Gravitt v. the State, 922 S.E.2d 392

922 S.E.2d 392

Ga.

2025

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intаke room by Highland Rivers staff, rather than law enforcement officers; he was not physically restrained in any way; he was not isolated from medical staff or from the facility itself; he was told multiple times that he did not have to speak to officers; and the interview lasted only about 35 minutes. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would believe he was free to terminate the interview and leave the intake room. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it concluded that Appellant was not in custody during his interview and that no Miranda warning was required. See Whittaker v. State, 317 Ga. 127, 135 (2023) (holding in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that a hospitalized defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes where he was being treated for injuries, there was no evidence that he was restrained, аnd he was not isolated); Jennings v. State, 282 Ga. 679, 681 (2007) (holding that a hospitalized defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes where he had expressed that he was suicidal and had not yet been released from medical treatment, but was not restrained when questioned); Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 299, 301 (2004) (holding that a hospitalized defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda even though he “had not been released from medical treatment“).

Appellant argues that he was in custody for two reasons. First, he claims that he was “effectively in custody on a 10-13 involuntary commitment at Highland Rivers.” Second, he avers that “officers already suspected that [he] was responsible for Fraser‘s killing” and that his interview “was a tactic to compel [Appellant] to implicate himself in a crime.” We note at the outset that the record does not appear to support these contentions. But even assuming Appellant‘s factual claims are true for purposes of his argument, his claims still fail. We consider each argument in turn.

Appellant claims that he was entitled to a Miranda warning because he was “effectively in custody” on an “involuntary commitment.” As we stated above, the relevant legal question when determining custody for Miranda purposes is whether a reasonable person in Appellant‘s circumstances would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. See Thompson, 516 US at 112.

So viewed, Appellant‘s purported inability to leave the facility is only relevant to the extent it affects our objective assessment of whether a reasonable person in Appellant‘s circumstances would have felt free to leave the interview. See Howes, 565 US at 515. And it does not tip the balance of our analysis above. See Jennings, 282 Ga. at 681; Robinson, 278 Ga. at 301.³

We now turn to Appellant‘s claim that he was in custody during the interview because the detectives already suspected he committed Fraser‘s killing and because the interview “was a tactic to compel [Appellant] to implicate himself.” Appellant does not claim, however, that detectives ever communicated an intention to arrest him during his questiоning. Nor could he, as the record does not establish any such communication. This “lack of communication was crucial,” because “under Miranda ‘(a) policeman‘s unarticulated plan [to arrest a suspect] has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was “in custody” at a particular time[.]‘” See Stansbury v. California, 511 US 318, 322–24 (1994) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420, 442 (1984)). See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 US 420, 431 (1984) (“The mere fact that an investigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the neеd for Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings, and the probation officer‘s knowledge and intent have no bearing on the outcome of this case.” (citation omitted)); Jennings, 282 Ga. at 681 (“[I]t is irrelevant to the Miranda analysis that investigators (1) might have focused their suspicions upon the person being questioned, or (2) have already decided that they will take the person into custody and charge him with an offense.” (cleaned up)). Because custody determinations are objective, and because the detectives never indicated any plan to arrest Appellant during the interview, any unarticulated plans they may have had to arrest him have no bearing on our analysis. As such, Appellant‘s claim fails.

3. In his remaining enumerations of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to give four of his requested jury charges. The first two of these charges concernеd Appellant‘s defense of delusional insanity, and the last two concerned voluntary intoxication. As explained below, we hold that the principles of law found in the requested charges were contained in the charges given by the trial court, and so it was not error for the court to refuse Appellant‘s requests. We consider each charge below.

(a) “When evaluating claims of instructional error, we examine the jury charge as a whole.” Craft v. State, 321 Ga. 638, 641 (2025). “The refusal to give a requested charge, even though it is a correct statement of law and pertinent and material to an issue in the case, is error only if it contains information that is not substantially covered by the charge actually given.” Thomas v. State, 297 Ga. 750, 754 (2015) (quotation marks omitted). And so “[w]hen a requested jury instruction adds no essential point of ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍law to the existing instructions, it is not error for the trial сourt to decline to give it.” Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563, 580 (2023). See also Allaben v. State, 299 Ga. 253, 259 (2016) (“A trial court‘s refusal to give a jury charge in the exact language requested by a defendant is not error if the charge given by the trial court substantially covers the applicable principles of law.” (quotation marks omitted)). When a party raises “a properly preserved claim that a trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on an applicable principle of law,” wе apply de novo review. Eubanks, 317 Ga. at 581.

“In Georgia, a defendant is presumed to be sane and a defendant asserting an insanity defense has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time the crime was committed.” Bowman v. State, 306 Ga. 97, 100 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). “A defendant may prove insanity by showing that, at the time of the incident, he lacked the mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong or that he was suffering from a delusional compulsion.” Id. See OCGA § 16-3-2 (“A person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the act ... constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act[.]“); OCGA § 16-3-3 (“A person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time of the act ... constituting the crime, the person, because of mental disease, injury, or congenital deficiency, aсted as he did because of a delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime.“).

(b) At trial, Appellant requested jury instructions regarding both forms of the insanity defense: the mental capacity defense and the delusional compulsion defense.⁴ The court agreed to give the standard pattern jury instructions on both defenses but refused to make certain changes to thе pattern charge on the delusional compulsion defense requested by Appellant‘s counsel. Specifically, Appellant‘s trial counsel requested that certain language found in paragraphs four and five of the pattern charge be omitted and that language from Lawrence v. State, 265 Ga. 310 (1995) be substituted in its place. The pattern charge is set forth in relevant portion below; Appellant‘s requested deletions are indiсated using text that has been struck through and Appellant‘s requested additions are indicated by text that has been italicized and underlined:

[¶4] In order for mental delusion or delusional compulsion to constitute a defense, it must appear not only that the accused was actually laboring under a delusion at the time of the commission of the alleged criminal act but that the alleged criminal act itself was cоnnected with the particular delusion under which the accused was then laboring and that the ~~delusion was as to a fact that, if true, would have justified the alleged act by the accused.~~ Defendant was compelled by that delusion to act in a manner that would have been lawful and right if the facts had been as the defendant imagined them to be. This is a question of fact to be determined by you.

[¶5] If you believe this defendant committed the act charged in this bill of indictment but, at that time, the defendant was actually laboring under a mental delusion, and that the act was connected with that delusion, and that the delusion was as to a fact that, if true, would have ~~justified the alleged act by the accused~~ been lawful and right, then you should find the defendant not guilty because of insanity. In this event, your deliberations will cease and the form of your verdict would be, “We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity.”

Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 3.80.30 (Jan. 2023) at 274–75 (as altered by Appellant‘s Request to Charge No. 17).

During the charge conference, Appellant‘s trial counsel argued that Appellant was under the delusion that the victim was a shapeshifting ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍lizard-person, rather than a human, and so killing him would not be murder, which requires the death of a “human being.” See OCGA § 16-5-1(a)–(b). Appellant‘s trial counsel argued, as Appellant now argues on appeal, that his requested changes were necessary to make the law clear under the facts at issue in his case. As mentioned above, the trial court disagreed, and it instructed the jury using the pattern charge without implementing Appellant‘s requested changes. Appellant preserved his objection for ordinary appellate review by renewing it after the charge was given. See OCGA § 17-8-58(a). The same is true for Appellant‘s other claims of instructional error.

We see no error in the trial court‘s decision. In Lawrence, the trial court instruсted the jury that for a compulsive delusion to constitute a defense to criminal liability, the delusion must have been “as to a fact which, if true, would have justified the alleged acts by the accused.” 265 Ga. at 312 (emphasis omitted). In so instructing the jury, the Lawrence trial court used the pattern jury instructions, just as the trial court did here. See id. (citing Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) (2nd ed.) Pt. 3(EE)(3) (Delusional Insanity)). And we explained in Lawrence that this charge accurately “reflect[ed] the requirements for a delusional compulsion insanity defense [as] recognized by Georgia case law since 1898.” Id.

But despite that being Lawrence‘s holding, Appellant contends that the trial court should have substituted other language drawn from the Lawrence opinion in place of the language from the pattern instruction. But as we held in Lawrence, the court‘s charge — the pattern charge — was an accurate statement of the law. See 265 Ga. at 312. Because the court‘s charge was accurate, see id., and because Appellant‘s requested alterations added no essential point of law to the existing instructions, it was not error for the trial court to decline to make them. See Eubanks, 317 Ga. at 580.

(c) Appellant further argues that it was error for the court to refuse to give a non-pattern charge drawn from the language of Brown v. State, 228 Ga. 215 (1971), which read, “the act itself may be so utterly senseless and abnormal as to furnish satisfactory proof of a diseased mind.” See id. at 219–20 (explaining that such a charge had been requested and holding that the trial court erred by failing to give it). We disagree. Though we held in Brown that it was error for the court to refuse to give the requested language, Brown is distinguishable. No charge was given on delusional insanity in that case, even though the facts warranted such a charge. See id. at 220 (holding that the charge was authorized by the evidence); id. at 221 (Felton, J., dissenting) (explaining that the trial court had refused to charge the jury on delusional insanity but disagreeing that such a charge wаs warranted by the evidence). Here, the trial court ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍provided the jury with the pattern charge on the delusional compulsion defense, and we have held that where such an insanity charge is given, it is “proper” to refuse giving the charge used in Brown. See Bennett v. State, 262 Ga. 149, 152 (1992) (holding that the trial court “properly refused” to give the charge used in Brown where the court gave “a charge on the insanity defense,” and that charge was “sufficient“). As such, Appellant‘s claim fails.

(d) We consider Appellant‘s remaining two claims of error together, which concern the court‘s refusal to give Appellant‘s requested non-pattern instructions on voluntary intoxication. As explained below, it was not error for the trial court to refuse Appellant‘s requests because the pattern charges it gave sufficiently explained the relevant law.

(i) At trial, Appellant requested two pattern instructions on voluntary intoxication. At the time of Appellant‘s trial in March 2023, the first of these charges read:

Georgia law provides that voluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act. It further provides that if a person‘s mind, when not affected by intoxicants, is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong as well as of reasoning and acting rationally, and the person voluntarily deprives himself/herself of reason by consuming intoxicants аnd commits a criminal act while under the influence of such intoxicants, the person is criminally responsible for such acts to the same extent as if the person were sober. Whether or not the defendant in this case was voluntarily intoxicated at or during the time alleged in this indictment is a matter solely for you, the jury, to determine.

Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 3.60.10 (Jan. 2023) at 269–70.⁵ The second charge read:

If the influence of (alcohol) (drugs) (narcotics) impairs a рerson‘s mind to the extent that the person is not able to form the intent to commit the act with which he/she is charged, that person would not be criminally responsible for the act. Whether that is true is a question for you, the jury, to decide.

Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 3.60.40 (Jan. 2023) at 271.⁶ During the charge conference, the State, citing Hayes v. State, 262 Ga. 881 (1993), argued that this second charge was only authorized where there was evidence “of an alteration in brain functions due to intoxication that was more than temporary.” See id. at 883 (holding that the trial court had correctly charged the jury when explaining that alteration to brain function arising from voluntary intoxication must be more than temporary to negate criminal intent). In an apparent acknowledgment of the State‘s concern, the trial court ruled that it would give the charge, but that it would add the word “continuous,” to the first sentence, so that it read, “If the continuous influence of alcohol, drugs, or narcotics impairs a person‘s mind ... .” The court later charged the jury consistent with its ruling.

In addition to these pattern charges, Appellant also requested two related non-pattern charges, the first of which read:

However, if you determine that a person is legally insane when sober, that person remains legally insane when intoxicated, even if the insanity is intensified by drugs or alcohol. Onе who is legally insane is not responsible for acts committed in their insanity, regardless of whether that person is intoxicated or sober.

During the charge conference, Appellant‘s counsel explained that he had “crafted this charge based on the language found in Choice [v. State, 31 Ga. 424 (1860)],” which he had “modernized.” See Choice, 31 Ga. at 472 (“[I]f a man is insane when sober, the fact that he increased ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍the insanity, by the superadded excitement of liquor, makes no difference. An insanе person is irresponsible, whether drunk or sober.“). Counsel argued at the charge conference, as he does now on appeal, that the custom charge was a “correct statement of the law” and would “clarify” for the jury “that one can be insane and then be intoxicated and that intoxication doesn‘t destroy the pre-existing insanity.” The trial court disagreed with the need for the non-pattern charge, reasoning that the issue would be “covered in the general charge on insanity.”

Appellant also requested that the trial court give the following non-pattern charge:

If you find that the Defendant‘s voluntary use of drugs or alcohol produced an immediate but temporary madness, insanity, or unsoundness of mind, this is no defense and you would be authorized to find the Defendant guilty for any criminal act allegedly committed while undеr the voluntarily induced influence of such immediate, temporary intoxication.

However, if you find that through the prolonged and excessive use of alcohol or drugs, the madness, insanity, or unsoundness of mind of the Defendant has become permanent and fixed, then the Defendant is no longer acting under the immediate and temporary influence of intoxicants. If you find that the Defendant committed a criminal act while lаboring under a permanent and fixed madness, insanity, or unsoundness of mind caused by prolonged excessive use of intoxicants, and that madness, insanity, or unsoundness of mind rendered the Defendant insane as I have previously defined it, then you would be obligated to find the Defendant Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity.

At the charge conference, Appellant argued that his requested charge “goes into a little greater detail [than thе pattern charge] and fl[e]shes these issues out for the jury ... in a less stilted way than the pattern does.” The trial judge declined to give the non-pattern charge, stating that she would not “charge the same thing three or four times.”

(ii) Collectively, the pattern charges on voluntary intoxication correctly explain that “voluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act or omission, except in thе extreme situation where the intoxication has resulted in the alteration of brain function so as to negate intent, and even then, the brain function alteration must be more than temporary.” Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 578 (2010) (cleaned up). See also Scott v. State, 275 Ga. 305, 307 (2002) (explaining that a “more than temporary” alteration in brain function is an “implied” condition of the pattern charge on voluntary intoxication resulting from permanent impairment).

Appellant claims that the first of his requested charges was needed to clarify that a person who is insane when sober remains insane when intoxicated and is therefore “not responsible for acts committed in their insanity, regardless of whether that person is intoxicated or sober.” And Appellant claims that his second charge provides more detail about when prolonged intoxication negates criminal liability. But Appellant fails to explain why it was error for the court to refuse these charges. The trial court charged the jury using the pattern charges on the mental capacity and delusional compulsion defenses, and in so doing, explained to the jurors the conditions under which a defendant is excused from criminal liability by reason of insanity, as explained above. And the court further instructed the jury on when a defendant is excused — and when a defendant is not excused — from criminal liability by reason of voluntary intoxication. The pattern charges made clear that a person who is voluntarily intoxicated “is criminally responsible for [his or her] acts to the same extent as if the person were sober.” Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 3.60.10 (Jan. 2023) at 269–70 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that a person who is insane when sober does not lose the benefit of that defense when temporarily voluntarily intoxicated. Because the court correctly instructed the jury on the legal principles in Appellant‘s requested charges, and because neither of those charges “add[ed]” an “essential point of law to the existing instructions,” it was not error for the court to refuse Appellant‘s requests. Eubanks, 317 Ga. at 580.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Decided October 21, 2025.

Murder. Catoosa Superior Court. Before Judge Graham.

Jerry W. Chappell II, for appellant.

Clayton M. Fuller, District Attorney, Herbert E. Franklin, Elizabeth O. Evans, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorney Genеral, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Notes

In denying Appellant‘s claims, we note that Appellant cites no authority to suggest that his case is distinct from the hospital interrogation cases cited above. See ; . Moreover, Appellant makes no argument on appeal that his interview was involuntary as a matter of due process due to his mental health at the time he was questioned. Cf. (holding that because “the evidence indisputably establishes the strongest probability that Blackburn was insane and incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed” the admission of such confession at trial, and his conviction thereon, was a violation of the defendant‘s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

The pattern charge on the mental capacity defense provides, in relevаnt part, that “[a] person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the act ... constituting the crime, that person did not have the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to the act[.]” Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 3.80.30 (Jan. 2023) at 272–73.

This pattern charge was revised in July 2024. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 3.60.10 (Jul. 2024). It now reads, “Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a crime. If the Defendant, when sober, could reаson and distinguish ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍between right and wrong, and he/she voluntarily became intoxicated and then committed a crime while intoxicated, he/she is responsible for the crime just as if he/she had been sober at the time he/she committed the crime.”

This pattern charge was also revised in July 2024. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 3.60.40 (Jul. 2024). It now reads, “A defendant who has permanently altered his brain function by persistent, though voluntary, intoxication may not be culpable if he can show that due to his permanent brain damage, he was no longer able to form intent to commit the crime charged (i.e., is no longer of sound mind).”