Robb v. SmallwoodRobb v. Smallwood
{¶ 1} Appellant, Walter J. Robb II, appeals the judgment of the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his complaint for failure to appear at a pretrial hearing and granting judgment in favor of appellee, Buford W. Small-wood, on his counterclaim. In his pro se brief, Robb first asserts that he is entitled to relief from judgment according to
{¶ 2} Robb filed a complaint against Smallwood alleging that Smallwood stole Robb’s Woodmizer Portable Sawmill. Smallwood responded with a counterclaim seeking damages for sawing services that he had allegedly performed for Robb, fraud, and attorney fees. Both parties attended a pretrial hearing, and both parties participated in discovery.
{¶ 3} On February 23, 2005, the clerk of courts served the parties with a hearing notice, which instructed them to attend a hearing scheduled for March 9, 2005. The notice also stated that failure to attend the hearing would result in dismissal or entry of default judgment. On the scheduled date, Smallwood and his counsel were present at the hearing, but Robb did not attend. The trial court dismissed Robb’s complaint for failure to prosecute and granted judgment for Smallwood on his counterclaim.
{¶ 4} Robb then filed a motion for a continuance, asserting that he had not received the hearing notice for the March 9, 2005 hearing. Before the trial court could rule on the motion, Robb filed a notice of appeal.
{¶ 5} Robb raises two issues in his pro se appeal. As is often the case in pro se matters, Robb’s brief is deficient in many respects. For instance, his brief fails to state an assignment of error, list a table of cases, or give a statement of the case. See
{¶ 6} Initially, appellant asserts that he is entitled to relief from the trial court’s judgment based upon
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} A litigant must first file a
{¶ 9} To the extent that Robb’s belated motion for a continuance could be considered as a
{¶ 10} In his second issue, appellant asserts that he was not given proper notice, as required by due process and
{¶ 12} According to the hearing notice in the record, the clerk sent a copy of the notice to “Walter J. Robb II” on February 23, 2005, presumably at his address of record in Athens, Ohio. According to
{¶ 13} This procedure also satisfies the due process requirement that notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to advise a party of the pendency of the proceedings. See, generally,
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
(1950),
{¶ 14} We overrule appellant’s assignments of error and sustain the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.