Grady v. Winchester Place Nursing & Rehab. Ctr.Grady v. Winchester Place Nursing & Rehab. Ctr.
For Plaintiff-Appellee
PHIL A. KURI
6105 Parkland Boulevard
Mayfield Heights, Ohio 44124
PAUL W. FLOWERS
Terminal Tower 35th Floor
50 Public Square
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
For Defendant-Appellant Winchester
PAUL W. MCCARTNEY
VASEEM S. HADI
One West Fourth Street
Suite 900
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-3688
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC, appeals the August 19, 2008, decision of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas refusing to stay Plaintiff-Appellee’s survivor claims pending arbitration proceedings.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On June 12, 2008, Plaintiff-Appellee, Debra (Nelson) Grady, individually and as Administratrix for the Estate of Judy Mae Hilles, commenced this action in the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas against Defendant-Appellant Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC dba Winchester Place Nursing & Rehabilitation Center (“Kindred“), and other medical Defendants alleging medical negligence survivor and wrongful death claims. Specifically, the complaint alleged that decedent, Judy Mae Hilles, had endured pain and suffering and had eventually passed away, as a result of substandard nursing home care and treatment that was furnished by Defendant-Appellant, Winchester Place Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, and others.
{¶3} On July 29, 2008, Defendant-Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings pursuant to
{¶4} Plaintiff-Appellee filed a Brief in Opposition on August 18, 2008.
{¶5} The following day, the trial court issued an Entry analyzing the issue and ultimately denying the Motion to Stay largely on the basis of Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 115 Ohio St.3d 134, 2007-Ohio-4787, 873 N.E.2d 1258.
{¶6} In said Entry, the trial court stated:
{¶7} “However, arbitration is nonetheless a matter of contract, and despite the strong policy in its favor, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate any dispute that he has not agreed to submit. Further, a decedent cannot bind his or her beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful-death claims. Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 115 Ohio St.3d 134, 873 N.E.2d 1258, 2007-Ohio-4787 (Ohio Sept. 20, 2007).
{¶8} “Here, although Plaintiff’s decedent, Judy May Hilles, signed an agreement to arbitrate any dispute with Defendant Winchester Place, she was the only party bound by her signed agreement with Defendant Winchester Place. The beneficiaries of Ms. Hilles did not specifically agree to arbitrate their wrongful death claims. Thus, while any survival claim Ms. Hines may have had against Defendant Winchester Place would have been subject to her agreement to arbitrate, pursuant to Peters, supra, her beneficiaries are not bound by that agreement to arbitrate.
{¶9} “Upon consideration of the parties’ respective Motion and Brief in Opposition, and reviewing the pertinent law, the court finds that the issues raised in Plaintiff’s Complaint are not referable to arbitration pursuant to Peters, supra. Defendant Kindred Nursing Center‘s Motion to Stay Proceedings pursuant to
R.C. 2711.02 is DENIED. This matter shall proceed accordingly.{¶10} “It is so ORDERED.”
{¶11} On September 2, 2008, Defendant-Appellant responded with a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that just the “survivor” claims should be stayed.
{¶12} Prior to any ruling on said motion to reconsider, on September 17, 2008, Defendant-Appellant commenced the instant appeal, setting forth the following assignment of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶13} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STAY PLAINTIFF‘S SURVIVOR CLAIMS IN THIS MATTER PENDING ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO OHIO REVISED §2711.02.”
I.
{¶14} Appellant argues that the trial court should have stayed the survivor claims in this action. We agree.
{¶15} We review a trial court‘s judgment on a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration using the abuse of discretion standard, Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Company, 157 Ohio App.3d 150, 2004-Ohio-829, 809 N.E.2d 1161. An abuse of discretion implies the trial court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, see, e.g., Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140. A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support the decision, AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corporation (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 157 at 161, 553 N.E.2d 597.
{¶16} Under
{¶17} Revised Code §2711.02(B) provides:
{¶18} “If an action is brought upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, the court in which the action is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in the action is referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until the arbitration of the issue has been had in accordance with agreement provided the applicant for stay is not in default in proceeding with arbitration.”
{¶19} Ohio public policy favors the enforcement of private arbitration agreements. Kelm v. Kelm (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 26, 623 N.E.2d 39. See also, N. Ohio Sewer Contrs., Inc. v. Bradley Dev. Co. (2005), 159 Ohio App.3d 794, 2005-Ohio-1014, 825 N.E.2d 650; Junkins v. Spinnaker Bay Condominium Ass‘n., Ottawa App. No. OT-01-007, 2002-Ohio-872. Any uncertainty that exists with regard to the applicability of an arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of coverage. Id. An arbitration clause should not be denied effect unless it can be determined to a high degree of certainty that the clause does not cover the asserted dispute. Owens Flooring Co. v. Hummel Constr. Co. (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 825, 749 N.E.2d 782. See also Willis v. Linnen, Summit App. No. 20775, 2002-Ohio-2000. The law favors and encourages arbitration. Brennan v. Brennan (1955), 164 Ohio St. 29, 128 N.E.2d 89. However, arbitration is a matter of contract and, despite the strong policy in its favor, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate any dispute that he has not agreed to submit. Teramar Corp. v. Rodier Corp. (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 39. 531 N.E.2d 721.
{¶20} In the case sub judice, upon entering the nursing home, the decedent Judy Hilles entered into an “Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement Between Residents and Facility” with Defendant-Appellant Kindred Nursing Home, which provided
{¶21} However, upon review, we find Plaintiff-Appellee’s complaint contains both survivor claims and wrongful death claims.
{¶22} In Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 115 Ohio St.3d 134, 2007-Ohio-4787, the Ohio Supreme Court was presented with an arbitration agreement in a case which had both survivor and wrongful death claims. The Court in Peters held that the wife‘s wrongful death claim against the Columbus Steel Castings, which was filed after her husband fell to his death while working with the company, was not subject to arbitration, even though the husband had signed an agreement with the company that required him to arbitrate all claims. The Court found that the husband was the only party bound by his signed agreement with company and that his beneficiaries did not specifically agree to arbitrate their wrongful death claims. The Court found that the wife‘s wrongful death claim was separate from any survival claim husband may have had against the company.
{¶23} In so finding, the Peters court addressed the separate nature of survival claims and wrongful-death claims, stating:
{¶24} “Although there is no common-law action for wrongful death,
R.C. 2125.01 establishes such a claim in Ohio. Under this provision, “[w]hen the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default which would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued * * * shall be liable to an action for damages.”{¶25} “As opposed to a survival claim, through which a decedent‘s estate may recover for the injuries suffered by the decedent before his death, a wrongful-death claim belongs to the decedent‘s beneficiaries. Compare
R.C. 2125.02(A)(1) *137 withR.C. 2305.21 . “Except as provided in this division, a civil action for wrongful death shall be brought in the name of the personal representative of the decedent for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children, and the parents of the decedent * * * and for the exclusive benefit of the other next of kin of the decedent.” (Emphasis added.)R.C. 2125.02(A)(1) . In evaluating such a claim, the trier of fact may award damages for “the injury and loss resulting to the beneficiaries * * * by reason of the wrongful death.”R.C. 2125.02(A)(2) . The personal representative is involved to prevent multiplicity of suits and facilitate distribution of any sums received from wrongful-death claims to the various beneficiaries. SeeR.C. 2125.03 .{¶26} “Thus, when an individual is killed by the wrongful act of another, the personal representative of the decedent‘s estate may bring a survival action for the decedent‘s own injuries leading to his or her death as well as a wrongful-death action for the injuries suffered by the beneficiaries of the decedent as a result of the death. Although they are pursued by the same nominal party, we have long recognized the separate nature of these claims in Ohio.
{¶27} “In 1908, we stated that survival actions and wrongful-death actions “are not the same,” even though they both relate to the defendant‘s alleged negligence. Mahoning Valley Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine (1908), 77 Ohio St. 395, 414, 83 N.E. 601. Thus, the fact that the representative of an estate fully litigates a survival action against a
defendant does not prevent the representative from also bringing a wrongful-death action against the same defendant. Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.”
{¶28} In applying this analysis to the instant case, we find the decedent’s beneficiaries were not parties to the arbitration agreement and that any wrongful death claims they may have are therefore not subject to arbitration.
{¶29} Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in not staying the survivor claims pending arbitration pursuant to the subject agreement but find that the trial court correctly denied Appellant’s motion to stay as it applies to the wrongful death claims.
{¶30} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
{¶31} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County, Ohio, is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the law and this opinion.
By: Wise, P.J.
Edwards, J., and
Delaney, J., concur.
/S/ JOHN W. WISE
/S/ JULIE A. EDWARDS
/S/ PATRICIA A. DELANEY
JUDGES
JWW/d 69
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County, Ohio, is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Costs assessed to Appellant and Appellee equally.
/S/ JOHN W. WISE
/S/ JULIE A. EDWARDS
/S/ PATRICIA A. DELANEY
JUDGES