BOWMAN v. THE STATE
S19A0428
306 Ga. 97
BENHAM, Justice.
Appellant Michael DeWayne Bowman was convicted of malice murder and associated offenses in connection with the shooting death of Griffin Police Officer Kevin Jordan and the aggravated assault of Officer Jordan’s brother, Raymond.1 For the reasons that
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the evidence presented at trial showed the following. In the early morning hours of May 31, 2014, Bowman, along with his girlfriend, Chantell Mixon, and his brother, Tyler Taylor, visited a Waffle House in Spalding County, Georgia. According to witnesses, things went “downhill” as soon as the trio arrived. Bowman, Mixon, and Taylor appeared to be intoxicated and were “obnoxious” and “loud.” The trio was overheard discussing a desire to get into a fight and making threatening and derogatory comments about Officer Jordan, who was off-duty at the time but dressed in his uniform while
of parole for malice murder, a consecutive twenty-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated assault of Raymond Jordan, a consecutive five-year term of imprisonment for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (malice murder), and a consecutive five-year term of imprisonment for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (aggravated assault of Raymond Jordan). All other counts were either vacated by operation of law or were merged for sentencing purposes, and the State has not disputed the sentences. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 698 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017).
Bowman filed a timely motion for new trial in March 2017, which was later amended in September 2017. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion as amended on October 30, 2017. Bowman filed a timely notice of appeal; this case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2018 and was thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs.
At the request of Waffle House employees, Officer Jordan intervened and asked the trio to leave. Mixon hurled racial slurs at Officer Jordan as the trio was escorted out, and Mixon tried to physically assault Officer Jordan once the group reached the parking lot. Officer Jordan then announced that Mixon was “going to jail” and attempted to handcuff her, but the pair fell to the ground. As Officer Jordan knelt over Mixon attempting to handcuff her, Bowman drew his pistol and fired five shots into Officer Jordan’s back, killing him. Bowman then shot wildly at various targets in the parking lot and aimed his pistol at various bystanders, including Raymond Jordan. Raymond was armed and returned fire, hitting Bowman in the face. The incident was captured on video surveillance, and the recordings were played for the jury.
At trial, Bowman pursued an insanity defense. He presented evidence of his military career — which involved combat during his three tours of active duty — and he offered extensive expert testimony concerning his resulting Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
1. Bowman now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him. This is without merit.
When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and defer to the jury’s assessment of the weight and the credibility of the evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
(a) Bowman first argues that the State failed to prove that he acted with criminal intent when he shot Officer Jordan because, he
When Bowman, Mixon, and Taylor arrived at the Waffle House, they had been drinking and seemed “angry,” and the trio were overheard discussing “kicking [Officer Jordan’s] a**.” When Officer Jordan attempted to arrest Mixon, Bowman drew his pistol and accurately fired five shots into Officer Jordan’s back; Bowman then began wildly firing at people and objects in the vicinity. The jury also received expert testimony that Bowman did not have PTSD at the time of the incident. Bowman’s conduct and demeanor, as well as the circumstances surrounding the incident, evinced criminal intent authorizing the jury’s verdicts. See Fuss v. State, 271 Ga. 319 (1) (519 SE2d 446) (1999) (finding the evidence sufficient to support a verdict of guilty but mentally ill because the trier of fact was not required to accept the testimony of Appellant’s
(b) Bowman next contends that the State failed to prove that his actions were voluntary because, he says, he presented extensive expert testimony establishing that he was in a dissociative state at the time of the shooting. While there were defense experts who testified that Bowman suffers from PTSD, has a traumatic brain injury, and was in a dissociative state at the time of the incident, the State countered this testimony at trial. Experts for both the State and the trial court testified that Bowman’s actions were not the result of PTSD or a traumatic brain injury. Thus, the jury was authorized to believe the State and trial court’s experts over the defense’s experts and find that Bowman’s acts were voluntary. See Jackson, 443 U. S. 307 (III) (B); Buford v. State, 300 Ga. 121 (1) (b) (793 SE2d 91) (2016) (citing Fuss, 271 Ga. 319 (1)).
(c) Bowman also argues that no rational jury could have concluded that he failed to meet his burden of showing that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. We disagree.
In Georgia, a defendant is presumed to be sane and “a
As discussed above, there was competing expert testimony concerning Bowman’s sanity, and the jury was not required to accept the opinion of the defense experts. See Buford, 300 Ga. 121 (1) (b); Fuss, 271 Ga. 319 (1). Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the jury was authorized to conclude that Bowman failed to show that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. See Jackson, 443 U. S. 307 (III) (B); Buford, 300 Ga. 121 (1) (b).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided June 3, 2019.
Murder. Spalding Superior Court. Before Judge Sams.
Nathanial L. Studelska, Gabrielle A. Pittman, for appellant.
Benjamin D. Coker, District Attorney, E. Morgan Kendrick, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.