LORAIN COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES, et al. v. LOUIS C. GOSSICK
C.A. No. 13CA010476
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
September 8, 2014
2014-Ohio-3865
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 12JS37527
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant Louis Gossick appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. This Court reverses and remands.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Gossick received legal custody of his son O.G. after a divorce. Beginning on April 18, 2011, when O.G. was 16 years old, he was apparently removed from Mr. Gossick‘s care and placed in foster care. There is no evidence in the record regarding any adjudication of O.G. as unruly, delinquent, dependent, or otherwise. O.G. attained the age of 18 years old on August 28, 2012, at which time he left the foster care system and went to live with his mother.
{¶4} The parties engaged in discovery. DJFS objected to Mr. Gossick‘s requests for production of documents evidencing, among other things, support orders issued prior to the Department‘s filing of the instant complaint and amounts paid for support of O.G. while he was a child in foster care, for the reason that such information should have been requested in case number 11JC32718. DJFS did provide, however, a copy of an April 21, 2011 journal entry from case number 11JC32718, captioned In the Matter of O.G., in which the trial court ordered, alternatively, that (1) Lorain County Child Support Enforcement Agency shall conduct genetic testing to determine paternity, and that the agency shall forward the results to the prosecutor for establishment of a child support order against the parents; or (2) if paternity had already been established, “this matter is referred to CSEA for the establishment of an order of child support against the parent(s) or legal custodian of the child;” or (3) if a child support order already existed, CSEA shall redirect those payments to Lorain County Children Services. That journal entry indicated that it was copied to Children Services, the assistant prosecutor, and CSEA. There is nothing to indicate that it was served on either parent or any putative father of O.G. Subsequently, DJFS moved the trial court for a protection order, relieving it of an obligation to
{¶5} Mr. Gossick filed a motion for summary judgment, a supplement to his motion, and a reply to the Department‘s brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The record contains neither a hard copy of the Department‘s purported brief in opposition nor an entry upon the docket indicating that DJFS ever filed such a brief. In his motion for summary judgment, Mr. Gossick argued that the juvenile court had no authority pursuant to Meyer v. Meyer, 17 Ohio St.3d 222 (1985), to issue an order for retroactive child support.
{¶6} Mr. Gossick also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
{¶7} The magistrate considered Mr. Gossick‘s motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss, as well as DJFS‘s motion for a protection order. The magistrate issued a decision denying both the motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. The juvenile court issued an order adopting the magistrate‘s decision and denying both of Mr. Gossick‘s motions the same day. Mr. Gossick filed timely objections to the magistrate‘s decision. DJFS filed a brief in opposition to the objections. The trial court overruled Mr. Gossick‘s objections and effectively adhered to its prior judgment.
{¶8} The matter proceeded to a hearing before the magistrate on the issue of the amount of retroactive child support for which Mr. Gossick would be responsible. On September 23, 2013, the magistrate ordered that Mr. Gossick shall pay $179.49 per month for child support
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT [MR. GOSSICK‘S] MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
{¶9} Mr. Gossick argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to grant his motion to dismiss DJFS‘s complaint for an order of child support for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This Court agrees.
{¶10} “A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction inherently raises a question of law, and appellate review is de novo.” Exchange St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Donofrio, 187 Ohio App.3d 241, 2010-Ohio-127, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.). ”
{¶11} The juvenile court derives its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to statute.
{¶12} The term “child” is defined as:
a person who is under eighteen years of age, except that the juvenile court has jurisdiction over any person who is adjudicated an unruly child prior to attaining eighteen years of age until the person attains twenty-one years of age, and, for purposes of that jurisdiction related to that adjudication, a person who is so adjudicated an unruly child shall be deemed a “child” until the person attains twenty-one years of age.
a person who is under eighteen years of age, except * * * [that] [t]he juvenile court has jurisdiction over a person who is adjudicated a delinquent child * * * prior to attaining eighteen years of age until the person attains twenty-one years of age, and, for purposes of that jurisdiction related to that adjudication, except as otherwise provided in this division, a person who is so adjudicated a delinquent child * * * shall be deemed a “child” until the person attains twenty-one years of age.
{¶13} Although Mr. Gossick makes some reference to O.G.‘s unruly behavior, DJFS did not allege in its complaint that O.G. was adjudicated an unruly child. Moreover, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that O.G. was ever adjudicated an unruly child. In addition,
{¶14} Instead, in its complaint, the department sought a child support order pursuant to
{¶15} Both parties seem to agree that the child support provision relevant to this child support proceeding is
Except as provided in section 2151.361 of the Revised Code [addressing child support orders relative to adoptive parents], when a child has been committed as provided by this chapter or Chapter 2152. of the Revised Code, the juvenile court shall issue an order pursuant to Chapters 3119., 3121., 3123., and 3125. of the Revised Code requiring that the parent, guardian, or person charged with the child‘s support pay for the care, support, maintenance, and education of the child. The juvenile court shall order that the parents, guardian, or person pay for the expenses involved in providing orthopedic, medical, or surgical treatment for, or for special care of, the child, enter a judgment for the amount due, and enforce the judgment by execution as in the court of common pleas.
{¶16}
{¶17} DJFS alleged in its complaint that Lorain County Children Services provided foster care for O.G. The juvenile court has the authority to commit a child to the temporary custody of a public children services agency for placement in foster care. E.g.,
{¶18} DJFS relies solely on reference to a purported child support order issued in case number 11JC32718 for its invocation of the juvenile court‘s subject matter jurisdiction. There are two journal entries from that case in the record, and neither party disputes their authenticity. The first journal entry, time-stamped April 18, 2011, is an “ex-parte predispositional interim order of custody” to Lorain County Children Services. That order mandates that “[t]he parents shall continue to be responsible for all medical, dental, optical, psychological, and counseling expenses for the child together with all necessities.” Although the order finds that “the continued
{¶19} The other journal entry in the record from case number 11JC32718 is the April 21, 2011 journal entry referenced earlier and which ordered, alternatively, that (1) Lorain County Child Support Enforcement Agency shall conduct genetic testing to determine paternity, and that the agency shall forward the results to the prosecutor for establishment of a child support order against the parents; or (2) if paternity had already been established, “this matter is referred to CSEA for the establishment of an order of child support against the parent(s) or legal custodian of the child;” or (3) if a child support order already existed, CSEA shall redirect those payments to Lorain County Children Services. This order, too, fails to disclose on what basis O.G. became subject to the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction, e.g., based on an adjudication as an unruly, delinquent, dependent, neglected, or abused child. Moreover, by its plain language, it does not constitute an extant child support order, but rather an order directing CSEA to take the preliminary action necessary to thereafter establish a child support order applicable to the underlying case. No order actually establishing child support exists in the record.
{¶20} Even construing the allegations in the pleadings and all documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the Department and further resolving all reasonable competing inferences in favor of DJFS as the non-moving party, this Court concludes that there is nothing
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT‘S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS A JUDGMENT FOR RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT.
{¶21} Mr. Gossick argues that the juvenile court erred by denying his motion for summary judgment. Based on this Court‘s resolution of the second assignment of error, we decline to address the first assignment of error as it has been rendered moot. See
{¶22} Mr. Gossick‘s second assignment of error is sustained. We decline to address the first assignment of error. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
LUCIUS C. GOSSICK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and MATT K. RECKO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.