Grigorian v. GonzalesGrigorian v. Gonzales
With respect to the substantive reasonableness of Enriquez-Bojorquez‘s sentence, we hold that, with or without the presumption of reasonableness accorded a within-Guidelines sentence, the sentence imposed here was reasonable. As the district court noted, Enriquez-Bojorquez‘s situation was not substantially different from many other illegal reentrants. While Enriquez-Bojorquez‘s prior aggravated assault conviction was some fourteen to fifteen years before, that alone does not justify ignoring it as a part of his criminal history. Furthermore, the district court noted the “cumulative” nature of his criminal history, and further noted that the reasons Enriquez-Bojorquez gave for reentering the United States were, essentially, run-of-the-mill. We accordingly hold that the sentence imposed is reasonable, in light of the
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence in this case.
Jennifer L. Lightbody, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Karen Stewart, Mark C. Walters United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Thomas W. Hussey, U.S. Department of Justice Appellant Section/ Civil Division, Washington, DC, Douglas Maurer, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Denver, CO, for Respondent.
Before BRISCOE, SEYMOUR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
STEPHANIE K. SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Vaagn Grigorian, a native and citizen of Armenia, petitions for review of a final order of removal. Our jurisdiction arises under
The government charged that Mr. Grigorian entered the United States illegally and was removable under
One week later he was called into the Armenian Ministry of Defense, where he was left alone for four hours, then interrogated for four hours about his refusal to follow orders. He was beaten, sustaining a cut over his eye when he hit his head on a table, and his interrogators “tried to threaten” him. Admin. R. at 124. He was released but his passport was confiscated. At some point his house was ransacked, apparently by uniformed officials, but nothing of value was taken. He then was followed as he drove to his mother‘s house and, upon leaving there, heard what he thought was a gunshot and fled on foot. He obtained a counterfeit passport, left Armenia, and arrived in the United States in November 2001.
The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Mr. Grigorian‘s story generally credible but denied asylum on two grounds, (i) that the mistreatment was not severe enough and the gunshot threat too vague to constitute persecution, and (ii) that Mr. Grigorian‘s fear of future persecution was speculative and not based on a protected ground. The IJ also denied restriction on removal and CAT relief.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) summarily affirmed the IJ‘s decision pursuant to
To be eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, Mr. Grigorian must first show that he is a refugee. See Wiransane, 366 F.3d at 893. Generally, an asylum applicant can establish refugee status by showing that he has suffered persecution, or has a well-founded fear of future persecution, on account of a protected ground—race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See id.;
Although persecution is not defined in the immigration statutes or regulations, we have characterized it as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive and requires more than just restrictions or threats to life and liberty.” Woldemeskel v. INS, 257 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). Assuming that Mr. Grigorian‘s mistreatment was on account of his political opinion, as he argues, it does not meet this standard. In Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1991), one of the petitioners seeking asylum, Stanislaw Saulo, alleged that on account of his political affiliation, he was detained for a two-day period, interrogated, beaten, assigned poor work tasks, denied bonuses, and fired. Id. at 704. He also alleged that his parents’ home was searched and that he was conscripted into the Polish army and constantly harassed. Id. He further claimed that a few years later, he was detained for several hours and beaten, and eventually convicted of distributing illegal pamphlets and fined. Id. at 704-05. We concluded that the treatment did not amount to persecution. See id. at 708.
The harm inflicted on Mr. Grigorian was, in certain respects, similar to the harm inflicted on Mr. Saulo. But the similar treatment of Mr. Grigorian was, at most, no more severe, and it does not compel a finding of persecution. While it is true that, unlike Mr. Saulo, Mr. Grigorian alleged he was threatened by a gunshot, the IJ characterized Mr. Grigorian‘s account of that threat as vague, noting it was “probably impossible to tell on this record” whether the noise he identified as a gunshot was directed at him or not because he was not shot and his car was not hit. Admin. R. at 56. The evidence supported the IJ‘s characterization, and hence the threat was entitled to little probative value, see Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003) (explaining that vague and conclusory testimony concerning a threat undercuts its probative value). Although the IJ did not discuss Mr. Grigorian‘s statement that his interrogators “tried to threaten him,” Admin. R. at 124, that statement also suffers from vagueness, rendering it of little probative value.
As to the denial of Mr. Grigorian‘s request for restriction on removal, we conclude that by challenging the IJ‘s past persecution findings before the BIA and in his petition for review, he exhausted his administrative remedies and adequately presented the issue to this court. See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that, under
The petition for review is DISMISSED as to the unexhausted issues and DENIED in all other respects.