Irvine v. StateIrvine v. State
Lead Opinion
The issue before this court is whether an employee has quit her work without just cause within the meaning of
“(D) * * * [N]o individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits * * *:
“(2) For the duration of his unemployment if the administrator finds that:
“(a) He quit his work without just cause or has been discharged for just cause in connection with his work * * *.”
The claimant has the burden of proving her entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits under this statutory provision, including the existence of just cause for quitting work. Shannon v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp. (1951),
Thе term “just cause” has not been clearly defined in our case law. We are in agreement with one of our appellate courts that “[t]here is, of course, not a slide-rule definition of just cause. Essentially, each cаse must be considered upon its particular merits. Traditionally, just cause, in the statutory sense, is that which, to an ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.” Peyton v. Sun T.V. (1975),
The determination of what сonstitutes just cause must be analyzed in conjunction with the legislative purpose underlying the Unemployment Compensation Act. Essentially, the Act’s purpose is “to enable unfortunate employees, who become and remаin involuntarily unemployed by adverse business and industrial conditions, to subsist on a reasonably decent level and is in keeping with the humanitarian and enlightened concepts of this modern day.” (Emphasis sic.) Leach v. Republic Steel Corp. (1964),
We are in basic agreement with the court of appeals below that, in determining “just cause” as that term is construed by Peyton and Salzl, supra, the source or cause of the physical inability to work may be of no import, “at least in the absence of evidence of the employee’s culpability in sustaining or incurring the condition.”
The determination of whether just cause exists necessarily depends uрon the unique factual considerations of the particular case. Determination of purely factual questions is primarily within the province of the referee and the board. Upon appeal, a court of law may reverse such decisions only if they are unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest
In the instant case, our review of the record suppоrts the decision of the board denying claimant unemployment compensation benefits. We agree with the court of appeals below that claimant terminated her employment with N.E.O.D.C on the advice of Drs. Crano and Nаrraway, and that claimant apprised N.E.O.D.C. of her medical condition and physical limitations. We do not agree with the court of appeals’ finding that claimant attempted to work with N.E.O.D.C. to obtain a less demanding position or that claimant gave N.E.O.D.C. sufficient timely notice to afford it the opportunity of finding satisfactory alternative employment for her. In fact, the record indicates that the exact opposite is true. The referee еxpressly stated, in his decision, that:
“Claimant took the two doctors’ releases to N.E.O.D.C. and immediately resigned her employment. There was no conversation between claimant and the employer with respect to whethеr there were any jobs available within the facility which claimant could perform within the medical restrictions. There may have been some work available for the claimant at the Center, but the employer was not given thе opportunity to look into the matter.
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“* * * The facts presented above indicate claimant quit her employment without inquiring as to whether any other jobs were available which could conform to her medical restrictions.”
In light of the foregoing facts, we do not believe that claimant has carried her burden of establishing just cause for her resignation. Claimant was not “involuntarily” unemployed as required by Leach v. Republic Steel Corp., supra, and Nunamaker v. United States Steel Corp., supra. Nor did claimant satisfy the test we articulated in Salzl v. Gibson Greeting Cards, supra, at 39, that in order to recover unemployment сompensation benefits, an employee must be “* * * able and willing to work, but was
We conclude that the foregoing findings of fact, as determined by the Bureau of Employment Services and the board, and as approved by the trial court below, arе not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Claimant therefore is not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. In sum, we hold that an employee’s voluntary resignation on the basis of hеalth problems is without just cause within the meaning of
Judgment reversed.
Notes
We need not analyze whether claimant’s health problems are related to her employment in order to resolve the instant case. Whether claimant’s medical problems are causally connected to her employment is a matter of workers’ compensation law. The question of whether claimant is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits is not before us and we do not reach that issue.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. The result we reach today is compelled by the narrow scope of review from fact-finding boards and tribunals concerning determination of purely factual questions by the fact-finder granted to this court and to our intermediate courts of appeal by a long line of legal prеcedents thoroughly and cogently examined and discussed in the majority opinion starting with Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Roach (1947),
Unfortunately this court has disregarded this lawful, proper and narrow scope of review possessed by a court of appeals and by this сourt in appellate review of zoning commission and zoning board of appeals decisions applying local zoning laws. See, e.g., Reed v. Rootstown Twp Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1984),
In Consolidated Mgmt., Inc., supra, the dissent at 243-244 recognized that a reversal of the court of appeals in an R.C. Chаpter 2506 appeal caused this court to function as a “super zoning board of review.” In Reed v. Rootstown, supra, at 57-62, it was pointed out that the common pleas court had competent, substantial factual support within its proper scоpe of judicial review to reverse a decision of a board of zoning appeals which denied a variance, and that, by contrast, the court of appeals and this court have no fact-finding de novo trial powers.
In Kisil v. Sandusky (1984),
“An appeal to the court of appeals, pursuant toR.C. 2506.04 , is more limited in scope and requires that court to аffirm the common pleas court, unless the court of appeals finds, as a matter of law, that the decision of the common pleas court is not supported by a preponderance of reliable, probаtive and substantial evidence.”
The dissent in Kisil, supra, fails to recognize this polestar principle of limited scope of review possessed by the court of appeals and this court and would elevate these courts to the status of super boards of zoning appeals.
In the area of an R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative appeal, involving termination of employment of a housing authority employee, in Dudukovich v. Housing Authority (1979),
In Nunamaker v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1982),
Just as a court of appeals and this court should not be a super zoning board of review, as we have often stated, this court and the court of appeals likewise should not be a super unemployment compensation board of review.