GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. FalahGEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Falah
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Geico General Insurance Company (“Geico“) appeals from the trial court‘s entry granting defendant-appellee Saleh Moh D. Falah‘s
{¶2} Following our review of the record, we hold (1) that there was evidence in the record, specifically Falah‘s affidavit, to support the trial court‘s decision, (2) that the trial court was not required to make findings of fact explaining its disposition of a
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶3} Geico filed a subrogation action against Falah in March of 2023, alleging that Falah negligently operated a motor vehicle and struck Geico‘s insured. Geico sought to be awarded $39,287.19 in damages, which it had paid for property damage to its insured‘s vehicle and for injuries suffered by its insured. Falah failed to file an answer, and on March 5, 2023, Geico filed a motion for a default judgment. The trial court granted that motion on June 8, 2023, awarding Geico the amount of damages requested in the complaint.
{¶5} Along with the motion, Falah filed an affidavit stating that, in March of 2023, Falah received a document by certified mail from the clerk of courts containing allegations that Falah had operated a vehicle that was involved in an automobile accident on November 24, 2021; that Falah believed the paperwork was a scam because he was not involved in any such collision; and that Falah had been involved in a different automobile accident in Kentucky in June of 2021 and his vehicle was inoperable at the time of accident involving Geico‘s insured. The affidavit further stated that Falah‘s daughter had contacted the attorney listed on the paperwork to explain that Falah‘s vehicle was not involved in the accident and to request more information, but that no response was received.
{¶6} According to the affidavit, Falah‘s vehicle had been towed from Kentucky to Ohio after the June 2021 accident and was “parked there for quite some time.” Falah alleged that someone drove past his parked vehicle and took a picture, believing that it “was involved in some accident.” The affidavit stated that Falah learned of the judgment against him when he received notice from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles on December 13, 2023, that his license was going to be suspended due to a judgment against him.
{¶7} The trial court held a hearing on Falah‘s motion for relief from judgment. No additional evidence was introduced at the hearing; rather, the trial court
{¶8} The trial court asked Falah‘s counsel for documentation that Falah had been involved in an earlier automobile accident in Kentucky, but counsel stated that he had not brought that paperwork to court.
{¶9} Geico‘s counsel discussed the accident report from the earlier accident in Kentucky, stating that while the report showed that Falah‘s vehicle was involved in an accident, it did not reflect that the vehicle was towed from the scene or that it was disabled. Rather, counsel stated, the report indicated that the vehicle suffered very minor damage. Geico‘s counsel acknowledged that he had been contacted by Falah‘s daughter and stated, “I emailed them the photo my insured took of the vehicle involved that they tracked down using the license plate and gave them that vehicle identification of the license plate picture that they took so they knew how it was that we tied them to this accident.”
{¶10} The trial court announced at the close of the hearing that it was setting aside the default judgment and granting Falah‘s motion for relief from judgment. The trial court issued an entry in accordance with its oral pronouncement, stating “for good cause shown Defendant‘s motion to set aside plaintiff‘s default judgment is hereby granted.”
II. Civ.R. 60(B)
{¶12} Geico has raised three assignments of error challenging the trial court‘s grant of Falah‘s
{¶13}
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(B) ;(3) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) The judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(5) Any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
{¶14} To succeed on a
{¶16} Here, Geico raises no challenge to the first and third elements of the GTE test regarding whether Falah has a meritorious defense and whether the motion was timely filed. Rather, Geico‘s arguments focus on the second element of the test, namely whether Falah was entitled to relief under one of the grounds set forth in
A. Lack of Evidentiary Support
{¶17} In its first assignment of error, Geico argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the
{¶18} The record belies Geico‘s assertion because such evidence was presented to the trial court. Falah filed a sworn affidavit stating that he received notice of the lawsuit, that he believed the paperwork regarding the lawsuit was a “scam” because he had not been involved in the accident with Geico‘s insured, that his vehicle was otherwise inoperable at the time of the accident, and that his daughter contacted Geico‘s counsel with this information.
{¶19} Geico relies on Bronco Excavating, 2022-Ohio-3805 (1st Dist.), in
{¶20} The law is clear, in fact, that a sworn affidavit can provide evidentiary support for a motion for relief from judgment. Fields Excavating, Inc. v. Welsh Elec. Co., 2005-Ohio-708, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.), quoting Countrywide Home Loans v. Barclay, 2004-Ohio-6359, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.) (“[I]n order to prevail on a motion for Civ.R. 60(B) relief, ‘[t]he movant must establish [the requirements of GTE] by operative facts presented in a form that meets evidentiary standards such as affidavits, depositions, transcripts of evidence, written stipulations or other evidence given under oath.‘” (Bracketed text in original.)); see Kobayashi v. Harada, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 11003, *3 (10th Dist. June 25, 1981) (holding that “[e]vidence supporting a motion to vacate a judgment or dismissal entry may be presented by affidavit” and that, where the only
{¶21} Citing to Coulson v. Coulson, 5 Ohio St.3d 12 (1983), Geico argues that the trial court was required to take evidence at the hearing to assure the allegations in Falah‘s affidavit could be proven. In Coulson, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “‘[i]f the movant files a motion for relief from judgment and it contains allegations of operative facts which would warrant relief under Civil Rule 60(B), the trial court should grant a hearing to take evidence and verify these facts before it rules on the motion.‘” Id. at 16, quoting Adomeit v. Baltimore, 39 Ohio App.2d 97, 105 (8th Dist. 1974). But in Coulson, the appellant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by holding a hearing. The court held there was no abuse of discretion because “appellee‘s motion and supporting affidavit contained allegations of operative facts that would warrant relief under Civ. R. 60(B).” Id.
{¶22} In the case at hand, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not holding a hearing. But the trial court had evidence before it in the form of Falah‘s affidavit to support the motion for relief from judgment. Geico never filed a response to Falah‘s
{¶23} Because the trial granted Falah‘s motion for relief from judgment without holding a hearing, this case is distinguishable from many of the prior cases in which this court has held that a trial court erred in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment absent an evidentiary hearing. See id.; Infinity Broadcasting, Inc. v. Brewer, 2003-Ohio-1022 (1st Dist.); Fifth Third Bank v. Ricci, 2021-Ohio-1648 (1st Dist.). In these prior cases, the trial court denied the motions for relief from judgment without holding an evidentiary hearing, and we found error in the trial courts’ rejection of the defendants’ self-serving affidavits without first holding a hearing to assess the credibility of the evidence in the affidavits. Brewer at ¶ 8-9; Altman at ¶ 15; Ricci at ¶ 10-11. Here, unlike the determinations of the trial courts in our prior cases, the trial court clearly found the statements in Falah‘s affidavit to be credible, as it granted the motion for relief from judgment based on those statements.
{¶24} We hold that, on the facts of this case, where the record contained evidence in support of the motion for relief from judgment in the form of an affidavit, where the trial court did not question the credibility of the affidavit, and where the party opposing the motion failed to respond, failed to raise a challenge to the credibility of the statements in the affidavit, and failed to request the opportunity to present its own evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to take additional evidence before ruling on the motion. The first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶25} In its second assignment of error, Geico argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the
{¶26} In support of this argument, Geico relies on GEICO Indemn. Ins. Co. v. August, 2021-Ohio-2118 (10th Dist.). August involved an appeal from a trial court‘s entry granting a motion for relief from judgment. Id. at ¶ 1. The appellant argued that the trial court erred in granting the motion without making any findings pursuant to the test set forth in GTE by the Ohio Supreme Court. Id. at ¶ 8. The Tenth District held that the trial court erred in granting the motion on several different grounds. As relevant to this appeal, it stated, “We further observe that the trial court‘s entry fails to set forth any of the findings as required by the test established by GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. as discussed above. This also constitutes error on the part of the trial court.” Id. at ¶ 15.
{¶27} Although the Tenth District held that a trial court must issue findings in accordance with the GTE test when granting a
C. Excusable Neglect
{¶29} In its third assignment of error, Geico argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Falah‘s
{¶30} Whether excusable neglect is present depends on the individual facts and circumstances of a case. Engelhart v. Bluett, 2016-Ohio-7237, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). “Courts have defined excusable neglect in the negative, stating that a defendant‘s inaction is not excusable neglect when it shows a complete disregard for the judicial system or it[] falls substantially below what is reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. Neglect will be considered inexcusable where it results from a movant‘s own willful disregard of court processes, carelessness, or lack of attention, rather than from an accident or interference that was unexpected or unavoidable. Custom Pro Logistics, 2022-Ohio-1774, at ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), citing Treasurer of Lucas Cty. v. Mt. Airy Invests. Ltd., 2019-Ohio-3932, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.).
{¶31} Geico argues that where Falah admittedly received service of the complaint, but nonetheless failed to respond because he believed it was a scam, his confusion and legal inexperience did not excuse his failure to respond or seek legal advice and did not constitute excusable neglect. Geico‘s contention that a pro se
{¶32} In the case at bar, the motion for a default judgment was not served on Falah. While lack of notice was not argued in this case, and while we do not hold on these facts that plaintiff‘s counsel was required to serve Falah pursuant to
{¶34} On this record, given the deferential standard of review that we must apply, we can find no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s determination that Falah‘s conduct constituted excusable neglect. Given that Falah communicated that he had not been involved in the accident with Geico‘s insured, and that the lack of a response to his communication did nothing to assuage his belief that the complaint was a scam, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Falah did not show a “complete disregard for the judicial system” or that his behavior did not “fall[] substantially below what is reasonable under the circumstances” and in finding the presence of excusable neglect. See Engelhart, 2016-Ohio-7237, at ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). While this court may have reached a different result under a de novo review, there was nothing “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable” about the trial court‘s decision. See Garry, 2023-Ohio-905, at ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), citing Berk, 53 Ohio St.3d at 169.
{¶35} The third assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶36} Having overruled Geico‘s assignments of error, we accordingly affirm the trial court‘s judgment granting Falah‘s
KINSLEY, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.