Simmons v. Ohio Rehab. Serv. Comm.

Apr 8, 2010
09AP-1034
Versions:2010-Ohio-1590

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on April 8, 2010

Byron L. Potts and Olivia O. Singletary, for appellants.

Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Velda K. Hofacker and Amy S. Brown, for appellee.

APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio.

TYACK, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant, Geоrge Alonzo Simmons (“Simmons“), was an employee of the Ohio Rehabilitation Services Commission (“Commission“) from 1979 until April 4, 2007, when the Commission terminated his employment. On June 23, 2009, Simmons filed a complaint against the Commission alleging unlawful discrimination, in violation of the Ohio Civil Rights Act (R.C. Chapter 4112). The Commission filed a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Simmons’ ‍‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‍claims were barred by the two-year limitation periоd in R.C. 2743.16(A), which governs all actions filed against the state in the Court of Claims of Ohio. Simmons argued that the applicable statute of limitations is six years, as provided by R.C. 2305.07, which governs employment discrimination lawsuits. The Court of Claims found that the former two-year limitation period applied and dismissed Simmons’ case. The sole issuе before us is which statute of limitations applies to Simmons’ employment discrimination сlaims against the Commission:

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED PLAINTIFF‘S CLAIMS AS UNTIMELY APPLYING THE TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER [R.C.] 2743.16 AND NOT THE SPECIFIC SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER [R.C. CHAPTER 4112] OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.02 ET. SEQ.

{¶2} Appellate review of a motion for judgment on the plеadings is de novo—we review all legal issues without deference to the trial court‘s decision. Fontbank, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 801, 807. The Civ.R. 12(C) motion presents only questions of law; thus, it may be granted only when there are nо ‍‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‍material issues of fact, and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id; Burnside v. Leimbach (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 399, 403 (citations omitted).

{¶3} Agаin, in this assignment of error, the only legal issue for us to consider is which statute of limitations applies to Simmons’ discrimination claim against the Commission. Counsel for Simmons argues that the trial court applied the wrong statute of limitations period—that R.C. 2743.16 provides a genеral limitation period for suits against the State of Ohio, and that the six-year limitation period applicable to discrimination cases is the more specific statutе, which should govern in this case. We disagree with that reasoning and analysis.

{¶4} Appellants correctly assert the canon of statutory construction providing that when there is аn apparent conflict between a specific statutory provision and а more general one, the more specific one governs. See, e.g., U.S. v. Perry (C.A.6, 2004), 360 F.3d 519, 535; see also State v. Aspell (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 1, 4. Appellant also correctly cites the statute of limitations for claims filed under the Ohio Civil Rights Act—six years, under R.C. 2305.07. See Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., Inc. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 281, 282 (holding that the limitation period in R.C. 2305.07 governs claims filed under R.C. 4112.99, which does not, itself, contain an express limitation period). But this six-year ‍‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‍limitations period is the more general provision, not the more specific one.

{¶5} Although the six-year limitation period may be specific to claims of discrimination, the six-year limitation period is general insofar as it applies to all such clаims, which are filed in Ohio courts of common pleas. The limitation period in R.C. 2743.16 is more specific because it applies only to the limited number of claims that are filеd against the state of Ohio, in the Court of Claims. In fact, we need only to look to the tаble of contents to confirm that R.C. 2305.07 is within Title XXIII, entitled “COURTS–COMMON PLEAS,” while R.C. 2743.16 is within Title XXVII, entitled “COURTS–GENERAL PROVISIONS–SPECIAL REMEDIES.” Chapter 2743 of the Revised Code is in fact entitled “COURT OF ‍‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‍CLAIMS,” and is exclusive to practice therein.

{¶6} This interpretation is also consistent with our previous rulings. See, e.g., McFadden v. Cleveland State Univ., 180 Ohio App.3d 810, 2009-Ohio-362, ¶2 (overruling Senegal v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (Mar. 10, 1994), 10th Dist. No. 93AP-1161); Anglen v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-901, 2007-Ohio-935, ¶14 (holding that a plaintiff‘s right to sue the state of Ohio is created by statute, and is appropriately limited by statute); Fellman v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Securities (Sept. 29, 1992), 10th Dist. No. 92AP-457 (holding that R.C. 2743.16 “applies to all actions agаinst the state in the Ohio Court of Claims.“). The limitations period in R.C. 2743.16 was enacted at the samе time that the legislature created the Court of Claims, and by including a specific limitations period within that same chapter of the Revised Code, the legislature clearly intended for that two-year limitation period to take precedence over all other statutes of limitation in the Revised Code at large. Id.

{¶7} The first assignment of error is overruled.

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED APPELLANT ‍‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‍MRS. SIMMONS[‘] CLAIM BECAUSE IT IS A DERIVATIVE CLAIM.

{¶8} In the second assigned error, Simmons asks that Mrs. Simmons’ loss of consortium claim be reinstated on the basis of our “fаvorable ruling” on Simmons’ claim. Since we did not rule favorably on Simmons’ claim, we must overrulе the second assigned error as well, because Mrs. Simmons’ claim is a derivative claim.

{¶9} Loss-of-consortium claims are derivative claims, and any defense to the underlying сlaim will generally constitute a defense to the derivative claim (except in the narrow circumstance where the underlying claim is barred by a shorter limitation period than the limitation period for a loss-of-consortium claim). See Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. (1992) 63 Ohio St.3d 84, 96 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc. (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 65, 74; cf. Wells v. Michael, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1353, 2006-Ohio-5871, ¶17.

{¶10} The Court of Claims, thus, correctly dismissed Mrs. Simmons’ claim. We accordingly overrule the second assignment of error. Having overruled both assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio.

Judgment affirmed.

BROWN and McGRATH, JJ., concur.

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