Hill v. StateHill v. State
Rendered on May 14, 2013
The Owen Firm, LLC, and Benjamin A. Tracy, for appellee.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Debra Gorrell Wehrle, for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, State of Ohio (the “state“), appeals from a summary judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas adjudicating plaintiff-appellee, Duane Hill (“Hill“), to be a wrongfully imprisoned individual as defined in
I. Facts and Case History
{¶ 2} Hill commenced the current action by filing a complaint naming the state as defendant and seeking an order declaring that he was a wrongfully imprisoned individual. Obtaining such an order is the first step toward recovering compensation for wrongful imprisonment from the state under Ohio‘s wrongful imprisonment statutes. See
{¶ 4} The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to Hill, finding that he had met all of the criteria set forth in
As used in this section and section 2743.49 of the Revised Code, a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” means an individual who satisfies each of the following:
(1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code by an indictment or information, and the violation charged was an aggravated felony or felony.
(2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the particular chargе or a lesser-included offense by the court or jury involved, and the offense of which the
individual was found guilty was an aggravated felony or felony.
(3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of which the individual was found guilty.
(4) The individual‘s conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation against the individual for any act associated with that conviction.
(5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual‘s release, or it was determined by the court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal action was initiated that the charged offense, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by the individual or was not committed by any person.
{¶ 5} The state timely appealed, asserting the following two assignments of error:
[1.] The trial court committed reversible error by declaring Appellee/Appellee a Wrongfully Imprisoned individual even though he failed to satisfy the statutory criteria.
[2.] The trial court committed reversible error by attempting to utilize the civil Wrongful Imprisonment Statute of R.C. § 2743.48 as a punitive/deterrent mechanism against law enforcement.
II. Legal Analysis
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 6} Summary judgment is appropriate where “the moving party demonstrates that (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.” Capella III, L.L.C. v. Wilcox, 190 Ohio App.3d 133, 2010-Ohio-4746, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.), citing Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, ¶ 6.
[A] party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the record demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of material fact as to the essential elements of the nonmoving party‘s claims. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 [1996]. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show why summary judgment is inappropriate.
Civ.R. 56(E) . If the non-movant fails to respond, or fails to support its response with evidence of the kind required byCiv.R. 56(C) , the court may enter summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Snyder v. Ford Motor Co., 3d Dist. No. 1-05-41, 2005-Ohio-6415, ¶ 11;Civ.R. 56(E) .
{¶ 8} Moreover, “appellate review of summary-judgment motions is de novo.” Capella III, citing Andersen v. Highland House Co., 93 Ohio St.3d 547, 548 (2001). “De novo appellate review means that the court of appeals independently reviews the record and affords no deference to the trial court‘s decision.” (Internal citations omitted.) Holt v. State, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-214, 2010-Ohio-6529, ¶ 9.
B. History of Ohio‘s Wrongful Imprisonment Statute, R.C. 2743.48
{¶ 9} The determinative issue in this case is whether Hill met all five statutory criteria of
{¶ 10} Prior to 1986, a person who had been wrongfully imprisoned in Ohio could receive compensation for that wrongful imprisonment only if the General Assembly enacted a law specifically providing for payment of compensation to that named individual, i.e., enactment of “ad hoc moral claims legislation.” Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 49 (1989). In 1986, however, the General Assembly enacted
In the first step, the claimant must bring an action in the court of common pleas to secure a determination that he is a wrongfully imprisoned individual entitled to compensation. As relevant here, a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” was defined in former
R.C. 2743.48(A) as one who satisfied four criteria:“(1) He was charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code by an indictment or information prior to, or on or after, the effective date of this section [September 24, 1986], and the violation charged was an aggravated felony or felony.
“(2) He was found guilty of the particular charge or a lesser included offense * * * and the offense of which he was found guilty was an aggravated felony or felony.
“(3) He was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of imprisonment in a state penal or reformatory institution for the offense of which he was found guilty.
“(4) Subsequent to his sentencing and during or subsequent to his imprisonment, it was determined by a court of common plеas that the offense of which he was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by him or was not committed by any person.”
R.C. 2305.02 grants exclusive jurisdiction to the court of common pleas “to hear and determine an action or proceeding that is commenced by an individual * * * that seeks a determination by the court that the offense of which he was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by him or was not committed by any person.” Once the claimant secures this determination,R.C. 2743.48(D) provides that he “has and may file a civil action against the state, in the court of claims, to recover a sum of money * * *” in an amount fixed byR.C. 2743.48(E) .
Id. (Fn. deleted.)
{¶ 11} In December 1988, the General Assembly enacted Am.H.B. No. 623, which, inter alia, added language to subsection (A)(2) of
The individual‘s conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney, City Director of Law, Village Solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation against the individual for any act associated with that conviction.
{¶ 12} As a result of the enactment of Am.H.B. No. 623, the four criteria in
{¶ 13} In December 2002 and effective April 9, 2003, however, the 124th General Assembly enacted Sub.S.B. No. 149 and changed subsection (A)(5) of
[A] “wrongfully imprisoned individual” means an individual who satisfies each of the following:
* * *
(5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to his imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual‘s release, or it was determined by a court of common pleas that the offense of which the individual was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by the individual or was not committed by any person.
(Emphasis added to indicate relevant text added by S.B. No. 149.)
{¶ 15} As a result of the statutory amendment, a WI claimant could satisfy (A)(5) by proving that “an error in procedure resulted in the individual‘s release.” Id.
{¶ 16} This court has previously recognized that the “revised statute thus provides an alternative to the actual-innocence requirement: the person seeking wrongful-imprisonment status need establish only that an error in procedure resulted in his or her release.” Nelson, 2009-Ohio-3231, ¶ 14. Similаrly, the Fifth District Court of Appeals has acknowledged that “[
{¶ 17} More recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio acknowledged that
{¶ 18} Accordingly, pursuant to the express text of subsection (A)(5) of
{¶ 19} Accordingly, if Hill satisfied the “error in procedure” alternative provided to WI claimants in 2003, he was not required to prove his actual innocence as a requisite to adjudication as a wrongfully imprisoned individual.
C. Analysis of State‘s First Assignment of Error
{¶ 20} In its first assignment of error, the state posits that the triаl court erred in declaring Hill a wrongfully imprisoned individual because Hill failed to satisfy the statutory criteria of
R.C. 2743.48(A)(2) – Absence of Guilty Plea
{¶ 21} The state first argues that Hill did not satisfy
{¶ 23} We therefore reject, as did the trial court, the state‘s argument that Hill had failed to prove the criterion of
R.C. 2743.48(A)(4) – Potential Further Criminal Proceedings for Acts Associated with the Reversed Conviction
{¶ 24} The state next argues that Hill did not satisfy
{¶ 25} We note initially that, to the extent a WI claimant must establish actual innocence of the crime of which he was convicted, that requirement is not based on subsection (A)(4) of
{¶ 26} In Gover, the Supreme Court specifically interpreted subsection (4) of
{¶ 27} Gover subsequently filed an action seeking adjudication as a wrongfully imprisoned individual. The Supreme Court acknowledged that Gover had not committed the offense of safecracking with respect to his conduct on September 13, 1988, but opined that Gover “was nevertheless committing other criminal offenses,” Gover v. State at 96, and suggested that the prosecutor might have charged him with burglary, rather than safecracking. The Supreme Court remanded the wrongful-imprisonment case to the civil trial court for it to detеrmine whether Gover had committed offenses other than safecracking on the date of the alleged criminal conduct.2 In an opinion written by Justice
{¶ 28} In the case before us, the state argues that Hill, by рleading no contest, admitted that he was in possession of crack cocaine and that he therefore “merely avoided criminal liability” based on application of the exclusionary rule. The state relies on the Supreme Court‘s statements in Gover and Hill‘s plea of no contest after the trial court denied his motion to suppress. It argues that Hill may not be deemed to be a wrongfully imprisoned individual because his lack of actual innocence on December 19, 2009 precludes a finding that Hill satisfied subsection (A)(4) of
{¶ 29} In making this argument, the state seeks to graft the innocence component of subsection (5) of
whether Gover, on September 13, 1988, rather than September 18, 1988, committed any criminal offense other than safecracking.
{¶ 30} In determining whether Hill established the
{¶ 31} Hill provided evidence that the Richland County prosecutor formally represented to the court in its motion to dismiss the criminal case against him that “without the evidence from the search [i.e., the crack cocaine], the State would be unable to prove the matter beyond a reasonable doubt.” This acknowledgement appеars, on its face, to satisfy the statutory criterion of subsection (A)(4) that “no criminal proceeding * * * can [or will] be brought” by the former prosecutor against Hill for “any act associated with that conviction.”
{¶ 32} The state posits two theories, however, as to why we should find that Hill failed to meet the criterion in subsection (A)(4). It first contends that Hill admitted through his no-contest plea that he had cocaine on his person on December 19, 2009 and observes that the criminal case was dismissed “without prejudice.” The state thus suggests a possibility that a county or city prosecutor might yet re-file charges against Hill based on his conduct on that date. Secondly, the state observes that Hill tested positive for marijuana at the time of his sentencing hearing in May 2010, suggesting that Hill might be prosecuted for offenses involving marijuana possession or use at that later time. It contends that Hill‘s marijuana use approximately five months after the December 19, 2009
{¶ 33} In considering the first of the state‘s two contentions, we must determine whether Hill proved that no other prosecutor can, or will, bring a criminal proceeding against him based on his having crack cocaine on his person on December 19, 2009. As noted above, Hill did prove that the Richland County prosecutor who had initially prosecuted him did not intend to retry him. But, arguably, Hill did not prove that no other legal officer, such as a municipal law director, would not prosecute him for his December 19, 2009 acts.
{¶ 34} It is true that a technical reading of
{¶ 35} We conclude, on this de novo review, that Hill did establish that no other prosecutor “can or will” prosecute Hill based on offenses involving his possession of crack cocaine on December 19, 2009. We base that conclusion on the same circumstance identified by the Richland County prosecutor in seeking dismissal of the indictment―because it was suppressed by the court of appeals no prosecutor could introduce evidence identifying the substance as cocaine that Hill had on his person when arrested and, without that evidence, no prosecutor could successfully prove that Hill committed drug offenses. No allegations were made that appellant violated laws other than the drug-related offenses and, reading the facts of the case as available to us, we do not discern, nor has the state suggested, that Hill might yet be charged with committing criminal offenses other than drug-related offenses on December 19, 2009. The facts in Hill‘s case are thus distinguishable from the facts in Gover.
{¶ 37} In interpreting
{¶ 38} We therefore reject the state‘s argument that the fact that Hill tested positive for marijuana in May 2010, shortly before he was sentenced and approximately five months after his arrest, precludes a finding that Hill satisfied
{¶ 39} Accordingly, we reject the state‘s argument that Hill failed to satisfy the criterion in
R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) – Release as the Result of an “Error in Procedure”
{¶ 40} The General Assembly amended subsection (A)(5) of
{¶ 41} In this case, therefore, we must more specifically address and interpret the term “error in procedure” as used in
{¶ 42} We agree with the state that the General Assembly did not intend that every reversal and remand of a criminal conviction based on evidentiary error satisfy subsection (A)(5) of
{¶ 43} In this case, Hill did not establish the (A)(5) criterion simply by demonstrating that his conviction was reversed and remanded. Hill‘s case was not one where remand could have produced a successful prosecution on retrial despite evidentiary error in the first trial. Rather, he established that his conviction was reversed and remanded based on the appellate court‘s discernment of procedural error that effectively precluded successful prosecution of the charged offenses on remand. Indeed, the prosecutor expressly observed on remand that the state could not successfully retry Hill since it could not introduce evidence of the cocaine found on Hill‘s person as the result of what the court of appeals had found to be an unconstitutional search and seizure. Thus, there was a direct causal relationship between the procedural error of the police in
{¶ 44} Our analysis is consistent with that of the trial court in this сase, which observed that, only in cases where the procedural error “vitiates the basis for all criminal liability,” would an error in procedure result in the individual‘s release. (July 18, 2012 Decision, at 13.) In addressing the issue of the meaning of the phrase “error in procedure,” the trial court used the definitions of “procedure” found in Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009), that is, “a specific method or course of action” or “the judicial rule or manner for carrying on a civil lawsuit or criminal prosecution.” (July 18, 2012 Decision, at 13, citing Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009), at 1323.) It also referenced Black‘s definition of “criminal procedure” as “[t]he rules governing the mechanisms under which crimes are investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and punished. It includes the protection of accused persons’ constitutional rights.” (Emphasis added.) Black‘s Law Dictionary, at 431. The trial court concluded that the procedural errоr in Hill‘s case was not a mere technical violation. Rather, “the procedural errors made in [Hill‘s] case rest upon a complete disregard for one‘s personal rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution and Ohio Constitution.” (July 18, 2012 Decision, at 15.) The trial court in this case found that both the police officer and the trial court in the criminal case had thus committed procedural errors, observing that the court of appeals “reversed [Hill‘s] conviction due to the errors in procedure made by Officer Kaufman and the trial court‘s factual analysis when ruling on the motion to suppress.” (July 18, 2012 Decision, at 16.)
{¶ 45} We acknowledge that the text of the statute provides no express direction as to whether the General Assembly meant to include errors in procedure committed by law enforcement officers prior to the criminal prosecution itself, as opposed to procedural errors by an officer of the court, such as a prosecutor or trial judge. In the final analysis, however, we are constrained to look to the text of the statute itself. In 2003 when the General Assembly amended the statute, it could have expressly included modifiers limiting the term “procedural error.” But it did not limit “procedural error” to include only structural error or to exclude procedural errors committed prior to the litigation of the
{¶ 46} Rather, courts construing the Revised Code are required to interpret words in statutes according to rules of grammar and common usage unless they have a particular or technical meaning. Id. at 49. Accordingly, we interpret the phrase “procedural error” according to its common usage. In the absence of contradictory legislative clarification or limitation of the term “procedural error,” we find that the procedural error committed here that ultimately resulted in the Hill‘s release from prison falls within the scope of
{¶ 47} Our holding is consistent with precedent established by the Eighth District Court of Appeals in Mansaray v. State, 8th Dist. No. 98171, 2012-Ohio-3376.5 In that case, as in the case before us, an individual had been convicted of drug offenses based on еvidence obtained by police in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court held that “the trial court‘s denial of Mansaray‘s motion to suppress, which was subsequently found
{¶ 48} Similarly, we have recognized that a prosecutor‘s violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in failing to disclose possibly exculpatory evidence to the defendant, constituted an error in procedure for purposes of
{¶ 49} We acknowledge the counterintuitive nature of our holding. We are not unsympathetic to the policy arguments presented by the state. Certainly, a case for paying wrongful-imprisonment compensation is more compelling where the claimant can prove his or her factual innocence. Moreover, both courts and legal commentators have identified as the traditional purpose of wrongful-imprisonment statutes the facilitation of financial compensation to those who are factually innocent. See 53 A.L.R. 6th 305 (2010), Construction and Application of State Statutes Providing Compensation for Wrongful Conviction and Incarceration (observing that “[a]t a minimum most statutes require some proof of innocence in addition to compliance with statutory rules and restrictions“); see also Mostaghel, Wrongfully Incarcerated, Randomly Compensated—How to Fund Wrongful-Conviction Compensation Statutes, 44 Ind.L.Rev. 503, 521 (2011) (“One consistent aspect of compensation statutes is that innocence will not be considered еstablished if reversal occurred merely because of procedural or jurisdictional errors,” citing Walden); Faridi, Hoffman, and Montuora, Undoing Time: A Proposal for Compensation for Wrongful Imprisonment of Innocent Individuals, 34 W.New Eng.L.Rev. 1, 23 (2012) (“compensation is not for individuals who are unable to prove their innocence in fact“); Mckneelen, “Oh Lord Won‘t You Buy Me a Mercedes Benz?“: A Comparison of State Wrongful Conviction Compensation Statutes, St.Mary‘sL.Rev. & Soc. Just 185, 192, 195-97 (2013) (observing that 27 states and the District of Columbia have enacted wrongful-compensation statutes and that many states specify additional eligibility requirements other than being innocent). But compare Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until
{¶ 50} One legal commentator has, however, rejected the suggestion that “convictions rendered wrongful by errors unrelated tо innocence are less important, or that they can or should be discounted as based on ‘technicalities’ [as] [s]uch errors and violations of rights are tremendously significant and legitimate for different reasons.” Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 AlbanyL.Rev. 1157, 1185 (2010-11). Had the trial court correctly ruled on Hill‘s motion to suppress, Hill undoubtedly would not have changed his not-guilty plea to one of no contest and would never have been found guilty of the drug crimes of which he was accused. Hill was, therefore, in a generic sense, wrongfully imprisoned. His incarceration was the result of procedural error of either the arresting law enforcement officer, the trial court, or both. Ultimately, his release occurred as a direct result of judicial recognition of that procedural error.
{¶ 51} It is not our role, however, to weigh competing policy considerations. Nor may we decide this case based on what we think the General Assembly meant to do, despite contradictory statutory text, or should do. Rather, we are required to construe and interpret the law as it is written. In doing so, we find that the General Assembly in 2002 changed Ohio‘s statutory framework to establish as Ohio‘s policy that wrongful-imprisonment compensation is warranted where an individual‘s release from prison results from the recognition of reversible procedural error that precludes further successful prosecution, regardless of guilt or innocence. We can discern no other purpose of the General Assembly in enacting the 2002 amendment to the wrongful-imprisonment statute than to allow individuals in Hill‘s posture to be recognized as falling within the classification of “wrongfully imprisoned individual.”
{¶ 52} We therefore overrule the state‘s first assignment of error.
D. Analysis of State‘s Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 53} In its second assignment of error, the state contends that “[t]he trial court committеd reversible error by attempting to utilize the civil Wrongful Imprisonment Statute of R.C. § 2743.48 as a punitive/deterrent mechanism against law enforcement.” It takes issue with the following concluding comments of the trial court in its written decision:
Plaintiff‘s case is one where a reversal by a Court of Appeals removes the entire basis for alleging criminal liability. Even if the Court‘s decision today minimally expands the pool of individuals who could be declared a “wrongfully imprisoned individual,” to hold otherwise has the potential of legitimizing illegal and unconstitutional conduct. The procedural safeguards for the Fourth Amendment exist to ensure that one‘s right to privacy is protected and that citizens are free from unreasonable intrusion by the police. The wrongful imprisonment statute exists, not only to compensate individuals who are innocent, but also to ensure that constitutional protections are not mere words. It serves as an incentive for police and courts alike to safeguard an individual‘s rights.”
(July 18, 2012 Decision and Entry, at 18.)
{¶ 54} The state argues that there is no evidence or other reason to believe that the General Assembly enacted the wrongful-imprisonment compensation statutes in order to deter improper police conduct. But assuming, arguendo, that the state is correct that the General Assembly did not expressly have as a purpose for amending the statute the deterrence of improper police conduct, “reviewing courts are not authorized to reverse a correct judgment on the basis that some or all of the lower court‘s reasons are erroneous.” Ritchie v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1019, 2006-Ohio-1210, ¶ 24, citing State ex rel. McGrath v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 100 Ohio St.3d 72, 2003-Ohio-5062, ¶ 8. The trial court‘s inclusion of the commentary quoted above does not, therefore, constitute reversible error.
{¶ 55} Rather, we have considered de novo whether Hill satisfied the five statutory criteria sеt forth in
{¶ 56} Accordingly, we overrule the state‘s second assignment of error.
III. Disposition
{¶ 57} There is no genuine issue of material fact, reasonable minds can only find that Hill met the criteria of
Judgment affirmed.
KLATT, P.J., and SADLER, J., concur.
Notes
Rather, we beliеve that the “subsequent to sentencing” phrase modifies the timing of the convict‘s release, i.e., it mandates that the individual be released from prison subsequent to sentencing, based on an error of procedure that occurred before sentencing.
We further note that the Legislative Service Commission in its Final Bill Analysis of Sub.S.B. No. 149, described the bill as including a new provision that “an error in procedure resulted in the individual‘s release as an alternative to the condition that subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment it was determined by the court of common pleas that the offense of which the individual was found guilty was not committed by the individual or by any other person.”