Hechavarria v. SessionsHechavarria v. Sessions
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Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of New York (John T. Curtin, J.) denying petitioner-appellant Joseph Emanuel Hechavarria‘s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
Reversed and remanded.
JOSEPH EMANUEL HECHAVARRIA, Batavia, N.Y., pro se.
JESI J. CARLSON, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice (Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, John W. Blakeley, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, on the brief), Washington, D.C., for Respondents-Appellees.
VILIA B. HAYES, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP (Malik Havalic, Dustin P. Smith, on the brief), New York, N.Y., Amicus Curiae, in support of Petitioner-Appellant.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA“) provides for the detention of immigrants under various circumstances, two of which are at issue in this case. Immigrants who have been ordered removed are detained during their “removal period” under
BACKGROUND
I. Immigration and Criminal History
Joseph Emanuel Hechavarria is a Jamaican citizen who first arrived in the United States in 1984 on a nonimmigrant visitor visa. Hechavarria overstayed his visa and married a U.S. citizen, who filed a marriage-based conditional permanent resident (“CPR“) application on his behalf, which was granted in 1987. In 1989, Hechavarria‘s CPR status was terminated because he and his spouse failed to submit a petition to lift the conditions on his status as required by
In December 2010, Hechavarria failed to appear for a required check-in in Buffalo and instead called the ATD officers to tell them he was on his way to Florida. Subsequent to this phone call, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) learned that Hechavarria was the subject of a criminal arrest warrant issued in Cheektowaga, New York on December 13, 2010 for, among other things, an alleged rape and assault that had occurred on December 2, 2010. Hechavarria was detained by ICE agents in New York City on December 22, 2010 and transported to Cheektowaga, New York to face the pending charges. In 2011, Hechavarria was convicted of assault in the second degree and sentenced to three years of incarceration and two years of post-release supervision.
While Hechavarria was incarcerated for the December 2010 assault, ICE filed an additional charge of deportability on the basis of Hechavarria‘s conviction of an aggravated felony under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA“) § 101(a)(43)(F),
II. Petition for Review and Habeas Corpus
On October 16, 2015, Hechavarria filed a pro se petition for review of the BIA order dismissing his appeal, as well as a motion for stay of removal with this Court. See Hechavarria v. Lynch, No. 15-3331 (2d Cir. 2015), ECF No. 1. On December 15, 2016, we granted the stay of removal because we found that Hechavarria had “an arguable claim that the BIA erred in adhering to the aggravated felony crime of violence determination under the law of the case doctrine without assessing whether Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), constituted intervening precedent.” Order Staying Appeal, Hechavarria v. Lynch, No. 15-3331 (2d Cir. 2016), ECF No. 55. We recognized that the question of Johnson‘s application to the same section of the INA providing grounds for Hechavarria‘s removal was currently under review by the Supreme Court in Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 31 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016), No. 15-1498. Id. Oral argument was heard in Dimaya on October 2, 2017, and the Supreme Court issued its opinion on February 27, 2018. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). The parties are currently litigating the impact of Dimaya on Hechavarria‘s petition for review. Meanwhile, the stay of removal remains in place.
On December 8, 2015, while his stay request was pending, Hechavarria filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Western District of New York. The district court analyzed Hechavarria‘s detention under
On April 29, 2016, Hechavarria timely appealed the district court‘s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On October 27, 2017, we appointed amicus curiae counsel to address whether Hechavarria‘s detention was governed by
DISCUSSION
Hechavarria challenges the district court‘s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
Hechavarria and the government disagree about which provision of the INA governs Hechavarria‘s detention. Hechavarria and the court-appointed amicus counsel argue that Hechavarria‘s detention is governed by
I. Judicial Review
This Court is currently engaged in two threads of judicial review regarding Hechavarria. The first thread is the one at
The INA explicitly provides for judicial review of removal orders in the federal courts of appeals.
In addition to a formal stay of removal, the government also implements a forbearance policy in this Circuit during the pendency of petitions for review. See In re Immigration Petitions for Review Pending in U.S. Court of Appeals for Second Circuit, 702 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2012). This discretionary policy dictates that “the filing of a motion to stay removal . . . will suffice to prevent removal” while a petition for review is pending. Efstathiadis v. Holder, 752 F.3d 591, 599 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2014). That forbearance is lifted—and the petitioner is eligible for removal—if we deny the motion for a stay of removal. If we grant the underlying petition, of course, the petitioner is either granted the immigration status he or she is seeking, or (more typically) the case is remanded to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with our decision.
In sum, the INA explicitly provides for judicial review of both habeas petitions and underlying removal orders. It also provides for the ability of courts of appeals to issue stays of removal pending the disposition of that review process. Further, the government‘s forbearance policy stays a removal until we decide on the formal motion for a stay. The statutory and customary procedural protections of judicial review and stays are essential tools in meeting the government‘s constitutional obligation to provide procedural due process for immigrants facing removal. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.“). Our power and obligation to participate meaningfully in the statutory scheme as structured by the Constitution is a foundational element of our analysis in this appeal.
II. Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C. § 1231
The government‘s power to detain an immigrant must be grounded in a specific provision of the INA. The question before us is precisely which provision of the INA applies to the detention of Hechavarria. The government endorses the district court‘s view that he is detained under Section 1231. Amicus asserts he is detained pursuant to Section 1226. Because the court below applied Section 1231, we begin our analysis by examining this provision.
This Section of the INA addresses immigrants in the “removal period,” the term used in the statute to describe the 90-day period following an order of removal during which “the Attorney General shall remove the alien.”
- The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.
- If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court‘s final order.
- If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process),
the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.”
The unambiguous language of the statute makes plain that Hechavarria cannot be detained pursuant to Section 1231. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.“). There are three scenarios that can trigger the start of the removal period, but only the latest of those scenarios is the trigger. The second scenario is the one that applies to immigrants like Hechavarria who have filed petitions for review with a court of appeals and received a stay. However, in that scenario, the removal period is only triggered on “the date of the court‘s final order.” We have not yet issued a final order. Cf. Wang, 320 F.3d at 147 (holding that the petitioner‘s due process claim under Section 1226 was “rendered moot” because the Court‘s decision on the petition for review effectively moved the petitioner into the removal period contemplated by Section 1231).
This reading of Section 1231 is confirmed by its structure and logic. The removal period—repeatedly described as a default 90-day period throughout the section—is the period of time during which the “Attorney General shall remove” the immigrant.
The government attempts to skirt this clear statutory language by arguing that we need only determine when Hechavarria‘s order became administratively final. In other words, the government asks us to ignore section (ii)‘s clear language “on the latest of the following,” so that any immigrant with an administratively final order of removal is subject to detention under
Nor do we need detain ourselves long on the government‘s argument that we ought to afford deference to its interpretation, pursuant to the principles articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As amicus counsel notes, the government‘s interpretation on this point is a litigation position, not an agency interpretation.4 But
Section 1231 does not govern the detention of immigrants whose removal has been stayed pending judicial review. To hold otherwise would ignore the clear language of the statute as well as its internal logic. When a court of appeals issues a stay pending judicial review of an underlying removal order, the removal is not inevitable. A contrary reading assumes that the courts of appeals function as mere ministerial rubber stamps for agencies. Yet this appears to be the view advanced by the government, which suggests that our review of Hechavarria‘s underlying removal order is a mere formality that simply “temporarily interrupted” “DHS‘s ability to carry out Hechavarria‘s removal.” Appellees’ Response to Amicus Br. at 2. Our responsibility to provide meaningful judicial review is one that is grounded in both the statute and the Constitution and may not be dismissed by the government as a mere procedural nuisance. Any interpretation to the contrary would render judicial review a meaningless symbolic exercise and has no basis in law.
III. Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C. § 1226
We agree with Hechavarria and the amicus counsel that the controlling statute is
Because Hechavarria has been granted a stay of removal while his petition for review is pending, there remains a very clear impediment to his removal—review by this Court. Specifically, this Court must decide whether, given intervening Supreme Court precedent, the BIA erred in finding that he is subject to removal on the basis of his conviction for an aggravated felony. Given the fact that such review has not been completed, it would make no sense to classify Hechavarria in the same section of the statute that governs the removal of aliens who have no remaining barriers preventing their immediate removal. Hechavarria‘s detention is thus governed by
IV. Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
In Lora v. Shanahan we assessed the detention of aliens under
On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court held that this interpretation of Section 1226(c) was erroneous, reversing the Ninth Circuit‘s bright-line rule. Specifically, the Court held in relevant part that “1226(c) mandates detention of any alien falling within its scope and that detention may end prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings ‘only if’ the alien is released for witness protection purposes.” Jennings, 138 S.Ct. at 847. The Court distinguished the statutes at issue in Jennings from its interpretation of a different statute in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). In Zadvydas, the Court invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance in interpreting the ambiguous language of Section 1231‘s detainment provision. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. Specifically, the Court held that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem” and that there must therefore be a reasonableness limit to the permissible length of detention. Id. at 690. The Court determined that six months was a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Id. at 701.
The Supreme Court found this analysis inapplicable to the statutory provisions at issue in Jennings. The Court held that the canon of constitutional avoidance did not apply to Section 1226(c) and the other challenged statutes, because “the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions is clear.” Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 848. “The canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one construction.” Id. at 842 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court therefore vacated the Ninth Circuit‘s decision on the basis of the erroneous application of the constitutional avoidance doctrine, but remanded the case for the Ninth Circuit “to consider respondents’ constitutional arguments on their merits.” Id. at 851.
Because our holding in Lora also relied upon the constitutional avoidance analysis of Zadvydas, see Lora, 804 F.3d at 606, the Lora decision was vacated by the Supreme Court shortly after Jennings was issued, Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018). This Court did not have the opportunity to consider the issues raised by the Supreme Court on the Lora remand, because during the pendency of the appeal the petitioner in Lora had received cancellation of removal and the case was therefore moot. Lora v. Shanahan, 719 F. App‘x 79 (2d Cir. 2018).
In light of the substantial uncertainty surrounding the detention provisions in Section 1226(c) given the new legal landscape, we remand this case to the district court for consideration in the first instance of the appropriate remedy for Hechavarria in light of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Jennings.
CONCLUSION
The plain language of the statutory scheme makes clear that Hechavarria is not in his “removal period” and cannot be detained pursuant to Section 1231. His detention is therefore governed by Section 1226. We thus REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND this case to the district court for reconsideration of the habeas petition under the correct statutory provision.