Hernandez-Gotay v. United StatesHernandez-Gotay v. United States
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It appears that appellants have misspelled the Secretary‘s name, an error which is reflected in their briefing and on the docket. The Clerk of Court shall amend the case caption to reflect the correct spelling as used in this opinion.
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Pursuant to
Edwin Prado-Galarza and María A. Domínguez, with whom Rafael Ojeda, Félix Román Carrasquillo, and DMRA Law LLC were on briefs, for appellants.
Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Sr., with whom Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant Attorney General, W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attornеy, Abby C. Wright, Attorney, Appellate Staff Civil Division, and John S. Koppel, Attorney, Appellate Staff Civil Division were on brief, for appellees.
Isaías Sánchez-Báez, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, and Carlos Lugo-Fiol on brief for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, amicus curiae.
Jorge Martínez-Luciano, Emil Rodríguez-Escudero, and M.L. & R.E. Law Firm on brief for the Puerto Rico Association of Mayors, amicus curiae.
Ana Maria Hernаndez Marti and Jessica L. Blome on brief for Animal Wellness Action, Animal Wellness Foundation, and the Center for a Humane Economy, amici curiae.
I. Background
On appeal from the grant of the government‘s motion for summary judgment, we read the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Stamps v. Town of Framingham, 813 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2016).
Cockfighting is “the sport of pitting gamecocks to fight and the breeding and training of them for that purpose.” Cockfighting, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/sports/cockfighting (last visited Dec. 17, 2020). The birds are bred to fight, are typically armed with steel spurs, and fight until one of the birds dies or is so injured that it can no longer fight. The Cockfight: A Casebook, at vii (Alan Dundes ed., 1994). The fights may end in a few minutes or go on as long as half an hour. Id. Cockfighting was banned in Puerto Rico from 1898 to 1933, and has since been heavily regulated under local Puerto Rico law. See
In 1976, Congress amended the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA“) to ban “animal fighting venture[s],” now defined as “any event,
Congress has amended the animal fighting venture prohibition several more times. As of 2018, before the passage of the law at issue in this case, Congress had banned attendance at all animal fighting ventures -- including those in Puerto Rico and other jurisdictions which still allowed cockfighting -- and the “[b]uying, selling, delivering, possessing, training, or transporting” of animals for the purpose of having the animal participate in an animal fighting venture.
In 2018, Congrеss passed Section 12616, which removed the remaining exception that allowed individuals to “[s]ponsor[] or exhibit[]” cocks in fights if allowed under local law and if they lacked knowledge that the cocks were moved in interstate commerce for purposes of cockfighting. See Section 12616(a);
The sponsors of Section 12616 explained that prohibiting cockfighting would “move to end the cruelty of animal fighting,” “protect . . . communities from associated crimes such as illegal drug dealing and human violence,” and “safeguard against the spread of diseases in poultry such as avian flu, since birds used in cockfighting are particularly vulnerable.” Further, “[a]fter a 2002 outbreak of exotic Newcastle disease in the U.S., which cost taxpayers nearly $200 million and the poultry industry many millions more, the USDA implicated cockfighting as a culprit in spreading the disease.”
II. Procedural History
On May 22 and August 1, 2019, plaintiffs filed two suits to enjoin the enforcemеnt of Section 12616.2 The cases were consolidated by the district court on August 5, 2019.
Plaintiffs asserted a number of claims, including that Section 12616 violated their First Amendment and Due Process rights, and that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce and Territorial Clauses. Club Gallístico de P.R. Inc. v. United States, 414 F. Supp. 3d 191, 201 (D.P.R. 2019). The plaintiffs lodged both facial and as-applied pre-enforcement challenges to the statute. Id. at 200.3
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Id. at 201. The district court granted the government‘s motion and denied plaintiffs’ motion. Id. at 202.
The district court first held that the plaintiffs had “standing to challenge the constitutionality of Congress’ extension of the animal fighting prоhibition to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and those provisions that have existed prior to Section 12616‘s approval.” Id. at 204.
The district court then concluded that Section 12616 was a valid exercise of Congress‘s Commerce Clause and Territorial Clause powers. Id. at 204-08. It next held that cockfighting is not expressive conduct and so is unprotected by the First Amendment, and that Section 12616 did not violate plaintiffs’ right of free association because it does not actually restrict association. Id. at 209-10. The district court rejected the substantive Due Process claim because there is no fundamental right to cockfighting and there was a rational basis for passing Section 12616. Id. at 211. It also rejected plaintiffs’ procedural Due Process claim, stating that “thе legislative process itself provides citizens with all of the process they are due.” Id. (quoting Correa-Ruiz v. Fortuño, 573 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2009)).
This appeal followed.5
III. Analysis
We review the district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. Irish v. Fowler, 979 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2020). We first address the issue of standing, followed by the Commerce Clause, First Amendment, and Due Process arguments.
A. Standing
Federal courts have “an independent obligation to assure that standing exists, regardless of whether it is challenged by any of the pаrties.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 499 (2009).
To have standing, a plaintiff must “‘allege[] such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” Id. at 493 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)). “To satisfy Article III‘s ‘personal stake’ requirement vis-à-vis a statutory challenge, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that (i) she has suffered an actual or threatened injury in fact, which is (ii) fairly traceablе to the statute, and (iii) can be redressed by a favorable decision.” Ramírez v. Sánchez Ramos, 438 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2006) (first citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); and then citing Lewis v. Cont‘l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). “[A] plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact
We conclude that plaintiff Ángel Manuеl Ortiz-Díaz, the owner of two cockfighting venues and a breeder and owner of more than 200 gamecocks, has standing to challenge Section 12616. Ortiz faces a credible threat of prosecution under Section 12616 because he regularly sponsors and exhibits cockfighting matches at his cockpits.6 The other standing requirements are clearly met. Article III‘s case-or-сontroversy requirement is satisfied if at least one party has standing. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986).
We also hold that Ortiz‘s claims are ripe. Ortiz‘s business is to sponsor and exhibit cockfights, and Section 12616 bans such activity. Thus, there is a controversy with “sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
B. Commerce Clause
Plaintiffs argue that Congress exceeded its authority under the Cоmmerce Clause in enacting Section 12616.
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). This includes “purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). “In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, . . . [w]e need not determine whether [plaintiffs‘] activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Id. at 22 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).
In making this inquiry, we consider four factors:
- whether the statute regulates economic or commercial activity;
- whether the statute contains an “express jurisdictional element” that limits the reach of its provisions;
- whether Congress made findings regarding the regulated activity‘s impact on interstate commerce; and
- whether “the link between [the regulated activity] and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was attenuated.”
United States v. Morales-de Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-12 (2000)).
As to the first factor, plaintiffs argue in passing that the statute “does not
As to the second factor, the plaintiffs arguе that the “express jurisdictional element” of the AWA -- which bans all cockfighting “in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,”
As to the third factor, plaintiffs argue that Congress made no findings regarding the 2018 amendments’ impact on interstate commerce. Plaintiffs assert that we should not look to Congress‘s reasons for banning animal fighting ventures in general, because they challenge only Section 12616. We disagree. Section 12616 extended the existing ban to Puerto Rico rather than creating entirely new restrictions, so earlier findings are relevant and must be considered.
Multiple congressional findings underscore the interstate commercial impact of cockfighting. Congress clarified in the AWA‘s “statement of policy” that the “animals and activities which are regulated under this chapter are either in interstate or foreign commerce or substantially affect such commerce or the free flow thereof.”
As to the fourth factor, plaintiffs argue that Section 12616‘s effect on interstate commerce is incidentаl and attenuated. In light of the jurisdictional hook, and the nature of the plaintiffs’ relationship to commercial cockfighting, in this case the effects on interstate commerce are certainly not incidental.
These factors require the conclusion that the prohibitions in the statute are about activities which substantially affect interstate commerce. Wе hold that Section
B. First Amendment
Plaintiffs argue that Section 12616 infringes on their First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. We reject both claims.
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”
Plaintiffs argue that cockfighting in Puerto Rico is expressive conduct entitled to First Amendment protection. We disagree. Plaintiffs’ assertion that cockfighting “еxpress[es] their culture and deeply rooted sense of self-determination” is insufficient to show that their sponsorship or exhibition of cockfighting “would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be communicative.” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 294; see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (recognizing “long history” of banning animal cruelty). By the same token, the O‘Brien test does not apply here because plaintiffs have failed to identify any exprеssive element in the cockfighting activities that they engage in such that Section 12616 could be considered even an incidental burden on speech. See O‘Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77. Even had plaintiffs shown that their cockfighting activities contained some expressive element, Section 12616 is plainly permissible as an incidental restraint on such speech. See id. at 377.
Plaintiffs next argue that Section 12616 infringеs on their First Amendment associational right to “peaceably assemble.”
C. Due Process
Plaintiffs next argue that the passage of Section 12616 violated their procedural and substantive Due Process rights.
Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that they have no cognizable liberty interest at stake other than their purported First Amendment interest. That concession dooms the argument they are making. Even apart from their concession, plaintiffs have not shown that they have any cognizable liberty interest which is being infringed by these prohibitions. We reject their procedural and substantive Due Process challenges.9 See
IV. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.