GONZALES v. THE STATE
S22A1303
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 21, 2023
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court‘s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court‘s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
Appellant Robert Michael Gonzales challenges his convictions for aggravated battery and felony murder, predicated on cruelty to children in the first degree, in connection with the death of three-year-old Samuel Carroll, the son of Appellant‘s girlfriend Jocelyn Carroll. Appellant contends that the evidence
1. “It is incumbent upon the Court to question its jurisdiction in all cases in which jurisdiction may be in doubt.” Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28, 28 (608 SE2d 631) (2005). The jurisdictional question presented here is whether the judgment below is final and thus appealable under
(a) When the trial court granted Appellant‘s motion for new trial in part, it did so because of an instructional error, not insufficiency of the evidence. Thus, at the time Appellant filed his notice of appeal, the two counts of child cruelty remained pending, such that the convictions for felony murder and aggravated battery did not constitute a final, appealable judgment. See Jenkins v. State, 294 Ga. 506, 509 (755 SE2d 138) (2014) (stating general rule that the grant of a new trial on a ground other than insufficiency of the evidence does not preclude retrial). Compare Jefferson v. State, 310 Ga. 725, 727 (854 SE2d 528) (2021) (holding that the partial grant of the motion for new trial on the basis that the evidence as to two counts was constitutionally insufficient, rendered the judgment on those counts final such that the defendant‘s
“Even if an appeal is jurisdictionally defective from the outset, a notice of appeal generally acts as supersedeas until the appeal is dismissed.” See Jones v. Peach Trader Inc., 302 Ga. 504, 508 (807 SE2d 840) (2017). However, the filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case from an order that is appealable only under
With these principles in mind, we now hold that Appellant‘s timely filing of a notice of appeal from the entry of the judgment of conviction on the felony murder and aggravated battery counts, which notice of appeal was unauthorized in the absence of an order from this Court granting an interlocutory application, see Tolbert, 296 Ga. at 360, did not preclude the trial court
(b) We acknowledge that in a footnote in Seals, 311 Ga. at 740 n.2, we implied a contrary answer to the question presented here. In Seals, we were considering whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing an appeal of a conviction where dead-docketed counts had not been finally resolved. After briefing in this Court had concluded, the trial court entered an order nolle prossing the dead-docketed counts, thus finally resolving them. Seals then filed a supplemental brief, attaching the nolle pros order. In addressing the supplemental brief, we stated that “[t]he trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter [a nolle pros order of the dead-docketed counts] because the appeal was pending here.” Id. Whether the trial court had such jurisdiction was not an issue before this Court—the issue was whether the Court of Appeals had correctly dismissed Seals’ appeal for failing to follow the interlocutory appeal procedures, which dismissal occurred before the entry of the nolle pros order. And more significantly, the trial court‘s order had not been made a part of the record on appeal under
It is, of course, axiomatic that a decision‘s holding is limited to the factual context of the case being decided and the issues that context necessarily raises. Language that sounds like a holding — but actually exceeds the scope of the case‘s factual context — is not a holding no matter how much it sounds like one.
Schoicket v. State, 312 Ga. 825, 832 (865 SE2d 170) (2021).
(c) Because the trial court‘s prompt dismissal of two pending child cruelty counts rendered the judgment final, Appellant‘s previously filed premature notice of appeal ripened. See Gillen v. Bostick, 234 Ga. 308, 310-311 (215 SE2d 676) (1975) (holding that a notice of appeal filed before the entry of the judgment is effective to vest jurisdiction in the appellate court). See also Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 466-467 (796 SE2d 261) (2017) (stating that once a judgment is entered, an early notice of appeal “ripens and becomes as timely as any notice could ever be” and that “[i]t would . . . go beyond the statutory mandate to deem such premature . . . notices of appeal ‘void’ — so long as they sufficiently indicate the judgment from which relief is sought — when they are filed at any time prior to the expiration of the 30-day time limit” in
2. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence at trial showed that sometime after 9:00 p.m. on February 27, 2011, Appellant brought Samuel to the emergency room at Liberty Regional Hospital in Liberty County. Samuel was unresponsive, and Appellant told Dr. James Green, the
At trial, Appellant told a different story than he had provided to the doctors who treated Samuel. According to his trial testimony, Appellant had been at his home babysitting Samuel on February 27 while Jocelyn was at work. When it was time to leave to pick up Jocelyn after her shift ended about 9:30 p.m., Samuel was sound asleep. Appellant put on Samuel‘s jacket, socks, and shoes, but Samuel did not awaken. As Appellant carried Samuel to the car, Appellant was trying to wake him up and tossed him into the air. At that moment, Appellant suddenly had a sharp pain in his groin — related to recent surgery he had in December 2010 — and collapsed on the ground and was unable to catch Samuel, who fell on a concrete walkway. According to Appellant, Samuel was “gurgling” and non-responsive. Appellant called Jocelyn, told her “what had happened,”9 and then drove Samuel to the hospital. Appellant did not tell the doctors or anyone else what actually happened because he was scared.
Medical examiner Dr. James Downs, who performed Samuel‘s autopsy, concluded that the cause of death was multiple acute blunt-force injuries to his head. In his testimony, Dr. Downs described Samuel‘s numerous external and internal head injuries, which included an abnormal amount of blood around, and swelling of, his brain. Dr. Downs opined that these injuries could not have been received simultaneously from a fall but rather indicated multiple impacts and applications of blunt force. Additionally, Dr. Downs testified that Samuel suffered numerous injuries to his abdomen, chest, back, arms, and legs, and he opined that most of these injuries also happened only a few hours before Samuel arrived at the emergency room and were not indicative of having been sustained in a fall. Dr. Downs further testified that internal injuries around Samuel‘s eyes were indicative of an “inflicted” rather than an accidental injury and that the injury to Samuel‘s spine also indicated a violent impact.
The physicians who treated Samuel at the hospitals, and who testified as experts, testified that Samuel‘s injuries were not consistent with Appellant‘s explanations of how the injuries occurred. Dr. Green, who evaluated Samuel at the emergency room, testified that the amount of blood on Samuel‘s brain indicated either a “slow bleed” that had continued for a very long time or an immediate trauma that had happened only a few minutes before the victim‘s arrival at the emergency room. Dr. Green explained that if Samuel suffered a slow bleed over a long period of time, he would not have been able to eat a hotdog, play video games, and watch television after the injury; instead, he would have been vomiting and complaining of a headache. Dr. Mary Carol Lytle, who treated Samuel at Memorial Hospital, testified that Samuel‘s injury was similar to injuries she had seen where a child was ejected from a vehicle during a high-speed automobile accident or had been riding an all-terrain vehicle without a helmet and was thrown from the vehicle following a high-speed crash. According to Dr. Lytle, Samuel‘s injuries were not consistent with a fall from standing height or falling to the ground after being tossed in the air. She testified that a child would have to fall from a height of at least 15 to 20 feet in order to sustain the type of injuries Samuel suffered.
The State also presented testimony from two of Samuel‘s babysitters, Sandra McPhearson and Shannon Wright. McPhearson testified that in early January 2011 she started babysitting Samuel in her home four days a week while Jocelyn was at work; that on the first day she cared for him, he had two bruises on his cheeks; that on another
Wright testified that Samuel stayed overnight at her home the night before his hospitalization. Although he seemed tired, he ate dinner, watched television, and slept normally, but when Appellant came the next morning to pick him up, he did not want to leave Wright‘s home and cried and clung to Wright‘s leg.
Dr. Francisco, a pediatrician, testified that on February 25, 2011, Jocelyn brought Samuel into his office for an evaluation of a rash on Samuel‘s face. Dr. Francisco testified that the rash, or “petechia,” can be caused by forceful vomiting but also may be present in situations where a child has suffered physical abuse. However, Dr. Francisco testified that during the evaluation, he did not have any concerns about child abuse.
Finally, the State introduced into evidence an eight-minute video that showed interactions Appellant had with Samuel on two occasions prior to February 27, 2011. The first excerpt showed Samuel cry as Appellant repeatedly offered him containers of toys and then took the containers away as Samuel tried to take a toy. The second excerpt showed Appellant toss Samuel onto what appears to be a couch or chair, while asking if Samuel wants “to be thrown.” In the second excerpt, Appellant also appeared to lightly punch and slap Samuel, while asking if it hurts and if Samuel wants to “fight.” Samuel cried during the “fighting” and in response to Appellant‘s question as to whether it hurts, sometimes said “it hurts” and sometimes said “no hurt.” Samuel appeared to laugh and say “it fun” while being tossed.
3. Appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions for felony murder and aggravated battery under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). He also asserts that the evidence supported convictions only on the lesser included offenses on which the jury was instructed — reckless conduct and involuntary manslaughter premised on reckless conduct. We disagree.
To convict Appellant of felony murder while in the commission of first degree cruelty to children,10 as alleged in the indictment, the State was required to prove that Appellant caused Samuel‘s death “by inflicting a severe blunt force trauma to the head of Samuel” and did so in such a way as to “maliciously cause Samuel Carroll, a child under the age of eighteen (18) years, cruel and excessive physical and mental pain by inflicting severe blunt force trauma” to his head. To convict Appellant of aggravated battery, as alleged in the indictment, the State was required to prove that Appellant “did maliciously cause bodily harm” to Samuel “by rendering his brain . . . useless.”11 When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above authorized the jury to reject Appellant‘s testimony; credit the testimony
4. Although the evidence was legally sufficient to support Appellant‘s convictions, we have identified a merger error that harms Appellant and therefore should be corrected. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 696-697 (808 SE2d 696) (2017) (noting this Court‘s discretion to correct merger errors sua sponte and stating that “[t]here are powerful reasons to exercise that discretion when a merger error leads to an unauthorized conviction and sentence“). The indictment charged that the same conduct established aggravated battery and felony murder predicated on cruelty to children. Pretermitting whether the two offenses, as charged, required proof of a fact that the other did not, see Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 214-215 (636 SE2d 530) (2006), we conclude that merger is required under
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices concur.