DAMIEN GUEDES, ET AL. v. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, ET AL.
No. 19-296
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
March 2, 2020
589 U. S. ____ (2020)
Statement of GORSUCH, J.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of JUSTICE GORSUCH.
Does owning a bump stock expose a citizen to a decade in federal prison? For years, the government didn‘t think so. But recently the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives changed its mind. Now, according to a new interpretive rule from the agency, owning a bump stock is forbidden by a longstanding federal statute that outlaws the “possession [of] a machinegun.”
In the first place, the government expressly waived reliance on Chevron. The government told the court of appeals that, if the validity of its rule (re)interpreting the machinegun statute “turns on the applicability of Chevron, it would prefer that the [r]ule be set aside rather than up-held.” 920 F. 3d 1, 21 (CADC 2019) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting concession). Yet, despite this concession, the court proceeded to uphold the agency‘s new rule only on
That was mistaken. This Court has often declined to apply Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it. See Eskridge & Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1121–1124 (2008) (collecting cases); Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969, 982–984 (1992) (same); see BNSF R. Co. v. Loos, 586 U. S. ___ (2019). Even when Chevron deference is sought, this Court has found it inappropriate where “the Executive seems of two minds” about the result it prefers. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 20). Nor is it a surprise that the government can lose the benefit of Chevron in situations like these and ours. If the justification for Chevron is that “‘policy choices’ should be left to executive branch officials ‘directly accountable to the people,‘” Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20) (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865), then courts must equally respect the Executive‘s decision not to make policy choices in the interpretation of Congress‘s handiwork.
To make matters worse, the law before us carries the possibility of criminal sanctions. And, as the government itself may have recognized in offering its disclaimer, whatever else one thinks about Chevron, it has no role to play when liberty is at stake. Under our Constitution, “[o]nly the people‘s elected representatives in the legislature are authorized to ‘make an act a crime.‘” United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 5) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)). Before courts may send people to prison, we owe them an independent determination that the law actually forbids their conduct. A “reasonable” prosecutor‘s say-so is cold comfort in comparison. That‘s why this Court has “never held that the Government‘s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to any deference.” United States v. Apel, 571 U. S. 359, 369 (2014). Instead, we have emphasized, courts bear an “obligation” to determine independently what the law allows and forbids. Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S. 169, 191 (2014); see also 920 F. 3d, at 39–40 (opinion of Henderson, J.); Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F. 3d 1019, 1027–1032 (CA6 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That obligation went unfulfilled here.
Chevron‘s application in this case may be doubtful for other reasons too. The agency used to tell everyone that bump stocks don‘t qualify as “machineguns.” Now it says the opposite. The law hasn‘t changed, only an agency‘s interpretation of it. And these days it sometimes seems agencies change their statutory interpretations almost as often as elections change administrations. How, in all this, can ordinary citizens be expected to keep up—required not only to conform their conduct to the fairest reading of the law they might expect from a neutral judge, but forced to guess whether the statute will be declared ambiguous; to guess again whether the agency‘s initial interpretation of the law will be declared “reasonable“; and to guess again whether a later and opposing agency interpretation will also be held “reasonable“?
Despite these concerns, I agree with my colleagues that the interlocutory petition before us does not merit review. The errors apparent in this preliminary ruling might yet be corrected before final judgment. Further, other courts of appeals are actively considering challenges to the same regulation. Before deciding whether to weigh in, we would benefit from hearing their considered judgments—provided, of course, that they are not afflicted with the same problems. But waiting should not be mistaken for lack of concern.