Henderson v. StateHenderson v. State
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-14-824177
BEFORE: Stewart, J., McCormack, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 7, 2015
Troy Henderson, pro se
11040 Clark Road
Chardon, OH 44024
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
For State of Ohio
Mike DeWine
Ohio Attorney General
Halli Brownfield Watson
Tiffany L. Carwile
Renata Y. Staff
Assistant Attorneys General
Constitutional Offices Section
30 East Broad Street, 16th Floor
Columbus, OH 43215
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
For Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office and Carrie Heindrichs
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Brian R. Gutkoski
Assistant County Prosecutor
Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee, Troy Henderson, appeals the
{¶2} In 2011, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury rеturned a four-count indictment charging Henderson with grand theft auto, receiving stolen property, forgery, and tampering with records. The indictment stemmed from a complaint filed by Henderson’s former girlfriend and mother of his child that accused Henderson of stealing her vehicle and several other items from her home. Acting in his own defense, Henderson was found not guilty on all counts following a jury trial.
{¶3} On March 24, 2014, Henderson filed a cоmplaint against the state of Ohio, the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, and Assistant County Prosecutor Carrie Heindrichs, alleging claims of 1) interfering with civil rights; 2) dereliction of duty; 3) negligent supervision; 4) negligence; and 5) fraud, seeking money damages and unspecified equitable relief from the
{¶4} On April 30, 2014, the prosecutors gave notice to the court that they served requests for admissions, interrogatories, and production of documents on Henderson in connection with his complaint and their counterclaim. On May 5, 2014, Henderson filed a brief in opposition to the prosecutors’ and state’s motions to dismiss, and on June 3, 2014, Henderson filed his answer to the prosecutors’ counterclaim. Along with his answer, Henderson filed a
{¶5} The court granted the prosecutors’ motion to dismiss pursuant to
The Dismissal of Henderson’s Complaint
{¶6} Henderson contends that the trial court committed reversible error by granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss and abused its discretion by not granting his motion for summary judgment.
{¶7} A
{¶9} The prosecutors suggest that because
{¶10} Under the notice pleading requirements of
{¶11} Even under the lower pleading standard, we agree with the prosecutors that Henderson’s complaint is almost entirely devoid of the necessary underlying facts needеd to support his claims of interfering with civil rights, dereliction of duty, negligent supervision,
{¶12} However, even if we assume that Henderson has complied with the
{¶13}
The political subdivision, and an employee who is a county prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or similar chief legal officer of a political subdivision, an assistant of any such person, or a judge of a court of this state is entitled to any defense or immunity available at common law or establishеd by the Revised Code.
And
(a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official responsibilities; (b) The employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless
{¶14} The United States Supreme Court has held that prosecutors are considered “quasi-judicial officers” entitled to the absolute immunity granted to judges when their activities are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); see also Henderson v. Euclid, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101149, 2015-Ohio-15, ¶ 26. Activities that are intimately associated with the judicial phase оf the criminal process include initiating a prosecution and presenting the state’s case. Id. at 431. However, absolute immunity often will not apply to a prosecutor’s actions that are more removed from the judicial phase, such as when a prosecutor gives advice to police during a criminal investigation; see Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991), when the prosecutor makes statements to the press, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 277, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993), or when a prosecutor acts as a complaining witness in support of а warrant application, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127, 132, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Willitzer v. McCloud, 6 Ohio St.3d 447, 449, 453 N.E.2d 693 (1983) (explaining that absolute immunity does not apply when the prosecutor is involved in “essentially investigative or administrative functions.“). Thus, the critical inquiry when determining the applicability of absolute immunity in these cases is how closely related the prosecutor’s challenged activity is to his role as an advocate of the state in the judicial phase of the criminal procеss. Moore v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100069, 2014-Ohio-1426, ¶ 25, citing Carmichael v. Cleveland, 881 F. Supp.2d 833, 846 (N.D.Ohio 2012).
{¶16} Further the trial court correctly granted the state’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
{¶17} The state of Ohio argued in its motion to dismiss that, pursuant to
{¶18}
(1) The court of claims is a court of record and has exclusive, original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in section 2743.02 of the Revised Code and exclusive jurisdiction of the causes of action of all parties in civil actions that are removed to the court of claims.* * *
(2) If the claimant in a civil action as described in division (A)(1) of this section also files a claim for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or other equitable relief аgainst the state that arises out of the same circumstances that gave rise to the civil action described in division (A)(1) of this section, the court of claims has exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear and determine that claim in that civil action. This division does not affect, and shall not be construed as affecting, the original jurisdiction of another court of this state to hear and determine a civil action in which the sole relief that the claimant seeks against the state is a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or other equitable relief.
{¶19} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that if an “action involves a civil suit for money damages against the state, the Court of Claims has original, exclusive jurisdiction” over the suit. Boggs v. Ohio, 8 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 455 N.E.2d 1286 (1983). The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims of money damages even if the plaintiff also asks for declarаtory or injunctive relief. See Friedman v. Johnson, 18 Ohio St.3d 85, 87–88, 480 N.E.2d 82 (1985).
{¶20} Henderson’s complaint requests money damages from each defendant, including the state of Ohio. Therefore, the court of claims has exclusive jurisdiction over Henderson’s causes of action against the state. Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims against the state, the court properly dismissed them.
{¶21} Lastly, the court correctly dismissed the complaint against the state under
{¶22} In light of our conclusion that the court properly dismissed the complaint against the appellees, Henderson’s second assignment of error, that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting his motion for summary judgment, is moot.
{¶23} On June 19, 2014, the prosecutors asked the court to strike the poverty affidavit Henderson filed with his complaint. Under Loc.R. 7(D) of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, General Division, a plaintiff may submit a poverty affidavit when initiating a case in lieu of making a security deposit for court costs. The poverty affidavit must state the reasons for the inability to prepay costs and is subject to court review at any stage in the proceedings. Loc.R. 7(D).
{¶24} In their motion to strike, the prosecutors argued that although Henderson’s poverty affidavit states that he had zеro income in 2014 and 2013, had zero assets, and that he was unemployed when he filed the action — he nonetheless apparently has room and board, internet service, and access to legal research tools. Furthermore, the prosecutors assert that in discovery requests, they asked Henderson to provide documentation regarding his lack of income, but that he failed to comply. According to the prosecutors, these facts call into question whether Henderson really is impoverished. Therefore, they asked the court to conduct a hearing on Henderson’s poverty status and, if appropriate, order him to pay all court costs incurred herein to date and to make a security deposit for future costs.
{¶25} We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to strike a povеrty affidavit for an abuse of discretion. See Wilson v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 138 Ohio App. 3d 239, 243, 741 N.E.2d 152 (10th Dist. 2000). An abuse of discretion connotes an unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable act on the part of the trial court. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the prosecutors’ motion to strike the poverty affidavit or for declining to hold a hearing on the issue. While Loc.R. 7(D) allows a court to review poverty affidavits, it does not say that a court
{¶26} The prosecutors further contend that it was error for the trial court to dismiss their counterclaim for vexatious litigator designation. On this issue, we agree.
{¶27} In their countеrclaim, the prosecutors alleged that since his not-guilty verdict, Henderson has initiated four separate lawsuits (including the present complaint) related to his criminal prosecution. The lawsuits included the city of Euclid, his former girlfriend, the judge presiding over his trial, and the court-supervised-release probation officer. The prosecutors further alleged that Henderson filed numerous pleadings, motions, objeсtions, and briefs that have no basis in law or fact, but nevertheless demand the attention and resources of both the court and the named defendants in each suit. The prosecutors, therefore, asked the trial court to declare Henderson a vexatious litigator pursuant to
{¶28} On June 3, 2014, Henderson filed his answer to the prosecutors’ counterclaim. With his answer, Henderson also filed a
R.C. 2323.52(B) provides that a person who has defended against habitual and persistent vexatious conduct “may commence a civil action in the court of common pleas * * * to have that person declared a vexatious litigator.”R.C 2323.52(C) provides as follows: “A civil action to have a person declared a vexatious litigator shall proceed as any other civil action and the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the action.”
State ex rel. Tauwab v. Ambrose, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97472, 2012-Ohio-817, ¶ 4.
{¶30} The prosecutors timely filed a counterclaim against Henderson alleging that he was a vexatious litigator under the statute. In their complaint, the prosecutors pleaded facts that, if true, would establish that Henderson is a vexatious litigator under
{¶31} Despite the fact that Henderson’s
{¶32} Finally, because we reverse the trial court’s decision to dismiss the prosecutor’s counterclaim, whether the trial court erred in denying the prosecutors leave tо file instanter a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss is rendered moot. We also reverse the trial court’s decision to deny as “moot” the prosecutor’s motions and remand for further proceedings.
{¶34} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
It is ordered that appellees/cross-appellants recover of said appellant/cross-appellee their costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
TIM McCORMACK, P.J., CONCURS;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
{¶35} I concur fully with the majority in all respects except the conclusion in paragraph 25 regarding the poverty affidavit, with which I respectfully dissent.
{¶36} Although I agree Loc.R. 7(D) does not mandate a hearing, the practice of rubber-stamping the validity of such affidavits must be called into question when the opposing party has raised a viable question of validity following repeated and excessive filings. At some point, inquiry in the form of a hearing is warranted. I see this as a most appropriate case. When, as here, there is a blanket attempt to paper the courthouse, common sense dictates a more prudent response.