in this case. The defendant has filed an opposition to the State’s motion.
As explained in our initial opinion in this case, Rule 746, and its predecessor Rule 740, reflect the legislative policy embodied in Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 591, that there should be a prompt trial of criminal charges in the circuit courts and the Criminal Court of Baltimore. This policy was deemed of such importance that the General Assembly in enacting § 591, and this Court in adopting Rule 746, employed the word “shall” with reference to the deadline for trying criminal cases. Under settled principles of statutory construction, the word “shall” is ordinarily presumed to have a mandatory meaning. Johnson v. State,
There are two circumstances, however, under which dismissal is not an appropriate sanction for violation of Rule 746.
First, in addition to the requirement that, absent extraordinary cause, criminal cases at the circuit court level be tried within 120 days of the appointment or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of counsel under Rule 723, Rule 746 also requires that the act of setting this trial date be done within 30 days. Of course, as long as the case is tried within the 120-day deadline, the purpose of the rule and the statute upon which it is based, namely having the case tried promptly, will be accomplished, even if the setting of that trial date is not done within 30 days. In other words, the legislative purpose underlying § 591 and Rule 746 will in no way be advanced by holding that dismissal is the appropriate sanction for violation of the 30-day requirement. For this reason, we do distinguish between the 120-day requirement and the 30-day requirement. While the 30-day requirement is mandatory for those persons involved in setting the trial date, we hold that dismissal of the criminal case is not an appropriate sanction for violation of the 30-day provision.
A second circumstance where it is inappropriate to dismiss the criminal charges is where the defendant, either individually or by his attorney, seeks or expressly consents to a trial date in violation of Rule 746. It would, in our judgment, be entirely inappropriate for the defendant to gain advantage from a violation of the rule when he was a party to that violation. In this respect, the situation is analogous to the well-established principle that a criminal defendant who seeks or expressly consents to a mistrial, even though the required “manifest necessity” standard for the mistrial may have been absent, cannot take advantage of his own act and prevent a retrial on double jeopardy grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Dinitz,
Although we reject the State’s request to modify our holdings that Rule 746 is mandatory and that dismissal is normally the proper sanction for violation of the rule’s 120-day trial date requirement, we do agree with the State that these rulings should be given purely prospective application. We recognize that our initial opinion in this case did not overrule any prior interpretation of Rule 746. Nevertheless, the critical language of Rule 746, upon which our decision in this case was based, was essentially unchanged from the language in Art. 27, § 591, which was incorporated by reference in former Rule 740 and was construed as being only directory in Young v. State, supra. Consequently, our holdings in the instant case did overrule a prior interpretаtion of the same language and did set forth a new interpretation of that language. Thus, the case is an appropriate one for considering whether such new interpretation should be given only prospective effect.
The principles governing the retroactivity of new rulings by courts in criminal cases, and the numerous Supreme Court cases in this area, were extensively dealt with by both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wiggins v. State,
Where retroactivity is not mandated under the above criteria, a balancing test involving three prongs is employed to determine whether the new ruling should be applied prospectively only. Those three considerations are: (1) the purpose of the new ruling; (2) the reliance placed upon the old ruling; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application of the new ruling. Stovall v. Denno,
Where the purpose of the new ruling is not “concerned with the ultimate fact-finding determination of whether the accused did or did not commit the act he is said to have committed,” Wiggins v. State, supra,
The other two “prongs” or considerations set forth in the above cases also clearly point to giving the new ruling prospective effect only. Obviously the State, the defense bar and the trial courts were relying upon the Young interpretation of Art. 27, § 591, for, as we stated in our initial opinion in this case, the provisions of § 591 “were largely unheeded.” Moreover, in light of the number of pending cases which might have to be dismissed if the new interpretation
While Stovall, Linkletter and Wiggins involved new constitutional rulings, the principles there announced apply as well to new interpretations of statutory provisions or rules. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
Rule 746, rather than being a rule that affects the admissibility of evidence or procedures at the trial itself, is concerned with what happens beginning with the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant pursuant to Rule 723. To apply the new interpretation of Rule 746 to any cases which have gone beyond that stage would be to give the interpretation a degree of retroactive effect. Therefore, our holdings in the instant case will be entirely prospective, applying only to future criminal prosecutions and only to those pending cases where, as of our mandate in this case, there have been no appearances of counsel or first appearances of defendants pursuant to Rule 723.
. Hereinafter, the term “statutory requirements” shall refer to both statutory and court-made requirements.
. The Federal Agreement is similar to the Maryland Agreement.
. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. App., pp. 1395-1398 (1976), art. IV (e) provides:
“If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V (e), hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.”
. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. App., pp. 1395-1398 (1976), art. IV (c) provides in pertinent part:
“fTJrial shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving Statе, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”
. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 616D (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) provides in pertinent part:
“Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or*333 complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint: provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”