Grenga v. Youngstown State Univ.Grenga v. Youngstown State Univ.
Rendered on November 1, 2011
Joseph Robert Grenga, pro se.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Amy S. Brown, for appellee.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio.
FRENCH, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Joseph Robert Grenga (“Grenga“), appeals the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio, which granted summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Youngstown State University (“YSU“), on Grenga‘s claims of trespass and invasion of privacy. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶3} Grenga commenced this action on August 18, 2010, by filing a complaint in the Court of Claims against the following defendants: (1) YSU; (2) Morgione, individually and in his capacity as YSU‘s General Counsel; (3) Mineo, individually and in his capacity as a YSU employee; (4) the Attorney General of Ohio (“Attorney General“); and (5) various John Does. Grenga alleged that the defendants entered upon his land without privilege or authority, in violation of
{¶4} On August 31, 2010, YSU and the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss Grenga‘s complaint, pursuant to
{¶5} On October 13, 2010, the trial court entered a partial dismissal. The court dismissed Grenga‘s constitutional and criminal claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed as time-barred all claims that accrued prior to August 18, 2008, two years before Grenga filed his complaint, pursuant to
{¶6} After the trial court‘s partial dismissal, Grenga moved the court for leave to file an amended complaint, although he neither identified the amendments he wished to make nor appended a copy of a proposed amended pleading to his motion. Grenga
{¶7} On November 8, 2010, YSU filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by an affidavit from Morgione. YSU argued that no YSU employees entered Grenga‘s property after March 8, 2007, more than two years before Grenga filed this action. In his affidavit, Morgione stated that he did not enter the property after March 8, 2007, while Grenga remained the owner, and he was unaware of any other YSU employee who subsequently entered onto the property on behalf of YSU while Grenga remained the owner. Accordingly, YSU argued that, as a matter of law, Grenga‘s claims arising from YSU employees entering upon his property were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims in the Court of Claims.
{¶8} Grenga opposed YSU‘s motion for summary judgment and, on December 2, 2010, filed his own motion for summary judgment. In opposition to YSU‘s motion, Grenga submitted his own affidavit, an affidavit of Fredrick Joseph Cannell, and a letter addressed to Grenga from the city‘s Deputy Law Director. The letter, dated January 14, 2009, informed Grenga that the city‘s appraiser, the County Auditor‘s appraiser, and their authorized representatives intended to enter the property for the purpose of appraising and documenting the property on January 19, 2009. In his affidavit, Grenga states that he believes Morgione and Mineo entered the property in January 2009, according to the January 14, 2009 letter. Grenga argued that Morgione‘s statement that he and Mineo accompanied city representatives during their inspection of the property demonstrates that they entered the building on or about January 19, 2009.
{¶10} On December 9, 2010, the trial court stayed this action, pending final disposition of a connected action in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, but ordered that discovery was to continue during the stay. {¶11} The Court of Claims granted YSU‘s motion for summary judgment and denied Grenga‘s motion for summary judgment on January 18, 2011. The court found that neither Grenga‘s affidavit nor the January 14, 2009 letter contradicted Morgione‘s affidavit, which provided evidence that Grenga‘s remaining claims were based on occurrences that predated August 18, 2008. The court stated that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the undisputed evidence is that Grenga‘s claims are based upon occurrences that predate August 18, 2008, and that those claims are time-barred. The trial court denied as moot all other pending motions, including Grenga‘s motion for leave to file an amended complaint and Grenga‘s motion for default judgment. {¶12} Grenga filed a timely notice of appeal, and he now asserts the following assignments of error: [I.] The Trial Court erred by not granting [Grenga] leave to amend [his] Complaint where all conditions of [Civ.R. 15] had been satisfied. [II.] The Trial Court erred when it granted [YSU] Summary Judgment based on [the] two-year statute of limitations under R.C. §2743.16 and not the specific four year statute of limitations under R.C.§ 2305.09. [III.] The Trial Court erred and committed reversible error by granting [YSU‘s] motion for Summary Judgment. [IV.] The Trial Court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it granted [YSU] Summary Judgment when discovery was still pending pursuant to order of the Trial Court. [V.] The Trial Court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when [it] failed to grant [Grenga‘s] Motion for Summary Judgment based on [YSU‘s] failure to timely respond to admissions pursuant to Civ. R. 36(A). [VI.] The judgment of the Trial Court was against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence relied upon by [YSU] was insufficient to support the Trial Court‘s judgment. {¶13} By his first assignment of error, Grenga asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for leave to file an amended complaint. {¶14} {¶15} In his motion for leave to file an amended complaint, Grenga stated only that “[t]he granting of such leave will work no prejudice to Defendants and will further the preference of Ohio Law for resolving cases on their merit.” Not only did Grenga not make a prima facie showing of support for new matters sought to be pleaded, he did not {¶16} By his second assignment of error, Grenga asserts that the trial court erred by applying the two-year statute of limitations set forth in {¶17} This court has rejected the assertion that longer, general statutes of limitations for tort claims apply over the {¶18} Although {¶19} Also under his second assignment of error, Grenga argues that the trial court failed to conduct a hearing to determine whether political subdivision immunity, under {¶20} Before turning to Grenga‘s third assignment of error, which addresses the substance of the trial court‘s entry of summary judgment, we briefly address Grenga‘s remaining procedural arguments, raised by his fourth and fifth assignments of error. In his fourth assignment of error, Grenga argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of YSU while discovery remained pending. Grenga argues that, because the trial court‘s order staying proceedings stated that discovery would continue during the stay, the trial court was not entitled to rule on YSU‘s motion for summary judgment. {¶21} We discern no error in the trial court‘s entry of summary judgment prior to the end of the discovery process. A party need not wait until discovery is complete to move for summary judgment. In fact, {¶22} Although Grenga now maintains that YSU‘s opposition to discovery prevented him from discovering relevant facts, Grenga did not file a motion for additional discovery with the trial court and did not file an affidavit stating that additional discovery was essential to justify his opposition to YSU‘s motion. Where a party does not file a {¶23} By his fifth assignment of error, Grenga argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary judgment based on YSU‘s alleged failure to respond to requests for admissions in a timely manner. In support of this assignment of error, Grenga relies on {¶24} Grenga undisputedly agreed that YSU could respond to his requests for admissions 28 days after the trial court ruled on YSU‘s motion to dismiss. The trial court issued its ruling on YSU‘s motion to dismiss on October 13, 2010, which provided YSU until November 10, 2010, to serve written answers or objections to Grenga‘s requests. Grenga states in his appellate brief that the requests instructed YSU to deliver or mail its responses to Grenga. YSU mailed its responses to the requests for admissions to Grenga, via regular United States mail, on November 8, 2010, and Grenga received those responses on November 13, 2010. Grenga argues that YSU‘s responses were untimely because he did not receive them by November 10, 2010. Therefore, on November 17, 2010, despite his receipt of YSU‘s responses, Grenga filed a Notice of Deemed Admissions and a motion for default judgment. {¶25} {¶26} Grenga‘s remaining assignments of error, his third and his sixth, assert that the trial court erred by granting YSU‘s motion for summary judgment. We review a summary judgment de novo and must affirm the trial court‘s judgment if any grounds the movant raised in the trial court support it. Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc. (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588, citing Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711; Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41-42. {¶27} Pursuant to {¶28} “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party‘s claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 1996-Ohio-107. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-movant must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 293. {¶29} Grenga‘s sixth assignment of error asserts that the entry of summary judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This court reviews a summary judgment, not under a manifest-weight standard, but pursuant to the standard set forth in {¶30} Grenga‘s third assignment of error states, generally, that the trial court erred by granting YSU‘s motion for summary judgment. In support of its motion for summary judgment, YSU submitted Morgione‘s affidavit as evidence that no YSU employees entered upon Grenga‘s property between March 8, 2007, and the termination of Grenga‘s ownership. In pertinent part, Morgione stated, “[o]n or about {¶31} Where, as here, YSU met its initial burden on summary judgment, Grenga was required to set forth specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. See Dresher at 293. In response to YSU‘s motion for summary judgment, Grenga submitted his own affidavit, the affidavit of Fredrick Joseph Cannell, and a letter from the city‘s Deputy Law Director. In his affidavit, Grenga states that Morgione and Mineo entered onto the property, a fact Morgione admits in his own affidavit. Grenga, however, states that, “according to the January 14, 2009 * * * letter,” he believes Morgione and Mineo entered the building in January 2009. (Grenga Affidavit, ¶8.) Cannell states that he was present on the property when representatives of the city and YSU visited, but he does not assign a date to that visit. Grenga contends that the submitted evidence {¶32} The January 14, 2009 letter submitted by Grenga states that “the [city‘s] appraiser, the County Auditor‘s appraiser and their authorized representatives intend to enter” the property on January 19, 2009, to appraise and document the property. Grenga argues that, if the appraisers entered the property on January 19, 2009, then Morgione must have entered the property on January 19, 2009, because Morgione stated that he and Mineo accompanied representatives from the city during their inspection of the property. Grenga‘s reasoning is flawed. The letter does not mention YSU, Morgione or Mineo, and Grenga admits that neither Morgione nor Mineo was an authorized representative of the city‘s appraiser or the County Auditor‘s appraiser. Thus, the letter does not suggest that Morgione, Mineo or any other YSU representative entered Grenga‘s property on January 19, 2009. Although Morgione stated that he and Mineo accompanied representatives of the city during an inspection of the property, he stated that they did so on March 8, 2007. The January 14, 2009 letter in no way contradicts Morgione‘s affidavit testimony. It cannot be inferred from the letter that representatives from the city had not inspected the property prior to January 2009 with Morgione and Mineo. In fact, Grenga alleged in his complaint that YSU employees entered onto the property on March 8, 2007, exactly as set forth in Morgione‘s affidavit. Accordingly, we reject Grenga‘s contention that Morgione‘s affidavit is in conflict with other facts in his record. {¶34} Having overruled each of Grenga‘s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio. Judgment affirmed. BROWN and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.