Sonia GONZALEZ, Luis Gonzalez, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Sand Canyon Corporation, Dale M. Sugimoto, Fabiola N. Camperi, Matthew A. Engel, William S. Smith, Leopold and Associates, Option One Mortgage Corporation, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Incorporated, Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-OPT3, Hunt Leibert Jacobson, P.C., Benjamin T. Staskiewicz, S. Bruce Fair, Esq., Jon Doe, Jan Doe, Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP, Valerie N. Doble, Defendants.
No. 15-756-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Jan. 27, 2016.
We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its January 30, 2015 opinion. We separately consider two of al-Qadaffi‘s arguments on appeal.
Al-Qadaffi contends that dismissal of his age discrimination claim was error because he alleged that only one individual over the age of 55 had been hired by Services for the Underserved during the relevant period. But al-Qadaffi does not allege the ages of the people hired instead of him or any other facts from which a court could draw a plausible inference of discrimination. See D‘Cunha v. Genovese/Eckerd Corp., 479 F.3d 193, 195 (2d Cir.2007).
As to al-Qadaffi‘s disparate impact claim: he alleges that Services for the Underserved‘s Brooklyn Clubhouse has a policy of not hiring people who were members of the Clubhouse, and that all Clubhouse members were disabled. He does not allege that the Clubhouse has a policy or practice against hiring non-members who have disabilities. Al-Qadaffi‘s threadbare allegation does not give rise to a plausible inference that the Clubhouse has a policy that adversely impacts disabled applicants. See Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep‘t, 352 F.3d 565, 574-75 (2d Cir.2003).
Accordingly, and finding no merit in al-Qadaffi‘s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Sonia Gonzalez, pro se, East Windsor, CT, for Appellants.
Marissa Delinks, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Boston, MA, for Appellee.
PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, DENNY CHIN and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiffs Luis and Sonia Gonzalez appeal pro se from the dismissal of their complaint charging Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Deutsche Bank“) and others with violating the United States Constitution and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as bank fraud, in foreclosing on their Windsor, Connecticut home. The
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal-court plaintiff who complains of injuries caused by an adverse state-court judgment from seeking federal review and rejection of the state judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); accord Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir.2009). Thus, insofar as plaintiffs here (1) contend that Deutsche Bank (a) lacked standing to pursue their home‘s foreclosure in state court, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ (a)(2), 7, 13, 17-18, 36, or (b) fraudulently obtained title to the home, see id. ¶¶ 2, 5, 7, 13, 25; or (2) seek to recover for injuries caused by the state judgment, their claims are barred because the validi-
To the extent plaintiffs’ complaint can be liberally construed to allege injury stemming from the same transaction but not directly caused by the foreclosure judgment, their claims are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. Nevertheless, we affirm dismissal on the ground of claim preclusion. See O‘Connor v. Pierson, 568 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir.2009) (stating that, under Connecticut law, “[c]laim preclusion prevents the pursuit of any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these claims in Gonzalez v. Option One Mortgage Corporation, No. HHD-CV11-5035882-S (Conn.Super.Ct.2011), and, thus, to the extent the claims were not barred by Rooker-Feldman, they were nevertheless correctly dismissed as precluded.
These rulings make it unnecessary for us to decide whether dismissal was also warranted for failure to state a claim, failure to serve defendants, or failure to timely prosecute the action.
We have considered all of plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and DENY plaintiffs’ motion for reversal.