Goodrich v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm.Goodrich v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm.
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on February 9, 2012
Cindy L. Goodrich, pro se.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and David E. Lefton, for appellee Director, Ohio Department of Job & Family Services.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
BROWN, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Cindy L. Goodrich, has filed an appeal from the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, in which the court affirmed the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission (“commission“), appellee, a division of the Ohio Department of Job & Family Services (“ODJFS“), appellee.
{¶3} On March 22, 2010, appellant applied for unemployment benefits. The application was eventually allowed, with benefits commencing March 21, 2010. In May 2010, the commission issued a re-determination disallowing the application, finding appellant quit her employment due to marital obligations. On June 4, 2010, appellant, pro se, filed an appeal with the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶4} On April 28, 2011, the trial court issued a decision and entry denying appellant‘s appeal. The trial court found (1) appellant quit her employment under disqualifying circumstances due to a marital obligation pursuant to
[I.] The decision of the Hearing officer finding that “Claimant contends that she submitted subpoena request to the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission to require the employer to produce documents and witness to prove that she had a right to transfer to San Diego, California. These Subpoenas were not issued. The evidence clearly demonstrates that claimant was an at-will employee. She had no contractual right to transfer to another state. Therefore, the Hearing officer refused to continue the hearing in order to have the subpoenas issued.” The Hearing officer in refusing to issue the requested subpoena(s) and to continue the hearing violated Appellant[‘]s Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process. Was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the evidence and should be reversed under
O.R.C. 4141.282(H) .[II.] That
O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) Denying unemployment to all individuals who “quit work to marry or because of marital, parental, filial, or other domestic obligations.” Is a violation of Appellant[‘]s Fourteenth Amendment rights to Due Process under the United States Constitution and a violation of the Ohio Constitution Article 1 Section 2 to Equal Protection. Was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the evidence and should be reversed underO.R.C. 4141.282(H) .[III.] That
O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) Denying unemployment to all individuals who “quit work to marry or because of marital, parental, filial, or other domestic obligations.” While allowing exceptions for some religious reasons and not other religious views is a violation of Appellant[‘]s First Amendment Rights as applied to the States thought [sic] the Fourteenth Amendment Rights under the United States Constitution and a violation of the Ohio Constitution Article 1 Section 1, 2, & 7. Which creates a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of both Federal and State Constitutions. Was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the evidence and should be reversed underO.R.C. 4141.282(H) .[IV.] That ODJFS and UCRC violated Appellant[‘]s rights under Americans with disabilities Act
U.S.C. § 12132 and28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29U.S.C. § 794 by refusing to address or respond to Appellant[‘]s repeated and continued request for accommodations of her reading disability. This was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the evidence and should be reversed underO.R.C. 4141.282(H) .[V.] The court of common pleas incorrectly stated that pro se litigants are to be held to the same standard as an attorney. When the U.S. Supreme Court has held that is not to be the case.
[VI.] That ODJFS, UCRC, and the court of common pleas rulings that Appellant did not have an implied contract and a legal right to transfer, after being transfer[ed] by employer months prior to her request. Was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the evidence and should be reversed under
O.R.C. 4141.282(H) .
{¶5} In all of appellant‘s assignments of error, appellant contests the trial court‘s affirmance of the commission‘s decision. A trial court and an appellate court employ the same, well-established standard of review in unemployment compensation appeals: “[A] reviewing court may reverse the board‘s determination only if it is unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 697 (1995);
{¶7} Appellant argues in her first assignment of error that the hearing officer violated her due process rights when he refused to continue the hearing so the commission could issue subpoenas that appellant had previously requested. The trial court concluded that appellant received proper notice and a hearing consistent with due process. Appellant does not contest this finding. The trial court then found that there was no documentation in the record, other than appellant‘s testimony, that she requested the issuance of subpoenas. Appellant contends this is not true, and, thus, she was not given the opportunity to present the facts to demonstrate that she was entitled to unemployment benefits, citing Atkins v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-182, 2008-Ohio-4019, citing Bulatko v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 7th Dist. No. 07 MA 124, 2008-Ohio-1061 (finding the key factor in deciding whether the hearing satisfied procedural due process is whether the claimant had the opportunity to present the facts which demonstrate that she was entitled to unemployment benefits). In support of her claim that the record does, in fact, show that she requested subpoenas, appellant cites the following portion of the hearing transcript:
Hearing Officer: Well (inaudible) our records [sic] I don‘t see there was ever a subpoena request made.
Mr. Goodrich: We, we mailed on the 4th uh I‘m sorry we emailed on the 3rd, received a response on the 4th that we had to call in number. Uh the number we called we were told that the person who does subpoena was out till Monday. We called on Monday and requested the subpoena of uh this week of the person who was doing them.
Hearing Officer: Well I understand how it (inaudible) issued but no record of being issued. We have to have uh at least five full business days to process the subpoena.
Mr. Goodrich: Right.
{¶8} Appellant claims that it was during the second “inaudible” section of the above excerpt that the hearing officer states appellant requested the subpoenas but they were never issued. However, we cannot rely upon appellant‘s unsupported claim that the inaudible section of the transcript contained the hearing officer‘s acknowledgment that appellant had requested the subpoenas. The language surrounding the “inaudible” notation does not illuminate the issue to any extent. We cannot say that appellant has shown that she requested subpoenas. Therefore, appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶9} Appellant argues in her second assignment of error that
{¶10} We note first that there is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes. State v. Dario, 106 Ohio App.3d 232 (1st Dist.1995), citing State v. Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d 168 (1991);
{¶11} Here, appellant cites a 2003 study surveying the states that have laws that deny benefits to spouses who quit work due to family relocation, with Ohio being in the small minority of states with such laws. Appellant argues that Ohio‘s laws are in the minority and outdated. Appellant also cites a California case, Boren v. California Dept. of Emp. Dev., 59 Cal.App.3d 250, 130 Cal.Rptr. 683 (1976), and a Pennsylvania case, Wallace v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 38 Pa.Cmmw. 342, 393 A.2d 43 (1978), both of which found violative of equal protection their respective unemployment compensation
{¶12} Initially, none of these authorities are controlling upon this court. Thus, we may reject them outright. Notwithstanding, many of appellant‘s arguments in her brief, especially those relating to the 2003 study, concern legislative prerogative, philosophy, and lawmaking, which are not within the province of this court. Questions regarding the wisdom of legislation are left to the General Assembly. If the General Assembly has the constitutional power to enact a law, its wisdom is of no concern to the court. Ohio Pub. Interest Action Group v. Pub. Util. Comm., 43 Ohio St.2d 175, 183 (1975), citing State Bd. of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 20 (1912); Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St. 171, 183 (1918). As for Boren, it is distinguishable from the present case. In Boren, the claimant‘s statistics showed that 99 percent of the applicants rejected under that state‘s unemployment provision were women. From this, the court concluded that the section affected women only and “was designed to disqualify a selected group of female claimants.” There is no such statistical evidence regarding
{¶13} Although the circumstances in Wallace are more closely akin to those in the present case, we decline appellant‘s invitation to strike down
Other states have had a variety of statutory provisions covering the subject of unemployment compensation, some of which, in dealing with the question of disqualification, particularly as to the effect of quitting work because of marital obligation, are substantially the same as the provisions of the Ohio statute above quoted. Although there appears to have been no decisions of courts of last resort construing and applying those provisions, they have generally been administered in accordance with the conclusion to which we are impelled by force of the clear and unequivocal language employed in these statutory provisions. In our view, a contrary construction and application would be tantamount to legislative action, which is the province of the legislative and not the judicial branch of the government.
{¶14} Judge Rogers, in his dissenting opinion in Wallace, agreed that any conferring of unemployment benefits upon those who quit work for marital reasons belongs to the legislature. Judge Rogers stated, “the history of unemployment compensation in Pennsylvania is one of increasingly larger benefits conferred on more and more people. This history, together with the exception made for domestic causes for quitting, convince me that the Legislature is aware both of the needs of the unemployed and of the problems of funding the program. We should not interfere with the Legislature‘s policy in this case on this record.” Id. at 354-355.
{¶16} In his dissenting opinion in Wallace, Judge Rogers shared the same rationale discussed in Brown-Brockmeyer. Judge Rogers contended the majority “entirely overlooks the reason why the disqualification of persons who quit their work for domestic reasons passes constitutional muster carefully explained in [Unemp. Bd. of Rev. v. Jenkins 23 Pa.Cmmw. 127, 350 A.2d 447 (1976)] that the purpose of unemployment compensation is to provide temporary assistance to persons who are suddenly without employment for causes over which they have little or no personal control.” Id. at 354.
{¶17} In addition, the decision in Wallace has been recently criticized by one member of the same court. In Procito v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 945 A.2d 261 (2008), Judge Leavitt stated in his concurrence that he believed Wallace was wrongly decided. After noting that Wallace was decided by a close four-to-three vote, with one of the four votes a concurrence in the result, he stated the jurisprudence expressed in Wallace was dated and not consistent with more recent holdings of the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts that economic legislation nearly always survives a
{¶18} These authorities convince us that any change in Ohio law, in this respect, should be left to the legislature. We have no indication that the Supreme Court of Ohio has changed its view on this type of legislation, and we decline to find
{¶19} Appellant argues in her third assignment of error that allowing exceptions to
{¶21} Appellant argues in her fourth assignment of error that the commission and ODJFS violated her rights under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when it refused to address or respond to her repeated requests for accommodations of her reading disability. Appellant asserts she was diagnosed with dyslexia, a disability under DSM-IV-TR 315.00, and she requested an exception to the policy of ODJFS and the commission that requires claims and appeals to be in writing. She contends that her disability hinders her ability to fully express herself in writing and comprehend writing.
{¶22} Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from discriminating based on disability. In pertinent part, the ADA states: “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
{¶23} In the present case, the trial court concluded that these claims are matters for a separate lawsuit and were not part of the claims litigated before the commission. Appellant does not contest such under this assignment of error, and she acknowledges that she may pursue a separate legal action based upon these alleged violations. Appellant claims, rather, that she raises the commission‘s lack of accommodation to demonstrate she was denied full and fair access to an appeal. However, even if we could address this issue in the present appeal, we would find it unavailing. Appellant does not specifically explain how she was disadvantaged by her dyslexia or how she was denied full and fair access to an appeal. She states that the commission may not have fully understood her and may have been confused by her inability to understand the rules and procedure, but she gives no further explanation or examples. There is also no indication in the record that the commission did not understand appellant‘s filings. Our own review of her filings demonstrates that appellant ably expressed her contentions and views throughout this matter, and she filed detailed documents that included legal citations and authority to support her claims. Appellant‘s vague and non-specific claims are insufficient to demonstrate that she was actually prejudiced by the commission‘s actions or inactions in this respect. For these reasons, we overrule appellant‘s fourth assignment of error.
{¶24} Appellant argues in her fifth assignment of error that the court of common pleas erred when it stated that pro se litigants are held to the same standard as an attorney, when the United States Supreme Court has held that pro se litigants are to be
{¶25} We agree with the trial court that it is well-established that pro se litigants are held to the same rules, procedures, and standards as litigants represented by counsel. The Supreme Court of Ohio has specifically held so in many cases. See, e.g., Zukowski v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 53, 2010-Ohio-1652; State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 100 Ohio St.3d 352, 2003-Ohio-6448; Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651 (10th Dist.2001). This court has held likewise in countless cases. See, e.g., Fields v. Stange, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-48, 2004-Ohio-1134, ¶ 7; Dailey v. R & J Commercial Contracting, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1464, 2002-Ohio-4724, ¶ 17. It is true that a court may, in practice, grant a certain amount of latitude toward pro se litigants. Robb v. Smallwood, 165 Ohio App.3d 385, 2005-Ohio-5863, ¶ 5 (4th Dist.). However, the court cannot simply disregard the rules in order to accommodate a party who fails to obtain counsel. Id. “The rationale for this policy is that if the court treats pro se litigants differently, ‘the court begins to depart from its duty of impartiality and prejudices the handling of the case as it relates to other litigants represented by counsel.’ ” Pinnacle Credit Servs., LLC v. Kuzniak, 7th Dist. No. 08 MA 111, 2009-Ohio-1021, ¶ 31, quoting Karnofel v. Kmart Corp., 11th Dist. No. 2007-T-0036, 2007-Ohio-6939, ¶ 27.
{¶26} Appellant here cites to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594 (1972) in support of her position that, as a pro se litigant, she is not held to the same procedural standards as an attorney. However, Haines is inapposite. In Haines, the Supreme Court
{¶27} Appellant argues in her sixth assignment of error that the commission erred when it found that she did not have an implied contract and a legal right to transfer. Appellant first contends that the trial court erred when it stopped its analysis after finding
{¶28} Appellant then argues that she proved by documentary and testimonial evidence that her transfer was approved but never complied with by Quest. Appellant asserts that Smith admitted she signed appellant‘s request-to-transfer form, and company policy and past history provided employees the right to transfer. We agree that Smith testified that she signed appellant‘s form requesting a transfer. However, we disagree with appellant‘s characterization of Smith‘s testimony that she stated company policy and past history provided employees the right to transfer. Smith only agreed with the question posed by appellant‘s representative that, “[I]n regards to transfer, have you ever seen an employee be able to transfer from one place to another, one business unit to another?” Thus, Smith only testified that she had seen employees transfer from one unit to another. Smith did not testify that company policy and past history provided employees any particular right to such a transfer. In fact, Smith testified, “[I]t‘s not a given that she will transfer. It‘s just a request.” In addition, appellant has cited no evidence to support her assertion that appellant‘s transfer was approved in any manner by anyone at Quest.
{¶29} Accordingly, appellant‘s six assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DORRIAN, J., concurs.
TYACK, J., dissents.
TYACK, J., dissenting.
{¶30} I believe that Cindy Goodrich‘s and her counsel‘s own statements about her attempts to get subpoenas issued, especially with the detailed history about the attempts to issue the subpoenas, are sufficient to show that she tried to present her case and was prevented from doing so by bureaucratic problems in the government agency. The assertion that the person responsible for issuing subpoenas was “out until Monday” is certainly believable. I do not believe that her claim was an unsupported claim.
{¶31} I am also slow to discard her claims where the governmental agency responsible for generating a record of the hearing generates a transcript with the word “inaudible” at key places.
{¶32} Due Process of Law involves both the right to be aware of the issues to be determined and the right to contest the issues.
{¶34} I cannot say that Cindy Goodrich is entitled to unemployment benefits. I cannot say she is not. However, I can say she was not given the opportunity to fully develop her case. Due Process of Law, to me, requires that she be given that opportunity.
{¶35} I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case so a complete evidentiary hearing can be conducted.
{¶36} Since the majority does not do so, I respectfully dissent.
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