THE COMMITTEE FOR EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS et al., Appellants, v. JIM EDGAR, Governor of the State of Illinois, et al., Appellees.
No. 78198.
Supreme Court of Illinois
October 18, 1996
FREEMAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Robert J. Lenz, of Bloomington, C. Richard Johnson, Roger Pascal, Charles H.R. Peters and Jeffrey Bushofsky, of Schiff, Hardin & Waite, of Chicago, David C. Long, of Mill Valley, California, and Patricia A. Brannan and Paul A. Minorini, of Hogan & Hartson, of Washington, D.C., for appellants.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Rita M. Novak, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.
Joan Marsh and Anne-Marie Eileraas, of Kirkland
JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court:
This appeal draws us into the sensitive and controversial area of public school finance. The plaintiffs in this action are the Committee for Educational Rights (which consists of more than 60 school districts associated pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement), the boards of education of 37 school districts named individually, and a number of students and their parents. The defendants are Governor Jim Edgar, the State Board of Education and State Superintendent of Education Joseph A. Spagnolo. Plaintiffs brought this action in the circuit court of Cook County seeking a declaratory judgment that the statutory scheme governing the funding of public schools violates various provisions of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the appellate court affirmed. 267 Ill. App. 3d 18. The appellate court issued a certificate of importance under
BACKGROUND
We begin with a general and vastly simplified description of those aspects of public school finance in Illinois that are germane to this appeal. Public schools receive funds from various federal, state and local sources. The controversy in the present case hinges on the relationship between funding derived from local property taxes and funds supplied by the state. Under the
There are principally two categories of state financial assistance which supplement local property tax revenues and other local sources of funding. First, the state provides assistance to school districts in the form of categorical grants for a variety of specific purposes. See, e.g.,
General state aid is distributed based on a weighted average daily attendance (ADA1) at schools within a particular district and on the equalized assessed valua-
The above method of distributing general state aid only applies in districts where the EAV per weighted ADA pupil is less than 87% of the guaranteed EAV.
In their five-count complaint, plaintiffs allege that under the present financing scheme, vast differences in educational resources and opportunities exist among the state‘s school districts as a result of differences in local taxable property wealth. During the 1989-90 school year, the average tax base in the wealthiest 10% of elementary schools was over 13 times the average tax base in the poorest 10%. For high school and unit school districts, the ratios of the average tax bases in the wealthiest and poorest districts were 8.1 to 1 and 7 to 1, respectively, during the 1989-90 school year.
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the general state aid formula does not effectively equalize funding among wealthy and poor districts. While the general state aid formula ensures minimum funding at the foundation level, the wealthiest districts are able to raise funds through property taxes considerably in excess of the foundation level. Moreover, the provision of a minimum grant—equal to 7% of the foundation level—to even the wealthiest school districts is counterequalizing.
Plaintiffs allege that disparities among wealthy and poor districts are reflected in various measures of
Based on these allegations, in counts I through III plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that to the extent that the statutory school finance scheme “fails to correct differences in spending and educational services resulting from differences in [local taxable property wealth]” the scheme violates our state constitution‘s equal protection clause (count I), prohibition against special legislation (count II) and education article (count III).
Counts IV and V of the complaint pertain to the educational opportunities available to certain socioeconomically disadvantaged children who are at risk of academic failure (at-risk children). Plaintiffs allege that at-risk children frequently exhibit educational deficits and require early intervention in order to succeed academically.
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court and issued a certificate of importance pursuant to
ANALYSIS
I
We first consider the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims that the statutory system for financing public schools violates the education article of our state constitution.
“A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be free. There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education.” (Emphasis added.)
Ill. Const. 1970, art. X, § 1 .
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the statutory system for
Before proceeding, we note that plaintiffs’ second argument is essentially raised for the first time on appeal. While in count III of their complaint plaintiffs allege that the quality of public education is comparatively better in wealthier districts, as we read the complaint there is no specific allegation that students (other than at-risk students) in districts with low taxable property wealth are deprived of a “high quality” education in normative terms. Because the theory that poor districts provide a normatively inadequate education was not raised in the trial court, we could properly treat it as waived. See Eagan v. Chicago Transit Authority, 158 Ill. 2d 527, 534 (1994) (“issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal“). We choose, however, to address the argument on the merits. The waiver rule is a limitation on the parties and not the jurisdiction of the courts. Herzog v. Lexington Township, 167 Ill. 2d 288, 300 (1995). Moreover, a reviewing court may consider an issue not raised in the trial court if the issue is one of law and is fully briefed and argued by the parties. People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 1, 27 (1991); Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967). As will be seen, plaintiffs’ argument regarding the quality of education,
A
We first consider plaintiffs’ argument that the present school funding system is not “efficient” within the meaning of the constitution because it produces disparities in educational resources and services based on differences in local taxable property wealth. In plaintiffs’ view, the efficiency requirement guarantees some measure of equality in educational funding and opportunity. Plaintiffs deny that they seek absolute uniformity in educational offerings or precisely equal spending for each pupil in the state. Plaintiffs would apparently approve variations in educational spending from district to district based on criteria such as local differences in the costs of resources and special educational needs in particular districts. However, plaintiffs maintain that a school district‘s property wealth is “educationally irrelevant” and is not a proper factor upon which to set the level of resources available to the district.
The trial and appellate courts rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the efficiency requirement guarantees parity of educational funding and opportunity. The trial court emphasized that the framers of the 1970 Constitution had considered and rejected specific proposals for a constitutional provision designed to reduce funding disparities among districts by limiting the amount of funds that could be raised by local property taxes. The appellate court concluded that
As this case turns upon the meaning of constitutional language, a brief summary of the general principles of constitutional interpretation may be helpful. The meaning of a constitutional provision depends on the common understanding of the citizens who, by ratifying the constitution, gave it life. League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria, 121 Ill. 2d 236, 243 (1987); Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 492 (1984). This understanding is best determined by referring to the common meaning of the words used. League of Women Voters, 121 Ill. 2d at 243; Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d at 492-93. Where the language is unambiguous, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction. Baker v. Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249, 257 (1994). However, if after consulting the language of a provision, doubt remains as to its meaning, it is appropriate to consult the debates of the delegates to the constitutional convention to ascertain the meaning they attached to the provision. League of Women Voters, 121 Ill. 2d at 243-44; Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d at 493.
“Efficient” has been defined as follows:
“1: serving as or characteristic of an efficient cause : causally productive : OPERANT *** 2: marked by ability to choose and use the most effective and least wasteful means of doing a task or accomplishing a purpose ***” Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 725 (1981).
This definition does not inherently compel the conclusion that an “efficient system” of public schools necessarily involves statewide parity of educational opportunity and resources. However, we do not believe that the precise meaning of the word “efficient” as used in
The education article of the 1970 Constitution originated as a proposal submitted by the education committee of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention. 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 227 (hereinafter cited as Proceedings). At
The constitutional requirement that the state provide for an efficient system of high quality educational institutions and services corresponds to
However, under a limited exception to this principle it was held that pursuant to the “thorough and efficient” requirement school district boundaries must be established so that the districts are compact and contiguous. See People ex rel. Community Unit School District No. 5 v. Decatur School District No. 61, 31 Ill. 2d 612, 613-14 (1964). As explained in People ex rel. Leighty v. Young, 301 Ill. 67, 71 (1921), “[i]t cannot be said that a system which places the school house at a point so remote that the children of school age cannot reach it conveniently is either thorough or efficient.” School districts organized in contravention of the requirements of compactness and contiguity have been held invalid. See, e.g., Decatur School District, 31 Ill. 2d 612; People ex rel. Goelzer v. Crawford, 310 Ill. 205 (1923) (finding district invalid under both the constitution and the applicable statute).
The framers of the 1970 Constitution embraced this limited construction that the constitutional efficiency requirement authorized judicial review of school district boundaries, but they did not intend to otherwise limit legislative discretion. The education committee‘s report accompanying the proposed education article specifically states, “The concept of the efficiency of the system (already contained in the present Constitution) has been used by the courts as a guide to the validation of district boundary changes. The Committee believes it useful to continue this concept and to add the notion of high quality.” 6 Proceedings 234.
An exchange between Delegates Netsch and Patch during the debate on section 1 confirms the framers’ understanding of the efficiency concept:
“MRS. NETSCH: Mr. Patch or Mr. Fogal, could I explore just very briefly your use of the word *** ‘efficient’ ***. Was this done quite consciously to adopt and reincorporate into this constitutional provision all of the body of law that has developed with respect to that term in the previous constitution?
MR. PATCH: Yes. In terms of boundaries and in terms of quality, so there would be a continuity of education based on the law or the court decisions relative to efficiency.” 2 Proceedings 766.
Careful review of the remainder of the debates on section 1 of the education article and other relevant materials in the convention record discloses no persuasive evidence to support the view that section 1‘s efficiency requirement was intended by the framers to function more broadly as a substantive guarantee of parity in educational opportunity or funding. Accord ILCS Ann., 1970 Const., art. X, § 1, Constitutional Commentary, at 789 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (“There is no indication that the Convention intended to alter the line of cases in which the courts have deferred to the legislature on the meaning of terms such as ‘efficient’ “).
Disparity in educational funding was a highly charged and controversial subject during the constitutional convention, but it was not touched upon to any significant degree in connection with section 1‘s efficiency requirement. Instead, the debate over unequal opportunities and resources ultimately led to the incorporation of section 1‘s final sentence, which provides that “[t]he State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education.”
The members of the education committee were deeply divided over the main committee proposal. The committee‘s majority report specifically noted that “[a] salient fact of Illinois school finance is the enormous inequality among the districts with respect to their resources from local tax receipts” and that “the quality of education received by any student in the State is largely a product of the accident of the wealth of his district.” 6 Proceedings 297. One of the majority‘s stated objectives was to “produce a level of educational opportunity that would be more equal throughout the State for all children.” 6 Proceedings 299. The education committee‘s minority report acknowledged existing inequities in school funding (see 6 Proceedings 300), but sought to preserve the tradition of local control of public education, which the minority feared would be imperiled under a constitutional regime of centralized funding of education. The minority believed that a system of statewide funding of schools would prove incompatible with local autonomy in educational decisionmaking. Simply put, the minority did not believe that it was realistic to expect that the General Assembly would allow local school boards and administrators free rein with state funds. See 6 Proceedings 301-02. The minority also objected that:
“While substantially full [State] support might improve the programs of inferior schools, it would lower the quality of education in the better schools and make it impossible for local citizens to restore these quality programs despite their willingness to do so. Local citizens might well show less interest in the welfare of their schools if they are frustrated in their efforts to improve their programs.” 6 Proceedings 302.
The minority further expressed the view that educational funding was “inherently a legislative subject.” 6 Proceedings 304.
The framers of the 1970 Constitution rejected both the education committee proposal (1 Proceedings 527-28) and Delegate Bottino‘s alternative proposal (1 Proceedings 622-23). Subsequently, however, Delegate Netsch offered an amendment to section 1 adding the language placing primary responsibility for financing public education on the state. 1 Proceedings 738. Delegate Netsch explained that the purpose of the amendment was “to put the Convention on record” that the state should bear greater responsibility for school funding both to reduce the burden of property taxes and to cure inequality in education. 5 Proceedings 4502. Delegate Netsch carefully explained, however, that the added language was “not a legally obligatory command to the state legislature. *** [I]t is something that can be pointed to every time the question of appropriations from the state to the school districts is at issue.” 5 Proceedings 4502. In Blase v. State, 55 Ill. 2d 94 (1973), this court reviewed this background and held that the final sentence of section 1 “was intended only to express a goal or objective, and not to state a specific command.” Blase, 55 Ill. 2d at 98; see also People ex rel. Carey v. Board of Education, 55 Ill. 2d 533, 535 (1973).
In our view, the foregoing persuasively suggests that the framers of the 1970 Constitution viewed educational equality and “efficiency” to be separate and distinct
Plaintiffs insist that the rejection of the specific funding proposals merely represents the framers’ unwillingness to prescribe specific funding ratios or formulas in the constitution. According to plaintiffs, the delegates generally spoke in support of the general ideal of equalizing educational opportunity. Be that as it may, we find no significant evidence in the convention record suggesting that the delegates believed that section 1‘s efficiency requirement related to these concerns.3 The mere utterance of sentiments favoring educational equality does not itself give rise to a constitutional guarantee. This court has noted:
“While statements and reports made by the delegates to the constitutional convention are certainly useful and important aids in interpreting ambiguous language of the constitution [citation], they are, of course, not a part of the constitution. It would be improper for this court to transform statements made during the constitutional convention into constitutional requirements where such statements are not reflected in the language of the constitution.” People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 1, 30 (1991).
Reminding us that the meaning of a constitutional provision depends on the common understanding of the citizens who ratified the constitution, plaintiffs emphasize that with reference to the education article, the “Address to the People” accompanying the
Finally, plaintiffs contend that several decisions from other states interpreting similar constitutional language have concluded that “efficiency” dictates fairness and parity in educational funding. See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990); Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979). For various reasons, these decisions provide no persuasive support for plaintiffs’ argument.
Pauley simply does not stand for the proposition for which plaintiffs cite it. In Pauley, the court ultimately defined a “thorough and efficient” system of schools not in terms of equal opportunity, but in terms of various specific substantive educational goals. Pauley, 162 W. Va. at 699-700, 255 S.E.2d at 877. Similarly, in Abbott, the court stated that New Jersey‘s “thorough and efficient” clause required “a certain level of educational opportunity, a minimum level, that will equip the student to become ‘a citizen and ... a competitor in the
Despite these statements, the Abbott court concluded that New Jersey was constitutionally required to ensure that education in poor urban school districts was funded at substantially the same level as in more affluent suburban districts. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 385, 575 A.2d at 408. The court reached this dubious result essentially by equating the constitutionally guaranteed minimum level of educational opportunity with the educational offerings in the wealthiest districts. See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 364, 575 A.2d at 397; see also Note, State Constitutional Law—Public School Financing—Spending Disparity Between Wealthy School Districts and Poor Urban School Districts, Caused By Reliance on Local Property Taxes, is Violative of the “Thorough and Efficient Education” Clause, 21 Seton Hall L. Rev. 445, 470 (1991). One writer has characterized the reasoning employed in Abbott as “an intellectual shell game” (21 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 477-78), and has suggested that the variance between the court‘s description of the “thorough and efficient” requirement and its ultimate holding “is simply the imprimatur of result oriented jurisprudence cloaked in superfluous reasoning” (21 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 480). The criticism is well founded, and we therefore decline to apply the Abbott court‘s analysis in this case.
The other decisions cited by plaintiffs, Rose from Kentucky and Kirby from Texas, are of limited relevance
“[I]t is a part of the history of the State when the constitution was framed, that there was a great want of uniformity in the course of study prescribed and taught in the common schools of the State. In the larger and more wealthy counties the free schools were well graded and the course of instruction of a high order, while in the thinly settled and poorer counties the old district system was still retained and the course of instruction prescribed was of a lower order.”
In view of all of the foregoing considerations, we agree with the courts below that disparities in educational funding resulting from differences in local property wealth do not offend section 1‘s efficiency requirement.
B
The remaining question under section 1 of the educa
Historically, this court has assumed only an exceedingly limited role in matters relating to public education, recognizing that educational policy is almost exclusively within the province of the legislative branch.
More generally, it has been stated that
“[
Section 1 of article VIII of the 1870 Constitution ] was a command addressed to the legislature, and it has been construed as a limitation also on its power to provide for the maintenance by local taxation of free schools of a different character from that named in the section. *** When we look for the limitations on that power we find these two, and these two only, which the courts can enforce: that the schools shall be free, and that they shall be open to all equally. The court has enforced these limitations when the occasion requiring the enforcement of them arose. [Citations.] There are no others to which the judicial power extends.” (Emphasis added.) Fiedler, 335 Ill. at 23.
In Richards v. Raymond, 92 Ill. 612 (1879), this court rejected the claim that a law providing for the establishment of public high schools exceeded the General Assembly‘s power to provide for schools where children may receive “a good common school education.” This court found no basis in the
“No definition of a common school is given or specified in the constitution, nor does that instrument declare what
course of studies shall constitute a common school education. How can it be said that a high school is prohibited by the constitution and not included within the definition of a common school? The phrase, ‘a common school education’ is one not easily defined. One might say that a student instructed in reading, writing, geography, English grammar and arithmetic had received a common school education, while another who had more enlarged notions on the subject might insist that history, natural philosophy and algebra should be included. It would thus be almost impossible to find two persons who would in all respects agree in regard to what constituted a common school education.” ***
*** “[W]hile the constitution has not defined what a good common school education is, and has failed to prescribe a limit, it is no part of the duty of the courts of the State to declare by judicial construction what particular branches of study shall constitute a common school education. That may be and doubtless is a proper question for the determination of the legislature, and as a law has been enacted by it which does not appear to violate the constitution it is not the province of the courts to interfere.” Richards, 92 Ill. at 617-18.
Notwithstanding this jurisprudence, plaintiffs insist that our present constitution accommodates a more active judicial role in implementing the constitutional guarantee of an efficient system of high quality educational institutions and services. In this regard, plaintiffs stress that while the
“MR. GARRISON: ***
It is my understanding that the word ‘quality’ is—in relation to education—is a much debated concept and that there have been commissions which have given a great deal of study to it.
Did the [education] committee come to any definite definition or conclusion as to what would constitute quality services with respect to education?
***
MR. FOGAL: No, we—the word ‘quality,’ I suppose, means different things to different people. We had in mind the highest, the most excellent educational system possible; leave this up to the determination of the legislature and your local districts, and let the citizens keep pushing for higher-quality education. We didn‘t attempt to define all of the ramifications of high quality.” 2 Proceedings 767.
Delegate Kamin, a member of the education committee, added that “[t]he use of the word ‘high quality’ is a play on the use of the word ‘good’ which is in the present article.” 2 Proceedings 767. According to delegate Kamin the education committee felt that “there was not
Our constitutional jurisprudence in the field of public education has been guided by considerations of separation of powers. In federal courts, the principles of separation of powers find expression in the so-called “political question” doctrine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 682, 82 S. Ct. 691, 706 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers“). The United States Supreme Court has stated that, “‘[i]n determining whether a question falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations.‘” (Emphasis added.) Baker, 369 U.S. at 210, 7 L. Ed. 2d at 682, 82 S. Ct. at 706, quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55, 83 L. Ed. 1385, 1397, 59 S. Ct. 972, 982 (1939).
In Baker, the Court identified several characteristics of nonjusticiable political questions, including “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the question] or the impossibility of deciding [it] without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 7 L. Ed. 2d at 686, 82 S. Ct. at 710. What constitutes a “high quality” education, and how it may best be provided, cannot be ascertained by any judicially discoverable or manageable standards. The constitution provides no principled basis for a judicial definition of high quality. It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of quality courts might develop would actually be derived from the constitution
To hold that the question of educational quality is subject to judicial determination would largely deprive the members of the general public of a voice in a matter which is close to the hearts of all individuals in Illinois. Judicial determination of the type of education children should receive and how it can best be provided would depend on the opinions of whatever expert witnesses the litigants might call to testify and whatever other evidence they might choose to present. Members of the general public, however, would be obliged to listen in respectful silence. We certainly do not mean to trivialize the views of educators, school administrators and others who have studied the problems which public schools confront. But nonexperts—students, parents, employers and others—also have important views and experiences to contribute which are not easily reckoned through formal judicial factfinding. In contrast, an open and robust public debate is the lifeblood of the political process in our system of representative democracy. Solutions to problems of educational quality should emerge from a spirited dialogue between the people of the state and their elected representatives. In delegate Fogal‘s words, previously quoted, “let the citizens keep pushing for higher-quality education.” 2 Proceedings 767.
We are well aware that courts in other jurisdictions have seen fit to define the contours of a constitutionally guaranteed education and to establish judicial standards of educational quality reflecting varying degrees of specificity and deference to the other branches of
Rather, we agree with the views of the dissenters in several of the cases cited above. In Seattle School District, Justice Rosellini lamented the court‘s usurpation of the legislative prerogative in the area of educational policy:
“I would be surprised to learn that the people of this state are willing to turn over to a tribunal against which they have little if any recourse, a matter of such grave concern to them and upon which they hold so many strong, though conflicting views. If their legislators pass laws with which they disagree or refuse to act when the people think they should, they can make their dissatisfaction known at the polls. They can write to their representatives or appear before them and let their protests be heard. The court, however, is not so easy to reach [citation] nor is it so easy to persuade that its judgment ought to be revised. A legislature may be a hard horse to harness, but it is not quite the stubborn mule that a court can be. Most importantly, the court is not designed or equipped to make public policy decisions, as this case so forcibly demonstrates.” Seattle School District, 90 Wash. 2d at 563-64, 585 P.2d at 120 (Rosellini, J., dissenting, joined by Hamilton & Hicks, JJ.).
In Pauley, Justice Neely offered the following views regarding West Virginia‘s “thorough and efficient system” requirement which are germane to our own constitution‘s efficiency and quality guarantees:
“‘Thorough and efficient’ education apparently does not mean in this modern world just advanced mathemat-
ics, chemistry, physics, foreign languages, competence in written and spoken English, and a well-developed knowledge of history. Something more in the form of vocational training and preparation for life is implied, yet whatever it is, it is far too unmanageable a standard to be developed in a vacuum devoid of political give and take by the logical judicial mind, because inherent in any consensus about ‘thorough and efficient’ education is a difficult balance between irreconcilable value systems. I have my own ideas of what constitutes ‘thorough and efficient’ education; nonetheless, I am constitutionally constrained not to force them down the throats of other equally well-informed persons who have different values merely because I am a judge.” Pauley, 162 W. Va. at 747, 255 S.E.2d at 899 (Neely, J., dissenting).
We conclude that the question of whether the educational institutions and services in Illinois are “high quality” is outside the sphere of the judicial function. To the extent plaintiffs’ claim that the system for financing public schools is unconstitutional rests on perceived deficiencies in the quality of education in public schools, the claim was properly dismissed. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under the education article of our state constitution.
II
We next consider whether the alleged disparities in educational funding and opportunity due to variations in local property wealth give rise to a cause of action under the equal protection clause of our state constitution (
“The analysis applied by this court in assessing equal protection claims is the same under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions. [Citation.] The guarantee of equal protection requires that the government treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. [Cita-
tion.] It does not preclude the State from enacting legislation that draws distinctions between different categories of people, but it does prohibit the government from according different treatment to persons who have been placed by statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation. [Citation.] In reviewing a claim that a statute violates equal protection, the court applies different levels of scrutiny depending on the nature of the statutory classification involved. Classifications based on race or national origin or affecting fundamental rights are strictly scrutinized. Intermediate scrutiny applies to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. In all other cases, the court employs only a rational basis review.” Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322-23 (1996).
Because the present challenge to the school funding scheme does not involve a classification based on gender or illegitimacy, the intermediate level of scrutiny does not apply. Accord Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 42-43, 439 N.E.2d 359, 365-66, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649-50 (1982). Moreover, plaintiffs do not argue that the school funding scheme involves a suspect classification such as race or national origin. Thus, the applicable standard of review in this case depends on whether education is a fundamental right. If so, to the extent that funding disparities can be said to impinge on or interfere with the right to an education, the system for financing public schools would be subject to strict scrutiny. On the other hand, if education is not a fundamental right, the highly deferential “rational basis” test would apply.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973), the United States Supreme Court rejected a challenge under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution (
Plaintiffs argue that Rodriguez does not control the determination of whether education is a fundamental right under our state constitution. They contend that unlike the United States Constitution,
This court has stated that fundamental rights are “only those which lie at the heart of the relationship between the individual and a republican form of nationally integrated government.” Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d at 509, quoting People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos, 68 Ill. 2d 88, 97 (1977). Fundamental rights include the expression of ideas, participation in the political process, travel among the states and privacy with regard to the most intimate and personal aspects of one‘s life. Kotsos, 68 Ill. 2d at 97. Plaintiffs urge us to add education to this list because of its relationship with certain of these rights which are at the core of one‘s role as a citizen. Plaintiffs contend that an education is essential to one‘s ability to lead a productive life and is closely tied to the basic rights of democracy. Amici amplify the point, asserting that “[a]
While plaintiffs and amici perceptively characterize the relationship between education and certain basic aspects of citizenship, we disagree with their conclusion that this relationship justifies treating education as itself a fundamental right for equal protection purposes. Generally speaking, the fundamental right analysis is concerned with laws that somehow restrain the exercise of a fundamental right. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 38, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 46, 93 S. Ct. at 1299 (“Each of our prior cases involved legislation which ‘deprived,’ ‘infringed,’ or ‘interfered’ with the free exercise of some such fundamental personal right or liberty“). Recognition that rights of expression and participation in the political process are fundamental—and thus safeguarded against unjustified governmental interference—does not necessarily translate into an affirmative governmental obligation to enrich each individual‘s personal capacity or ability to exercise these rights. In this regard it is significant that while the framers of the
In determining that education was not implicitly protected by the United States Constitution, the Rodriguez Court rejected an argument similar to the one plaintiffs and amici presently advance:
“The Court has long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual‘s rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the
most informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative form of government is not to be doubted. These are indeed goals to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference. But they are not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.” (Emphasis in original.) Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 44-45, 93 S. Ct. at 1298.
While education is certainly a vitally important governmental function (see Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 73-74 (1990)), it is not a fundamental individual right for equal protection purposes, and thus the appropriate standard of review is the rational basis test. Under the rational basis test, judicial review of a legislative classification is limited and generally deferential. Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 323 (1996). The challenged classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate state goal (People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 231 (1995)) and if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the classification, it must be upheld (Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 324).
The rationality of Illinois’ school funding scheme is best gauged in light of the basic philosophical considerations that have defined the policy debate in the area of public education finance. As noted in Rodriguez:
“‘The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces: the desire by members of society to have educational opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family to provide the best education it can afford for its own children.‘” Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 52, 93 S. Ct. at 1305, quoting J. Coleman, Foreword to G. Strayer & R. Haig, The Financing of Education in the State of New York vii (1923).
Similarly, one commentator has observed:
“The character of a public education system can be evaluated in terms of three often competing principles: quality,
equality, and liberty. The quality of a school system is high when good educational opportunities are available to the least advantaged children in the state. In a school system featuring a high degree of equality every student has access to the same educational resources as any other student. Liberty is enhanced when localities or families have the autonomy to determine what proportion of their resources they wish to devote to the education of their youth. *** A guarantee of equal educational funding does not secure any particular level of quality. It does ensure a high level of equality and a low level of liberty. Liberty is curtailed because equalization of educational funding requires redistribution of resources from wealthy districts to poor ones, which can only be achieved through greater centralization of control over the public schools. Centralization reduces the freedom of localities and families to choose their own levels of educational spending.” R. Stark, Education Reform: Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutions’ Education Finance Provisions—Adequacy vs. Equality, 1991 Annual Survey of American Law 609, 665-66.
The concept of “local control” in public education connotes not only the opportunity for local participation in decisionmaking but also “the freedom to devote more money to the education of one‘s children.” Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49-50, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 52, 93 S. Ct. at 1304-05; see also Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005, 1023 (Colo. 1982) (“[local] control is exercised by influencing the determination of how much money should be raised for local schools, and how that money should be spent“). As noted earlier, several members of the education committee of the Sixth Constitutional Convention voiced strong support for the preservation of local control. They felt that community members would be less enthusiastic in their efforts to improve public education if limits were placed on community decisions to support local schools with local resources for the sake of equalizing resources statewide.
While some decisions in other jurisdictions have concluded that there is no rational basis for funding disparities based on local wealth (see, e.g., Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 153-56 (Tenn. 1993); Dupree v. Alma School District No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 345, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (1983)), financing schemes similar to ours have been upheld by a ma-
CONCLUSION
In closing, it bears emphasis that our decision in no way represents an endorsement of the present system of financing public schools in Illinois, nor do we mean to discourage plaintiffs’ efforts to reform the system. However, for the reasons explained above, the process of reform must be undertaken in a legislative forum rather than in the courts. Plaintiffs’ complaint was properly dismissed, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE HARRISON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
I agree with the majority that count I of plaintiffs’ complaint does not state a cause of action under the equal protection clause of the
However, the majority also concludes that count III of the complaint does not state a cause of action under the education article of the
BACKGROUND
This case comes to this court on a motion to dismiss.
The majority describes the gist of plaintiffs’ detailed second-amended complaint. 174 Ill. 2d at 8-10. Plaintiffs allege the following. The Illinois public school funding scheme creates vast disparities in educational resources and opportunity among Illinois school districts. The complaint quotes from the 1989 School Report Card, published by the Illinois State Board of Education, which stated as follows. Rich school districts employed a greater percentage of teachers with advanced degrees
I recount some of the complaint‘s specific allegations to show clearly the factual basis of this lawsuit. For example, a poor school district reported that it replaces its worn-out desks by retrieving from a dumpster perfectly functional desks thrown away by a neighboring school district.”
The complaint offers two neighboring school districts as “a concrete example of the consequences of differences in local property wealth.” Byron Community Unit School District No. 226 and Mount Morris Community Unit School District No. 261 are located in Ogle County, which lies in north central Illinois. Based on their respective property tax bases, schools in the Byron district receive significantly greater funding than schools in the Mount Morris district. “As a result of these large differences in school funding in the two districts, the children of Byron have far greater educational opportunity than the children of Mount Morris, with far less tax effort.”
For example, Byron offers a starting salary for new teachers of $22,800 per year; Mount Morris can afford to offer only $16,000. Byron High School offers 187 courses; Mount Morris’ high school offers only 113. Byron uses relatively new and current textbooks; Mount Morris uses textbooks that are 15 to 20 years old. Physical facilities at Byron are new and in good condition; Mount Morris lacks funds to remedy a $900,000 asbestos problem, repair leaky roofs, and replace flammable stage curtains and rotting football field bleachers.
Further, the disparities in educational resources and opportunity among Illinois school districts are some of the most severe in the nation. The complaint quotes from the 1989 Annual Report of the Illinois State Board of Education, which acknowledged that Illinois ranks sixth in the nation in educational funding disparities.
DISCUSSION
I note at the outset some general principles that the majority recognizes. 174 Ill. 2d at 12-13. A court presumes legislation to be constitutional. Based on this presumption, the party challenging particular legislation has the burden of clearly establishing the alleged constitutional violation. Nevitt v. Langfelder, 157 Ill. 2d 116, 124 (1993); People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 499 (1992).
The meaning of a constitutional provision depends on the common understanding of the citizens who gave the constitution life by ratifying it. This understanding is best determined by referring to the common meaning of the words used (League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria, 121 Ill. 2d 236, 243 (1987)), unless it is clearly evident that a contrary meaning was intended. Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 453, 464 (1976). Where the text of the constitution is clear and unambiguous, the constitutional convention debates can have no bearing or effect on its interpretation. Nevitt, 157 Ill. 2d at 134; People ex rel. Watseka Telephone Co. v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 311 (1922).
If ambiguities remain after consulting the language of the provision, it is then appropriate to consult the convention debates to ascertain the meaning that the delegates attached to the provision. This is so because it is only with the consent of the convention that the provision was submitted to the voters in the first place. League of Women Voters, 121 Ill. 2d at 243-44. Also, “[i]n construing the meaning of a constitutional provi
Illinois Education Article
Plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that the public school funding scheme violates section 1 of the education article of the
“§ 1. Goal—Free Schools
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be free. There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education.” (Emphasis added.)
Ill. Const. 1970, art. X, § 1 .
Plaintiffs focus on the first sentence of the second paragraph (hereafter the education system provision). Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the education system provision requires the state to provide an education system that is “efficient” and “high quality.” Plaintiffs allege that the Illinois public school funding scheme creates significant and growing disparities in educational services and resources throughout the state. According to plaintiffs, “[a]n educational funding system is not an ‘efficient system’ when some children have vast educational resources and others minimal. An education funding system is not a ‘system of high quality’ schools where only some children can go to them.”
While I agree with plaintiffs’ characterization of the “efficiency” aspect of the education system provision, I
Jurisdiction
I initially address the issue of whether count III presents a justiciable issue, or whether it raises a nonjusticiable political question over which a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. When the parties seek adjudication of only a political question, they do not present a court with a justiciable controversy. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Absent a justiciable controversy, a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. People v. Capitol News, Inc., 137 Ill. 2d 162, 170 (1990). Agreeing with the State, the majority declares that the high quality aspect of the education system provision is not judicially enforceable. 174 Ill. 2d at 23-32.
I respectfully disagree. The following principles are fundamental:
“Under traditional constitutional theory, the basic ‘sovereign’ power of the state resides in the legislature. From this it follows, again in theory, that there is no need to grant any power to the legislature. All that need be done is to place such limitations as are desired on the legislature‘s otherwise unlimited power.” G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 111 (1969), cited in Client Follow-Up, 75 Ill. 2d at 215.
Accordingly:
“limitations written into the Constitution are restrictions
on legislative power and are enforceable by the courts. On the other hand, constitutional directives to the legislature are considered as mandates or commands to the legislature to act, and it is generally held that the courts are powerless to enforce them.” Client Follow-Up, 75 Ill. 2d at 215.
To determine the judicial enforceability of the education system provision, I first review section 1 of the education article of the
“The general assembly shall provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of this state may receive a good common school education.” (Emphasis added.)
Ill. Const. 1870, art. VIII, § 1 .
Applying traditional constitutional theory to this section, this court consistently held that this section was a mandate to the legislature, requiring it to provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools. The same section was held also to limit the power of the legislature, in that the section limited the purpose of the system of free schools to that of providing a good education to all the children of the state. People ex rel. Hepfer v. Price, 310 Ill. 66, 73 (1923); People ex rel. Goodell v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 286 Ill. 384, 390 (1918).
This court concluded that section 1 of the 1870 Constitution‘s education article imposed only two judicially enforceable limitations on the legislature: that the schools were free, and that they were open to all without discrimination. People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 30 (1948); Fiedler v. Eckfeldt, 335 Ill. 11, 23 (1929). However, the question of the efficiency and fairness of the school system was solely for the legislature to answer. McLain v. Phelps, 409 Ill. 393, 398 (1951); Deatherage, 401 Ill. at 31.
This court expressly based this conclusion on the plain language of section 1 of the 1870 Constitution‘s education article, which commanded the legislature specifically. In Fiedler, 335 Ill. at 23-24, this court cited
“The command of the constitution is addressed to the General Assembly alone. It was not a self-executing provision but required legislation to give it effect, and the responsibility and duty of providing the system and the means and agencies by which it should be made effective rest upon the General Assembly alone.” (Emphasis added.) Fiedler, 335 Ill. at 23.
In contrast, the education system provision in the
Initially, the plain language of the
It is correct and traditional to speak of the complete or unlimited power of the legislature, absent constitutional limitations. See, e.g., Client Follow-Up, 75 Ill. 2d at 215; Locust Grove Cemetery Ass‘n v. Rose, 16 Ill. 2d 132, 138 (1959); Greenfield v. Russel, 292 Ill. 392, 399 (1920); Harris v. Board of Supervisors, 105 Ill. 445, 450 (1882). However, it must be remembered that the people of the state, as the ultimate sovereign, vested such power in the legislature in the first place. Barnett, 344 Ill. at 66; Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302, 306 (1883); accord 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories, and Dependencies § 41, at 440 (1974); 1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 175-77 (8th ed. 1927). Thus, I read the first paragraph of section 1 of the education article to declare that education is a fundamental goal of the entire state government.
The education system provision immediately follows, addressed simply to “The State.” Why would the framers of the
I also note that the last sentence in the second paragraph of the education article refers specifically to the “General Assembly.” Thus, if the framers of the
My analysis of the education system provision, based on the plain language of the education article, should properly end here. See Nevitt, 157 Ill. 2d at 134. However, the State contends that the convention record reveals the opposite conclusion.
I disagree. The plain language of the education article is supported by the record of the constitutional convention. The Education Committee originally drafted the education system provision to read: ”To achieve this goal [educational development as the ‘paramount goal’ of the people of the State], it shall be the duty of the State to provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services.” (Emphasis added.) 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 227, Committee Proposal No. 1 (hereinafter cited as Proceedings).
In presenting Committee Proposal No. 1 to the convention, committee member Samuel Patch repeatedly referred to the education system provision as a mandate to the “state.” 2 Proceedings 764-65. Further, in response to questions on the proposal, Patch specifically said that the “state” was mandated “to carry out this goal—therefore, we said the whole state, that is, the executive branch as well as the General Assembly.” (Emphasis added.) 2 Proceedings 766.
At the end of the debate, the phrase “the paramount
“A fundamental goal of the People of the State [shall be] is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.
[To achieve this goal, it shall be the duty of] The State shall [to] provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services.” 6 Proceedings 331 (Style Committee Proposal No. 11).
On the convention floor, delegates questioned the Style Committee chairman on whether the deletions to the education system provision, as originally drafted, changed the meaning of the sentence. 5 Proceedings 4120. The chairman answered:
“We didn‘t work a substantive change in it. If anything, I think we reaffirmed in a stronger manner by sentence 2, the intent of the [convention] on first reading.
Furthermore, sentence 2 follows sentence 1; the two are definitely interrelated. I don‘t think reasonable people would differ about that ***.” 5 Proceedings 4121.
Thus, both the plain language of the education article and the convention record show that the education system provision is addressed to the entire state government and not solely to the legislature.
The State contends that the record of the constitutional convention clearly expresses the obvious intent of the framers that the education system provision is addressed solely to the legislature. The State cites several examples from the convention record.
The Education Committee originally drafted the first section, first paragraph of the education article to declare that education is the “paramount” goal of the people of the state. 6 Proceedings 227 (Committee Pro
The State also points to the Education Committee‘s written explanation of the education system provision. The committee described it as a mandate. The committee noted that Illinois courts already used the concept of efficiency as a guide in validating school district boundary changes. The committee believed that it would be useful to continue this concept of efficiency and to add to it the idea of high quality. 6 Proceedings 234, Committee Proposal No. 1. During questioning on the convention floor, committee member Patch explained that the committee intended to reincorporate and maintain the continuity of case law on efficiency in the context of school district boundaries. 2 Proceedings 766. The State argues that this explanation clearly shows the obvious intent of the framers to continue this court‘s interpretation of section 1 of the education article of the 1870 Constitution as judicially nonenforceable.
The State also points to the Education Committee‘s Proposal No. 2, which provided that “substantially all funds for the operational costs of the free public schools shall be appropriated by the General Assembly for the benefit of the local school districts,” and which limited local school taxes to 10% of the amount that a school district received from the legislature. 6 Proceedings 295, Committee Proposal No. 2. In Blase v. State, 55 Ill. 2d 94, 98-100 (1973), this court recounted the debate on this proposal and how it ultimately resulted in the third paragraph of section 1 of the education article. Based on the convention record, this court held that the paragraph was merely hortatory and did not impose a specific, legally enforceable funding obligation on the General Assembly.
These references to the constitutional convention record do not constitute such a clear expression of an obvious intent of the framers as to allow this court to ignore the unambiguous constitutional language. Of course, the convention delegates were sensitive to the need for legislative flexibility. The delegates did not intend to constitutionally mandate any particular public school funding scheme. They also wanted to maintain the continuity of case law on efficiency in the context of school district boundaries.
Nevertheless, the plain language of the education article, additionally supported by the convention record, shows that the education system provision is not limited to the legislature, as was section 1 of the education article of the 1870 Constitution. Rather, the education system provision is a restriction that is directed at the entire state government.
The entire state government consists not only of the executive and legislative departments, as Delegate Patch stated (2 Proceedings 766), but also the judicial department. People v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 367 Ill. 260, 273 (1937); Devine v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 270 Ill. 504, 509 (1915); Dodge, 97 Ill. at 355.
Neither the plain language of the education article of the
I acknowledge that this court reached a contrary conclusion in Cronin v. Lindberg, 66 Ill. 2d 47, 58 (1976). The court in Cronin mechanically applied this court‘s interpretation of the 1870 Constitution‘s education
The majority concludes that the plain language of the education system provision, additionally supported by the convention record, “does not alter the roles or expand the powers assigned to the different branches of government by the constitution.” 174 Ill. 2d at 26-27. I agree that it does not. However, as I have explained, where section 1 of the education article of the 1870 Illinois Constitution excluded the judicial and executive departments, the education system provision in the 1970 Constitution embraces all three branches of state government, including the judiciary. This court stated long ago:
“To the judiciary is confided the power and the duty of interpreting the laws and the constitution whenever they are judicially presented for consideration. Hence it becomes our duty to determine what is the meaning of the laws passed by the legislature, and, also, whether those laws are such as the legislature was authorized by the constitution to pass.” People ex rel. Billings v. Bissell, 19 Ill. 229, 231 (1857).
Accord Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78, 2 L. Ed. 60, 73-74 (1803).
Indeed, the judicial role of construing the constitution and determining if it has been violated is essential to our form of government. Accordingly, as the highest court of this state, it is the function and duty of the supreme court to act as the final arbiter of the
The majority fears “legislating” in the field of public education. 174 Ill. 2d at 27. The majority concludes that the issue of disparities in educational services and resources among school districts is a political question and, thus, nonjusticiable. 174 Ill. 2d at 27-29. Indeed, the majority would deny the judicial department of state government jurisdiction over this issue even if the judiciary gave great deference to the legislative and executive departments in defining and regulating educational quality. 174 Ill. 2d at 29-31.
Out of fear of entering a “political thicket” (see Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556, 90 L. Ed. 1432, 1436, 66 S. Ct. 1198, 1201 (1946)), the majority completely abdicates its constitutional duty to interpret the Illinois Constitution. The doctrine at issue here “is one of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’ The courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 686, 82 S. Ct. 691, 710 (1962).
Of course, courts cannot exercise legislative powers or compel their proper action. Donovan v. Holzman, 8 Ill. 2d 87, 93 (1956); People ex rel. Huempfner v. Benson, 294 Ill. 236, 239 (1920). However, “the judiciary has always had the right and duty to review all legislative acts in the light of the provisions and limitations of our basic charter. The mere fact that political rights and questions are involved does not create immunity from judicial review.” Donovan, 8 Ill. 2d at 93; accord Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491, 532, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 1978 (1969). This court has not hesitated to invalidate long-standing practices under statutes that offend the Illinois Constitution. Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 95 (1955). It is the duty of the judiciary “to interpret laws and protect the rights of individuals against acts beyond the scope of legislative power.” Benson, 294 Ill. at 239.
The best example of a “political case” is one involving legislative apportionment. The
In apportionment, this court‘s “historic function does not give us the right to indirectly exercise the legislative function by striking down a redistricting merely because we conceive that it might have been done better. The complicated considerations involved require careful study and a weighing of factors.” Donovan, 8 Ill. 2d at 93. Rather, this court‘s role is limited solely to determining whether or not the legislature complied with the constitution:
“The drawing of a reapportionment map is essentially a political and not a judicial process. It becomes judicial only if the parties who have the responsibility of drawing a map violate the law and produce a legally unacceptable map. A map that is politically unacceptable to one political party is not, for that reason, legally unacceptable. The courts must necessarily extend latitude to the political and governmental authorities in discharging their duties. Otherwise, the courts would become a political rather than a judicial institution.” (Emphasis in original.) Burris, 147 Ill. 2d at 302 (Heiple, J., concurring).
Although this court is appropriately sensitive to its limited role, it has never abandoned its constitutional function to determine solely whether or not the legislature has complied with the constitution. Donovan, 8 Ill. 2d at 93; People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 462, 480 (1895).
As with a reapportionment map, I believe that the judiciary cannot strike down the Illinois public school funding scheme merely because it might have been done better. However, it is the constitutional function of this court to determine solely whether or not the Illinois public school funding scheme comports with the education system provision.
Giving great deference to the legislative and executive departments of state government, I believe that the education system provision establishes a constitutional floor regarding educational adequacy. That provision imposes a constitutional responsibility on the entire state government. It is the duty of the judicial department to adjudicate the nature of that responsibility. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 315, 655 N.E.2d 661, 665, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (1995).