Lenward P. HEBERT; Darnell A. Hebert, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Randy J. MAXWELL, Sheriff of Concordia Parish, Individually and in His Official Capacity and as Keeper of Concordia Parish Jail; Jim Boyd, Deputy of Concordia Parish Sheriff‘s Department, in His Individual Capacity and Official Capacity, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 05-30929.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Decided Jan. 19, 2007.
451
In this case, the opinion as a whole gives sufficient reasons and documentation for the ALJ‘s credibility determination. The ALJ noted that Undheim‘s complaints were not fully supported by the objective medical evidence, that Undheim‘s physical and mental conditions had improved with medication and treatment, that Undheim engaged in various household activities, and that Undheim had made various inconsistent statements to his treating physicians. These determinations and findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, and the ALJ‘s opinion was sufficiently specific to make clear how the ALJ reached his decision. The ALJ‘s discussion was therefore sufficient to meet the requirements of
We AFFIRM.
William L. Goode, The Goode Law Firm, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
L. Joseph Hassinger, Jr., Timothy R. Richardson, Usry, Weeks & Matthews, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants-Appellants.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
After being arrested for criminal trespass and spending about forty-eight hours in jail, Lenward Hebert brought a
I.
After the Concordia Parish Sheriff‘s office received several calls about a suspicious blue pickup, Boyd came upon Hebert sitting inside his blue pickup, which was
Boyd called Gene Tiffee, the landowner, to the scene. Tiffee signed a statement that Hebert was parked “on Gene Tiffee[‘s] land at the intersection of La. 129 & 907 next to his cow pen.” Hebert claims that he offered to move his truck and leave the scene but was precluded from doing so. Boyd arrested Hebert for criminal trespass and later testified that Maxwell told him to arrest Hebert and hold him until they “found out more information.”
Hebert was taken to the parish jail Saturday afternoon. He was given two bedsheets, two towels, and two hand towels, was permitted to call his wife, and was placed in a holding cell called the “tank.” Hebert told his wife that he had been arrested but that she should not come to the jail because he would not be let out until Monday. Although the bond for criminal trespass is preset on a bond schedule, Hebert did not pay the bond until Monday. Maxwell had placed a “hold” on Hebert until Monday and testified that the “hold” was maintained until they could “find out who [Hebert] was.” On Monday, Hebert was taken before a judge, posted bond, and was released.
Hebert complains that the jail conditions were inhumane. He asserts that the cell reeked of human waste, which was strewn across the walls and the floor. The “tank” contained no bed, only a hard wooden bench. He claims the overhead lights were never turned off, that he was not permitted to shower or exercise, and that he was not given soap, toilet paper, toothbrush, or toothpaste until shortly before release. Although he received three meals a day, he urges that the food was cold, that it had been sitting out for a considerable time before being served, and that the only edible item was a biscuit. Finally, he alleges that clean cells with mattresses were empty and available in the jail.
II.
We have jurisdiction to review the district court‘s denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in this case because it comes within the collateral order doctrine. Where the denial of qualified immunity is based on an issue of law, it is an appealable “final order” within the meaning of
Defendants argue that the uncontested facts demonstrate that there was probable cause to arrest Hebert. They also reason that even if the plaintiff‘s allegations as to the condition of the “tank” are true, they do not rise to the level of a violation of a clear statutory or constitutional right. These arguments address the materiality of the facts the district court found to be in dispute, raising legal issues that this court may review on interlocutory appeal.
Defendants contend that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity on the claim of false arrest. We review the refusal to dismiss Hebert‘s claim on the basis of qualified immunity de novo. Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir.2003).
Once a public official has raised the defense of qualified immunity, the burden rests on the plaintiff to rebut it. See Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871-72 (5th Cir.1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the disputed facts to which the plaintiff points must be sufficient, if his version is accepted, for a reasonable trier of fact to determine (1) that the defendants violated the plaintiff‘s constitutional rights and (2) that the violation was objectively unreasonable. See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir.1992). The inquiry into reasonableness asks “whether [t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the right.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). If reasonable public officials could differ as to whether the defendants’ actions were lawful, defendants are entitled to immunity. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).
“The right to be free from arrest without probable cause is a clearly established constitutional right.” Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.1994). The test for probable cause is whether the officer, at the time of arrest, “had knowledge that would warrant a prudent person‘s belief that the person arrested had already committed or was committing a crime.” Id. (citing Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1992)). “Police officers who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)).
In Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004), the Court considered a claim of false arrest under the Fourth Amendment and concluded that a subjective analysis of the officer‘s state of mind is irrelevant to the analysis. Id. at 153, 125 S.Ct. 588. The only question is whether, given the facts known to the officer, he had probable cause to arrest the defendant for a crime. Id. Applying the Devenpeck standard in the qualified immunity context, the inquiry is whether, given the facts known to Boyd, he could have reasonably believed he had probable cause to arrest Hebert for any crime.
Boyd and Maxwell point to three statutes under which Hebert could have been arrested: Criminal Trespass,
B. No person shall intentionally enter immovable property owned by another:
(1) When he knows his entry is unauthorized, or
(2) Under circumstances where he reasonably should know his entry is unauthorized ...
C(2) It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution pursuant to Subsection B(2) to show that property was not adequately posted in accordance with Subsections D or E, and F of this Section.
...
E. In order for immovable property other than forest land to be adequately posted ... the owner ... shall post the property by ... (3) Constructing a fence around the area to be posted. ...
To convict a defendant of criminal trespass under this statute, the state must “prove an unauthorized intentional entry onto immovable property owned by another under circumstances where the person entering the property knows or reasonably should know the entry is unauthorized.” State v. Davis, 540 So.2d 600, 602 (La.App. 5th Cir.1989). Boyd can point to no facts, other than reports of “suspicious activity,” that are entirely unrelated to Tiffee‘s property, to suggest that Hebert had the intent to enter property belonging to another. Similarly, Boyd has pointed to no facts suggesting Hebert had reason to believe parking on the highway side of Tiffee‘s fence was unauthorized. Without any facts suggesting intent or knowledge, Boyd could not have had probable cause to believe Hebert was committing the crime of criminal trespass.
The other two statutes are similarly unavailing. One refers specifically to parking “unattended” vehicles on a state highway shoulder.
Thus these two statutes, even if they were violated, are not grounds for imprisonment. Because Boyd could not have believed he had probable cause to arrest Hebert without facts relating to Hebert‘s intent to trespass or his knowledge that he was trespassing, the defense of qualified immunity was properly denied.
IV.
Defendants urge that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity on the claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Section 1983 liability for alleged violations of detainee‘s rights can be premised on two theories: (1) that the conditions of confinement violated the detainee‘s rights or (2) that episodic acts or omissions of officials violated those rights. Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1997). Hebert complains that he was not provided a bed, that the meals were inadequate, that he lacked basic supplies like toilet paper and toothpaste, and that the room was filthy. These allegations amount to a “constitutional attack on general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement,” so this case presents a claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Id. (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 644 (5th Cir.1996)). In a condition of confinement case, the municipality is considered to have intended the alleged deprivation, and a constitutional violation occurs where we determine that “the condition of confinement is not related to a legitimate, non-punitive governmental objective.” Id.
We take the facts in the light most favorable to Hebert. He alleges that he was forced to sleep on a wooden plank while the county had other cells with mat-
The order denying qualified immunity is AFFIRMED, and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings. We express no view on the ultimate merits of this case.