654 N.E.2d 1327 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1995
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *40 Defendant-appellant, Jeffrey L. Ecker, appeals from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, Coventry Township, on the township's complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. We affirm.
Ecker is an independent trucking contractor who owns a flatbed semitractor-trailer. Ecker admits that when he is not using his semi, he parks the truck in the driveway of his Coventry Township residence at 140 Swartz Road. Ecker also admits that he uses his Coventry Township residence as the sole place for conducting his trucking business. Finally, it is undisputed that Ecker's residence is located in area zoned by Coventry Township as an R-3 residential zone and that the operation of a trucking business and the overnight parking of a semi are not permitted in an R-3 residential zone.
Based on Ecker's trucking-related activity, Coventry Township brought this action seeking an order declaring that Ecker was in violation of the township's zoning regulations and an order enjoining Ecker from continuing to violate those regulations. After the pleadings were filed, Coventry Township moved for summary judgment, and Ecker responded in opposition. The trial court granted the township summary judgment, finding that the township's zoning regulations were a reasonable exercise of its police power and were not inconsistent with the authority of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio ("PUCO") to regulate motor transportation companies. Ecker appeals, raising two assignments of error.
Of central importance to this appeal is the organization of Ecker's trucking business. Ecker conducts his business as an independent contractor. However, Ecker obtains hauling jobs by leasing his truck and driving services to Vanguard Transportation Systems of Westchester, Ohio. Vanguard, in turn, has a sublease agreement in which Vanguard subleases the trucks under its control, including Ecker's, to the O.K. Trucking Company of Cincinnati, Ohio.
Although Ecker's trucking business is a motor transportation company regulated by the PUCO, Ecker has not been issued a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity by the PUCO to operate over Ohio routes. Ecker, however, is legally permitted to operate over Ohio routes via his lease relationship with O.K. *41 Trucking, which has been issued a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.
In his second assignment of error, Ecker contends that the trial court erred in entering a final judgment because issues of fact remain as to whether his PUCO-regulated trucking business is a public utility exempt from township zoning pursuant to R.C.
R.C.
Ecker initially argues the parties stipulated that the issue of whether his trucking business is a public utility was to be decided at trial because it is an issue of fact that cannot be determined through summary judgment. Contrary to Ecker's argument, however, the determination of whether an entity is a public utility under R.C.
Ecker next argues that the trial court did not specifically address the public utility exemption issue in granting summary judgment. Although we agree with Ecker that the trial court did not directly address the public utility issue in its judgment entry, it is a basic rule of appellate review that a lower court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. McKay v.Cutlip (1992),
Two Ohio appellate districts have dealt directly with this question. In Hill v. Russell (Jan. 6, 1987), Licking App. No. CA-3198, unreported, 1987 WL 5763, Russell owned several semis that he would regularly park, store, and repair on his residentially zoned property in Monroe Township. Russell leased his trucks to a motor transportation company operating under the authority of the PUCO. The township brought a zoning violation action against Russell to stop him from conducting trucking activity at his residence. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the township summary judgment, finding that Russell was not made a public utility, exempt from township zoning, by the mere fact that he leased his trucks to a company holding PUCO authority.
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed. The court found that:
"[T]he statute in question [R.C.
In Whitten v. Munson Twp. Bd. of Trustees (June 11, 1993), Geauga App. No. 92-G-1725, unreported, 1993 WL 418474, the Whittens were cited for parking and storing on their residential property a truck exceeding the weight and length limitations contained in Munson Township's zoning regulations. The Whittens were leasing the truck to Roberts Express, a motor transportation company regulated by the PUCO. The Whittens brought an action seeking declaratory relief from the township's zoning regulations. The case was tried to the court, which found that the Whittens' truck was used in the operation of a public utility and that its parking and storage were therefore exempt from township zoning pursuant to R.C.
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that:
"Although Roberts [Express] is a public utility, it is not using [the Whittens'] land as contemplated by R.C.
In the present case, Ecker claims as an affirmative defense that his trucking business is a public utility exempt from township zoning. The burden of proving an affirmative defense rests with the party raising the defense. See Foote Theatre,Inc. v. Dixie Roller Rink, Inc. (1984),
The only evidence Ecker produced on this issue was O.K. Trucking's Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, and his lease agreements with O.K. Trucking and Vanguard. Without more, we are inclined to agree with the holdings of the Fifth and Eleventh District Courts of Appeals in Russell and Whitten.
Based on those cases, the mere fact that Ecker leases his truck to a company holding a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to support a finding that his business is a public utility under R.C.
In his first assignment of error, Ecker argues that Coventry Township's zoning regulations are not reasonable local police regulations because they are inconsistent with the authority of the PUCO. We do not agree.
Under R.C. Chapter 4921, local subdivisions may make reasonable local police regulations relating to motor transportation companies so long as the local regulations are not inconsistent with the authority of the PUCO. R.C.
Ecker argues that Coventry Township's zoning regulations materially interfere with the efficiency of his trucking business because as an independent trucking contractor, it would be economically inefficient, if not infeasible, for him to maintain a place of business other than at his residence. Ecker's argument, however, is based on a reading of Ramsey that is unsupported by the facts of that case.
The plaintiffs in Ramsey owned Red Star Transportation, a motor transportation company conducting passenger bus service under the authority of the PUCO. Pursuant to Red Star's Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, Red Star was permitted to operate passenger bus service over an intrastate route between Lancaster and Athens, Ohio. This route passed through the city of Nelsonville, Ohio. In 1924, Nelsonville passed a local ordinance preventing bus travel on streets served by the local street railway company, which apparently operated on most of the paved and improved streets in the city. The practical effect of the ordinance required Red Star to detour its buses "a considerable distance out of the way of the route prescribed by the commission over a dirt road wholly unimproved, in some places narrow and full of ruts."
In this case, Ecker is authorized by the PUCO to operate his trucking business over specific Ohio routes. Ecker, however, has presented no evidence that Coventry Township's zoning regulations prevent him from efficiently using those routes as was the case in Ramsey. Without such evidence, Ecker has failed as a matter of law to demonstrate that Coventry Township's zoning regulations are inconsistent with the authority of the PUCO. The first assignment of error is overruled.
The trial court's entry of summary judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
QUILLIN and BAIRD, JJ., concur. *45