GRIFFITH, APPELLEE, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND ET AL.; THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT.
No. 2009-1363
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted April 20, 2010—Decided October 12, 2010
[Cite as Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4905.]
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether a claim for wrongful imprisonment may originate, in certain circumstances, in the Court of Claims. We hold that all claims for wrongful imprisonment must originate in a court of common pleas.
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} Appellee Gerry E. Griffith Jr. was charged in federal district court with possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. He moved to suppress evidence of the gun, arguing that the consent to the search that yielded the gun was obtained due to an unlawful arrest. The court denied the motion, finding
{¶ 3} The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court‘s decision to deny Griffith‘s motion to suppress, concluding that the consent to search Griffith‘s home was a direct result of an unlawful arrest. According to Griffith, the charges were dismissed upon remand, and he was released from custody in January 2007.
{¶ 4} Griffith subsequently filed a claim for wrongful imprisonment against the state of Ohio2 in the Court of Claims. That court dismissed the claim, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case without an initial declaratory judgment from a court of common pleas stating that Griffith was a wrongfully imprisoned individual. Griffith appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, relying on a 2003 amendment to
{¶ 5} We accepted the state‘s discretionary appeal. Griffith v. State, 123 Ohio St.3d 1492, 2009-Ohio-6015, 916 N.E.2d 1073.
Analysis
R.C. 2743.48(A)
{¶ 6}
{¶ 7} “(A) As used in this section and section 2743.49 of the Revised Code, a ‘wrongfully imprisoned individual’ means an individual who satisfies each of the following:
{¶ 8} “(1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code by an indictment or information prior to, or on or after, September 24, 1986, and the violation charged was an aggravated felony or felony.
{¶ 9} “(2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser-included offense by the court or jury involved, and the offense of which the individual was found guilty was an aggravated felony or felony.
{¶ 10} “(3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of which the individual was found guilty.
{¶ 11} “(4) The individual‘s conviction was vacated or was dismissed, or reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation against the individual for any act associated with that conviction.
{¶ 12} “(5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual‘s release, or it was determined by a court of common pleas that the offense of which the individual was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by the individual or was not committed by any person.”
{¶ 13} Under
R.C. 2743.48(A) is ambiguous as to this issue
{¶ 14} Griffith argues, and we do not deny, that
R.C. 1.49(D): Prior Statutory Provisions and Case Law
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16} “If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, may consider among other matters:
{¶ 17} “* * *
{¶ 18} “(D) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects.”
{¶ 19} When Sub.S.B. No. 149 amended
R.C. 1.49(C): Legislative History of the Amendment to R.C. 2743.48
{¶ 20} The various reports on 2002 Sub.S.B. No. 149 as it worked its way toward passage by the General Assembly all contained this description of the existing law: “Once a person is determined to be a wrongfully imprisoned individual by a court of common pleas, that person may file in the Court of Claims a civil action against the state to recover damages because of the wrongful imprisonment.” See Legislative Service Commission Bill Analyses, 124th General Assembly, S.B. 149: As Introduced; As Reported by S. Judiciary on Civil Justice; As Passed by the Senate; As Reported by H. Civil and Commercial Law; and As Passed by the General Assembly, all linked at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/analyses.cfm?ID=124_6dSB_149ACT=As%20Enrolled. This is a clear indication that the General Assembly understood that the statutory scheme contemplated a two-step process.
{¶ 21} The Act Summary of the Final Bill Analysis indicates that the General Assembly intended to effect four substantive changes to the statutory scheme. See http://lsc.state.oh.us/analyses/fnla124.nsf/All%20Bills%20and%20Resolutions/2558EFFB4897BAAC85256CAA005F47A7. The first three substantive changes are not relevant to this case. They increase the amount that a wrongfully imprisoned individual is entitled to recover; require the Auditor of State to make certain adjustments; and adds “specified cost debts” recovered from the individual by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to the amount of compensation. The fourth substantive change “[e]xpands the criteria that an individual must satisfy to be considered a ‘wrongfully imprisoned individual’ to include the condition that subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual‘s release as an alternative to the condition that subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment it was determined by a court of common pleas that the offense of which the individual was found guilty was not committed by the individual or by any other person.” Even though the act expanded the criteria by which a
R.C. 1.49(D): Laws upon the same subject
{¶ 22}
{¶ 23} As noted,
{¶ 24}
R.C. 1.49(E): Consequences of a Particular Construction
{¶ 25} Under
{¶ 26} If a wrongful-imprisonment case based on procedural error could originate in the Court of Claims, that court would have to rule on the criteria of
{¶ 27} Further, if actions brought under
R.C. 2305.02
{¶ 28} Finally,
{¶ 29}
Conclusion
{¶ 30} Based on the foregoing, we are convinced that the holding in Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 547 N.E.2d 962, still applies: All wrongful-imprisonment claimants must follow a two-step process. In the first step, the claimant must bring an action in the court of common pleas to secure a determination that he or she is a wrongfully imprisoned individual entitled to compensation. In the second step, the claimant must file a civil action against the state, in the Court of Claims, to recover a sum of money. Id. at 49-50. We are further persuaded that the General Assembly intended that only courts of common pleas have jurisdiction to determine whether a person has satisfied the five requirements of
{¶ 31} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment reversed.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘CONNOR, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
BROWN, C.J., not participating.
Slicer Law Office, Charles W. Slicer III, and Kathryn L. Bowling, for appellee.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Brandon J. Lester,