DIEDRA L. COLE-RANDAZZO et al., Plaintiffs, v. JIM RYAN, Illinois Attorney General, et al., Defendants.
No. 92443
Supreme Court of Illinois
Opinion filed November 28, 2001.
233
In the case at bar the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the gang evidence. The State‘s theory of the case was that the stabbing was not wholly innocent self-defense by one or two men being set upon by 10 men, as defendant claimed, but rather the result of gang-based violence which had begun earlier in the evening and escalated into a sortie by the Bishops to McDonald‘s house. The usage of various gang-related boasts and taunts between the two groups, as well as the flashing of gang signs, substantiated this theory and helped to explain what occurred that morning.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, we reverse the decision of the appellate court and reinstate defendant‘s conviction and sentence for second degree murder.
Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.
GARMAN, J., joined by THOMAS, J., also dissenting.
Mary Lee Leahy, of Leahy Law Offices, of Springfield, fоr plaintiffs.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Michael P. Doyle, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for defendants.
Steven F. Molo, Kenneth T. Kristl, Joseph A. Spiegler, Jessica L. Gonzalez and Michael P. Rohan, of Winston & Strawn, of Chicago, for intervenor-plaintiff James Philip.
Steven F. Molo, Kenneth T. Kristl, Joseph A. Spiegler, Jessica L. Gonzalez and Michael P. Rohan, of Winston & Strawn, of Chicago, and James G. Sotos, of Hervas, Sotos, Condon & Bersani, P.C., of Itasca, for intervenor-plaintiff Lee A. Daniels.
James D. Montgomery, of James D. Montgomery & Associates, and Courtney C. Nottage, Rudоlph M. Braud, Jr., Shannon K. Moorer and James W. Dodge, all of Chicago, for intervenor-defendant Emil Jones, Jr.
Larry R. Rogers, Larry R. Rogers, Jr., and Devon C. Bruce, of Power, Rogers & Smith, P.C., and Clyde E. Murphy and Sharon K. Legenza, all of Chicago, for amicus curiae African American Working Group on Reapportionment.
Maria Valdez and Patricia Mendoza, of Chicago, for amicus curiae League of United Latin American Citizens.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an original action under
Plaintiffs initiated this proceeding by filing a motion for leave to file a complaint in accordance with
In their complaint, as amended, plaintiffs challenge the boundaries established by the Commission for the 51st Legislative (Senate) District, which encompasses the 101st and 102nd Representative Districts. They also challenge the boundaries fixed by the Commission for the 99th and 100th Representative (House) Districts. Intervenors Philip and Daniels attack the Commission‘s redistricting plan as a whole, as well as various specific legislative and representative districts, including Legislative Districts 29, 38, 51 and 55 and Representative Districts 15, 18, 35, 36, 75, 113 and 114.
Legislative redistricting maps approved and filed under
The challengers to the redistricting plan at issue in this case make no claim that the districts fail to meet the requirement of equality of population or that the configuration of those districts denies adequate representation to any minorities and other special interests protected by state and fedеral law. The contiguity of the districts is unquestioned. The legal requirements regarding political fairness are not alleged to have been infringed. The only dispute concerns whether the various districts identified by the original and intervening plaintiffs meet our state‘s “compactness” requirement.
Based on visual observation, the compactness of the districts formed under the plan before us today is not discernibly different from the compactness of the districts established under the plan apprоved by this court 10 years ago in People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 296 (1992). While some of the new districts are certainly more elongated than others, the same was true of districts drawn under the old map. Overall, the level of compactness has changed little.
The data submitted by the intervening plaintiffs confirm this observation. The various representative and legislative districts were analyzed by the intervening plaintiffs’ experts using two different tests. The first, known as the dispersion test, compared a district‘s area to the area of the smallest circle that circumscribed that area. The second, called the perimeter test, measured irregularities in the boundaries of districts. The highest score a district could receive was one. The lowest was zero. The mean dispersion score for representative districts under the old map and the mean dispersion score for representative districts under the map challenged here differed by only one one-hundredth of a point (0.01). That was also the case with the mean dispersion score for legislative districts.
The results yielded by the perimeter test were com-
The original and intervening plaintiffs suggest alternatives to the present map which would yield some increases in compactness both visually and under the dispersion and perimeter tests. The fact that more compact formulations can be devised is not, however, a sufficient basis for invalidating a map duly approved and filed according to law. That is so for two reasons. First, as indicated earlier in this opinion, compactness is only one of several factors that must be taken into consideration in setting the boundaries for legislative and representative districts. No matter how compact proposed districts may be geographically, those districts will not suffice under the law unless they comply with each of the additional factors we have enumerated.
The need to take the additional factors into account was specifically acknowledged in the affidavit of Professor Richard Niemi, one of the intervening plaintiffs’ experts. Significantly, however, neither the original nor the intervening plaintiffs have addressed the implications of their proposed alternatives with respect to those factors. The materials they have submitted are silent on the question of how the proposed alternatives would compare in terms of equality of population, the provision of adequate representation to any minоrities and other special interests protected by state and federal law, or adherence to the legal requirements regarding political fairness. Accordingly, we have no basis for assessing whether the proposed alternatives would be legally acceptable and, if so, whether they would be superior, on balance, to the plan approved and filed by the Commission.
For the foregoing reasons, the requests by the original and intervening plaintiffs for a declaratory judgment invalidating the redistricting plan approved and filed by the Commission and for an order requiring reconfiguration of districts formulated under that plan are hereby denied. Judgment is entered for defendants. The mandate of this court shall issue immediately.
So ordered.
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
The last time a challenge to the validity of the redistricting plan approved by the Illinois Legislative Redistricting Commission (Commission) was raised in this court, this court initially remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings because the Commission did not hold a hearing on the approved map. See People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 284 (1991). We noted that both sides in the case had submitted their plans and amendments on the last two days, “thereby thwarting any type of hearing, whether for expert testimony or public criticism.” Burris, 147 Ill. 2d at 284-85. We recognized that, although there is a
Here, the majority does not address the process that led to the adoption of the map at issue. Rather, the majority notes the presumption of validity accorded a redistricting plan approved and filed by the Commission. The majority then concludes that the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs have failed to establish that the map is against the manifest weight of the evidence. I do not agree with this analysis. I find this case to be indistinguishable from Burris. Consequently, I believe this matter must be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings before this court can address the validity of this map.
The process through which the redistricting map in this case was approved was at variance with the constitutional mandate. As in Burris, the map in this case was presented in the last few days, thereby thwarting any type of hearing that would ensure that constitutional requirements were met. As intervening plaintiffs Philip and Daniels observe, the Democratic Commission members filed a map styled Currie I on September 17, 2001, and set a hearing for September 18, 2001. At the
No vote was taken on September 21, 2001. On September 24, 2001, the Democratic Commission members proposed an amendment to Currie I, known as the Bilandic amendment, which was filed with the Commission clerk. The next day, September 25, the Currie I map was amended pursuant to the Bilandic amendment, thereby creating the map at issue in this case, known as Currie II. The intervening plaintiffs contend that the Democratic commission mеmbers refused to call witnesses or allow analysis or debate on Currie II. On September 24, 2001, the Republican Commission members’ expert witness, Richard Niemi, Ph.D., was allowed
Intervening defendant John Tully responds that the Currie II map is the result of “the most extensive, deliberative and accommodating process that this State has seen in the redistricting of the Illinois House and Senate.” Tully contends that the record of proceedings is 10,557 pages and that the General Assembly redistricting committees heard more than 500 live witness presentations. The majority of the record of proceedings and the 500 live witness presentations, however, do not address the constitutional validity of the specific map at issue in this case. With regard to Currie I, Tully asserts that the Commission met for more than six hours and heard testimony, including testimony from two expert witnesses, Dr. Allan J. Lichtman and Dr. Janet Box-Steffensmeier. As noted, however, the intervening plaintiffs argue that the expert witnesses were presented without any advance notice and without affording the Republican Commission members a 24-hour recess to prepare to cross-examine those witnesses. Notably, although there was testimony concerning the compactness of Currie I and Currie II, that testimony concerned the compactness of the maps as a whole, not the compactness of individual districts.
As in Burris, the process through which the Currie II map was adopted does not present sufficient facts for this court to determine with certainty whether the district lines in Currie II meet legal guidelines. Absent those facts, I believe this case must be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. Further, I believe
In Burris, this court found that certain districts did not appear to meet the constitutionally mandated requirements. Burris, 147 Ill. 2d at 285. Here too, the specified districts do not appear to meet the constitutionally mandated requirements. Those districts certainly do not appear compact based upon a visual inspection, and do not appear compact based upon the mathematic calculations testified to by Richard Niemi, Ph.D. Defendants and intervening defendants rеspond that any shapes departing from a compactness norm are justified by the influence of other neutral redistricting criteria, including the irregular state, county and municipal boundaries within the State of Illinois, adherence to natural boundaries such as rivers, the preservation of political subdivision and precinct lines and the cores of existing districts, protecting incumbencies, and maintaining communities of interest.
While it is true that departures from the constitutional requirement of compactness possibly may be justified (see Schrage v. State Board of Elections, 88 Ill. 2d 87, 98 (1981)), there is no evidence that any such “neutral” criteria were presented to, considered, or accepted by the Commission with regard to those districts in Currie II that do not appear compact. Such evidence must be presented to and considered by the Commission before this court can presume that departures from the constitutional requirement of compactness are valid.
The voters of this state deserve—indeed, demand—fair play. Gone forever are the procedural safeguards, such as notice and cross-examination, that were so
I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this dissent.
JUSTICE GARMAN, also dissenting:
Today this court comes remarkably close to sounding the death knell to the constitutional requirement of compactness. The majority concludes that “on visual observation, the compactness of the districts formed under the plan before us today is not discernibly different from the compactness of the districts established under the plan approved by this court 10 years ago in People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 296 (1992). While some of the new districts are certainly more elongated than others, the same was true of districts drawn under the old map. Overall, the level of compactness has changed little.” 198 Ill. 2d at 237. This court may have eliminated the compactness requirement altogether. The
The compactness requirement, along with the other requirements of the
At the very least, certain districts in the Commission‘s redistricting plan appear, on their face, to violate the compactness standard of
Representative District 114 also appears, on its face, to viоlate the compactness requirement. It is a bizarrely drawn U-shaped district that substantially wraps around Representative District 113. Similarly, Representative District 100 wraps around the 99th Representative District on three sides. Clearly, these districts were severely gerrymandered.
These districts are just a few of the problematic districts in the Commission‘s redistricting plan. As indicated in Justice Thomas’ dissent and as demonstrated by a single cursory glance at the Commission‘s plan, it is clear this list is not exhaustive.
The majority opinion also fails to address the larger prоblem that pervades legislative redistricting in the State of Illinois. The process that gave rise to this redistricting plan is fundamentally flawed. Plaintiff intervenors, in both their brief and oral argument, contend that the Commission failed to provide meaningful analysis or discussion of proposed amendments to the redistricting plan which resulted in the creation of the Commission‘s final plan.
In 1991, in People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270 (1991) (Ryan I), this court remanded the redistricting proposal to the Commission based on its perception that to affirm the proceedings of the Commission would “circumvent the spirit and purpose of the Illinois Constitution.” Ryan I, 147 Ill. 2d at 285. Despite defendants’ arguments to the contrary, the 2001 Redistricting Commission proceedings appear fraught with similar procedural vacuity.
Prior to the adoption of the Commission‘s final plan, entitled Currie II, alternate plans were before the Commission. In fact, a feasible alternate plan is before this
Apparently, it is implied that once the name is drawn to determine which party shall havе the tie-breaking vote on the Commission, the process is, for all intents and purposes, complete. See
In any action involving redistricting, much more is at stake than simply who will control the legislature for the next 10 years. “If any fundamental principle underlies our American system of government, it is the notion that government exists only to serve the governed.” Ryan II, 147 Ill. 2d at 307 (Clark, J., dissenting). Today, that fundamental principle is dealt a serious blow.
A redistricting plan approved and filed by the Commission is presumed to be valid.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s opinion and recommend that this plan be remanded to the Redistricting Commission for further action with instructions to submit a map that meets all constitutional requirements, including compactness, and to carry forth its duties in a fair and meaningful manner.
JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this dissent.