JAMES GOODWIN v. COLCHESTER PROBATE COURT ET AL.
(AC 36214)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Argued October 22, 2015—officially released January 19, 2016
Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Hon. Joseph Q. Koletsky, judge trial referee.
******************************************************
The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical сorrection prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
******************************************************
Eric H. Rothauser, with whom, on the brief, was Lee B. Ross, for the appellant (defendant John Fedus).
Kerin M. Woods, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
LAVINE, J.
There is no dispute as to the following facts and procedural history. For forty years, until her death on June 1, 2006, the decedent and her sister Mae C. Fedus (Mae Fedus) lived together in a house on Rutland Street in Philadelphia (house). The plaintiff, James K. Goodwin, is the only child of Mae Fedus. At the time of her death, the decedent had the following known heirs at law: Mae Fedus; her brother Stephen Fedus, Jr. (Stephen Fedus), her sister Alyce Daggett, and her nephew, John Fedus, the defendant on appeal in this court.3 The decedent and her heirs at law were the co-owners in equal shares of 130 acres of land (farm) in the town of Colchester.
On or about October 8, 2008, the plaintiff filed a petition for probate and grant of letters with the Register for Probate оf Wills (register of wills) for the county of Philadelphia, seeking to probate a handwritten document entitled ‘‘Last Will and Testament’’ (will).4 Although the decedent had signed the will, her signature had not been witnessed.5 The will bears the handwriting
The plaintiff gave notice of the Pennsylvania petition to probate to Stephen Fedus, Alyce Daggett, and the defendant (collectively, Connecticut relatives). On October 8, 2008, the register of wills issued a notice granting Letters of Administration–CTA in the Estate of Rose Fedus to the plaintiff. The Connecticut relatives objected to the admission of the will to probate in Pennsylvania, but prior to trial in the Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court Division (Orphans’ Court), they withdrew their challenge to the admission of the will to probate. On May 24, 2010, the Orphans’ Court decreed the matter ‘‘Settled, Ended and Discontinued’’ and remanded the matter to the register of wills.6
On July 22, 2010, the plaintiff filed a petition for ancillary administration of the decedent’s estate (anсillary administration) in the Court of Probate for the district of Colchester (probate court). The Connecticut relatives objected to the admission of the will for ancillary administration. The probate court, Judge Jodi M. Thomas, held a hearing on the objection to the ancillary administration and thereafter issued her opinion. In her opinion, the probate judge stated in part: ‘‘The Court finds that the Will is certainly questionable in appearance, having been handwritten in at least two different hands and having no witnesses. There is little doubt that it would not be admitted primarily under Connecticut law. There was also evidence adduced that undue influence by the [plaintiff] and [Mae Fedus] over the decedent may have occurred; that the decedent was a meticulous and capable woman, who would not have left such an important legal decision to chance by virtue of a handwritten, unwitnessed document; and that her bounty during her lifetime extended beyond the [plaintiff] and his family to her other siblings and their families (to which the Will is contrary).7’’ (Footnote in original.) In re Estate of Rose F. Fedus, Probate Court, district of Colchester (January 3, 2011) (25 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 263, 266–67 [2012]).
On the basis of the foregoing, the probate court issued an order stating: ‘‘[T]he court declines to admit the alleged instrument, on an ancillary basis, as the last will and testament of the decedent, Rose Fedus, at this time as ‘sufficient objection’
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was aggrieved by the order of the probate court for the reason that (1) his petition for ancillary probate satisfies the requirements of
Prior to trial, at the request of the court, the parties submitted pretrial briefs. In their briefs, the Connecticut relatives contended that the appeal should be decided as a matter of law on the grounds that the will is legally insufficient, vague, contrary to Connecticut law and public policy, and that it had been revoked. They further argued that, if they were to prevail on their legаl claims, there would be no reason to present evidence regarding the decedent’s testamentary capacity and whether
At trial the plaintiff testified as to his relationship with the decedent and how her will came to be written. The plaintiff grew up in the house his mother, Mae Fedus, shared with the decedent and was raised by the two women. He lived in the house until he was thirty-five years of age when he married and moved to a nearby town.10 After he married, the plaintiff ate lunch with the decedеnt and Mae Fedus in their house daily during the work week.11 One day a week after work, the plaintiff took Mae Fedus to the grocery store and then spent the night in the house. He, his wife, June A. Goodwin (June Goodwin), and their daughters12 visited the decedent and Mae Fedus on some weekends and on holidays. The plaintiff, his wife, and their three daughters had a close relationship with the decedent, who treated his daughters as if they were her grandchildren. She babysat for them and provided financial support for their education related activities. The decedent also gave savings bonds to the plaintiff’s daughters on each birthday and at Christmas.
The decedent suffered a stroke in April, 2000, was hospitalized, and spent more than five months in a rehаbilitation facility. She returned to the house in October, 2000, and was confined to a bed in the dining room. Due to the stroke, she could not walk and therefore used a wheelchair. The stroke, however, did not affect her mental capacity, cognition, or her speech.13
Stephen Fedus sent the decedent and Mae Fedus a Christmas card postmarked December 15, 2000. The Christmas card contained a note written by Stephen Fedus, which stated that ‘‘if one of us should die, the probate court and the lawyers will again have a ball, including estate taxes. Rose and Mae we have to do some planning with Alyce & nephew John. I can’t do it myself.’’ (Emphasis in original.) In his note, Stephen Fedus referenced extensive litigation regarding the estate
On December 21, 2000, while the plaintiff was having lunch at the house, the decedent asked him to write her will.15 The plaintiff was surprised by the decedent’s request as she had never before discussed her will with him. The decedent, who was then eighty-nine years old, gave the plaintiff a small pad of paper and told the plaintiff what to write. He used his own pen. When he had finished writing, the plaintiff handed the pad of paper to the decedent to review. The decedent reviewed the will, and, using her own pen, added her middle initial ‘‘F.’’ in two places, crossed out the words ‘‘my mother,’’ and added the words ‘‘and Mae Fedus.’’ See footnote 5 of this opinion. She then instructed the plaintiff to draw a line at the bottom of the page fоr her to sign her name. After the decedent signed her will, she placed it on the hutch next to her bed in the dining room. The plaintiff and the decedent never discussed the will again. Over time, the plaintiff forgot about writing the will for the decedent. The decedent died approximately six years after signing the will.
After the decedent died, Mae Fedus lived alone in the house until April, 2008, when she was moved to a nursing home, where she was diagnosed with dementia. As Mae Fedus’ cognitive abilities declined, the house became increasingly disordered and cluttered. She neglected to pay her bills. Between 2006 and 2008, the plaintiff inquired of Mae Fedus whether she had probated the decedent’s estate. She assured him that she had, but in reality she had not.
After Mаe Fedus was moved to a nursing home, June Goodwin, with the assistance of friends, began to sort through the contents of the house. They found a great deal of accumulated paperwork, including bills, receipts, bank statements, letters, and other documents that were stacked in piles on the floor. One day in October, 2008, Liz Fazzolari, a friend of June Goodwin, found the decedent’s will in a stack of papers. She gave the will to June Goodwin who in turn gave it to the plaintiff when he came to the house at lunch time. The plaintiff had forgotten about the will, but seeing the paper caused him to remember that he wrote it at the decedent’s request. The plaintiff took the will to a Pennsylvania attorney to probate the deсedent’s estate. The plaintiff and June Goodwin filed affidavits with the Philadelphia register of wills attesting to the decedent’s signature on the will.16
After the plaintiff presented his evidence, the Connecticut relatives filed a
The Connecticut relatives then presented evidence, which consisted of testimony from Stephen Fedus concerning his efforts to have the co-owners of the farm divide it among themselves to avoid what he opined would be costly estate taxes, and legal and probate costs. He also testified about other will contests involving the decedent.17 The Connecticut relatives also placed in evidence a report from a handwriting expert regarding the different handwritings in the will and the different colors of ink used. They argued that the manner in which the decedent prepared her will was very much out of character, as she had strong opinions about wills and had participated in a will contest involving the estate of her aunt, Frances Schofield, in the Probate Court for the district of West Hartford. Some of the documents the Connecticut relatives submitted were to demonstrate that during her life, the decedent had objected tо Schofield’s will, arguing that Schofield was quite elderly and no physician was present when she made her will. The decedent was of the opinion that Schofield was under undue pressure due to her advanced age and poor health at that time. The Connecticut relatives argued that the decedent would never have left something as important as a will to a handwritten document.
At the conclusion of all evidence, the court issued an oral opinion. The court stated: ‘‘By way of findings of fact, the court accepts, completely, the testimony in court yesterday of [the plaintiff] to the effect that he wrote down, at [the decedent’s] direction, the very words that she spoke. Those words were, ‘Last will and testament of Rose Fedus. I, Rose Fedus,’ he initially wrote, later she added the F., ‘leave all my money and property,’ so forth. The court accepts that the pen used by [the decedent] when she took the paper back and made the two corrections that [the plaintiff] testified about explained the different inks, the handwriting expert report points out.
‘‘All of the facts are completely in startling concurrence. It’s rare that there are—the only loose ends in this case from a factual standpoint are the staples in the upper left-hand corner of the original will, a factoid which is of utterly no significance in the court’s opinion.
‘‘The court finds that [the decedent] was a wonderful womаn of great strength of character and will. Of course, I do not know what the previous preceding evidence was, but I do note that the probate decree indicated that there may have been some undue influence in the same area of the opinion that indicates what a strong willed person [the decedent] was. I don’t know how those two logically correlate, but there is not the slightest doubt in my mind
‘‘To tie this into the statute, the proponent of the will has presented to the Colchester Probate Court, and herе, an authentic and exemplified copy of the will, which the court finds was proved and established by a court of competent jurisdiction, the register of wills in Pennsylvania, and that that authentication and exemplified copy has indeed been filed in Connecticut. The court, sitting as the court of probate, finds that there is no sufficient objection proffered at this hearing to that will; therefore, [§] 45a-288 (c) is not applicable.18
‘‘The court notes that, in spite of these factual findings, the decree of the Pennsylvania court is entitled to full faith and credit. The court has had a full hearing, and all parties have had the opportunity to present any evidence that they wish, so the issue of full faith and credit does not need to be reached since the court has heard all the evidence and has found that the will is appropriate, and no sufficient objection has been proffered by the opponents. For that reason, the appeal is sustained.’’ (Footnote added.) The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court.
On appeal to this court, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) admitting the decedent’s will to ancillary administration pursuant to
The standard of review in probate appeals is well known. ‘‘In a probate appeal . . . the Superior Court’s jurisdiction is statutory and limited to the order appealed from. The issues presented for review are those defined in the reasons of appeal. The Superior Court cannot consider or adjudicate issues beyond the scope of those proper for determination by the order or decree attacked. This is so even with the consent of the parties to the appeal because the court has subject matter jurisdiction limited only to the order or decree appеaled from.’’ Silverstein’s Appeal from Probate, 13 Conn. App. 45, 58, 534 A.2d 1223 (1987). The Superior Court ‘‘tries the questions presented to it de novo, but in so doing it is . . . exercising a special and limited jurisdiction conferred on it by the statute authorizing appeals from probate.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal
In the plaintiff’s appeal from probate, the trial court concluded that there was no sufficient objection to the will pursuant to
The defendant’s claim raises a question of statutory interpretation. ‘‘The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
I
The defendant’s principal claim on appeal is that the will is not admissible to probate under
In modern times, the law of Connecticut permits a will executed in accordance with the law of another state in which it was executed to pass real property in this state. The Connecticut legislature modified the commоn law of lex loci rei sitae in 1856 when it enacted the precursor of
Section 45a-288 (a) provides in relevant part with respect to a ‘‘will conveying property situated in this state [that] has been proved and established out of this state by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . any person interеsted in such property may present to the court of probate . . . an authenticated and exemplified copy of such will and of the record of the proceedings proving and establishing the will and request that such copies be filed and recorded. The request shall be accompanied by a complete statement in writing of the property and estate of the decedent in this state. If, upon a hearing . . . no sufficient objection is shown, the court of probate shall order such copies to be filed and recorded, and they shall thereupon become a part of the files and records of such court, and shall have the same effect as if such will had been originally proved and established in such court of probate. . . .’’
In short,
In the present case, the trial court found that the plaintiff had presented the probate court with an authenticated and exemplified copy of the decedent’s will that the court found was proved and established by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Philadelphia register of wills.20 The court’s findings as to the documents the plaintiff presented to the probate court are in accord with the requirements of
II
The defendant also сlaims that the trial court improperly failed to grant the Connecticut relatives’ motion to dismiss for failure to make out a prima facie case pursuant to
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
LAVINE, J.
JUDGE